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On April 3, 2014, the Senate Select Committee onIntelligence voted to send the
Findings and Conclusions and the Executive Summary of its final Study on the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the President fordeclassification
and subsequent public release.
This action marked the culmination ofa monumental effort that officially began
with the Committee's decision to initiate the Study in March 2009, but which had
its roots in an investigation into the CIA's destruction ofvideotapes ofCIA
detainee interrogations that beganin December 2007.
The full Committee Study, which totals more than 6,700 pages, remains classified
but is now an official Senate report. The full report has been provided to the White
House, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the
hopes that it willprevent future coercive interrogation practices and inform the
management of other covert action programs.
As the Chairman of the Committee since 2009,1 write to offer some additional
views, context, and history.
I began my service on the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2001. I
remember testimony that summer from George Tenet, the Director of Central
Intelligence, that warned of a possible major terrorist event against the United
States, but without specifics on the time, location, or method of attack. On
September 11, 2001, the world learned the answers to those questions that had
consumed the CIA and other parts of the U.S. Intelligence Community.^
I recall vividly watching the horror of that day, to include the television footage of
innocent men and women jumping out of the World Trade Center towers to escape
the fire. The images, and the sounds as their bodies hit the pavement far below,
will remain with me for the rest of my life.
It is against that backdrop - the largest attack against the American homeland in
our history - that the events described in this report were undertaken.
' For information on the events at the CIA prior to September 11, 2001, see the Final Report ofthe National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon theUnited States (9/11 Commission) and Office of theInspector General
Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks.
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Nearly 13 years later, the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions of
this report are being released. They are highly critical of the CIA's actions, and
rightfully so. Reading them, it is easy to forget the context in which the program
began - not that the context should serve as an excuse, but rather as a warning for
the future.
It is worth remembering the pervasive fear in late 2001 and how immediate the
threat felt. Just a week after the September 11 attacks, powdered anthrax was sent
to various news organizations and to two U.S. Senators. The American public was
shocked by news of new terrorist plots and elevations of the color-coded threat
level of the Homeland Security Advisory System. We expected further attacks
against the nation.
I have attempted throughout to remember the impact on the nation and to the CIA
workforce from the attacks of September 11, 2001. I can understand the CIA's
impulse to consider the use of every possible tool to gather intelligence and remove
terrorists from the battlefield,^ and CIA was encouraged by political leaders and
the public to do whatever it could to prevent another attack.
The Intelligence Committee as well often pushes intelligence agencies to act
quickly in response to threats and world events.
Nevertheless, such pressure, fear, and expectation of further terrorist plots do not
justify, temper, or excuse improper actions taken by individuals or organizations in
the name of national security. The major lesson of this report is that regardless of
the pressures and the need to act, the Intelligence Community's actions must
always reflect who we are as a nation, and adhere to our laws and standards. It is
precisely at these times of national crisis that our government must be guided by
the lessons of our history and subject decisions to internal and external review.
Instead, CIA personnel, aided by two outside contractors, decided to initiate a
program of indefinite secret detention and the use of brutal interrogation
techniques in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and our values.
This Conomittee Study documents the abuses and countless mistakes made
between late 2001 and early 2009. The Executive Summary of the Study provides
^It is worth repeating that the covert action authorities approved bythe President inSeptember 2001 didnotprovide
any authorization or contemplate coercive interrogations.
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a significant amount ofnew information, based on CIA and other documents, to
what has already been made public by the Bush and Obama Administrations,' as
well as non-governmental organizations and the press.
The Committee's full Study is more than ten times the length of the Executive
Sununary and includes comprehensive and excruciating detail. The Study
describes the history ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program from its
inception to its termination, including a review of each of the 119 known
individuals who were held in CIA custody.
The full Conmiittee Study also provides substantially more detail than what is
included in the Executive Summary onthe CIA's justification and defense of its
interrogation program on the basis that it was necessary and critical to the
disruption of specific terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists. While the
Executive Summary provides sufficient detail to demonstrate the inaccuracies of
each of these claims, the information in the full Committee Study is far more
extensive.
I chose not to seek declassification of the full Committee Study at this time. I
believe that the Executive Summary includes enough information to adequately
describe the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and the Committee's
Findings and Conclusions cover the entirety of the program. Seeking
declassification of the more than six thousand page report would have significantly
delayed the release of the Executive Summary. Decisions will be made later on the
declassification and release of the full 6,700 pageStudy.
In 2009, when this effortbegan, I stated (in a press release co-authored with the
Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kit Bond) that "the purpose is to review
the program and to shape detention and interrogation policies in the future." The
reviewis now done. It is my sincere and deep hope that through the release of
these Findings and Conclusions and Executive Summary that U.S. policy will
never again allow for secret indefinite detention and the use of coercive
interrogations. As the Study describes, prior to theattacks of September 2001, the
CIA itself determined from its own experience with coercive interrogations, that
such techniques "do not produce intelligence," "will probably result in false
answers," and had historically proven to be ineffective. Yet these conclusions
were ignored. Wecannot again allow history to be forgotten and grievous past
mistakes to be repeated.
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PresidentObama signedExecutive Order 13491 in January 2009 to prohibit the
CIA from holding detainees other than on a "short-term, transitory basis" and to
limit interrogation techniques to those includedin the Army Field Manual.
However, these limitations are not part of U.S. law and could be overturned by a
future presidentwith the strokeof a pen. They should be enshrined in legislation.
Even so, existing U.S. law and treaty obligations should have prevented many of
the abuses and mistakes made during this program. While the Office of Legal
Counsel found otherwise between 2002 and 2007, it is my personal conclusion
that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also
believe that the conditions of confinement and the use of authorized and
unauthorized interrogation and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhuman, and
degrading. I believe the evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible.
While the Conmiittee did not make specific recommendations, several emerge
from the Committee's review. The CIA, in its June 2013 response to the
Committee's Study from December 2012, has also already made and begun to
implement its own recommendations. I intend to work with Senate colleagues to
produce recommendations and to solicit views from the readers of the Committee
Study.
I would also like to take this opportunity to describe the process of this study.
As noted previously, the Committee approved the Terms of Reference for the
Study in March 2009 and began requesting information from the CIA and other
federal departments. The Committee, through its staff, had already reviewed in
2008 thousands of CIA cables describing the interrogations of the CIA detainees
Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, whose interrogations were the
subject of videotapes that were destroyed by the CIA in 2005.
The 2008 review was complicated by the existence of a Department of Justice
investigation, opened by Attorney Geiieral Michael Mukasey, into the destruction
of the videotapes and expanded by Attomey General Holder in August 2009. In
particular, CIA employees and contractors who would otherwise have been
interviewed by the Committee staff were under potential legal jeopardy, and
therefore the CIA would not compel its workforce to appear before the Committee.
This constraint lasted until the Committee's research and documentary review
were completed and the Committee Study had largely been finalized.
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Furthermore, given the volume and internal nature ofrelevant CIA documents, the
CIA insisted that the Committee enter into an arrangement where our staff would
revie^ocuments and conduct research at aCIA-leased facility |
rather than at the Committee's offices on Capitol Hill.
From early 2009 to late 2012, a small group of Committee staffreviewed the more
than six million pages of CIA materials, to include operational cables, intelligence
reports, internal memoranda and emails, briefing materials, interview transcripts,
contracts, and other records. Draft sections of the Study were prepared and
distributed to the full Committee membership beginning inOctober 2011 and this
process continued through to the Committee's vote to approve the full Committee
Study on December 13,2012.
The breadth ofdocumentary material onwhich the Study relied and which the
Committee Study cites is unprecedented. While the Committee did not interview
CIAofficials in thecontext of the Committee Study, it had access to and drew
from the interviews ofnumerous CIA officials conducted by the CIA's Inspector
General and the CIA Oral History program on subjects that lie at the heart of the
Committee Study, as well as past testimony to the Committee.
Following the December 2012 vote, the Committee Study was sent to the President
and appropriate parts ofthe Executive Branch for comments byFebruary 15, 2013.
The CIA responded in late June 2013 with extensive comments on the Findings
and Conclusions, based in part on the responses of CIA officials involved in the
program. At my direction, the Committee staffmet with CIArepresentatives in
orderto fully understand the CIA's comments, and then incorporated suggested
edits or comments as appropriate.
The Committee Study, including the now-declassified Executive Summary and
Findings and Conclusions, as updated is nowfinal and represents the official views
of the Committee. This and future Administrations should use this Study to guide
future programs, correct past mistakes, increase oversight of CIA representations
to policymakers, and ensure coercive interrogation practices are notused byour
government again.
Finally, I want to recognize themembers of the staffwho haveendured years of
long hours poring through thedifficult details of oneof the lowest points in our
nation's history. Theyhave produced the most significant and comprehensive
oversight report in the Committee's history, and perhaps in that of the U.S. Senate,
and their contributions should be recognized and praised.
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Daniel Jones has managed and led the Committee's review effort from its
inception. Dan has devoted more than six years to this effort, has personally
written thousands of its pages, and has been integrallyinvolved in every Study
decision. Evan Gottesman, Chad Tanner, and Alissa Starzak have also played
integral roles in the Committee Study and have spent considerable years
researching and drafting specific sections of the Committee Study.
Other Comumittee staff members have also assisted in the review and provided
valuable contributions at the direction of our Committee Members. They include,
among others, Jennifer Barrett, Nick Basciano, Michael Buchwald, Jim Catella,
Eric Chapman, John Dickas, Lorenzo Goco, Andrew Grotto, Tressa Guenov, Clete
Johnson, Michael Noblet, Michael Pevzner, Tonmiy Ross, Caroline Tess, and
James Wolfe. The Conmiittee's Staff Director throughout the review, David
Grannis, has played a central role in assisting me and guiding the Conmiittee
through this entire process. Without the expertise, patience, and work ethic of our
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The Committee makes the following findings and conclusions:
#1: The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of
acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.
The Committee fmds, based on a review of CIA interrogation records, that the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of obtaining accurate information
or gaining detainee cooperation.
For example, according to CIA records, seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA
custody.* CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
were usually subjected to the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody.
Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been
subjected to these techniques.
While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, multiple
CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. Detainees provided
fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the
CIA identified as its highest priorities.
At numerous times thi'oughout the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA personnel
assessed that the most effective method for acquiring intelligence from detainees, including from
detainees the CIA considered to be the most "high-value," was to confront the detainees with
information already acquired by the Intelligence Community. CIA officers regularly called into
question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the
use of the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence.
#2: The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on
inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.
The CIA represented to the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of
Justice, the CIA Office of Inspector General, the Congress, and the public that the best measure
of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific
terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the techniques.
The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only
effective, but also necessary to acquire "otherwise unavailable" actionable intelligence that
"saved lives."
The Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported
counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation
techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects. In some cases, there was no
relationship between the cited counterterrorism success and any information provided by
detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In the
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remaining cases, the CIA inaccurately claimed that specific, otherwise unavailable information
was acquired from a CIA detainee "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,
when in fact the information was either: (1) corroborative of information already available to the
CIA or other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community from sources other than the CIA
detainee, and was therefore not "otherwise unavailable"; or (2) acquired from the CIA detainee
prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The examples provided by the
CIA included numerous factual inaccuracies.
In providing the "effectiveness" examples to policymakers, the Department of Justice, and
others, the CIA consistently omitted the significant amount of relevant intelligence obtained
from sources other than CIA detainees who had been subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques—leaving the false impression the CIA was acquiring unique
information from the use of the techniques.
Some of the plots that the CIA claimed to have "disrupted" as a result of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques were assessed by intelligence and law enforcement officials as being
infeasible or ideas that were never operationalized.
#3: The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA
represented to policymakers and others.
Beginning with the CIA's first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others,
the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques with significant repetition for days or
weeks at a time. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and "wallings" (slamming detainees
against a wall) were used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and
nudity. Records do not support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an "an open, non-
threatening approach,"^ or that interrogations began with the "least coercive technique possible"^
and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary.
The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu
Zubaydah, for example, became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open,
full mouth.'"^ Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as
evolving intoa "series of near drownings."^
Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in
stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. At least five detainees
experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of
those cases, the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation.
Contrary to CIA representations to the Department of Justice, the CIA instructed personnel that
the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take "precedence" over his medical care,^ resulting in
the deterioration of a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred during his capture. In at least two
other cases, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques despite warnings from CIA
medical personnel that the techniques could exacerbate physical injuries. CIA medical personnel
TOP
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treated at least one detainee for swelling in order to allow the continued use of standing sleep
deprivation.
At least five CIA detainees were subjectedto "rectal rehydration" or rectal feeding without
documented medical necessity. The CIA placed detainees in ice water "baths." The CIA led
several detainees to believe they would neverbe allowed to leave CIA custody alive, suggesting
to one detainee that he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box.^ One interrogator told another
detainee that he would never go to court, because "we can never let the world know what I have
done to you."^ CIA officers also threatened at least three detainees withharm to theirfamilies—
to include threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a
detainee, and a threat to "cut [a detainee's] mother's throat."^
#4: The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had
represented to policymakers and others.
Conditions at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program.
CIA detainees at the COBALT detention facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly
shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste.
Lack of heat at the facility likely contributed to the death of a detainee. The chief of
interrogations described COBALT as a "dungeon."^^ Another seniorCIA officerstated that
COBALT was itself an enhanced interrogation technique.^'
At times, the detainees at COBALT were walked around naked or were shackled with their
hands above their heads for extended periods of time. Other times, the detainees at COBALT
were subjected to what was described as a "rough takedown," in which approximately five CIA
officers would scream at a detainee, drag him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure
him with Mylar tape. The detainee would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long
corridor while being slapped and punched.
Even after the conditions of confinement improved with the construction of new detention
facilities, detainees were held in total isolationexcept when being interrogated or debriefed by
CIA personnel.
Throughout the program, multiple CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues,
including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.
Multiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause
of psychiatric problems.
#5: The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice,
impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
From 2002 to 2007, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice relied
on CIA representations regarding: (1) the conditions of confinement for detainees, (2) the
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applicationof the CIA's enhanced interrogationtechniques, (3) the physical effects of the
techniques on detainees, and (4) the effectiveness of the techniques. Those representations were
inaccurate in material respects.
The Department of Justice did not conduct independent analysis or verification of the
information it received from the CIA. The department warned, however, that if the facts
provided by the CIA were to change, its legal conclusions might not apply. When the CIA
determined that information it had provided to the Department of Justice was incorrect, the CIA
rarely informed the department.
Prior to the initiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and throughout the life
of the program, the legal justifications for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques relied on
the CIA's claim that the techniques were necessary to save lives. In late 2001 and early 2002,
senior attorneys at the CIA Office of General Counsel first examined the legal implications of
using coercive interrogation techniques. CIA attorneys stated that "a novel application of the
necessity defense" could be used "to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain
information that saved many lives."^^^
Having reviewed information provided by the CIA, the OLC included the "necessity defense" in
its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House counsel on Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation. The OLC determined that "under the cun*ent circumstances, necessity or self-
defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against
torture.
On the same day, a second OLC opinion approved, for the first time, the use of 10 specific
coercive interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah—subsequently referred to as the CIA's
"enhanced interrogation techniques." The OLC relied on inaccurate CIA representations about
Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's "certain[ty]" that Abu
Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks. The CIA's
representations to the OLC about the techniques were also inconsistent with how the techniques
would later be applied.
In March 2005, the CIA submitted to the Department of Justice various examples of the
"effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that were inaccurate. OLC
memoranda signed on May 30, 2005, and July 20, 2007, relied on these representations,
determining that the techniques were legal in part because they produced "specific, actionable
intelHgence" and "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence" that saved lives.
#6: The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program.
The CIA did not brief the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been
approved and used. The CIA did not respond to Chairman Bob Graham's requests for additional
information in 2002, noting in its own internal communications that he would be leaving the
Committee in Januai-y 2003. The CIA subsequently resisted efforts by Vice Chairman John D.
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Rockefeller IV, to investigate the program, including by refusing in 2006 to provide requested
documents to the full Committee.
The CIA restricted access to information about the program from members of the Committee
beyond the chairman and vice chairmanuntil September 6, 2006, the day the president publicly
acknowledged the program, by which time 117 of the 119known detainees had already entered
CIA custody. Until then, the CIA had declined to answer questions fi"om other Committee
members that related to CIA inteiTogation activities.
Prior to September 6, 2006, the CIA provided inaccurate information to the leadership of the
Committee. Briefings to the full Conmiittee beginning on September 6, 2006, also contained
numerous inaccui*acies, including inaccurate descriptions of how interrogation techniques were
applied and what information was obtained from CIA detainees. The CIA misrepresented the
views of members of Congress on a number of occasions. After multiple senators had been
critical of the program and written letters expressing concerns to CIA Director Michael Hayden,
Director Hayden nonetheless told a meeting of foreign ambassadors to the United States that
every Committee member was "fully briefed," and that "[t]his is not CIA's program. This is not
the President's program. This is America's program."^^ TheCIA alsoprovided inaccurate
information describing the views of U.S. senators about the program to the Department of
Justice.
A year after being briefed on the program, the House and Senate Conference Committee
considering the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to limit the CIA to using
only interrogation techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. That legislation was
approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in Febniary 2008, and was vetoed by
President Bush on March 8, 2008.
#7: The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making.
The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information related to the
operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the White
House, the National Security Council principals, and their staffs. This prevented an accurate and
complete understanding of the program by Executive Branch officials, thereby impeding
oversight and decision-making.
According to CIA records, no CIA officer, up to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and
Porter Goss, briefed the president on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before
April 2006. By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques.The CIA did
not inform the president or vice president of the location of CIA detention facilities other than
Country
At the direction of the White House, the secretaries of state and defense - both principals on the
National Security Council - were not briefed on program specifics until September 2003. An
internal CIA email from July 2003 noted that "... the WH [White House] is extremely concerned
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[Secretary] Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going on."^^
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage complained that he and Secretary Powell were "cut out" of
the National Security Council coordination process.^®
The CIA repeatedly provided incomplete and inaccurate information to White House personnel
regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
This includes the provision of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements
of the U.S. Government and later to the public, as well as instances in which specific questions
from White House officials were not answered truthfully or fully. In briefings for the National
Security Council principals and White House officials, the CIA advocated for the continued use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, warning that "[tjermination of this program will
result in loss of life, possibly extensive."^^
#8: The CIA's operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases
impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies.
The CIA, in the conduct of its Detention and Interrogation Program, complicated, and in some
cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI). The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant to these
agencies' missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees, and provided inaccurate
information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to these agencies.
The use of coercive interrogation techniques and covert detention facilities that did not meet
traditional U.S. standards resulted in the FBI and the Department of Defense limiting their
involvement in CIA interrogation and detention activities. This reduced the ability of the U.S.
Government to deploy available resources and expert personnel to interrogate detainees and
operate detention facilities. The CIA denied specific requests from FBI Director Robert Mueller
III for FBI access to CIA detainees that the FBI believed was necessary to understand CIA
detainee reporting on threats to the U.S. Homeland. Information obtained from CIA detainees
was restricted within the Intelhgence Community, leading to concerns among senior CIA
officers that Hmitations on sharing information undermined government-wide counterterrorism
analysis.
The CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign
policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. The CIA did not inform two secretaries of
state of locations of CIA detention facilities, despite the significant foreign policy implications
related to the hosting of clandestine CIA detention sites and the fact that the political leaders of
host countries were generally informed of their existence. Moreover, CIA officers told U.S.
ambassadors not to discuss the CIA program with State Department officials, preventing the
ambassadors from seeking guidance on the policy implications of establishing CIA detention
facilities in the countries in which they served.
In two countries, U.S. ambassadors were informed of plans to establish a CIA detention site in
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countries to host the detention sites. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new
CIA detention facilities were takingplace,the CIA told local government officials not to
inform the U.S. ambassadors.
The ODNI was providedwith inaccurate and incomplete information about the program,
preventing the director of national intelligencefrom effectively carrying out the director's
statutory responsibility to serve as the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters.
The inaccurate informationprovided to the ODNI by the CIA resulted in the ODNI releasing
inaccurate information to the public in September 2006.
#9; The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General.
The CIA avoided, resisted, and otherwise impeded oversight of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program by the CIA's Office oHnspector General (OIG). The CIA did not brief
the OIG on the program until after the death of a detainee, by which time the CIA had held at
least 22 detainees at two different CIA detention sites. Once notified, the OIG reviewed the
CIA's Detention and InterrogationProgramand issued several reports, including an important
May 2004 "Special Review" of the program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies.
During the OIG reviews, CIA personnel provided OIG with inaccurate information on the
operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as on the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The inaccurate information was
included in the final May 2004 Special Review, which was later declassified and released
publicly, and remains uncorrected.
In 2005, CIA Director Goss requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate further
reviews of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program until reviews already underway were
completed. In 2007, Director Hayden ordered an unprecedented review of the OIG itself in
response to the OIG's inquiries into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
#10: The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including
inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.
The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior CIA officials coordinated to share classified
information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to select members of the media to
counter public criticism, shape public opinion, and avoid potential congressional action to restrict
the CIA's detention and inteiTogation authorities and budget. These disclosures occurred when
the program was a classified covert action program, and before the CIA had briefed the full
Committee membership on the program.
The deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center wrote to a colleague in 2005, shortly
before being interviewed by a media outlet, that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered,
which has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up
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ourbudget... we either put outour story or wegeteaten. [T]here is no middle ground."^ The
same CIA officer explained to a colleague that "when the [Washington Post]/[New York Tjimes
quotes 'senior intelligence official,' it's us... authorized and directed by opa [CIA's Office of
Public Affairs].
Much of the information the CIA provided to the media on the operation of the CIA's Detention
and Interrogation Program and the effectiveness of its enhanced inteiTogation techniques was
inaccurate and was similar to the inaccurate information provided by the CIA to the Congress,
the Department of Justice, and the White House.
#11: The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation
Program more than six months after being granted detention authorities.
On September 17, 2001, the President signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification
(MON) granting the CIA unprecedented counterterrorism authorities, including the authority to
covertly capture and detain individuals "posing a continuing, serious threat of violence or death
to U.S. persons and interests or planning terrorist activities." The MON made no reference to
interrogations or coercive interrogation techniques.
The CIA was not prepared to take custody of its first detainee. In the fall of 2001, the CIA
explored the possibility of establishing clandestine detention facilities in several countries. The
CIA's review identified risks associated with clandestine detention that led it to conclude that
U.S. military bases were the best option for the CIA to detain individuals under the MON
authorities. In late March 2002, the imminent capture of Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA to
again consider various detention options. In part to avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah to the
International Committee of the Red Cross, which would be required if he were detained at a U.S.
militaiy base, the CIA decided to seek authorization to clandestinely detain Abu Zubaydah at a
facility inCountry |—a country that had not previously been considered as a potential host for a
CIA detention site. A senior CIA officer indicated that the CIA "will have to acknowledge
certain gaps in ourplanning/preparations,""^ butstated that this plan would be presented to the
president. At a Presidential Daily Briefing session that day, the president approved CIA's
proposal to detain Abu Zubaydah inCountry |.
The CIA lacked a plan for the eventual disposition of its detainees. After taking custody of Abu
Zubaydah, CIA officers concluded that he "should remain incommunicado for the remainder of
his life," which "may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country.
The CIA did not review its past experience with coercive interrogations, or its previous statement
to Congress that "inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because
they do notproduce intelligence and will probably result in false answers."-^ The CIA also did
not contact other elements of the U.S. Government with interrogation expertise.
In July 2002, on the basis of consultations with contract psychologists, and with very limited
internal deliberation, the CIA requested approval from the Department of Justice to use a set of
coercive interrogation techniques. The techniques were adapted from the training of U.S.
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military personnel at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance andEscape (SERE)
school, which was designed to prepare U.S. military personnel for the conditions and treatment
to which they might be subjected if taken prisoner by countries that do not adhere to the Geneva
Conventions.
As it began detention and interrogation operations, the CIA deployed personnel who lacked
relevant training and experience. The CIA began interrogation training more than seven months
after taking custody of Abu Zubaydah, and more than thi'ee months after the CIA began using its
"enhanced inteiTogation techniques." CIA Director George Tenet issued formal guidelinesfor
interrogations and conditions of confinement at detention sites in January 2003, by which time
40 of the 119 known detainees had been detained by the CIA.
#12: The CIA's management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program
was deeply flawed throughout the program's duration, particularly so in 2002 and early
2003.
The CIA's COBALT detention facility in Country | began operations inSeptember 2002 and
ultimately housed more than half of the 119 CIA detainees identified in this Study. The CIA
kept few formal records of the detainees in its custody at COBALT. Untrained CIA officers at
the facility conducted frequent, unauthorized, and unsupervised interrogations of detainees using
harsh physical interrogation techniques that were not—and never became—part of the CIA's
formal "enhanced" interrogation program. The CI^)laced ajunior officer with no relevant
experience in charge of COBALT. On November jf, 2002, adetainee who had been held
partially nude and chained to a concrete floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility.
At the time, no single unit at CIA Headquarters had clear responsibility for CIA detention and
interrogation operations. In interviews conducted in 2003 with the Office of Inspector General,
CIA's leadership and senior attorneys acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of
operations at COBALT, and some believed that enhanced interrogation techniques were not used
there.
Although CIA Director Tenet in January 2003 issued guidance for detention and interrogation
activities, serious management problems persisted. For example, in December 2003, CIA
personnel reported that they had made the "unsettling discovery" that the CIA had been "holding
a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "very litde" at multiple detention sites in
Country i.-'
Divergent lines of authority for interrogationactivities persisted through at least 2003. Tensions
among interrogators extended to complaints about the safety and effectiveness of each other's
interrogation practices.
The CIA placed individuals with no applicable experienceor training in senior detention and
interrogation roles, and providedinadequate linguistic and analytical support to conduct effective
questioning of CIA detainees, resulting in diminished intelligence. The lack of CIA personnel
available to question detainees, which theCIAinspector general referred to as "an ongoing
problem,persisted throughout the program.
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In 2005, the chief of the CIA's BLACK detention site, where many of the detainees the CIA
assessed as "high-value" were held, complained that CIA Headquarters "managers seem to be
selecting either problem, underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or
whomever seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time," resulting in "the production
of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence.
Numerous CIA officers had serious documented personal and professional problems—including
histories of violence and records of abusive ti'eatment of others—that should have called into
question their suitability to participatein the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their
employment with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. In nearly all
cases, these problems were known to the CIA prior to the assignment of these officers to
detention and interrogation positions.
#13: Two contract psychologists devised the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and
played a central role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program. By 2005, the CIA had overwhelmingly outsourced
operations related to the program.
The CIA contracted with two psychologists to develop, operate, and assess its interrogation
operations. The psychologists' prior experience was at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion,
Resistance and Escape (SERE) school. Neither psychologist had any experience as an
interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in
counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural or linguistic expertise.
On the CIA's behalf, the contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on
"learned helplessness,"^^ and developed the list of enhanced inteiTogation techniques that was
approved for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. The psychologists
personally conducted interrogations of some of the CIA's most significant detainees using these
techniques. They also evaluated whether detainees' psychological state allowed for the
continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including some detainees whom
they were themselves interrogating or had interrogated. The psychologists carried out inherently
governmental functions, such as acting as liaison between the CIA and foreign intelligence
services, assessing the effectiveness of the interrogation program, and participating in the
interrogation of detainees in held in foreign government custody.
In 2005, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their
work with the CIA. Shortly thereafter, the CIA outsourced vktually all aspects of the program.
In 2006, the value of the CIA's base conti"actwith the company formed by the psychologists with
all options exercised was in excess of $180 million; the contractors received $81 million prior to
the contract's termination in 2009. In 2007, the CIA provided a multi-year indemnification
agreement to protect the company and its employees from legal liability arising out of the
program. The CIA has since paid out more than $1 million pursuant to the agreement.
TOP
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In 2008, the CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group, the lead unit for detentionand
interrogation opera^ns at the CIA, had atotal of positions, which were filled with | CIA
staff officers and contractors, meaning that contractors made up 85% of the workforce for
detention and interrogation operations.
#14: CIA detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been
approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters.
Prior to mid-2004, the CIA routinely subjecteddetainees to nudity and dietary manipulation.
The CIA also used abdominal slaps and cold water dousing on several detainees during that
period. None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice.
At least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without
authorization from CIA Headquarters. Additionally, multiple detainees were subjected to
techniques that were applied in ways that diverged from the specific authorization, or were
subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques by interrogators who had not been authorized to
use them. Although these incidents were recorded in CIA cables and, in at least some cases were
identified at the time by supervisors at CIA Headquarters as being inappropriate, corrective
action was rarely taken against the interrogators involved.
#15: The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the number of
individuals it detained, and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for
detention. The CIA's claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its
enhanced Interrogation techniques were inaccurate.
The CIA never conducted a comprehensive audit or developed a complete and accurate list of the
individuals it had detained or subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA statements
to the Committee and later to the public that the CIA detained fewer than 100 individuals, and
that less than a third of those 100detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, were inaccurate. The Committee's review of CIA records determined that the CIA
detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 39 were subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.
Of the 119 known detainees, at least 26 were wrongfully held and did not meet the detention
standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). These included an
"intellectually challenged" man whose CIA detention was used solely as leverage to get a family
member to provide information, two individuals who were intelligence sources for foreign
liaison services and were former CIA sources, and two individuals whom the CIA assessed to be
connected to al-Qa'ida based solely on information fabricated by a CIA detainee subjected to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Detainees often remained in custody for months after
the CIA determined that they did not meet the MON standard. CIA records provide insufficient
information to justify the detention of many other detainees.
TOP
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CIA Headquarters instructed that at least four CIA detainees be placed in host country detention
facilities because the individuals did not meet the MON standard for CIA detention. The host
country had no independent reason to hold the detainees.
A full accounting of CIA detentions and interrogations may be impossible, as records in some
cases are non-existent, and, in many other cases, are spai'se and insufficient. There were almost
no detailed records of the detentions and interrogations at the CIA's COBALT detention facility
in 2002, and almost no such records for the CIA's GRAY detention site, also in Country At
CIA detention facilities outside of Country the CIA kept increasingly less-detailed records of
its interrogation activities over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
#16: The CIA failed to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation
techniques.
The CIA never conducted a credible, comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of its enhanced
interrogation techniques, despite a recommendation by the CIA inspector general and similar
requests by the national security advisor and the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.
Internal assessments of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were conducted by CIA
personnel who participated in the development and management of the program, as well as by
CIA contractors who had a financial interest in its continuation and expansion. An "informal
operational assessment" of the program, led by two senior CIA officers who were not part of the
CIA's Counterterrorism Center, determined that it would not be possible to assess the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques without violating "Federal Policy
for the Protection of Human Subjects" regarding human experimentation. The CIA officers,
whose review relied on briefings with CIA officers and contractors running the program,
concluded only that the "CIA Detainee Program" was a "success" without addressing the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^
In 2005, in response to the recommendation by the inspector general for a review of the
effectiveness of each of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA asked two
individuals not employed by the CIA to conduct a broader review of "the entirety of the
"rendition, detention and interrogation program."^"^ According to one individual, the review was
"heavily reliant on the willingness of [CIA CounterteiTorismCenter] staff to provide us with the
factual material that forms the basis of our conclusions." That individual acknowledged lacking
the requisite expertise to review the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, and concluded only that "the program," meaning all CIA detainee reporting
regardless of whether it was connected to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques, was a "great success." '^' The second reviewer concluded that "there is no objective
way to answer the question of efficacy" of the techniques.
There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the
"effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence
cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced
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interrogation techniques. Nordid the reviews seek to confirm whether the intelligence cited by
the CIA as being obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was
unique and "otherwiseunavailable," as claimed by the CIA, and not previously obtainedfrom
other sources.
#17: The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and
significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systemic and individual management
failures.
CIA officers and CIA contractors who were found to have violated CIA policies or performed
poorly were rarely held accountable or removed from positions of responsibility.
Significant events, to include the death and injury of CIA detainees, the detention of individuals
who did not meet the legal standard to be held, the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques
against CIA detainees, and the provision of inaccurate information on the CIA program did not
result in appropriate, effective, or in many eases, any corrective actions. CIA managers who
were aware of failings and shortcomings in the program but did not intervene, or who failed to
provide proper leadership and management, were also not held to account.
On two occasions in which the CIA inspector general identified wrongdoing, accountability
recommendations were ovennled by senior CIA leadership. In one instance, involving the death
of a CIA detainee at COBALT, CIA Headquarters decided not to take disciplinary action against
an officer involved because, at the time, CIA Headquarters had been "motivated to extract any
and all operational information" from the detainee.^^ In another instance related to a wrongful
detention, no action was taken against a CIA officer because, "[t]he Director strongly believes
that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty," and "the Director
believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against
those thatunder connect them."^^ In neither case was administrative action taken against CIA
management personnel.
#18: The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and
objections concerning the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program.
Critiques, criticisms, and objections were expressed by numerous CIA officers, including senior
personnel overseeing and managing the program, as well as analysts, interrogators, and medical
officers involved in or supporting CIA detention and interrogation operations.
Examples of these concerns include CIA officers questioning the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, interrogators disagreeing with the use of such techniques
against detainees whom they determined were not withholding information,psychologists
recommending less isolated conditions, and Office of Medical Services personnel questioning
both the effectiveness and safety of the techniques. These concerns were regularly overridden by
CIA management, and the CIA made few corrective changes to its policies governing the
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program. At times, CIA officers were instructed by supervisors not to put their concerns or
observations in written communications.
In several instances, CIA officers identified inaccuracies in CIA representations about the
program and its effectiveness to the Office of Inspector General, the White House, the
Department of Justice, the Congress, and the American public. The CIA nonetheless failed to
take action to correct these representations, and allowed inaccurate information to remain as the
CIA's official position.
The CIA was also resistant to, and highly critical of more formal critiques. The deputy director
for operations stated that the CIA inspector general's draft Special Review should have come to
the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives,"^^ while the CIA general
counsel accused the inspector general of presenting "an imbalanced and inaccurate picmre" of
the program.'^ ^ A February 2007 report from theInternational Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), which the CIA acting general counsel initially stated "actually does not sound that far
removed from the realitywas also criticized. CIA officers prepared documents indicating
that "critical portions of the Report are patently false or misleading, especially certain key factual
claims..CIA Director Hayden testified to the Committee that "numerous false allegations of
physical and threatened abuse and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the [ICRC] report
undermine its overall credibility.'"^^
#19; The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was inherently unsustainable and
had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation
from other nations, and legal and oversight concerns.
The CIA required secrecy and cooperation from other nations in order to operate clandestine
detention facilities, and both had eroded significantly before President Bush publicly disclosed
the program on September 6, 2006. From the beginning of the program, the CIA faced
significant challenges in finding nations willing to host CIA clandestine detention sites. These
challenges became increasingly difficult over time. With the exception of Country the CIA
was forced to relocate detainees out of every country in which it established a detention facility
because of pressure from the host government or public revelations about the program.
Beginning in early 2005, the CIA sought unsuccessfully to convince the U.S. Department of
Defense to allow the transfer of numerous CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. By 2006, the
CIA admitted in its own talking points for CIA Director Porter Goss that, absent an
Administration decision on an "endgame" for detainees, the CIA was "stymied" and "the
program could collapse of its own weight.""^
Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA's detention
facilities caused recunring problems. The refusal of one host country to admit a severely ill
detainee into a local hospital due to security concerns contributed to the closing of the CIA's
detention facility in that country. The U.S. Department of Defense also declined to provide
medical care to detainees upon CIA request.
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In mid-2003, a statement by the president for the United Nations International Day in Support of
Victims of Torture and a pubHc statement by the White House thatprisoners in U.S. custody are
treated "humanely" caused the CIA to question whether therewas continued policy support for
the program and seek reauthorization from the White House. In mid-2004, the CIA temporarily
suspended the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques after the CIA inspector general
recommended that the CIA seekan updated legal opinion from the Officeof LegalCounsel. In
early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush
prompted the CIA to move detainees outof a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
In late 2005 and in 2006, the Detainee TreatmentAct and then the U.S. Supreme Couit decision
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeldcaused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced
interrogation techniques.
By 2006, press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention
sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA's ability to operate clandestine
detention facilities.
After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, the CIA brought only six additional
detainees into its custody: four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. By March 2006, the
program was operating in only one country. The CIA last used its enhanced interrogation
techniques on November 8, 2007. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008.
#20; The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States'
standing in the world, and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs.
The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Pi-ogram created tensions with U.S. partners and allies,
leading to formal demarches to the United States, and damaging and complicating bilateral
inteUigence relationships.
In one example, inJune 2004, the secretary ofstate ordered the U.S. ambassador inCountry | to
deliver ademarche to CounteyB/li^ssence demanding [Country | Government] provide full
access to all [Country | detainees" to the International Committee ofthe Red
Cross. At the time, however, the detainees Country | was holding included detainees being held
in secret at the CIA's behest."^^
More broadly, the program caused immeasurable damage to the United States' public standing,
as well as to the United States' longstanding global leadership on human rights in general and the
prevention of torture in particular.
CIA records indicate that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program cost well over $300
million in non-personnel costs. This included funding for the CIA to construct and maintain
detention facilities, including two facilities costing nearly $| million that were never used, in
part due to host country political concerns.
To encouragegovernments to clandestinely host CIA detention sites, or to increase support for
existing sites, the CIA provided millions ofdollars in cash payments to foreign government
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' As measured bythe number ofdisseminated intelligence reports. Tlierefore, zero intelligence reports were
disseminated based on information provided by seven of the 39 detainees known to have been subjected to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
- May 30,2005, Memorandum forJohn A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency,
from Steven G. Bradbiury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of
Justice, re; Application of United States Obligations UnderArticle 16of tlie Convention Against Torture to Certain
Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
^Transcript of Senate Select Committee onIntelligence briefing, September 6, 2006.
This episode was not described in CIAcables, butwas described in internal emails sent by personnel in the CIA
Office of Medical Services andtheCIAOffice ofGeneral Counsel. A review of the videotapes of the interrogations
of Abu Zubaydahby the CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG)did not note the incident. A reviewof the catalog
of videotapes, however, found that recordings of a 21-hourperiod, which included twowaterboarding sessions, were
missing.
from to cc: ^H|||HHIiHilH> More.
Throughout the Committee Study, last names in all capitalized letters are pseudonyms.
^ALEC (182321Z JUL 02)
^Atthe time, confining a detainee ina box with tlie dimensions ofa coffin was an approved CIA enhanced
interrogation technique.
8[REDACTED] 1324 a61^Z SEP 03), referring to Hambali.
^Interview of by[REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of theInspector General, June 17,
2003
Inone case, interrogators informed a detainee that hecould earn a bucket ifhecooperated.
" Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review ofInterrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, April 7,
2003, p. 12.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, May 8,
2003, p. 9.
November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile InteiTogations: Legal Considerations for CIA
Officers," at 1.
May 30, 2005, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputyGeneral Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency,
from StevenG. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof LegalCounsel, Department of
Justice, re: Application of UnitedStates Obligations Under Article 16 of tlie Convention Against Torture to Certain
Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. July 20, 2007, Memorandum
for John A. Rizzo, ActingGeneral Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, fi-om StevenG. Bradbury, Principal
DeputyAssistant AttorneyGeneral, Officeof Legal Counsel,Department of Justice, re: Application of War Crimes
Act, the DetaineeTreatment Act, andCommon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to CertainTechniques that May
be Used by tlie CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
The CIA's June 27, 2013,Response to theCommittee Studyof theCIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
states that these limitations were dictated by the White House. The CIA's June 2013 Response then acknowledges
that theCIA was |^comfortable" with this decision.
DIRECTOR•• (152227Z MAR 07)
The Committee's conclusion is basedon CIA records, including statements from CIA DirectorsGeorge Tenet and
PorterGoss to the CIA inspector general, that thedirectors had not briefedthe president on the CIA's interrogation
program. According to CIA records, when briefed in April 2006, the president expressed discomfort with the
"image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself." The
CIA's June 2013 Response does notdispute the CIArecords,but states that "[w]hileAgencyrecordson the subject
are admittedly incomplete, fonner President Bushhas stated in his autobiography that he discussed the program,
including the use of enhanced techniques, withthen-DCIA Tenetin 2002, prior to application of the techniques on
Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved tlie techniques." A memoir by fonner Acting CIA General Counsel John
Rizzo disputes this account.
CIA records indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of the presence of CIA detention facilities in
Counti-ies |, | and |. Itis less clear whether policymakers were aware ofthe detention facilities in Country |
and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. TlieCIA requested that countrynames and infonnation directlyor indirectly
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identifying countries be redacted. The Study therefore lists the countries by letter. The Study uses the same
designations consistently, so "Country J,"forexample |^efers to the same country throughout the Study.
July 31, 2003, email from John Rizzo to re Rump PC on interrogations.
Lotus Notes message from Chief ofthe CIA Station inCountiy | toD/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from
I to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED],
|, subj: ADCI Talking Points forCall to DepSec Armitage, date9/23/2004, at 7:40:43 PM
Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003
" No CIA detention facilities were established in these two countries.
U.S. law (22 U.S.C. § 3927) requires that chiefs of mission "shall be kept fully and cuirently infonned with
respect to all activities and operations of the Government witliin tliatcountry," including tlie activities and
operations of the CIA.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and April 13, 2005.
Sametime communication, betweenJohnRN^dd April 13, 2005.jVlarch 29,2002, email from to ^^^^^^lireA^ Interrogation Plan.
ALEC (182321Z JUL 02)
Januai-y 8,1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director ofCongressiona^^irs, toVice Chairman William S.
Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on at 7-8.
[REDACTED] 1528 (191903Z DEC 03)
Report of Audit,CIA-controlled Detention FacilitiesOperated Underthe 17 September 2001 Memorandum of
Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14, 2006.
April 15, 2005, email f^ [REDACTED] (Chief ofBase of DETENTION SITE BLACK), to
m, imillll, reGeneral Comments.
"Learned helplessness" in this context was the theory that detainees might become passive and depressed in
response to adverse or uncontrollableevents, and would thus cooperateand provide information. Memo from
Grayson SWIGERT,Ph.D., February 1, 2003, "Qualifications to providespecial mission interrogation consultation."
They also concluded that the CIA "should not bein the business of running prisonsor^tempora^detention
facilities.'" May 12, 2004, Memorandumfor Deputy Dkector for Operationsfrom Chief,
Infonnation Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division via Associate Deputy
Director for Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program."
March 21, 2005, Memorandum for Deputy Diiector for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI
Counterterrorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and
Interrogation Programs.
September2, 2005, Memorandum from to DirectorPorterGoss, CIA, "Assessmentof EITs
Effectiveness."
September 23, 2005, Memorandum from to The Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central
Intelligence Agency, "Response to request from Director for Assessmentof EIT effectiveness."
Febmary 10, 2006, Memorandum for [|Hill^^^^H OFFICER 1], CounterTerrorist Center, National
Clandestine Service, from Executive Director re: Accountability Decision.
Congressional notification,CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of
German Citizen Khalid al-Masri, October 9, 2007.
Memorandum for Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re Comments to
Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: Februaiy
27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterten-orism Detention and
Interrogation Activities.
Februaiy 24, 2004, Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Inten'ogation
Program Special Review (2003-7123-IG).
November 9, 2006, email from John A. Rizzo, to Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, cc: Michael Morell,
subject: Fw: 5 December 2006 Meeting with ICRC Rep.
CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on tlie Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA
Custody."
Senate Select Committee on Litelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007.
DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President,re: Way Forwai'don Counterterrorist
Rendition, Detention and Intenogation Program.
HEADQUARTERS JUN 04)
[REDACTED] 5759 03); ALEC 03); ALEC 03)
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I. Background on the Committee Study
(U) On December 11, 2007, the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence ("the Committee")
initiated a review of the destruction of videotapes related to the interrogations of CIA detainees
Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri after receiving a briefing that day on the matter by
CIA DirectorMichaelHayden. At thatbriefing, Director Hayden stated that contemporaneous
CIA operational cables were "a more than adequate representation of the tapes," and he agreed to
provide the Committee with limited access to these cables at CIA Headquarters.
(U) On February 11, 2009, after the Committee was presented with a staff-prepared summary of
the operational cables detailing the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri, the
Committee began considering a broader review of the CIA's detention and interrogation
practices. On March 5, 2009, in a vote of 14 to 1, the Committee approved Terms of Reference
for a study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^
(U) The Committee Studyof the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is a lengthy, higlily
detailed report exceeding 6,700 pages, including approximately 38,000 footnotes. It is divided
into three volumes;
I. History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This
volume is divided chronologically into sections addressing the establishment,
development, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. It
includes an addendum on CIA Clandestine Detention Sites and the Arrangements Made
with Foreign Entities in Relation to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
II. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. This volume addresses the intelligence the CIA
attributed to CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,
specifically focusing on CIA representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as how the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program was operated and managed. It includes sections on CIA representations to the
media, the Department of Justice, and the Congress.
ni. Detention and Interrogation of CIA Detainees. This volume addresses the detention
and interrogation of 119 CIA detainees, from the program's authorization on September
17, 2001, to its official end on January 22, 2009, to include information on their capture,
detention, interrogation, and conditions of confinement. It also includes extensive
information on the CIA's management, oversight, and day-to-day operation of its
Detention and Interrogation Program.
(U) On December 13, 2012, the Senate Select Committee on InteUigence approved the
CommitteeStudy of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program ("Committee Study") by a
bipartisan vote of 9-6. The Committee Study included 20 findings and conclusions. The
' See Appendix 1: "Terms of Reference, Senate Select Committee onIntelligence Study of the Central Intelligence
Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program."
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Committee requested that specific executive branch agencies review and provide comment on
the Committee Study prior to Committee action to seek declassification and public release of the
Committee Study. On June 27, 2013, the CIA provided a written response, which was followed
by a series of meetings between the CIA and the Committee that concluded in September 2013.
Following these meetings and the receipt of Minority views, the Committee revised the findings
and conclusions and updated the Committee Study. On April 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 11-
3, the Committee agreed to send the revised findings and conclusions, and the updated Executive
Summary of the Committee Study, to the president for declassification and public release.
(U) The Committee's Study is the most comprehensive review ever conducted of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA has informed the Committee that it has provided
the Committee with all CIA records related to theCIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^
The document production phase lasted more than three years, produced more than six million
pages of material, and was completed in July 2012. The Committee Study is based primarily on
a review of these documents,^ which include CIA operational cables, reports, memoranda,
intelligence products, and numerous interviews conducted of CIA personnel by various entities
within the CIA, in particular the CIA's Office of Inspector General and the CIA's Oral History
Program, as well as internal email"^ and other communications.^
(U) The Executive Summary is divided into two pai'ts. The first describes the establishment,
development, operation, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The
second part provides information on the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and InteiTogation
Program, to include information acquired from CIA detainees, before, during, and after the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; as well as CIA representations on the
effectiveness and operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the media, the
Department of Justice, and the Congress. The Executive Summary does not include a
^ The Committee did not have access to approximately 9,400 CIA documents related to the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program that were withheld by the White House pending a determination and claim of executive
privilege. The Committee requested access to these documentsover several years, including in writing on January
3, 2013, May 22, 2013, and December 19,2013. The Committee received no response from the White House.
^From January 2, 2008, to August 30, 2012, the Department of Justice conducted a separate investigation into
various aspects of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, witli tlie possibility of criminal prosecutions of
CIA personnel and contractors. On October9, 2009, the CIA informedthe Committee that it would not compel CIA
personnel to participate in interviews with the Committee due to concerns related to the pending Department of
Justice investigations. (See DTS #2009-4064.) While the Committee did not conduct interviews with CIA
personnel during the course of this review, the Committee utilized previous interview reports of CIA personnel and
CIA contractors conducted by tlie CIA's Office of the Inspector General and the CIA's Oral History Program. In
addition to CIA materials, the Committee reviewed a much smaller quantity of documents from the Department of
Justice, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, as well as documents that had separately been
provided to the Committee outside of this review. Inconsistent spellings found within the Committee Study reflect
the inconsistencies found in the underlying documents reviewed.
The CIA informed tiie Committee that due to CIA record retention policies, the CIA could not produce all CIA
email communications requested by the Committee. As a result, in a few cases, the text of an email cited in the
Study was not available in its original format, but was embedded in a larger email chain. For tliis reason, the
Committee, in some limited cases, cites to an email chain that contains the original email, ratlier than the original
email itself.
The report does not review CIA renditions for individuals who were not ultimately detained by tlie CIA, CIA
interrogation of detainees in U.S. military custody, or tlie treatment of detainees in the custody of foreign
governments, as these topics were not included in the Committee's Terms of Reference.
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description of the detention and interrogations of all 119 known CIA detainees. Details on each
of these detainees are included in Volume in.
(U) Throughout this summary and theentire report, non-supervisory CIA personnel havebeen
listed by pseudonym. The pseudonyms for these officers are used throughout the report. To
distinguish CIA officers in pseudonym from those in true name, pseudonyms in this report are
denoted by last names in upper case letters. Additionally, the CIA requested that the names of
countries thathosted CIAdetention sites, or with which the CIA negotiated the hosting of sites,
as well as information directly or indirectly identifying such countries, be redacted from the
classified version provided to Committee members. The report therefore lists these countries by
letter. The reportuses the same designations consistently, so "Country J," for example, refers to
the same country throughout the Committee Study. Further, the CIA requested that the
Committee replace the original code names for CIA detention sites with new identifiers.^
^On April 7,2014, the Executive Summary ofthe Committee Study ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program wasprovided to theexecutive branch fordeclassification andpublic release. On August 1,2014, theCIA
returned to the Committee the Executive Summary with its proposed redactions. Overthe ensuing months, the
Committee engaged in deliberations with the CIA and the White House to ensure that the Committee's narrative—
andsupport for theCommittee's findings andconclusions—remained intact. Significant alterations havebeen made
to the Executive Summary in order to reach agreement on a publiclyreleasable versionof the document. For
example, theCIA requested that in select passages, the Committee replace specific dates with more general time
frames. The Committee also replaced the true names of some senior non-undercover CIA officials with
pseudonyms. The executivebranchthen redacted all pseudonyms for CIA personnel,and in some cases the titles of
positions held bytheCIA personnel. Further, while the classified Executive Summaiy and full Committee Study
lists specific countries by letter (for example "Country J"), and uses thesame letter to designate the specific country
throughout the Committee Study, the letter^iav^eei^edacte^^ieexecuti^ branch for this public release.
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II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program
A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to
Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals
1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a
U.S. Military Base Is the "Best Option": the CIA Delegates "Blanket" Detention
Approvals to CIA Ojficers in
September 17, 2001, six days after the teiTorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action Memorandum of
Notification (MON) to authorize the director of central intelligence (DCI) to "undertake
operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of
violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who areplanning terrorist activities."^
Although the CIA had previously been provided limited authorities to detain specific, named
individuals pending the issuance of formal criminal charges, the MON provided unprecedented
authorities, granting the CIA significant discretion in determining whom to detain, the factual
basis for the detention, and the length of the detention.^ The MON made no reference to
interrogations or interrogation techniques.^
On Septemberl4^00Mhrcj days before the issuance ofthe
MON, the chief ofoperations ofthe CIA's based on an urgent requh^ent from
the chief ofthe Counterterrorism Center (CTC), sent an email to CIA Stations in HI seeking
input on appropriate locations for potential CIA detention facilities. Over the courseoftiie
next month, CIA officers considered at least four countries in |||||||||| and one in HHHB as
possible hosts for detention facilities and at least three proposed sitelocations. ^^
September 26, 2001, senior CTC personnelji^ to discuss the
capture and detain authorities in the MON. On September 28, 2001, [^^^HCTC Legal,
sent an email describing the meeting and a number of policy decisions. The
^ September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security Council, re.
Rm^So^?7iratparag^^




rector, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, transmitting the^| Memoranda ofNotification
®September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security Council, re.
(DTS #2002-0371)^a^aragraph4.
DIRECTOR (IBiHIH); email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject; Cable re
Country |; date: January 29, 2009.
" Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Duector of Central
Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central
Intelligence/Militaiy Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists."
nil 11 III I i mi imii
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email stated that covert facilities would be operated "in a manner consistent with, but not
pursuant to, the formal provision of appropriately comparable Federal instructions for the
operation of prison facilitie^n^he incarceration of inmates held under the maximum lawful
security mechanisms." I^H^I's email recognized the CIA's lack ofexperience in nmning
detention facilities, and stated that the CIA would consider acquiring cleared personnel from the
Department of Defense or the Bureau of Prisons with specialized expertise to assist the CIA in
operating the facilities.On September27, 2001, CIA Headquarters informed CIA Stations that
any future CIA detention facility would have to meet "U.S. POW Standards.
early November 2001, CIA Headquarters further determined
that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards and that CIA
detention and interrogationoperations should be tailored to "meet the requirements of U.S. law
and the federal rules of criminalprocedure," adding that "[s]pecific methods of interrogation
w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices
deemed lawful by U.S. courts.The CIA's search for detention site locations was then put on
hold and an internal memorandum from senior CIA officials explained that detention at a U.S.
military base outside of the United States was the "best option."'^ The memorandum thus urged
the DCI to "[pjress DOD and the US military, at highest levels, to have the US Military agree to
host a long-term facility, and have them identify an agreeable location," specificallyrequesting
that the DCI "[s]eek to have the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay designated as a long-term
detention facility.
Addressing the risks associated with the CIA maintaining a
detention facility, the CIA memorandum warned that "[a]s captured terrorists may be helddays,
months, or years, the likelihood of exposure will grow over time," and that "[m]edia exposure
could inflame public opinion against a host government and the U.S., thereby threatening the
continued operation of the facility." The memorandum also anticipated that, "[i]n a foreign
country, close cooperation with the host government will entail intensive negotiations."^^ The
CIA memorandum warned that "any foreign country poses uncontrollable risks that could create
incidents, vulnerability to the security of the facility, bilateralproblems, and uncertainty over
maintaining the facility."^^ The memorandum recommended the establishment of a "short-term"
facility in which the CIA's role would be limited to "oversight, funding and responsibility." The
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; subject: EYES ONLY- Capture and Detention; date:
September 28, 2001, at 09:29:24 AM.
'3 DIRECTOR (272119ZSEP 01)
November 7, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogation." See also Volume I.
Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black,Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Directorof Central
Intelligence,General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Directorfor Operations and Associate Directorof Central
Intelligence/Military Support, entitled,"Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists."
Memorandum for DCI from J. CoferBlack, Director of Counterterrorism, via DeputyDirectorof Central
Intelligence, General Counsel, ExecutiveDirector,Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central
Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facilityfor Terrorists."
" Memorandum for DCI from J.Cofer Black, Director ofCounterterrorism, via Deputy Director ofCentral
Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director,Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central
Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Teixorists."
Memorandum for DCI from J. CoferBlack, Director of Counterterrorism, via DeputyDirectorof Central
Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central
Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "ApprovaltoEstablisl^Deten^^ for Terrorists."
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CIA would "contract out all other requirements to other US Government organizations,
commercial companies, and, as appropriate, foreign governments."'^
October 8, 2001, DCI George Tenet delegated the management
and oversight of the capture and detention authorities provided by the MON to the CIA's deputy
director for operations (DDO), James Pavitt, and the CIA's chief of the Counterterrorism Center,
Cofer Black.^^ The DCI also directed that all requests and approvals for capture and detention be
documented in writing. On December 17, 2001, however, the DDO rescinded these^^^^
requirements and issued via aCIA cable "blanket approval" for CIA officers in jHHH to
"determine [who poses] the requisite 'continuing serious threat of violence or death to US
persons and interests orwho are planning terrorist activities.'" '^ By March 2002, CIA
Headquarters had expanded the authority beyond the languageof the MON and instructed CIA
personnel that it would be appropriate to detain individuals who might not be high-value targets
in their own right, but could provide information on high-value targets.
On April 7, 2003, ^^IHCTC Legal,
sent a cable to CIA Stations and Bases stating that "at this stage in the war [we] believe there is
sufficient opportunity in advance to document the key aspects of many, if not most, of our
capture and detainoperations.cable also provided guidance as to who could
be detained under the MON, stating:
"there must be an articulable basis on which to conclude that the actions of a
specific person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a 'continuing
serious threat' of violence or death to U.S. persons or interests or that the person
is planning a terrorist activity.
.. .We are not permitted to detain someone merely upon a suspicion that he or
she has valuable information about teiTorists or planned acts of ten'orism....
Similarly, the mere membership in a particular group, or the mere existence of a
particular familial tie, does not ncccssarily connote that the threshold of
'continuing, serious threat' has been satisfied."^"^
Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, GeneralCounsel, ExecutiveDirector, DeputyDirector for Operations and AssociateDirectorof Central
Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Tenorists."
Memorandum from George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to Deputy Director for Operations, October 8,
2001, Subject: (U) Delegations of Authorities.
2' DIRECTORHljimUlOZDEC01)
22 WASHINGTOnHIH (272040Z MAR 02)
23 DIRECTOR {{^•(072216Z APR 03)
2'* DIRECTOR (072216Z APR 03). In alater meeting with Committee staff, Hi^HCTC Legal,
stated that the prospect that the CIA "could hold [detainees] forever" was "teiTifying," adding, "[n]o
one wants to be in a position of being called back from retirement in however many years to go figure out what do
you do with so and so who still poses a tlueat." See November 13, 2001, Transcript of Staff Briefing on Covert
Action Legal Issues (DTS #2002-0629).
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2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA
Detainees Wrongly Detained
While the CIA has represented in public and classified settings that
it detained "fewer than one hundred" individuals,-^ the Committee's review of CIA records
indicates that the total number of CIA detainees was at least 119.^^ Internal CIA documents
indicate that inadequate record keeping made it impossible for the CIA to determine how many
individuals it had detained. In December2003, a CIA Station overseeing CIA detention
operations in Country | informed CIA Headquarters that ithad made the "unsettling discovery"
that the CIA was "holding a number of detainees about whom" it knew "very little,"^^ Nearly
five years later, in late 2008, the CIA attempted to determine how many individuals the CIA had
detained. At the completion of the review, CIA leaders, including CIA Director Michael
Hayden, were informed that the review found that the CIA had detained at least 112 individuals,
and possibly more.^^ According to an email summarizing the meeting, CIA Director Hayden
CIA Director Hayden typicallydescribed the program as holding "fewer than a hundred"detainees. For example,
in testimony before the Committee on February 4, 2008, in response to a question from Chairman Rockefeller
during an open hearing, Hayden stated, "[i]n the life of the CIA detention program we have held fewer than a
hundred people." {See DTS #2008-1140.) Specific references to "98" detainees were includedin a May 5, 2006,
House PermanentSelect Committee on IntelUgence (HPSCI)report on Renditions, Detentions and Interrogations.
See also Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting GeneralCounsel,Central IntelligenceAgency, from StevenG.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof LegalCounsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation oniigl^alu^l Qaeda Detainees. Other examples ofthis CIA
representatioi^nclu^ a statement to the HPSCI on February 15, 2006, and a
statement by ^^^CTC Legal B^H^HtotheSSO^ June 10, 2008. See DTS #2008-2698.
The Committee's accountingof the numberof CIA detainees is conservative and only includes individuals for
whom there is clear evidence of detention in CIA custody. The Committee thus did not count, among the 119
detainee^ix ofthe 31 individuals listed in amemo entitled "Updated List of Detainees In |
attached to a March 2003 email sent byDETENTION SITE COBALT sitemanager |
[CIA OFFICER 1], because they were no^xplicitl^esc^ed as CIA detainees andbecausethe^idnoto^
appea^i^IA record^(5^^mail from: ^HH|||Hm[CIAOFnCER 1]; to:|||m^^, HH
and subjectr^^^HP^^^^I DETAINEES; date: March 13, 2003.) An
additional individual is the subjectof CIA cablesdescribing a plannedtransferfrom U.S. military to CIA custody at
DETENTION SITE COBALT. He was likewise not included among the 119 CIA detainees because of a lack of
CIA records confiraiing either his transfer to, or his presence at, DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed in this
summary, in December 2008, the CIA attempted to identify the total number ofCIA detainees^nag^h prepared
for CIA leadership, the CIA repre^nted the number of CIA detainees as "112+ ?" See {HHIHUHM 12417
(101719Z OCT 02); ALEC (232056Z OCT 02); 190159 (240508Z OCT 02); and ALEC llll
(301226ZOCT 02).
27
As of June 27, 2013, when the CIA provided its Response to the Committee Study of tlie CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program (hereinafter, the "CIA's June 2013 Response"), the CIA had not yet made an independent
determination of the numberof individuals it had detained. The CIA's June 2013 Response does not address the
numberof detainees determined by the Committee to be held by the CIA,other than to assert that the discrepancy
between past CIA representations, that there were fewer than 100 detainees, and the Committee's determination of
there being at least 119CIA detainees, was not "substantively meaningful." The CIA's June 2013 Response states
that the discrepancy "does not impact the previously known scale of the program," and that "[i]t remains true that
approximately 100 detainees were pjirt of the program; not 10 and not 200." The CIA's June 2013 Response also
states that, "[t]he Studyleavesunarticulated what impactthe relativelysmall discrepancy might have had on
policymakers or Congressional overseers." The CIA's June 2013 Response further asserts that, at the time Director
Hayden was representing there had been fewer than 100 detainees (2007-2009), the CIA's internal research
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instructed a CIA officer to devise a way to keep the number of CIA detainees at the same number
the CIA had previously briefed to Congress. The email, which the briefer sent only to himself,
stated:
"I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be included in RDI"^
numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98 ~ pick
whatever date i [sic] needed to make that happen but the number is 98."^^
While the CIA acknowledged to the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in February 2006 that it had wrongly detained five
individuals throughout the course of its detention program, a review of CIA records indicates
"indicate[d] the total number of detainees could have been as high as 112," and that "uncertainty existed within CIA
about whether a group of additional detainees were actually part of the program,partially because some of tliem had
passed tlirough [DETENTION SITE COBALT] prior to the formal establishment of tlieprogram under CTC
auspices on 3 December 2002" (emphasis added). This June 27, 2013, CIA statement is inaccurate: the CIA's
determination at the time was that there had been at least 112 CIA detainees and that the inclusion of detainees held
prior to December 3, 2002, would make that number higher. On December20, 2008, a CTC officer informed the
chief of CTC that "112 were detained by CIA since September 11, 2001," noting "[t]hese revised statistics do not
include any detainees at [DETENTION SITE COBALT] (other than Gul Rahman) who departed [DETENTION
SITE COBA^Jprior to RDG assuming authority of[DETENTION SITE COBALT] as of03 Deceiver 2002."{See "||||^ ^mH|||||||numbersbri£fdoc/*at^he^^inaiHiromJ||||^ ^ |^||||^ ^ to: IHl
|, [REDACTED], Revised Rendition andDetention
Statistics; date: December 20, 2008.) By December 23, 2008, CTC had created a giaph that identified the total
number of CIA detainees, excluding Gul Rahman, "Post 12/3/02" as 111. The graph identified the total number
including Gul Rahman, but excluding otlier detainees "pre-12/3/02" as "112+ ?." (See CIA-produced PowerPoint
Slide, RDG Numbers, dated December 23, 2008.) Witli regard to the Committee's inclusion of detainees held at
DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to December 3, 2002, the CIA does not dispute that they were held by the CIA
pursuant to the same MON authorities as detainees held after that date. Moreover, the CIA has regularly counted
among its detainees a number of individuals who were held solely at DETENTIONSITECOBALT prior to
December 3,2002, as well as several who were held exclusively at Country ^^^m||m|p:'acilities on behalf of
the CIA. In discussing the role of DETENTION SITE COBALT in the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program,
tlien Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt told the CIA Office of Inspector General in August 2003 that
"there are those who say that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] is not a CIA facility, but that is 'bullshit.'" (See
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, James Pavitt, August 21,
2003.)
The "Renditions and Inteirogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition,
Detention, and Intenj^gatiot^roi^ "RDI/^n^|RD^ in CIA records.
Email from; subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: Januaiy 5,
2009. According to tlie CIA's June 2013 Response, "Hayden did not view the discrepancy, if it existed, as
particularly significant given that, if true, it would increase the total number by just over 10 percent."
They include Sayed Habib, who was detained duetofobrications made by KSM wliile_KSM_was_beinf subiected
to the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques 1281 (130801Z JUN 04)
3031 2817
Saeed Awadh, the subject of mistaken identity (ALEC |
ModinNik
Muhammed, whom the CIA determinedhadbeenpu^sefiil^ misidentified b^^ourc^u^^i blood feud
143701 DIRECTOR
152893 Khalidal-Masri, whose"prolonged detention" was determinedby the CIA
InspectorGeneral to be "unjustified" (CIA Officeof Inspector General, Reportof Investigation, The Rendition and
Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-MasrH200^60^[G)^ul^6^007^ 83); and Zarmein, who was one of
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that at least 21 additional individuals, or a total of 26 of the 119 (22 percent) CIA detainees
identified in this Study, did not meet the MON standard for detention.^" This is a conservative
calculation and includes only CIA detainees whom the CIA itself determined did not meet the
standard for detention. It does not include individuals about whom there was internal
disagreement within the CIA over whether the detainee met the standard or not, or the numerous
detainees who, following theirdetention and interrogation, were found not to "pose a continuing
threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests" or to be "planning terrorist activities" as
required by the September 17, 2001, With one known exception, there ai'e no CIA
'a number ofdetainees about whom" the CIA knew "veiy httle" (| 1528
They include Abu Hudhaifa, whowas subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standingsleep deprivation
before being released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be
(WASHINGTON 51303 Muhammad Khan, who, like
Zarmein, was among detainees about whom the CIA acknowledged knowing "very little"
1528 another case ofmistaken identity (HEADQUARTERS llim
); Shaistah Habi^llahKl^^ his brother, Sayed Habib, was the subject of fabrications
by KSM (HEADQUARTER^^^^HH^^^^^^^^I); Hai^Ghalgi^lKM^is detained as "useful leverage"
against a family member Naz^ir Ali, an "intellectually
challenged" individual whose taped crying was used as leverage against his family member
13065
liiiiiii ( ml ii'liii was released with a
xivment of $||||| mil |iillii i iiiin in I ~ \
33693 33265
33693 HHIIII^^^^^^ft^Hayatullal^^ whom theCIAdeterm^ "may have been in the
wrong place the wrong time^jflBHI^I^^BH 33322 Jan, whowasde^
for using asatellite phone, traces on which "revealed no derogatory information^jlHH 1542
two individuals —Mohammad al-Shomaila and Salah Nasir Salim Ali—on
whom derogatory information was "speculative" (email from: [REDACTED]Uo: [REDACTEDl, 1REDACTED],
and [REDACTED]; subjety: Backgrounders; date: April 19, 2006;|^^^^^| 17411 ALEC|; undated document titled. "Talking Points for HPSCI about Former CIA Detainees");
two individuals who were discovered to be foreign government sources prior to being rendered to CIA custody, and
laterdetermined to be former CIA 2185 ([REDACTED]); ALEC|([REDACTED]); HEADQUARTERS B||H(IrS)ACTED])); seven individuals
thought to be travelling to Iraq to join al-Qa'ida who were detained based on claims that were "thin but cannot be
ignore£^en^^ to: [REDACTED|; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED];
subject: Request Chief/CTC Approval to Apprehend and Detain Individuals Departing Imminently for Iraq to Fight
Against US Forces; date: September 16, 2003); and Bismullah, who was mistakenly arrested |
and later released with $H[ and told not to speak about his experience 46620
For example, the Committee did not include among the 26 individuals wrongfully detained: Dr. Hikmat Nafi
Shaukat, even though it was determined that he was not involved in CBRN efforts and his involvement with al-
30414
uiestions
QaMda members was limited to perst)nal relationships with former neighbors
DIRECTOR Karim, cika Asat Sar Jan, about whom
wererai^ within theCIAaboiU he may have been slandered by arival tribal faction (|
IHIIII^H 27931 [REDACTED] Memo, SUBJECT: getting ahandle on
detainees); Arsala Khan, who suffereddisturbinghallucinations after 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, after
which the CIA determined thath^|doefuiot^^ the subject involved in... cuiTent plans oractivities against
l^M^e^<>;ineU^cilities" (^^^IHIHlliiiHH (20I006Z OCT 03); HEADQUARTERS UtM
(lll^mmillllllll); and Janat Gul, who also suffered "frightful" hallucinations following sleep deprivation and
about whom the chief of the detention facility wrote, "[t]here simply is no 'smoking gun' that we can refer to that
would justify our continued holding of [Janat Gul] at a site such as [DETENTION SITE BLACK]"
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records to indicate that the CIA held personnel accountable for the detention of individuals the
CIA itself determined were wrongfully detained.
occasions, the CIA used host country detention
sites in Country | todetain individuals on behalf of the CIA who did not meet the MON
standard for capture and detention. ALEC Station officers at CIA Headquarters explicitly
acknowledged that these detainees did not meet the MON standard for detention, and
recommended placing the individuals in host country detention facilities because they did not
meet the standard. The host country had no independent reason to detain these individuals and
held them solely at thebehest of theCIA.^^
B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were
''Counterproductive " and "Ineffective After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys
Research Possible Legal Defensefor Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA
Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No
Relevant Experience
which, as noted, did not reference interrogation techniques—the CIA had in place long-standing
formal standards for conducting interrogations. The CIA had shared these standards with the
At the time of the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON-
1530 04); 1537 04)
from: [REDACTED] (COB [DETENTIONSITEBLACK]); to:|; subject: re date: April 30,2005).
The CIA's June 2013 Response "acknowledge[s] that there were cases in which errors were made," but points
only to the case of Khalid al-Masri, whose wrongful detention was the subject of an Inspector General review. The
CIA's June 2013 Response does not quantify the number of wrongfully detained individuals, other than to assert that
it was "far fewer" than the 26 documented by the Committee. The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that
"the Agency frequently moved too slowly to release detainees," and that "[o]f the 26 cases cited by the Study, we
adjudicated only three cases in less than 31 days. Most took tliree to six months. CIA should have acted sooner."
As detailed in the Study, there was no accountability for personnel responsible for the extended detention of
individuals determined by the CIA tohave been wmng^l^etained^^^^^
ALEC ^^•J^^B^^H^IRECTOR ••••••I; DIRECTOR
B; ALEC^^Ifm^^^^Hi. Despite the CIA's conclusion that these individuals did not meet the
standard for detention, these individuals were included in tlie list of 26 wrongfully detained if they were released,
but not if they were transferred to the custody of another country. The list thus does not include Hamid Aich,
although CIA Headquartereiecognize^hat Aich did not meet the threshold for unilateral CIA custody, and sougl^
to place him in Country ||||||^g|g||||||m custody where the CIA could still debrief him. {See DIRECTOR mH
Hamid Aich was transferred to Country ^m||||^n|||m custod^i^pn^B^003^nd
transferred to^^^rtifanother country's] custody more than a month later. (See 36682
38836 HIIIHIi^HH)- ^helist also does not include
Mohammad Dinshah, despite a detemiination prior to his capture that the CIA "does not view Dinshah as meeting
the 'continuing serious threat' threshold required for this operation to be conducted pursuant to [CIA] authority,"
and a detennination, after his capture, that "he does not meet the strict standards requiredto^ to [DETENTION
SITE COBALT]." {See DlRECTOR^^lHEADQUAKrERS_H|UHiiHil^B)-
Dinshali was transferred to IHIii^^^V^tody. See HEADQUARTERS
^60937^
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Committee. In January 1989, the CIA informed the Committee that "inhumane physical or
psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and
will probably result in false answers."^^ Testimony of the CIA deputy director of operations in
1988denounced coercive interrogation techniques, stating, "[pjhysical abuse or other degrading
treatment was rejected not only becauseit is wrong, but because it has historically proven to be
ineffective."^^ By October 2001, CIA policy was to comply with the Department of the Army
Field Manual "Intelligence Interrogation."^^ A CIA Directorate of Operations Handbook from
October 2001 states that the CIA does not engage in "human rights violations," which it defined
as: "Torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without
charges or trial." The handbook further stated that "[i]t is CIA policy to neither participate
directly in nor encourage interrogation which involves the use of force, mental or physical
torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an
aid to interrogation."^^
(U) The CIA did, however, have historical experience using coercive forms of interrogation. In
1963, the CIA produced the KUBARK Counterintelligence InteiTogation Manual, intended as a
manual for Cold War inteiTogations, which included the "principal coercive techniques of
interrogation: arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or
similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis
and induced regression."'^ ® In 1978, DCIStansfield Turner asked former CIA officer John
Limond Hart to investigate the CIA interrogation of Soviet KGB officer Yuri Nosenko"^^ using
the KUBARK methods—to include sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing."^^ In
Hart's testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations on September 15, 1978,
he noted that in his 31 years of government service:
"It has never fallen to my lot to be involved with any experience as unpleasant
in every possible way as, first, the investigation of this case, and, second, the
necessity of lecturing upon it and testifying. To me it is an abomination, and I
January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director ofCongressionalA^irs, to Vice Chairman William S.
Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on HHii> ^-8 (DTS #1989-0131).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, DeputyDirectorfor Operations,Central
Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), p. 15 (DTS #1988-2302).
Attachment to Memorandum entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Tenorists," CTC:
1026(138)701 from J. Cofer Black, Directorof DCICounterterrorist Center, to Directorof Central Intelligence via
multiple parties, October 25, 2001; Draftof LegalAppendix, "Handling Interrogations."
Directorate of Operations Handbook, 50-2, Section XX(l)(a), updated October 9,2001.
KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation, July 1963, at 85.
According to public records, in the mid-1960s, the CIA imprisonedand interrogatedYuri Nosenko,a Soviet KGB
officer who defected to the U.S. in early 1964,for three years (April 1964 to September 1967). Senior CIA officers
at the time did not believe Nosenko was an actual defectorand orderedhis imprisonment and interrogation.
Nosenkowas confined in a specially constructed "jail," with nothing but a cot, and was subjected to a series of
sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing.
Amongother documents, see CIA "FamilyJewels"Memorandum, 16 May 1973, pp. 5, 23-24, available at
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222^rail^ewel^^all^crpdf
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am happy to say that... it is not in my memory typical of what my colleagues
and I did in the agency during the time I was connected with it.'"^^
Notwithstanding the Hart investigation findings, just five years
later, in 1983, a CIA officer incorporated significant portions of the KUBARK manual into the
Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) Training Manual, which the same officer used to provide
interrogation training inLatin America in the early 1980s, and which was used tomjovid^^^^
interrogation training to the 1981."^ CIA officer
was involved in the HRE training and conducted interrogations. The CIA inspector general later
recommended that he be orally admonished for inappropriate use of interrogation techniques.'^ ^
In the fall of 2002, became the CIA's chief of interrogations in the CIA's Renditions
Group,the officer in charge of CIA interrogations."^^
Despite the CIA's previous statements that coercive physical and
psychological interrogation techniques "result in false answers'"^^ and have "proven to be
ineffective,'"^^ as well as the aforementioned eai'ly November 2001 determination that "[sjpecific
methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with
commonly accepted practices deemed lawful byU.S. courts,"^^ by the end of November 2001,
CIA officers had begun researching potential legal defenses for using interrogation techniques
that were considered torture by foreign governments and a non-governmental organization. On
November 26, 2001, attorneys in the CIA's Office of General Counsel circulated a draft legal
memorandum describing the criminal prohibition on torture and a potential "novel" legal defense
for CIA officers who engaged in torture. The memorandum stated that the "CIA could argue that
the torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there
is no other available means to prevent the harm," adding that "states may be very unwilling to
call the U.S. to taskfor torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives,"^^ An August 1,
"Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Hearings before the Select Committee on
Assassinations of U.S. House of Representatives, 95"^ Congress, Second Session, September 11-15, 1978.
Testimony ofJohn Hart, pp. 487-536 (Septeml^ 15, 1978) (DTS #Q04761).
Transcriptof CommitteeHearing on Interrogation Manual, June 17, 1988,pp. 3-4 (DTS #1988-2302).
April 13, 1989, Memorandum from CIA Inspecto^eneral William F. Donnelly to Jim Currie and John Nelson,
SSCI Staff, re: Answers to SSCI Questions on^^|^|, attachment Mto Memorandum to Chairman and Vice
Chairman, re: Inquiry into Interrogation Training, July 10, 1989 (DTS # 1989-0675). See also|H|l984^Meniorandum for Inspector General from [REDACTED], Inspector, via Deputy Inspector General, re:
IO-III84.
As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and Interrogations
Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG."
December 4,2002, Training ReportjRevise^ersion, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE)
Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 ("[HUH] was recently assigned to tlie CTC/RG to manage the HVT
Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) mission, assuming tlie role as HVT interrogator/Team Chief.").
January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director ofCongressionalA^irs to Vice Chairman William S.
Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence re: SSCI Questions on ^H||||||, at7-8 (DTS #1989-0131).
Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence, Transcriptof Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations,Central
Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), at 15 (DTS #1988-2302).
50 November 7, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Intenogation." See also Volume I.
November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix,"Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers."
The draft memo cited the "Israeli example" as a possible basis for arguing that "torture was necessary to prevent
imminent, significant, physical hann to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm."




2002, OLC memorandum to the White House Counsel includes a similar analysis of the
"necessity defense" in response to potential charges of torture.^^
January 2002, the National Security Council principals began to
debate whether to apply the protections of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 ("Geneva") to the conflict with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban.
A letter drafted for DCI Tenet to the presidenturged that the CIA be exempt from any
application of these protections, arguing that applicationof Geneva would "significantly hamper
the ability of CIA to obtain critical threat information necessary to save American lives."^^ On
February 1, 2002—approximately two months prior to the detention of the CIA's first detainee—
a CIA attorney wrote that if CIA detainees were covered by Geneva there would be "few
alternatives to simply asking questions." The attorney concluded that, if that were the case,
"then the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the
convention, but ultimately saves lives.
On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum stating
that neither al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detainees qualified as prisoners of war under Geneva, and that
Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a conflict, did not
apply to al-Qa'ida or Taliban detainees.^^
From the issuance of the MON to early 2002, there are no
indications in CIA records that the CIA conducted significant research to identify effective
interrogation practices, such as conferring with experienced U.S. military or law enforcement
interrogators, or with the intelligence, military, or law enforcement services of other countries
with experience in counterten-orism and the interrogation of terrorist suspects.Nor are there
CIA records referencing any review of the CIA's past use of coercive interrogation techniques
and associated lessons learned. The only research documented in CIA records during this time
on the issue of interrogation was the preparation of a report on an al-Qa'ida manual that was
Memorandum for AlbertoR. Gonzales, Counsel to the President,re: Standardsof Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Like the November 26, 2001, draft memo, the OLC memorandum addressed the Israeh
example.
-'3 Email fromj^^H||^^H; to: [REDACTED] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose
Rodi-iguez, ^^^^^••^[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: For OOB Wednesday - Draft Letterto the President; date: January 29, 2002. Norecords
have been identified to indicate that this letter was or was not sent.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: POW's and Questioning; date:
Februaiy 1, 2002, at 01:02:12 PM.
February 7, 2002, Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
AttorneyGeneral, chief of staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for
NationalSecurity Affairs, and Chainnan of the JointChiefs of Staff, re. HumaneTreatmentof al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees.
After the CIA was unsuccessful in acquiring information from its lastdetainee, Muhammad Rahim, using the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, an after-action review in April 2008suggested that the CIAconduct a
survey of interrogation techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries in an effort to
develop effective interrogation techniques. See undated CIA Memorandum, titled H^H|| After-Action Review,
author [REDACTED], and undatedCIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment,
with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification
ofSleep Deprivation and Reinstatement ofWallin^^i^IT^Foradditionalinfor^^ see Volume I.
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initially assessed by the CIA to include strategies to resist interrogation. This report was
commissioned by the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS) and drafted by two CIA
contractors, Dr. Grayson SWIGERT and Dr. Hammond DUNBAR.^^
Both SWIGERT and DUNBAR had been psychologists with the
U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school, which exposes select
U.S. military personnel to, among other things, coercive interrogation techniques that they might
be subjected to if taken prisoner by countries that did not adhere to Geneva protections. Neither
psychologist had experience as an interrogator, nor did eitherhave specialized knowledge of al-
Qa'ida, a background in terrorism, or any relevant regional, cultural, or linguistic expertise.
SWIGERT had reviewed research on "learned helplessness," in which individuals might become
passive and depressed in response to adverse oruncontrollable events.^^ He theorized that
inducing such a state could encourage a detainee to cooperate and provide information.^^
2. The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval
Without Inter-Agency Deliberation
March 2002, Pakistani government authorities, working
with the CIA, captured al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Zubaydah in a raid during which Abu Zubaydah
suffered bullet wounds. At that time, Abu Zubaydah was assessed by CIA officers in ALEC
Station, the office within the CIA with specific responsibility for al-Qa'ida, to possess detailed
knowledge of al-Qa'ida terrorist attack plans. However, as is described in greater detail in the
full Committee Study, this assessment significantly overstated Abu Zubaydah's role in al-Qa'ida
and the information he was likely to possess.^®
GraysonSWIGERTand HammondDUNBAR, Recognizing and Developing Countenneasures to A1 Qaeda
Resistance to Intenogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective (undated). See also Memorandum for
the Record, November 15, 2007, SSCI Staff Briefing with Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR (DTS
#2009-0572).
See, for example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT,subject, "Qualifications to provide special
mission intenogation consultation"; Undated^mtitle^iem^tating^^^^ollowin^nf^^ by a
telephone [REDACTED],|, Interrogator Training, Lesson Plan, Title: AScientific Approach toSuccessful Intenogation; DIR
1(031227Z APR 02).
See, for example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, subject: "Qualifications to provide special
mission intenogation consultation."
See detainee review of Abu Zubaydah in Volume III. See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006,
"Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001." The document states: "Khaldan
Not Affiliated With Al-Qa'ida. A common misperception in outside articles is tliat Khaldan camp was mn by al-
Qa'ida. Pre-11 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a 'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant,' which led to the
inference tliat the I^aldan camp he was administering was tied to Usama bin Laden. The group's flagsliip camp, al-
Faruq, reportedly was created in the late 1980s so tliat bin Laden's new organization could have a training
infrastructure independent of 'Abdullah Azzam's Maktab al-Kliidamat, the nongovernmental organization that
supported Khaldan. Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and Khaldan was not
overseen by bin Laden's organization. There were relations between the al-Qa'ida camps and Klialdan. Trainees,
particularly Saudis, who had finished basic trainingat Klialdan wererefened to al-Qa'ida camps for advanced
courses, and Khaldan staff observed al-Qa'idatraining^Ti^w^roupsJ^ did not exchange trainers."
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On the day that Abu Zubaydah was captured, CIA attorneys
discussed interpretations of the criminal prohibition on torture that might permit CIA officers to
engage in certain interrogation activiti^®' An attorneyinCTC^sos^ an email with the
subject line "TorUire Update" to Legal listing, without
commentary, the restrictions on interrogation in the Geneva Conventions, the Convention
Against Torture, and the criminal prohibition on torture.^-
March 2002, anticipating its eventual custody of Abu
Zubaydah, the CIA began considering options for his transfer to CIA custody and detention
under the MON. The CIA rejected U.S. military custody ^H|||||||H, in large part because of
the lack of security and the fact that Abu Zubaydah would have to be declared to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).^^ The CIA's concerns about custody at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, included the general lack of secrecy and the "possible loss of control to
US military and/or FBI."^"^ Rendition to Country | was rejected because ofthe perception that
the results of that country's recent interrogations had been disappointing, as well as the intense
interest in Abu Zubaydah from CIA leadership. As ALEC Station wrote, the CIA needed to
participate directly in the interrogation, "[n]ot because we believe necessarily we can improve on
[Country |] performance, but because the reasons for the lack of progress will be transparent
and reportableup die line."^^
Over the course of four days, the CIA settled on a detention site in
Country | because of that country's
and the lack of U.S. court jurisdiction. The only disadvantages identified by the CIA with
detention in Country | were that itwould not be a"USG-controlled facility" and that
"diplomatic/policy decisions" would be required.^^ As a March 28, 2002, CIAdocument
acknowledged, the proposal to render Abu Zubaydah to Country | had not yet been broached
with that country's officials. The document also warned: "[w]e can't guarantee security. If AZ's
presencedoes becomeknown, not clear what the impactwould be."^^
The decision to detain Abu Zubaydah at a covert detention facility
inCountry | did not involve the input ofthe National Security Council Principals Committee,
the Department of State, the U.S. ambassador, or the CIA chief of Station in Country On
March 29, 2002, an email from the Office of the Deputy DCI stated that "[w]e will have to
March 29, 2002, email from [REDACTED] cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject, NEW INFO; A-Z Interrogation Plan ("I have thought about the 18 USC
sect. 2340 issues we briefly discussed yesterday.").
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: subject; Torture Update; date: March 28, 2002, at 11:28:17
AM.
19595(281106Z MAR02). PowerPoint presentation,Optionsfor Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27,
2002.
^ PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. PowerPoint presentation,
Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002.
ALEC IHI (282105Z MAR 02)
^ PowerPointpresentation.Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah,March 27, 2002.
PowerPoint presentation. Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002.
Email from: [REDACTED] BHH; Pavitt; subject; DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE
GREEN] Briefing for Armitage; date: Septembe^6^002^IRECTO|^ ^^H MAR 02).
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acknowledge certain gaps in our planning/preparations, but this is the option the DDCI will lead
with for POTUS consideration."^^ That morni^, the president approved moving forward with
the plan to transfer Abu Zubaydah to Country During the same Presidential Daily Brief
(PDB) session, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld suggested exploring the option of putting Abu
Zubaydah on a ship; however, CIA records do not indicate any further input from the
)rincipals7^ That day, the CIA Station in Country | obtained the approval ofCountry |'s
officials for the CIA detention site7^ The U.S. deputy chief of mission in
Country |, who was notified by the CIA Station after Country B's leadership, concurred in the
absence of the ambassador, Shortly thereafter, Abu
Zubaydah was rendered from Pakistan to Country^ where he was held at the first CIA
detention site, referred to in this summary as "DETENTION SITE GREEN."^"^ CIA records
indicate that Country | was the last location ofa CIA detention facility known to the president
or the vice president, as subsequent locations were kept from the principals as a matter of White
House policy to avoid inadvertent disclosures of the location of the CIA detention sites.^^
3. Tensions with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foreshadow Future
Challenges
(TS//H[^^(^HB||^ ^J^^^h^a^fte^h^2ndition of Abu Zubaydah to DETENTION
III (il' II I I 11II which was responsible for the security of
the detention facility, linked its support for the CIA's detention site to a request for
support fronrtheCIAjjU^^^^HI^^^^H^^^^H^I. The CIA eventually provided the
requested ^^^^^|support7
According to CIA cables and internal documents.
Email from: HIIIHHHI' subject: A-Z Inteirogation Plan; date: March 29, 2002.
POTUS is an abbreviation for President of the United States.
Email fiom: [REDACTED]; to: subject: NEW INFO: A-Z Intenogation Plan; date: March 29,
2002.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ilHHIilll^l> subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; email from:
[REDACTED] to: James Pavitt; subject: DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE GREEN^n^ng for
Armitage; date: September 26, 2002. After the PDB session, the assistant secretary of state was
briefed. The assistant secretary indicated that he would brief the secretary and deputy secretary of state. An internal
CIA email stated that at the NSC, only National Security Advisor Rice and Deputy National SecurityAdvi^r
Hadley were briefed. See DIRECTOR (|||^||| MAR 02); email froin: [REDACTED] to:
James Pavitt; date: September 26, 2002.
^2 [REDACTED] 69132 MAR 02)
^3 [REDACTED] 69132 MAR 02)
For additional infonnation on the rendition of Abu Zubaydah and the estabhsliment of DETENTION SITE
GREEN, see Volume I.
HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED]; HEADQUARTERS CIA records
indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of tlie presence ofCIA detention facilities in Countries |
and It is less clear whether policymakers were aware ofthe detention facilities in Country | and atGuantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
See, for example, [REDACTED] 70240 (300614Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 70112 (250929Z APR 02);
[REDACTED] 70459 (080545Z MAY 02); Congressional Notification: Intelligence Support to|
ll| Ill I
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence; FROM:|;SUBJECT: Your meet^with |
12002; coverpag^ate^





individuals responsible for supporting
the CIA's detention facilityThose officials were replaced by different officials whom the CIA
believed were not supportive of theCIA's detention site7^ Despite considerable effort by the
C^l^tation in Counti'^ ^^etaii^upport for DETENTION SITE GREEN from its new
partners, called for the closing of the CIA detention facility
within three weeksContinued lobbying by the chief of Station, however, eventually led
Country | to reverse this decision, allowing DETENTION SITE GREEN to remain
operational.^^
On April 2002, the CIA Station inCountry | attempted to list
the number ofCountry | officers who, "[t]o the best ofStation's knowledge," had "knowledge
of the presence of Abu Zubaydah" in a specific city in Country The list included eight
individuals^jef^^ personnel "staff of |H
andconcluded "[djoubtless many others."^^ By April B, 2002,
a media organization had learned that Abu Zubaydah was in Country |, prompting the CIA to
explain to the media organization the "security implications" of revealing the information.^^ The
CIA Station in Country | also expressed concern that press inquiries "would do nothing for our
liaison and bilateral relations, possibly diminishing chances that [the of Country|] will permit [Abu Zubaydah] to remain in country or that he would accept other [Abu
Zubaydah]-like renderees in the future."^-^ In November 2002, after the CIA learned that a major
U.S. newspaper knew that Abu Zubaydah was inCountry |, senior CIA officials, as well as Vice
President Cheney, urged the news^per not to publish the information.^"^ While the U.S.
newspaper did not reveal Country | as the location ofAbu Zubaydah, the fact that ithad the
information, combined with previous media interest, resulted in the decision to close
DETENTION SITE GREEN.^^
4. FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to
Cooperate; Abu Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Infonnation the
CIA Later Describes as "Important" and "Vital"
(TS/.
on March
'm¥-) After Abu Zubaydah was rendered to DETENTION SITE GREEN
2002, he was questioned by special agents from the Federal Bureau of







The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]t was only as leaks
detailing the program began to emergethat foreign partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement.'
As described, however, the tensions with Country | were unrelated to public revelations about the program.
[REDACTED] 69626
Email from: WilliamHarlow,Directorof the CIA Office of PubUc Affairs; to: John McLaughlin, Buzzy
Krongard, John Moseman, John Rizzo, James Pavitt, [REDACTED], Stanley Moskowitz; subject: [REDACTED]
call Re: Abu Zubaydah; date: April 25, 2002,12:06:33 PM.
83 [REDACTED] 701681
^ ALEC April 6,2006, Interview, Chief, Renditions and
/NOFORN
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Investigation (FBI) who spoke Arabic and had experience interrogating members of al-Qa'ida.
Abu Zubaydah confirmed his identity to the FBI officers, informed the FBI officers he wanted to
cooperate, and provided background information on his activities. That evening, Abu
Zubaydah's medical condition deteriorated rapidly and he required immediate hospitalization.
Although Abu Zubaydah was largely unable to communicate because of a breathing tube, he
continued to provide information to FBI and CIA officials at the hospital using an Arabic
alphabet chart. According to records, the FBI officers remained at Abu Zubaydah's bedside
du'oughout this ordeal and assisted in his medical care. When Abu Zubaydah's breathing tube
was removed on April 8, 2002, Abu Zubaydah provided additional intelligence and reiterated his
intention to cooperate.^^
During an April 10, 2002, debriefing session, conducted in the
hospital's intensive care unit, Abu Zubaydah revealed to the FBI officers that an individual
named "Mukhtar" was the al-Qa'ida "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah identified
a picture of Mukhtar provided by the FBI from the FBI's Most Wanted list. The picture was of
Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM), who had been indicted in 1996 for his role in Ramzi
Yousef's terrorist plotting to detonate explosives on 12 United States-flagged aircraft and destroy
them mid-flight over thePacific Ocean.^^ Abu Zubaydah told theinterrogators that "Mukhtar"
was related to Ramzi Yousef, whom Abu Zubaydah said was in an American jail (Yousef had
been convicted for the aforementioned terrorist plotting and was involved in the 1993 World
Trade Center terrorist attack).^^
Zubaydah told the FBI officers that "Mukhtar" trained the
9/11 hijackers and also provided additional information on KSM's background, to include diat
KSM spoke fluent English, was approximately 34 yeai*s old, and was responsible for al-Qa'ida
operations outside of Afghanistan.^^ Subsequent representations on the success of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program consistently describe Abu Zubaydah's identification of
KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, as well as his identification of KSM's alias
("Mukhtar"), as being "important" and "vital" information. '^^ A review of CIA records found
that this information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases.^^
5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive
Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah
10005 (092316Z APR 02). See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume HI for additional
information.
See United States Court ofAppeals^ugus^^n, 2001, U.S. vRamzi Ahmed Yousef, and DIRECTOR
HJAN 02). See also ••••••ciA MAR 02).
10022 (121216Z APR 02). CIA records include the variant spelling, "Muhktar." KSM was placed on
the FBI's public "Most Wanted Terrorist" list on October 10,2001. See also U.S. Department of Justice materials
related to Ramzi Ahmed Yousef.
•m 10022 (I21216Z APR 02); 18334 (261703Z MAR 02)
See, for example. President Bush's September 6, 2006, speech, based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA,
which stated tliat Abu Zubaydah provided "quite important" infomiation and "disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Muklitar. This was a vital piece of the
puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM."
See information later in tliis summary and Volume II for additional details.
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While Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, personnel at CIA
Headquarters began discussing how CIAofficers would interrogate Abu Zubaydah upon his
return to DETENTION SITE GREEN. The initial CIA interrogation proposal recommended that
the interrogators engagewith Abu Zubaydah to get himto provide information, and suggested
that a"hard approach," involving foreign gov^jjmen^ersonnel, be t^cei |^onlyasala£
resort."^^ At a meeting about this proposal, ^H^^hCTC Legal,
recommended that a psychologist working on contract in the CIA's Office of Technical Services
(OTS), Grayson SWIGERT, be used by CTC to "provide real-time recommendations to
overcome Abu Zubaydahl^^sistan^ to interrogation."^^ SWIGERT had come to
attention through who worked in OTS. Shortly thereafter, CIA
Headquarters formally proposed that Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24
hours a day, that Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, that
loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number of people interact with
him. CIA records indicate that these proposals were based on the idea that such conditions
would lead Abu Zubaydah to develop a sense of "learned helplessness."^"^ CIA Headquarters
then sent an interrogation team to Country |, including SWIGERT, whose initial role was to
consult on the psychological aspects of the interrogation.^^
DCI Tenet was provided an update on the Abu Zubaydah
interrogation plans on April 12, 2002. The update stated that the CIA team was preparing for
Abu Zubaydah's transfer back to DETENTION SITEGREEN, and noted the CIA interrogation
team intended to "set the stage" and increase control over AbuZubaydah.^^ The update stated:
"Our [CIA] lead interrogator will require Abu Zubaydah to reveal the most
sensitive secret he knows we are seeking; if he dissembles or diverts the
conversation, the interview will stop and resume at a later time.... In
accordance with the strategy, and with concurrence from FBI Headquarters,
the two on-site FBI agents wiU no longer directly participate in the
interview/debriefing sessions."^^
Attachment to email from: [REDACTED
Strategy, Powerpoint on
31, 2002.
Email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc: April 1,2002, re: POC for [Grayson
SWIGERT]- consultant who drafted al-Qa'ida resistance to interrogation backgrounder (noting thatCTC/LGL
woul^jea^out to SWIGERT). According to tlie email, after the meeting, HBillUCTC Legal,
HIHH' provided SWIGERT's contact information to ALEC Station officers, noting that it was SWIGERT
who composed an OTS assessment on al-Qa'ida resistance techniques.
On the evening ofApril 1, 2002, "at the request ofCTC/OP^nd ALEC" Station, acable from OTS with a
proposed interrogation strategy was sent to Country | (HHI178955 (012236Z APR 02). The information in
this cable was consistent with a subsequent cable, which was coordinated with SWIGERT, that proposed "several
environmental modifications to create an atmosphere thatenhances thestrategic interrogation process." Thecable
noted, "[t]he deliberate manipulation of theenvironment is intended to causepsychological disorientation, and
reduced psychological wherewithal for the interrogation," as well as"tlie deliberate establishment of psychological
dependence upon the interrogator," and "an increased senseof learned helplessness." (See [REDACTED] 69500
(070009ZAPR 02).) For detailedinfonnation,see VolumeI and the AbuZubaydahdetainee review in Volume HI.
DIRECTOR•• APR 02)
CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12April 2002, "1630Hours."
CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on th^Abi^ubayd^^peration/^^ April 2002, "1630 Hours."
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The FBI special agents questioning Abu Zubaydah at the hospital
objected to the CIA's plans. In a message to FBI Headquarters, an FBI special agent wrote that
the CIA psychologists had acquired "tremendous influence.The message further stated:
"AZ's health has improved over the last two days and Agency[CIA]is ready
to move [Abu Zubaydah] out of the hospital and back toUH^^Ion
in an elaborate plan to change AZ's environment. Agency [CIA]
advised this day that they will be immediately changing tactics in all future AZ
interviews by having only there [sic] [CIA officer] interact with AZ (there will
be no FBI presence in interview room). This change contradicts all
conversations had to date.... They believe AZ is offering, 'throw away
information' and holding back from providing threat information (It should be
note [sic] that we have obtained critical information regarding AZ thus far and
have now got him speaking about threat information, albeit from his hospital
bed and not [an] appropriate interview environment for full follow-up (due to
his health). Suddenly the psychiatric team here wants AZ to only interact with
their [CIA officer, and the CIA sees this] as being the best way to get the threat
information.... We offered several compromise solutions... all suggestions
were immediately declined without further discussion. .. .This again is quite
odd as all information obtained from AZ has come from FBI lead interviewers
and questioning.... I have spent an un-calculable amount of hours at [Abu
Zubaydah's] bedside assisting with medical help, holding his hand and
comforting hum through various medical procedures, even assisting him in
going [to] the batliroom.... We have built tremendous report [sic] with AZ and
now that we are on the eve of 'regular'' interviews to get threat information, we
have been 'written out' of future interviews.
6. New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydah's "Most Important Secret"; FBI
Temporarily Barredfrom the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed
in Isolation for 47 Days Without Questioning
On April 13, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still at the hospital,
the CIA implemented the"new interrogation program."^®" This initial meeting was held with
just one interrogator in the room and lasted 11 minutes. A cable stated that the CIA interrogator
was coached by the"psychological team."'^ ^ The CIA interrogator advised Abu Zubaydah that
he (Abu Zubaydah) "had a most important secret that [the interrogator] needed to know."
According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah "amazingly" nodded in agreement about the secret, but
Federal Bureau of Investigationdocuments pertaining"to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligenceby cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).
Federal Bureau of Investigationdocumentspertaining"to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidali" and provided to the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).
10026 (131233Z APR 02)
10026 (131233Z APR 02)
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"did not divulge any information, as [the interrogation team] expected."'^- A cable further
explained that Abu Zubaydah indicated that he understood that the key question was about
"impending future terrorist plans against the United States,"'^'' and that the CIA officer told Abu
Zubaydah to signal for him "when he decides to discuss that 'one key item he knows he is
keeping from the [interrogator]."'^^ The FBI officers provided a similar account to FBI
Headquarters, adding that: "We spent the rest of the day in the adjoining room with [the CIA
officer] and one of the psychiatrists [REDACTED] waiting for [Abu Zubaydah] to signal he was
ready to talk. [Abu Zubaydiili] apparcnt[y went to sleep... they did not approach [Abu
Zubaydah] the rest of the day."'"'' In their communications with FBI Headquarters, the FBI
officers wrote that they explained their rapport-building approaches to the CIA interrogation
team and "tried to explain that we have used this approach before on other Al-Qaeda members
with much success (al-Owhali,^"^ KKM, Jandal, Badawi etc.). We tried to politely suggest that
valuable time was passing where we could attempt to solicit threat information...."''^^
Ori April 15, 2002, per a scripted plan, the same CIA interrogator
delivered what a CIA cable described as "the pre-move message" to Abu Zubaydah; that "time is
mnning out," that his situation had changcd, and that the interrogator was disappointed that Abu
Zubaydah did not signal "to discuss the one thing he was hiding."^"®^ Abu Zubaydiih was sedated
and moved from the hospital to DETENTION SITE GREEN. When Abu Zubaydah awoke at
11:00 PM, four hours after his arrival, he was described as surprised and disturbed by his new
situation. An April 16, 2002, cable states the "objective is to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah] is at
his most vulnerable state."
a cable described Abu Zubaydah's cell as white with no natural
lighting or windows, but with four halogen lights pointed into the cell."" An air conditioner was
also in the room. A white curtain separated the interrogation room from the cell. The
interrogation cell had three padlocks. Abu Zubaydah was also provided with one of two chairs
that were rotated based on his level of cooperation (one described as more comfortable tlian the
other). Security officers wore all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and
goggles to keep Abu Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as well as to prevent Abu Zubaydah
"from seeing the security guards as individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or
dialogue with.""' The security officers communicated byhand signals when they were with
10026(131233Z APR 02)
10029 (131505Z APR 02)
10029 (131505Z APR 02)
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidah" and provided to the SenateSelectCommittee on Intelligence by cover leUer dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).
See Intelligence Science Board "Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and Case Studies" for additional
details on the FBI's interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documentspertaining "to the interrogationof detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidiili" and provided to the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).
10043 (151614Z APR 02)
10047 (161406Z APR 02)
10116 (250731Z APR 02)
HHB 10053 (162029Z APR 02)
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Abu Zubaydah and used hand-cuffs and leg shackles to maintain control. In addition, either loud
rock music was played or noise generators were used to enhance Abu Zubaydah's "sense of
hopelessness."'^ ^ Abu Zubaydah was typically keptnaked and sleepdeprived.'
An April 16, 2002, cable explained that the interrogation strategy
had shifted since Abu Zubaydah's medical condition prevented "total isolation as originally
planned." According to the cable, a 24-hour interrogation strategy was now "deemed to be the
best approach" for acquiring information. As a result, the FBI officers were once again allowed
to question Abu Zubaydah.''"^ On April 17, 2002, an FBIofficer met with Abu Zubaydah for six
hours.'FBI records state that Abu Zubaydahhad "not seen the interviewing (FBI) agent" since
April 11, 2002, but thatAbu Zubaydah greeted the agent by name.''^ During thequestioning
Abu Zubaydah denied any knowledge related to specific tai*gets for a pending attack and
"advised that many of the brothers on the front lines (nfi) [no further information] talked about
all types of attacks against America but that for the most part this was usually just talk and that
[the United States] should not be concerned about this type of talk,""^ Abu Zubaydah provided
information on al-Qa'ida, KSM, his past ti-avel to the United States, as well as general
information on extremists in Pakistan."^
Zubaydah continued to provide information to interrogators
thi'oughout April 2002, but not information on pending attacks against the United States. On the
evening of April 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers about two men who approached
him with a plan to detonate a uranium-based explosive device in the United States. Abu
Zubaydah stated he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the names of the two
individuals, butprovided physical descriptions of the pair.''^ This information was acquired
after Abu Zubaydah was confronted with emails indicating that he had sent the two individuals
to KSM.'^ ® The CIA would later represent that this information was acquired "as a result" of the
use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques, and that the information acquired resulted in
10116 (25073IZ APR 02). CIA recoi^sindic^ tliat Abu Zubaydah was nude, butgiven a towel to
cover himself when interrogated. See, for exampleJ|BB||||H| 10080 (200735Z APR 02).
'1310053 (162029Z APR 02);H1BBh10094(21 1905Z APR02). As detailed in Volume III, the FBI
Special Agents only questioned Abu Zubaydah when he was covered with a towel. Sleep deprivation during this
period also differed from how sleep deprivation was implemented after the Department of Justice approved the
CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques in August 2002. Ratlier than being placed in a stress position during sleep
deprivation, Abu Zubaydah was kept awake by being questioned nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI intenogators.
Records further indicate that during breaks in the interrogations at this time, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly
sleep. See, for example, •••I 10116 (25073IZ APR 02).
10047 (161406Z APR 02)
10058 (171904Z APR 02)
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the intenogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).
10058 (171904Z APR 02)
See Abu Zubaydali detainee review in Volume III for additional information.
10090 (210703Z APR 02). As described in more detail in Volume II, Abu Zubaydah did provide
kimyas for the pair.
llllllflllllim 10063 (180515Z APR 02). As described in detail in Volume II and Volume III, as well as more
briefly in this summary, Abu Zubaydah providedthisinfori^^ tosleep.
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the thwarting of the "Dirty BombPlot" and the capture of Jose Padilla.^^^ However, the chief of
the Abu Zubaydah Task Force stated that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find
them," while another CIA officer stated that the CIA was already "alert" to the threat posed by
Jose Padilla, and that the CIA's "suspicion" was only "enhanced during the debriefings of Abu
Zubaydah."^^^ Additional information on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla
is provided later in this summary.
During the month of April 2002, which included a period during
which Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized, on life support, and unable to speak, the CIA
disseminated 39 intelligence reports based on his interrogations.'^ ^ At the end of April 2002, the
DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team provided CIA Headquarters with three
interrogation strategies. CIA Headquarters chose the most coercive interrogation option, which
was proposed and supported by CIA contractor SWIGERT.^^"^ This coercive interrogation
option—which included sensory deprivation—was again opposed by the FBI special agents at
the detention site.'^ ^ The interrogation proposal was to engage in"only a single-minded,
consistent, totally focused questioning ofcurrentthreat information." '^ ^ Once implemented, this
approach failed to produce the information CIA Headquarters believed Abu Zubaydah
possessed: threats to the United States and information about al-Qa'ida operatives located in the
United States. Nonetheless, Abu Zubaydahcontinued to provide other intelligence. In May
2002, the CIA disseminated 56 intelligence reports based on the interrogations.
In early June 2002, the CIA interrogation team recommended that
Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members departed
the facility "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed
time off for a break and to attend to personal matters as well as to discuss "the
endgame" ofAbu Zubaydah jjjjHIH with officers from CIA Headquarters.'^ ^ As a result, from
June 18, 2002, through August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation without being
See information in this summary and Volume II for additional details on the CIA's representationson the
effectiveness of the CW^nhancedh^rrogationtech^ makers and the Depaitment ofJustice.
CIA email from: to: subject: AZ information; date: July 10, 2002, at
01:18:50 PM. The email states: "The only way we put thistogedieris^at Paki liaison mentioned to
the arrest oftwo individuals (one being an American) and jKIHmi put two and two together. Therefore, AZ's
info alone would never have allowed us to find them." See also SSCI Transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated
June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603), in which a CIAofficer states, "the Pakistani liaison felt it was important to bring
[Padilla] to our attention, given the recent raids...there was enough infoiTnation indicating that his travel was
suspicious, to put us on alert. This suspicion wasenhancedduring the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which
occurred on 21 April."
^2^ee analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the
Hjjjdatabase. The titles ofspecific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are
listed in the Abu Zubaydahdetainee review in Volume III.
ALEC ••• MAY 02)
See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multipleccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in
the AZ Interrogations; date: April 30, 2002, at 12:02:47 PM.
See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multipleccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in
the AZ Intenogations; date: April 30,2002, at 12:02:47 PM.
analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the
database. The titles of specific intelligence reports resultingfrom information provided by Abu Zubaydah are
listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
'28 10424 (070814Z JUN 02)
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asked any questions. Despite the fact that Abu Zubaydah was in isolation for nearly half of the
month, the CIA disseminated 37 intelligence reports based on the interrogations of Abu
Zubaydah in June 2002. The CIA would later represent publicly—as well as in classified
settings—that during the use of "established US Government interrogation techniques," Abu
Zubaydah "stopped all cooperation" in June 2002, requiring the development of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.CIA records do not support this assertion.
Prior to Abu Zubaydah's 47-day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah
provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to
information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes,
training, and tactics.As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, Abu
Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and
operatives in the United States served as the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah
was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use
of what would later be known as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" to become
"compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding. Abu Zubaydah
never provided this information, and CIA officers later concluded this was information Abu
Zubaydah did not possess.
After Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation, the Abu Zubaydah
iiiliiiii| iliiiiili III! [depaited Country |]. Security and medical
personnel remained at the detention site. The FBI special agents did not return to DETENTION
SITE GREEN.
7. Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques
Leads to the Development of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA
Determines that "the Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative
Medical Procedures "
See analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by tlie CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the
IIB database. The titles ofspecific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are
listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III of the Committee Study.
See Presidential Speech on September 6,2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel. See also
ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some
information tliat he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh
Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Muklitar.' Tliis identification allowed us to
comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to tliis tenorist plotter—leads that
eventually resulted in liis capture. It was clear to his intenogators tliat Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of
information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed
a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also CIA Director Michael Hayden,
Classified Statement for the Record, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation
Program, April 12,2007 (DTS #2007-1563) ("...FBI and CIA continuedunsuccessfully to try to glean information
from Abu Zubaydah using established US Government intenogation techniques....").
' See reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu
Zubaydah," dated March 2005. Tlie same information is included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared
on 9 August 2006."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume HI for additional details.




In early July 2002, CIA officers held several meetings at CIA
Headquarters to discuss the possible use of "novel interrogation methods" on Abu Zubaydah.'^ "^
During the course of those meetings SWIGERT proposed using techniques derived from the U.S.
military's SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) school.SWIGERT provided a
list of 12 SERE techniques for possible use by the CIA: (1) the attention grasp, (2) walling, (3)
facial hold, (4) facial slap, (5) cramped confinement, (6) waU standing, (7) stress positions, (8)
sleep deprivation, (9) waterboard, (10) use of diapers, (11) use of insects, and (12) mock
burial.SWIGERT also recommended that the CIA enter into a contract with Hammond
DUNBAR, his co-author of the CIA report on potential al-Qa'ida interrogation resistance
training, to aid in the CIA interrogation process.Like SWIGERT, DUNBAR had never
participated in a real-world interrogation. His interrogation experience was limited to the paper
he authored with SWIGERT and his work with U.S. Air Force personnel at the SERE school.
See CIA document dated, July 3, 2002, 1630Hours, titled, "CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA
Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and |m|Raid "
For more information on the SEREprogram, see the SenateArmed Services Committee Inquiryinto the
Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, December2008. See also statement of Senator Carl Levin on the inquiry,
December 11, 2008; "SERE training is intended to be used to teach our soldiers how to resist interrogation by
enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions and international law. In SERE school, our troops who are at
riskof capture are exposed in a controlled environment withgreatprotections and caution- to techniques adapted
from abusive tactics used againstAmerican soldiers by enemies such as the CommunistChineseduring the Korean
War. SERE training techniques include stress positions, forced nudity,use of fear, sleep deprivation and, until
recently, the Navy SERE school used the waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste
of what they might be subjected to if capturedby a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they wouldbe better prepared to
resist. The techniques were never intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody. As one [Joint Personnel
Recovery Agency (JPRA)] instructorexplained,SERE training is based on illegal exploitation (under the rules listed
in the 1949 GenevaConvention RelativetotheTreati^nt ofPrisoners of War) ofprisoners over the last 50years."
Email from: subject: Description of Physical Pressures; date: July 8,
2002, at 04:15:15 PM.
ALEC•• (051724Z JUL 02)
See Resume, Hammond DUNBAR, submitted to the CIA in March 2003. In a section on "Interrogation and
Debriefing Experience," DUNBAR's 2003 resume noted that he had been a "debriefer for all USG DOD and
Civilian
|.)." All other experience in the section related to his
interrogation experience as acontractor for the Cl^beginningin^ DUNBAR's resume did state that he had
participated in an interrogation training course in 1992, and that he had taken a one-week
Defense Interrogation Courseat some point in 2002, although his resume does not indicate whether this wasprior to,
or after, the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. TheCIA's June 2013 Response states that the Committee Study was
"incorrect... in asserting that thecontractors selected had no relevant experience." The CIA's June 2013Response
notes SWIGERT and DUNBAR's experience at the Department of Defense SERE school, and SWIGERT's
"academic research" and "researchpapers"on "such topics as resistancetraining,captivity familiarization, and
learned helplessness - all of which were relevant to the development of the program." The CIA's June 2013
Responsedoes notdescribe any experience related to actual interrogations or counterterrorism, or any relevant
cultural, geographic, or linguistic expertise. TheCIA's June 2013 Response provides tliefollowing explanation:
"Drs. [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] hadtheclosest proximate expertise CIAsought at the beginning of the program,
specificallyin the area of non-standard meansof interrogation. Expertson traditional interrogation methods did not
meet this requirement. Non-standard interrogation methodologies were not an area of expertiseof CIA officersor of
the US Government generally. We believe their expertise was so unique that we would have been derelict had we
not sought them out when it became clear that CIA would be heading into the unchartedterritoryof the program"
(italics and emphasis in original). As noted above, the CIA did not seek out SWIGERT and DUNBAR after a
decision was made to use coercive interrogation techniques; rather, SWIGERT and DUNBAR played a role in
convincing the CIA to adopt such a policy.
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In May 2003, a senior CIA interrogator would tell personnel from
the CIA's Office of Inspector General that SWIGERT and DUNBAR's SERE school model was
based on resisting North Vietnamese "physical torture" and was designed to extract "confessions
for propaganda purposes" from U.S. airmen "who possessed little actionable intelligence." The
CIA, he believed, "need[ed] a different working model for interrogating terrorists where
confessions are not the ultimate goal."^^^
^/NF) After the July 2002 meetings, the CIA's |^^|CTC Legal,
|, drafted a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft asking the Department of
Justice for "a formal declination of prosecution, in advance, for any employees of the United
States, as well as any other personnel acting on behalf of the United States, who may employ
methods in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah that otherwise might subject those individuals to
prosecution."^"^® The letterfurther indicated that "theinterrogation teamhad concluded" that
"the use of more aggressive methods is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the
critical information we need to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women and
children within the United States and abroad." The letter added that these "aggressive methods"
would otherwise be prohibited by the torture statute, "apart from potential reliance upon the
doctrines of necessity or of self-defense."^"^^ This letter was circulated internally at the CIA,
including to SWIGERT; however, there are no records to indicate it was provided to the attorney
general.
On July 13, 2002, HI^HCTC Legal,
and the CIA's acting general counsel, John Rizzo, met with attorneys from the National Security
Council and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), as well as with Michael
Chertoff, the head of the Department of Justice Criminal Division, and Daniel Levin, the chief of
staff to the FBI director, to provide an overview of the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques
and to ask for a formal, definitive DOJ opinion regarding the lawfulness of employing the
specific CIA inten'ogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
The CIA attorneys described the 12 proposed interrogation
techniques and told the Department of Justice and National Security Council attorneys that Abu
Zubaydah continued to withhold critical intelligence on the identities of al-Qa'ida personnel in
the United States and planned al-Qa'ida attacks. The CIA attorneys also told the gi-oup that CIA
officers were complemented by:
"expert personnel retained on contract who possess extensive experience,
gained within the Department of Defense, on the psychological and physical
Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October
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methods of interrogation and the resistance techniques employed as
countermeasures to such interrogation."^"^
According to the CIA cable describing the meeting, the
representatives from the OLC, including Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, advised
that the criminal prohibition on torture would not prohibit the methods proposed by the
interrogation team becauseof the absence of any specific intent to inflict severe physicalor
mental pain or sufferingJ"^^ On July 13,2002, Yoo sent anunclassified letter to the CIA's acting
general counsel describing his interpretation of the statute.
Despite the initial view expressed by Yoo that the use of the
proposed CIA interrogation techniques would be lawful, on July 17, 2002, National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice requested a delay in the approval of the interrogation techniques for
Abu Zubaydah's interrogationuntil the attorney general issued an opinion.The following
day. Rice and Deputy NationalSecurity Advisor Stephen Hadley requested that the Department
of Justice "delay the approval of the memo detailing the next phase of interrogations" until the
CIA provided specific details on its proposed interrogation techniques and "an explanation of
why the CIA is confident these techniques will not cause lasting and irreparable harm to Abu
Zubaydah."'" '^^ Rice asked the CIA to provide the OLC with a description ofeach of the planned
interrogation techniques, and to "gather and provide any available empirical data on the reactions
and likelihood of prolonged mental harmfrom the use of the 'water board' and the staged
burial."'^^
On July 15, 2002, a cable providing details on the proposed
interrogation phase stated that only the DETENTION SITE GREEN chief of Base would be
allowed to interrupt or stop an inteiTogation in process, and that the chief of Base would be the
final decision-making authority as to whether the CIA's interrogation techniques applied to Abu
Zubaydah would be discontinued. ^^® The CIA officers at the detention site added:
"If [Abu Zubaydah] develops a serious medical condition which may involve a
host of conditions including a heart attack or another catastrophic type of
condition, all efforts will be made to ensure that proper medical care will be
provided to [him]. In the event [Abu Zubaydah] dies, we need to be prepared
to act accordingly, keeping in mind the liaison equities involving our hosts.
DIRECTOR lim(031357Z AUG 02)
DIRECTOR m (031357Z AUG 02)
July 13, 2002, Letter from John Yoo, Deputy AssistantAttorneyGeneral to John Rizzo, ActingGeneralCounsel,
CL\.
Memorandumfor the RecordfromJohn H. Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 17, 2002.
July 19, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandim for CI^L^ership, SENSITIVE
ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and Raid
July 21, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandi^ for CI^L^ership, SENSITIVE
ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and mH Raid HH-
10536 (151006ZJUL 02)
10536 (151006ZJUL 02)
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To address these issues, the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were
to die during the interrogation, he would be cremated.The interrogation team closed the cable
by stating:
"regardless which [disposition] option we follow however, and especially in
light of the planned psychological pressure techniques to be implemented, we
need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu Zubaydah] will remain in isolation
and incommunicado for the remainder of his life,"^^^
Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station responded to the
interrogation team's comments several days later. Their cable noted that the interrogation team
was correct in its "understanding that the interrogation process takes precedence over
preventative medical procedures."ALEC Station further observed:
"There is a fairly unanimous sentiment witiiin HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will
never be placed in a siaiation where he has any significant contact with others
and/or has the opportunity to be released. While it is difficult to discuss
specifics at this point, all major players are in concurrence that [Abu
Zubaydah] should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life. This
may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country, but
a final decision regarding his future incarceration condition has yet to be
made."^^^
^ result of the request by National Security Advisor Rice for
additional research on the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques, CIA and DOJ personnel
contacted individuals at the Department of Defense's Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA),
the agency that administers the SERE school, to gather information about the effects of using the
techniques in training exercises.According to CIA officer who had
mill joined the CIA's OTS after (j at JPRA, an individual with SERE school
experience commented that "information gleaned via harsh treatment may not be accurate, as the
prisoner may say anything to avoid further pain," and that "[c]urrent doctrine for interrogations
conducted in the permanent phase of capture may lean towards 'soft' or 'indirect' rounds of
questioning."157
Pursuant to National Security Advisor Rice's request, CIA
Headquarters personnel also requested information from the interrogation team—particularly
10536 (151006ZJUL 02)
10536 (151006Z JUL 02)
ALEC (182321Z JUL 02)
'55 ALEC ^•(182321ZJ^02)
'5''Email ACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002;
July 24, 2002, faxfrom^ |^J||^ H|^ HtoJohi^^ an^REDACTED^roviding information from the
OTS/OA^T^hologistsTemail^omr^^Blj^^l; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
with JPRA Chief of Staff; date: July 24, 2002.
'5'^ Email &omr|j||||H to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA infonnation; date: July 19, 2002.
Records indicatethat|||||||||||^|^ notes were not provided to the Department ofJustice. In November 2002,
along with Chief of InterrogationsH^BH^B;l£dthefirstCI^nterrogator training course.
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SWIGERT and DUNBAR—aboutthe psychologicaleffects of the use of the waterboard and
mock burial. The chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN responded by cable noting that:
"We are a nation of laws and we do not wish to parse words. A bottom line in
considering the new measuresproposed is that [Abu Zubaydah] is being held
in solitary confinement, againsthis will, without legal representation, as an
enemy of our country, our society and our people. Therefore, while the
techniques described in Headquarters meetings and below are administered to
student volunteers in the U.S. in a harmless way, with no measurable impact
on the psyche of the volunteer, we do not believe we can assure the same here
for a man forced through these processes and who will be made to believe this
is the future course of the remainder of his life. Station, [DETENTION SITE
GREEN chief of Base] and [DETENTION SITE GREEN] personnel will make
every effort possible to insure [sic] that subject is not permanently physically
or mental harmed but we should not say at the outset of this process that there
is no risk."^^^
As former psychologists for the United States Air Force,
SWIGERT and DUNBAR had no direct experience with the waterboard, as it was not used in
Air Force SERE training. Nonetheless, they indicated that the waterboard—which they
described as an "absolutely convincing technique"—was necessary to overwhelm Abu
Zubaydah's ability toresist.^^^ They also responded that they were aware that the Navy—which
used the waterboard technique in training—had not reported any significant long-term
consequences on individuals from its use. Unlike the CIA's subsequent use of the waterboard,
however, the Navy's use of the technique was a single training exercise and did not extend to
multiple sessions. SWIGERT and DUNBAR wrote:
"any physical pressure applied to exti'emes can cause severe mental pain or
suffering. Hooding, the use of loud music, sleep deprivation, controlling
darkness and light, slapping, walling, or the use of stress positions taken to
extreme can have the same outcome. The safety of any technique lies
primarily in how it is applied and monitored.'^ ^^
On July 24, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the use
of 10 interrogation techniques, which included: the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the
facial slap (insult slap), cramped confinement, wall standing, stresspositions, sleep deprivation,
use of diapers, and use of insects.The interrogation team, however, indicated that they
intended to wait for the approval to use the waterboard before proceeding with their
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. On July 26, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the
[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02)
•^•110568 (261 lOlZ JUL 02)
[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02)
DIRECTOR•• (251609Z AUG 02
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use of the waterboardJ^^ The OLC finalized its classified writtenlegal opinion on August 1,
2002. The earlier CIA request to conduct a mock burial was not formally considered by the
OLC. The approved interrogation techniques, along with other CIA interrogation techniques
that were subsequently identified and used by the CIA, are referred to as the CIA's "enhanced
interrogation techniques," or more commonly by the CIA as "EITs."
course of seeking approval to use the techniques, CIA
Headquarters advised the Depaitment of Justice and the nationalsecurity advisor that "countless
more Americans may die unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what he knows." CIA
Headquarters further represented that the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team
believed "Abu Zubaydah continues to withhold critical threat information," and "that in order to
persuade him to provide" that information, "the use of more aggressive techniques is
required."^^^ The cable to DETENTION SITEGREEN from CIA Headquarters documenting
the information CIA Headquarters had provided to the Department of Justice warned that "[t]he
legal conclusions are predicated upon the determinations by the interrogation team that Abu
Zubaydah continues towithhold critical threat information."^^"^ According tocables, however,
the CIA interrogators at the detention site had not determined that "the use of more aggressive
techniques was required" to "persuade" Abu Zubaydah to provide threat information. Rather,
the interrogation team believed the objective of the coercive inten-ogation techniques was to
confirm Abu Zubaydah did not have additional information on threats to the United States,
writing:
"Our assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high degree
of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information
concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has
already provided."^^^
described in this summary, and in more detail in the full
Committee Study, the interrogation team later deemed the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques a success, not because it resulted in critical threat information, but
because it provided further evidence that Abu Zubaydah had not been withholding the
aforementioned information from the interrogators.
8. The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques:
The CIA Does Not Brief the President
Email from: Rodriguez, [REDACTED],
subject: EYES ONLY- Where we stand re: Abu Zubaydah; date: July 26, 2002. See also
(261101ZJUL 02).
DIRECTOR IHIII (031357Z AUG 02)
DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02)
'65 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) and email from: to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],and subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN], [REDACTED]
73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: July 23, 2002, at 07:56:49 PM.
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
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As described, CIA officers represented to National Security
Advisor Rice that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information on pending attacks and operatives
in the United States. On July 31, 2002, Rice informed Deputy DCI John McLaughlin that, in
balancing the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against the possible
loss of American lives, she would not object to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques if
the attorney general determined them to be legal.
louring the month of July 2002, the CIA anticipated diat the
president would need to approve the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques before
they could be used. Therefore, in late July 2002, the CIA prepared talking points for a briefing
of the president. These draft talking points indicated that the CIA was planning to use
inteiTogation techniques beyond what was normally permitted by law enforcement, and included
a brief description of the waterboard interrogation technique. On August 1, 2002, based on
comments from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the talking points were revised to
eliminate references to the waterboard.CIA records indicate, however, that the talking points
were not used to brief the president. On August 2, 2002, the National Security Council legal
advisor informed the DCI's chief of staff that "Dr. Rice had been informed that there would be
no briefing of the President on this matter,but that the DCI had policy approval to employ
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
records state that prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah in 2002, the CIA did not brief Secretary of State
Colin Powell or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, two members of the National Security
Council, on the techniques.The Committee, including the chairman and vice chairman, was
also not briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques prior to their use.'^ ^
Approximately a year later, on July 31, 2003, senior CIA personnel
believed the president had still not been briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.In August 2003, DCI Tenet told the CIA Office of Inspector General that "he had
never spoken to the President regarding the detention and interrogation program or EITs, nor was
Memorandum for the Record from John Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 31, 2002.
July 26, 2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation; July 31,
2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation. Note that the draft
document lists the incorrect year.
CIA records do not indicate who informed National Security Advisor Rice "that there would be no briefing of the
President on this matter."
Email from: John Moseman; to: John McLaughlin, Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], John Rizzo, [REDACTED];
subject: Abu-Z Interrogation; datejAueust2j2002.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003.
See Volume II for additional information on congressional briefings.
An email from CIA Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo stated that "the President will be briefed as part
of the regular annual [covert action] review. Briefing (by Rice or VP or Counsel to the President or some
combination thereof) will describe the interrogation program, the fact that some aggressive but AG-approved
techniques have been used, but will not apparently get into the details of the techniques themselves." See email
from: John Rizzo; to: HHHH; subject^um^^orMnte^oeations^^ July 31, 2003.
III! null I III! Mill I
Page 38 of 499
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
he awareof whether the President had been briefed by his staff,"^^"^ The May 2004 CIA
Inspector General Special Review included a recommendation for the DCI to:
"Brief the President regarding the implementation of the Agency's detention
and inten-ogation activities pursuant to the MON of 17 September 2001 or any
other authorities, including the use of EITs and the fact that detainees have
died. This Recommendation is significant."^^^
In transmitting the Special Review to the Committee, DCI Tenet
responded to the recommendation, noting only that "[t]he DCI will determine whether and to
whatextent the President requires a briefing on the Program."^^^ On April6, 2006, CIA
Inspector General Helgerson responded to a request from Committee Vice Chairman John D.
Rockefeller IV on the status of con-ective actions taken in response to the Special Review
recommendations. With regard to a briefing for the president, Helgerson wrote: "Consistent
with this recommendation, DCI Tenet, before he left office, and Director Goss, shortly after
taking office, both advised me that they had made requests to brief the President."^^^ Prepared
"Questions and Answers" for the National Security Council principals in connection with the
disclosure of the program in September 2006 and subsequent media outreach also suggest that
the president was not briefed at the outset about the CIA's interrogation techniques. In response
to the potential question: "What role did the President play.. .Was he briefed on the interrogation
techniques, and if so when?" the proposed answer did not assert that the president was briefed,
but rather that the "President was not of course involved in CIA's day to day operations -
including who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are
made or overseen by CIA Directors.
'''• Office of General Counsel Comments on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program Special Review,
at 23 C'[i]n August 2003, the DCI advised OIG..."); CIA Office of Inspector General, Interview of George Tenet,
memorandum dated 8 September 2003, Subject; 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogation for Countertemorism
Purposes.
Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-
October 2003), May 7, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).
Letter from George J. Tenet to Chairman Pat Roberts, June 22, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).
Helgerson then added, "Additionally, public disclosure of many of these activities ensured wide awareness. In
light of tliese developments, I consider the matter closed." The Helgerson letter does not indicate to whom Directors
Tenet and Goss, who met regularly with the President, submitted requests to brief the President about the program.
See letter from John L. Helgerson to Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, April 5, 2006 (DTS #2006-1564). The
CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute these records. It states, however, that "[w]hile Agency records on the
subject are admittedly incomplete, former President Bush has stated in his autobiography that he discussed the
program, including the use of enhanced techniques, with DCIA Tenet in 2002, prior to application of the techniques
on Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." A subsequent memoir by former CIA Acting General
Counsel John Rizzo (published January 7, 2014) states, "The one senior U.S. Government national security official
during this time—from August 2002 through 2003—who I did not believe was knowledgeable about the E.I.T.s was
President Bush himself. He was not present at any of the Principal Committee meetings ... and none of the
principals at any of the E.I.T. sessions during this period ever alluded to the President knowing anything about
them."
Included in the packet of CIA infomiation was tlie following: "Question: 'What role did the President play in
authorizing this program? Did he select detainees held by CIA or direct their intenogation? Was he briefed on the
interrogation techniques, and if so when?' Answer: 'In the days after 9/11, the President directed that all the
instruments of national power, including tlie resources of our intelligence, military, and law enforcement
communities, beemployed tofight and winthewaragamstalQaedaandi^^ within the bounds of the law.




(TS/f^HlfllHIIIIII^/NF) CIA records indicate that the first CIA briefing for the president on
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques occurred on April 8, 2006.^^^ CIA records state that
when the president was briefed, he expressed discomfort with the "image of a detainee, chained
to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself."^ '^^
9. The CIA Uses the Waterboardand Other Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against
Abu Zubaydah
On August 3, 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the interrogation
team at DETENTION SITE GREEN that it had formal approval to apply the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, including the waterboard, against Abu Zubaydah. According to CIA
records, only the two CIA contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, were to have contact with Abu
Zubaydah. Other CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN - including CIA medical
personnel and other CIA "interrogators with whom he is familiar" - were only to observe.
From August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, the CIA subjected
Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced inteiTogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. After
Abu Zubaydah had been in complete isolation for 47 days, the most aggressive interrogation
phase began at approximately 11:50 AM on August 4, 2002.^^- Security personnel entered the
cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his towel (Abu Zubaydah was then
naked). Without asking any questions, the interrogators placed a rolled towel around his neck as
a collar, and backed him up into the cell wall (an interrogator later acknowledged the collai' was
This included important, new roles for CIA in detaining and questioning terrorists. [He was periodically updatedby
CIA Directorson significantcaptures of tenorists, and information obtainedthat helped stop attacks and led to
capture of other terrorists.] [ThePresident was not of course involvedin CIA's day to day operations- including
who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - thesedecisions are made or overseenby CIA
Directors]."' See Draft Questions and Proposed Answers, attached to Memorandum from NationalSecurity Advisor
StephenJ. Hadley; for; the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, Directorof
National Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; cc: chief of staff to the President, Counsel to the
President, Assistant to the President for National Security, WhiteHouseSpokesman, dated September2, 2006.
Brackets in the original.
See April 16, 2008,CIA "Backgrounder: Chronology of Interrogation Approvals, 2001-2003" (notingthat "CIA
documentation and discussions withPresidential briefers and individuals involved withthe interrogation program at
the time suggest that details on enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were not shared with the President" in the
2001-2003 timeframe); CIA Q&A, Topic: Waterboarding ("The information we have indicates the President was not
briefed by CIA regarding the specificinterrogation techniques until April 2006, and at that time DCIA Goss briefed
himon theseven EITsproposed at thattime for the post-Detainee Treatment ActCIAinterrogation program."). As
described, in the April 2006 briefing the President "expresseddiscomfort" with the "image of a detainee, chained to
the ceiling, clothed in adiaper^n^or^d to go to the bathroom on himself." See email from: Grayson SWIGERT;
to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June meetingwith DCI; date: June 7, 2006.
Email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June
meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.
Increased Pressure in theNext PhaseoftheAbuZuba^ah Interrogations, Attachment toemail from:
[REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED^^I; subject: Increased Pressure Phase - forDCI Sensitive Addendum; date: July 10, 2002.
10586 (041559Z AUG 02)
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used to slam Abu Zubaydah against a concrete wall).'^ ^ The interrogators then removed the
hood, performed an attention grab, and had Abu Zubaydah watch while a large confinement box
was brought into the cell and laid on the floor.A cable states Abu Zubaydah "was unhooded
and the large confinement box was carried into the interrogation room and paced [sic] on the
floor so as to appear as a coffin."^^^ The interrogators then demanded detailed and verifiable
information on terrorist operations planned against the United States, including the names, phone
numbers, email addresses, weapon caches, and safe houses of anyone involved. CIA records
describe Abu Zubaydah as appearing apprehensive. Each time Abu Zubaydah denied having
additional information, the interrogators would perform a facial slap or face grab.^^^ At
approximately 6:20 PM, Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded for the first time. Over a two-and-a-
half-hour period, Abu Zubaydah coughed, vomited, and had "involuntary spasms of the torso and
extremities" during waterboarding.^^^ Detention site personnel noted that "throughout the
process [Abu Zubaydah] was asked and given the opportunity to respond to questions about
threats" to the United States, but Abu Zubaydah continued to maintain that he did not have any
additional information to provide,In an email to OMS leadership entitled, "So it begins," a
medical officer wrote:
"The sessions accelerated rapidly progressing quickly to the water board after
large box, walling, and small box periods. [Abu Zubaydali] seems very
resistant to the water board. Longest time with the cloth over his face so far
has been 17 seconds. This is sure to increase shortly. NO useful information
See email from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of
today; date: March 28, 2007, at 04:42 PM, which states AbuZubaydahclaims "a collar was used to slam him
against a concrete wall. While we do not have a record that this occurred,one inteiTogator at the site at the time
confirmed that tliis did indeed happen. For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at the site
after the walling on the concrete wall."
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10586 (041559Z AUG 02)
10586 (041559Z AUG 02); ••• 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10586 (041559Z AUG 02). CIA contractor DUNBAR later told the CIA OIG that "[tjheir
instRictions from [chief of Base] were to focus on only one issue, that is, Zubaydah's knowledge of plans to attack
tlie U.S." According to the OIG's record of the interview, "[DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT] could ask that question in
a number of ways, but it was the only theme they were authorized by [chief of Base] to use with [Abu] Zubaydah."
{See February 10, 2003, interview report of Hammond DUNBAR, Office of the Inspector General.) The acting
chief ofStation inCountry |, in an interview with the CIA OIG, stated that "there were days at [DETENTION
SITE GREEN] when the team had no requirements from Headquarters," and that CTC did not give the chief of Base
(COB) the "flexibility as COBtoaskotherques^ besides those related to threats tothe United States. {See May
28, 2003, interview report of||||||m||||m|, Office of tlie Inspector General.) The chief of Support
Services at the CIA Station stated that "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] were fmstrated that they kept beating
Zubaydah up on th^am^uestioi^Wl^etting the same physiologic response from him." {See May 21, 2003,
interview report of Office of the Inspector General.) Other interviewees described how
analytical assumptions about Abu Zubaydah drove the interrogation process. {See May 22, 2003, inter^w report of|, Office ofthe Inspector General; and February 27, 2003, interview report ofm
|, Office of theInspector General.) ChiefofCTC, Jose Rodriguez, toldtheOIG that "CTC subject
matter experts" pointed to intelligence that they said indicated that Abu Zubaydah knew more than he was admitting
and thus disagreed with the assessment from DETENTION SITE GREEN that Abu Zubaydah was "compliant."
According to the OIG's record of die Jose Rodriguez interview, "disagreement between the analysts and
interrogators can be healthy, but in this case Rodriguez believes that the analysts were wrong." {Seeinterview of
Jose Rodriguez, Office of tlie Inspector General^March6j2003^^^^^^^^^
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including "walling, attentiongrasps, slapping, facial hold, stress positions, cramped confinement,
white noise and sleep deprivation"—continued in "varyingcombinations, 24 hours a day" for 17
straight days, through August 20, 2002}^^ When Abu Zubaydah was left alone during this
period, he was placed in a stress position, left on the waterboard with a cloth over his face, or
locked in one of two confinement boxes. According to the cables, Abu Zubaydah was also
subjected to the waterboard "2-4 times a day...with multiple iterations of the watering cycle
during each application."'^^
The "aggressive phase of interrogation" continued until August 23,
2002.^^^ Over the course of the entire 20 day "aggressive phase of interrogation," Abu Zubaydah
spent a total of 266 hours (11 days, 2 hours) in the large (coffin size) confinement box and 29
hours in a small confinement box, which had a width of 21 inches, a depth of 2.5 feet, and a
height of 2.5 feet. The CIA interrogators told Abu Zubaydah that the only way he would leave
the facility was in the coffin-shaped confinement box.'^ ^
According to the daily cables from DETENTION SITE GREEN,
Abu Zubaydah frequently "cried," "begged," "pleaded," and "whimpered," but continued to
deny that he had any additional information on current threats to, or operatives in, the United
States,
August 9, 2002, the sixth day of the interrogation period, the
interrogation team informed CIA Headquarters that they had come to the "collective preliminary
assessment" that it was unlikely Abu Zubaydah "had actionable new information about current
threats to the United States."On August 10, 2002, the interrogation team stated that it was
"highly unlikely" that Abu Zubaydah possessed the information they were seeking,On the
same day, the interrogation team reiterated a request for personnel from CIA Headquarters to
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET// //NOFORN
so far.. ..He did vomit a couple of times during the water board with some
beans and rice. It's been 10 hours since he ate so this is surprising and
disturbing. We plan to only feed Ensure for a while now. Fm head[ing] back
for another water board session."^^^
//NF) The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques-
Emphasis in the original. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: So
it begins; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09AM. CIA Director Hayden informed the Committee in 2007 that "in tlie
section [of the ICRC report] on medical care,thereport omitskeycontextual facts. Forexample, Abu Zubaydali's
statement that he was given only Ensure and water for two to three weeks fails to mention the fact that he was on a
liquid diet quite appropriate because he was recoveringfrom abdominal surgery at the time."
10644 (201235Z AUG 02). Forthefirst 17days, the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were
usedagainst Abu Zubaydah in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day." The "aggressive phase," as defined by the
CIA, continued for an additional three days. TheCIAcontinued to use its enhanced interrogation techniques against
Abu Zubaydah until August 30,2002.
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10667 (231206ZAUG 02);|
10615 (120619Z AUG 02)
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10604 (091624Z AUG 02)
10607 (100335Z AUG 02)
TOP SECRET//
10672 (240229Z AUG 02)
//NOFORN




travel to the detention site to view the interrogations. A cable stated that the team believed that a
"first-hand, on-the-ground look is best," but if CIA Headquarters personnel could not visit, a
video teleconference would suffice.DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel also informed
CIA Headquarters that it was their assessment that the application of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques was "approach[ing] the legal limit."^^^ The chiefof CTC, Jose
Rodriguez, responded:
"Strongly urge that any speculative language as to the legality of given
activities or, more precisely, judgment calls as to their legality vis-a-vis
operational guidelines for this activity agreed upon and vetted at the most
senior levels of the agency, be refrained from in written traffic (email or cable
traffic). Such language is nothelpful."^^^
detention SITE GREEN cables describe Abu Zubaydah as
"compliant," informing CIA Headquarters that when the interrogator "raised his eyebrow,
without instructions," Abu Zubaydah "slowly walked on his own to the water table and sat
down."^®'^ When the inten'ogator "snappedhis fingers twice," AbuZubaydah would lie flat on
the waterboard.^®^ Despite the assessment of personnel at the detention site that Abu Zubaydah
was compliant, CIA Headquarters stated that they continued to believe that Abu Zubaydah was
withholding threat information and instructed the CIA interrogators to continue using the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.
times Abu Zubaydah was described as "hysterical"^^^ and
"distressed to the level thathe was unable to effectively communicate."-^ Waterboarding
sessions "resulted in immediate fluid intake and involuntary leg, chest and arm spasms" and
"hysterical pleas.In at least one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah "became completely
10607 (100335Z AUG 02). On August 2002, a video-conference between DETENTION SITE
GREEN and CIA Headquaiters occuned, which included an interrogation videodescribed by the inteirogation team
as "quite graphic" and possibly "disturbing to some viewers." After tlie video-conference, CIA Headquarters
instructed DETENTION SITE GREEN to continue the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques against
Abu Zubaydah, but agreed to send two CIA Headquarters officers to the detention site to obsei-ve the interrogations
first-hand. On August 2002, a team from CIA Headquarters, including ^^^|CTC Legal
and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station visitedDETENTION SITE GREEN and observed tlieuse
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding. The
ended after the arrival of the officers from CIA Headqua^rs. See
02); ALECHH(im AUG 02); •••I 10643 (••• AUG 02);
02)j_and^^^B(l067^40229Z AUG 02).
10607 (100335Z AUG 02)
Email from: Jose Rodi'iguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTIONSITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002,
with attachment of earlier email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED].
10614 (111633Z AUG 02)
10614 (111633Z AUG 02)
202 See, for example, ALEC^^H (101728 AUG 02); ALEC •
i^G 02); and 10700 (280820Z AUG 02).
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
ressive phase of intenogation"
10616 AUG
10667 (231206Z AUG
(130034Z AUG 02); ALEC
10643 (191518Z AUG 02)
10643 (191518Z AUG 02)
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unresponsive, withbubbles rising through his open, full mouth."^*^^ According to CIArecords,
AbuZubaydah remained unresponsive until medical intervention, when he regained
consciousness and expelled "copious amounts of liquid." This experience with the waterboard
was referenced in emails, but was not documented or otherwise noted in CIA cables.^^^ When
two CIA Headquarters officers later compared the Abu Zubaydah interrogation videotapes to the
cable record, neither commented on this session. A review of the catalog of videotapes,
however, found that recordings of a 21-hour period, which included two waterboarding sessions,
208
were missmg.
CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN reported being
disturbed by the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
CIA records include the following reactions and comments by CIA personnel:
• August 5, 2002: "want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly not a
place he's ever been before in his medical career...It is visually and psychologically
very uncomfortable."^®^
• August 8, 2002: "Today's first session.. .had a profound effect on all staff members
present.. .it seems the collective opinion that we should not go much
further.. .everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to continue.. .we cannot
guarantee how much longer."-^®
• August 8, 2002: "Several on the team profoundly affected.. .some to the point of
tears and chokingup."-"
The description of the episode statedthat"on beingrighted, he failed to respond until the interrogators gavehim
a xyphoid thrust (with our medi^folks edcin^owai^tl^room)." This passage was included in multiple emails,
to include emails from the ||^^|OMS, to; [DETENTION
SIT^BLj^] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from:
mm, OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^i^ect: Re: Acceptable lower ambient temperatures;
date: March 7, 2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED];
subjec^Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; and email from:
to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject:
Discussion with Dai^evin-A^date: October 26, 2004, at6:09 PM.
Email from: OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^ubiect: Re: Acceptable lower
ambient temperatures; date; March 7,2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: HHSfeHII' OMS; to: [REDACTED]
and [REDACTED]^ubie^Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM;
email from: •HHIHI; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
and [REDACTED]; subject: Re; Discussions with Dan Levin - AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM.
CIA Inspector General's Special Reviewon Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities issuedon
May 7, 2004.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5,
2002, at 05:35AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], ||||||^|^m, and [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date:
August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to; [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject; Update; date:
August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.
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• August 9, 2002: "two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer" away from
the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.^
• August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu Zubaydah on video "has produced
strong feelings of futility (and legality) of escalating or even maintaining the
pressure." Per viewing the tapes, "prepare for something not seen previously."^^^
After the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques
ended, CIA personnel at the detention site concluded that Abu Zubaydah had been truthful and
tliat he did not possess any new terrorist threat information.
As noted, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided
the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and
approved: information on the next terrorist attack and operatives in the United States.
Furthermore, as compared to the period prior to August 2002, the quantity and type of
intelligence produced by Abu Zubaydah remained largely unchanged during and after the August
2002 use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. '^^ Nonetheless, CIA Headquarters
informed the National Security Council that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used
against Abu Zubaydah were effective and were "producing meaningfulresults.A cable from
Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
August 9, 2002, at 10:44:16 PM.
213 Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
at 09:45 AM.
See, forexample, ••• 10672 (240229Z AUG 02).
2'-'' See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for detailson Abu Zubaydah's intelligence production. As
noted, Abu Zubaydah was taken into CIA custodyon March 2002, and washospitalized until April 15, 2002.
During the months of Apriland May 2002, which included a periodduring which Abu Zubaydahwas on life support
and unable to speak, the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah produced95 intelligencereports. Abu Zubaydah spent
much of June 2002 and all of July 2002 in isolation, without being asked any questions. The CIA reinstituted
contact with Abu Zubaydah on August4, 2002, and immediately began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques—including the waterboard. During the monthsof August iuid September 2002, Abu Zubaydah produced
91 intelligence reports, four fewer than the first two monthsof his CIA detention. CIA records indicate tliat the type
of intelligence Abu Zubaydah provided remained relatively constantprior to and after the use of the CIA's enhanced
intenogation techniques. According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah providedinformation on "al-Qa'ida activities,
plans, capabilities,and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities,
decision-making processes, tiaining, and tactics." See also CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005,
as well as "Abu Zubayd^iBio|^ dorament, "Prepare^)r^^ugus^006."
On August 30, 2002, l-^egal, ^SC Legal Adviser John Bellinger to
discuss Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. See email fi:om: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC
Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002; ALEC (052227ZSEP 02). In his email documenting the meeting,
'noted that we had employed the walling techniques,confinement box, waterboaid, along witli some of
the otlier methods which also had been approved by the Attorney General," and "reported that while the experts at
tlie site and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the recent sessions, it did appear that the current
phase was producing meaningful results." (See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with
NSC Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002.) The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described
to Bellinger with respect to either the use of the techniques or the "results"of the intenogation. It is unclear from
CIA records whether the CIA ever informed the NSC Legal Adviseror anyone else at the NSC or the Department of
Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide information about futme attacksagainst the United States or operatives
tasked to commit attacks in the U.S. during or after the use of tlie CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques.
nil null imiimii
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and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date:
and [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002,
UNCLASSIFIED
DETENTION SITE GREEN, which CIA records indicate was authored by SWIGERT and
DUNBAR, also viewed the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah as a success. The cable
recommended that "the aggressive phase at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] should be used as a
template for future interrogation of high value captives,"^'^ not because the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques produced useful information, but rather because their use confirmed that
Abu Zubaydah did not possess the intelligence that CIA Headquarters had assessed Abu
Zubaydah to have. The cable from the detention site stated:
"Our goal was to reach the stagewhere we have broken any will or ability of
subject to resist or deny providing us information (intelligence) to which he
had access. We additionally sought to bring subject to the point that we
confidently assess that he does not/not possess undisclosed threat information,
or intelligence that could prevent a terrorist event."~"^
The cable further recommended that psychologists—a likely
reference to contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR — "familiar with interrogation, exploitation
and resistance to interrogation should shape compliance of high value captives prior to
debriefing by substantive experts."-^^
From Abu Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002, to his transfer
to Department of Defense custody on September5, 2006, infomiation provided by Abu
Zubaydah resulted in 766 disseminated intelligence reports."^^ According to CIA documents,
Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and
relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities,
decision-making processes, training, and tactics."-'^ As noted, this type of information was
provided by Abu Zubaydah before,during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. At no time during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
According to CIA records, on September 27, 2002, the CIA briefed the chairman and the vice chairman of the
Committee, Senators Graham andShelby, as well as theCommittee staffdirectors, on AbuZubaydiili's
interrogation. The CIA's memorandum of the briefing indicates that the chairman and vice chairman were briefed
on "the enhanced techniques that had been employed," as well as "die nature andquality of reporting provided by
Abu Zubaydah." See (DIRECTOR (252018Z OCT 02).
••• 10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
The Committee usessole-source intelligence reporting in this summary. While CIA multi-source intelligence
reports are included in the full Committee Study, the focusof the Committee analysisis on sole-source intelligence
reporting, as these reports were deemed to more accurately reflect useful reporting from individual CIA detainees.
Asbackground, multi-source intelligence reports are reports thatcontain data from multiple detainees. Forexample,
a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA detainees at
a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees wereor were not able to identify
or provide infomiation on the individual. As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS (202255Z JUN
06), which states that from January 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hanibali was "used in the
dissemination of three intelligence reports, twoof which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Baydetainees," and
the third of which "detailed [Hambali's] statement that he knewof no threats or plots to attackany world sporting
events." Sole-sourcereports, by contrast, are basedon specific information provided by one CIA detainee.
CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005. Same information included inan "Abu Zubaydah
Bio"document "Prepared on 9 August 2006."
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did Abu Zubaydah provide information about operatives in, or future attacks against, the United
States.
10. A CIA Presidential Daily BriefProvides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of
Abu Zubaydah
Although CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN agreed
that Abu Zubaydahwas compliant and cooperative, personnel at CIA Headquarters prepared a
Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) in October 2002 that, according to a cable, "accurately reflect[ed]
the collective HQS view of the information provided [by Abu Zubaydah] to date."-^^ The
October 2002 PDB stated Abu Zubaydah was still withliolding "significant threat information,"
including information on operatives in the United States, and that Abu "Zubaydah resisted
providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the
hope of improving his living conditions."" '^^ The PDB made noreference to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques or the counter-assessment from the detention site interrogation team
indicating that Abu Zubaydah was cooperative and not withholding information.^^^
documents identified the "key intelligence" acquired from
Abu Zubaydah as information related to suspected terrorists Jose Padilla and Binyam
Mohammad, information on English-speaking al-Qa'ida member Jaffar al-Tayyar, and
information identifying KSM as the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks who used the
alias "Mukhtar."^^^ All of this information was acquired by FBI special agents shortly after Abu
Zubaydah's capture.^^^
The CIA has consistently represented that Abu Zubaydah stated
that the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques were necessary to gain his cooperation. For
example, the CIA informed the OLC that:
"As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques,
'brothers who are captured and interrogated aie permitted by Allah to provide
Sec Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.223 ALEC |||i|f(181439Z OCT 02)
224 ALEC (181439Z OCT 02)
22'' Among other documents, 10667 (231206Z AUG 02); ••• 10672 (240229Z AUG 02); and
email from: [REDACTED] (j^^^HclSof Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN); to: CIA Headquarters; subject:
"Assessment to Date" of Abu Zubaydah; date: October 6,2002, at 05:36:46 AM.
22'' See "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and KSM," dated February 2008, updated for
briefings on several dates, including for a 2009 briefing to Director Leon Panetta, as well as the "Effectiveness
Memo" provided to the Department of Justice, testimonyprovidedby CIA Director Michael Hayden, and other
documents discussed in detail in Volume 11. For example, see ODNI September 2006 press release stating: "During
initial inteiTogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was
important,however,including that KhalidShaykhMohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the
moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names,
opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventuallyresulted in his capture. It was clear to his
intenogators that Abu Zubaydali possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped
all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe,
effective, and legal."
22^ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.




information when they believe they have 'reached the limit of their ability to
withhold it' in the face of psychological and physical hardships.
As is described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, CIA
records do not support the CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah made these statements.^^^ CIA
records indicate that Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always intended to talk and never
believed he could withhold information from interrogators.^ '^^ In February 2003, Abu Zubaydah
told a CIA psychologist thathe believed prior to his capture that every captured "brother" would
talk in detention and that he told individuals at a terrorist training camp that "brothers should be
able to expect that the organization will make adjustments to protectpeopleand plans when
someone with knowledge is captured.""^'
11. The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation ofAbu Zubaydah
I" contrast to relatively open communications that the CIA had
with the Committee following the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON, the CIA
significantly limited its communications with the Committee on its detention and interrogation
activities after Abu Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002.^^^ In responses to threedifferent
sets of Committee Questions for the Record addressed to the CIA regarding the MON authorities
in the spring and summer of 2002, the CIA provided no indication that the CIA had established
DETENTION SITE GREEN, or was using, or considering using, coercive interrogation
techniques.'-^^
On September 27, 2002, CIA officials provided a briefing on Abu
Zubaydah's interrogation only to Committee Chairman Bob Graham, Vice Chairman Richard
Shelby, and their staff directors. After this briefing Chairman Graham made multiple and
228 Memorandumfor John A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputy General Counsel,Central IntelligenceAgency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re; Application of
United StatesObligations Under Article 16of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the InteiTogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). This OLC mejiiorandum
citesCIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from
HHI'HI Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist
Interrogation Techniques."
^^Mj^iU^her^re no records of Abu Zubaydah making these statements, the deputy chief of ALEC Station,
told the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, that the "best information [tlie CIA] received on
how tohandle die [CIA] detainees came from a wallc-in [asource ^
to volunteer information to the CIA] after the arrest of Abu Zubaydah. He told us we were
underestimating Al-Qa'ida. Thedetainees were happy to be arrested by the U.S. because theygot a big show trial.
When theywere turned over to [foreign governments], they were treated badly so they talked. Allah apparently
allows youto talk if you feel threatened. The [CIA] detainees never counted on being detained by us outside the
U.S. and being subjected to methods they never dreamed of." See Memorandum for the Record;
subject^^ting with deputy chief, CounterteiTorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
10496 (1620I4Z FEB 03)^or more information, see a March 7, 2005, cable describing Abu
Zubaydah|^ xplanations more fully (|^| 2166 (070647Z MAR 05)).|M^Hi0496 (162014Z FEB 03) For additional details on this matter, see Volume D, specifically the section
on information provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice.
The information providedby the CIA to the Committee on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is
summarized later in this document, and described in greater detail in Volume IL
See Volume 11, specifically the section on CIA representations to Congress.
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specific requests for additional information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
Internal CIA emails include discussion of how the CIA could "get... off the hook on the cheap"
regarding Chairman Graham's requests for additional information.^-^"^ In the end, CIA officials
simply did not respond to Graham's requests prior to his departure from the Committee in
January 2003.
C. Interrogation in Country | and the January 2003 Guidelines
1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour
Officer in Charge
for a specialized CIA detentionfaciHtym Country | began
in April 2002, with the intention that itwould be "totally under [|^^^^H]/Station
Control.On June 6, 2002, CIA Headquarters approved more than $200,000 for the
construction of the facility, identified in this summary as "DETENTION SITE COBALT."^^^ In
a 2003 interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, Associate Deputy Director for
Operations ^n|||^^m|||| described his views ofthis facility and "stated that [DETENTION
SITE COBALT] wasopened^cause there needed to be adetention site in [Country |] for those
detainees enroute [DETENTION SITE GREEN]. It was not a place for the use
ofEITs."^^^
DETENTION SITE COBALT, constructed with CIA funding,
opened in Country | in September 2002.^^^ According to CIA records, the windows at
DETENTION SITE COBALT were blacked out and detainees were kept in total darkness. The
guards monitored detainees using headlamps and loud music was played
constantly in the facility. While in their cells, detainees were shackled to the wall and given
buckets for human waste. Four of the twenty cells at the facility included a bar across the top of
the cell.^^^ Later reports describe detainees being shackled to thebai" with their hands above
their heads, forcing them to stand, and therefore not allowing the detainees to sleep.^"^^
Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John H. Moseman; cc: Scott Mtiller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached
document] Re: Graliam request on interrogations; date: December 9, 2002, at 05:46:11 PM.
By June 2002 the CIA had taken custody offive detainees who were captured outside ofCountry Hand placed
detention facilities. The detainees were held at the Country B facilities atthese CIA detainees in Country
the request of the CIA and the CIA had unlimited access to them.
236 DIRECTOR (062212Z JUN 02)
23'' Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,
September 9, 2003.
238 For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume I and Volume HI. Tlie specific date
has been generalized at the request of the CIA.
23^ 28246
2'*° For additional information on DETENTION SIT^COBALT^ce Volume I an^Volum^U^n^mon^ther
documents: 31118 DIRECTO |^^ ^^J|^ Hp[|B|||||||B email
from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], I^^^HB^BIREDACTED];
subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureauof Prisons;date: December 4,2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to:
[REDACTED]; subject: Meetingwith SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December5, 2002; Special Review,
Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTOgation Activities (Septembe^OO^^cto^r 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7,
2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director o^perations^romHHB||^ ^^^H|, January 28, 2003, Subject:
III! 11 III I I'll Mill I






\fm¥} The CIA officer in charge ofDETENTION SITE COBALT,
[CIA OFFICER 1], was a junior officer on his first overseas assignment with
no previous experience or training in handling prisoners or conducting interrogations.
[CIA OFFICER 1] was the DETENTION SITE COBALT manager during the period in which a
CIA detainee died and numerous CIA detainees were subjected to unapproved coercive
interrogation techniques.-"^^ Areview ofCIA records found that priorto [CIA
OFFICER I's] deployment and assignment as the CIA*s DETENTION SITE COBALT
manager, other CIA officers recommended [CIA OFFICER 1] not have continued
access to classified information due to a"lack ofhone^, judgment, and maturity."^"^"
According to records, "the chief ofCTC told [Hi^l [CIA OFFICER 1]] that he would not
want [him] in his overseas station."^"^^ A supervising officer assessed that [CIA
OFFICER 1]:
"has issues with judgment and maturity, [and his] potential behavior in the
field is also worrisome. [The officer] further advised that [|||[|||||[| [CIA
OFFICER 1]] was only put into processing for an overseas position so that
someone would evaluate all of the evidence of this situation all together. [The
officer further noted that [|^H|| [CIA OFFICER 1]] might not listen to his
chief of station when in the field.
2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details ofInterrogations in
Country |
Detainees held in Country | were detained under the authority of
the MON; however, CIA officers conducted no written assessment of whether these detainees
DeaO^n^stigation - Gul RAHMAN; and CIA Inspector General, Reportoflnvestigation, Death of aDetainee |
Hmi (2003-7402-10), April 27, 2005. One senior interrogator, told the CIA OIG that
"literally, a detainee could go for days or weekswithout anyone looking at him," and that his team found one
detaineewho, "'as far as we coulddetermine,' had been chained to the wallin a standing positionfor 17days."
According to the CIA interrogator, someof the CIAdetainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT "'literally looked
like a dog that had been kenneled.' When the doors to their cells were opened, 'they cowered.'" {See Interview
Report, 2003-7123-IG, Revie\^nnte^ogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, M^^llilllllii> April 30, 2003.)
The chief of interrogations, told the CIA OIG that "[DETENTION SITECOBALT] is good for
interrogations because it is the closest thing hehas seen toadungeon, facilitating the displacement ofdetaineeKions." {See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ||^ |
April 7, 2003.) An analyst who conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT told the CIA
OIG that "[DETENTION SITECOBALT] is an EIT." {See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of
Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ^|B|||||B, May 8, 2003.)
See April 27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee
April 7, 2005,Memorandum for JohnHelgerson, Inspector General, fromRobert Grenier, Subject: Comments on
Draft Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG).
, Subject:
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"pose[d] a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or...
[we]re planning terrorist activities." The CIA maintained such poor records of its detainees in
Country | during this period that the CIA remains unable to determine the number and identity
of the individuals it detained. The full details of the CIA interrogations there remain largely
unknown, as DETENTION SITE COBALT was later found to have not reported multiple uses of
sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation,
reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and "rough treatment" of CIA detainees.
3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country | Use the
CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar
Ridha al-Najjar was the first CIA detainee to be held at
DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Najjar, along with Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr an^a
number of other individuals, was arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, after raids conducted t>y
^^^mPakistan^^^l in late May 2002.^"^^ Al-Najjar was identified by the CIA as a
former bodyguard for Usama bin Laden,^"^^ and was rendered with Abu Bakr to CIA custody at a
Counti-y I detention facility on June |, 2002. '^^ ^ Ridha al-Najjar was transferred
to DETENTION SITE COBALT on September B, 2002.^^^
While the CIA was describing to the Department of Justice why it
needed to use the CIA's enhanced inten*ogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, a parallel
internal discussion at the CIA was taking place regarding Ridha al-Najjar. An ALEC Station
cable from a CTC officer stated that, on June 27, 2002:
"ALEC/HQS held a strategy session regarding the interrogation of high
priority detainee Ridha Ahmed al-Najjar in [Country |]. The
goal of the session was to review the progress of the interrogation to date and
to devise a general plan as to how best to proceed once the new [Country |
HH] detention/debriefing facility [i.e., DETENTION SITE COBALT] is
completed."250
The meeting participants included individuals who were also
involved in discussionsrelatedtoAbi^ub^ interrogatiojMncludin^e^ chief of
ALEC Station, LegA
The full Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Wliile
tliere are no records of the CIA using the waterboard at COBALT, the waterboard device in tlie photograph is
surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a
watering can resting on the wooden beams of the waterboard. In meetings between tlie Committee Staff and the
CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain tlie details of the photograph, to include the buckets,




250 I I I BMl " ' "" 02). Although the plans at the time were for DETENTION SITE COBALT to be
owned and operated by the Country | government, the detention site was controlled and overseen by tlie CIA and
its officers from the day it became operationalinSeptember2002^^^^^^^




2002, to the CIA Station in Country
against Ridha al-Najjar, including:
A cable followed on July 16,
suggesting possible interrogation techniques to use
utilizing "Najjar's fear for the well-being of his family to our benefit," with the cable
explicitly stating that interrogators could not "threaten his family with imminent death";
using "vague threats" to create a "mind virus" that would cause al-Najjar to believe that
his situation would continue to get worse until he cooperated;^^^
manipulating Ridha al-Najjar's environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and
253• employing sleep deprivation through the use of round-the-clock interrogations.
The cable went on to note that the "possibility that [al-Najjar] may
have current threat or lead information demands that we keep up the pressure on him."^^"^ With
the exception of a brief mention of "diminished returns from the most recent interviews of al-
Najjar," and references to the detainee's complaints about physical ailments, the cable offers no
evidence al-Najjar was actively resisting CIA interrogators."^^
Ten days later, on July 26, 2002, CIA officers in Country |, none
of whom had been trained in the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, proposed
putting al-Najjar in isolation^^^ and using "sound disorientation techniques," "sense of time
deprivation," limited light, cold temperatures, and sleepdeprivation.^^^ The CIA officers added
that they felt they had a "reasonable chance of breaking Najjar" to get "the intelligence and
locator lead information on UBL and Bin Ladin's family.The plan for al-Najjar was
circulated to senior CIA officers as part of the Daily DCI Operations Update.-^^
ALEC
Legal,
162135Z JUL 02). The deputy chiefof ALEC Station, and H||^^^|CTC
would later travel to DETENTION SITE GREEN to observe the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
The term "mind virus" first appeared in the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. See 10086 (201900Z
APR 02).
25^ Referenced July 16, 2002, cable is ALEC HII (162135Z JUL 02).
ALEC (162135Z JUL 02)
255 ALEC•• (162135Z JUL 02)
At this time,July 26, 2002,Abu Zubaydah was in isolation at DETENTION SITEGREEN. Abu Zubaydah was
placed in isolation on June 18,2002,andremained in isolation for 47 days, until the CIA begansubjecting him to its
enhance^nteiTogat^^ on August 4, 2002.
2-'^ 25107 (260903Z JUL02)
25107 (260903Z JUL 02)
259 Email from: [REDACTEDjUo^uzz^rongard, John O. Brennan, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], John H.
Moseman, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED]7^H||||^ H, Rodriguez^^^m^^^^Kjohn P.
Mudd, •••••, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
III! I (nil i




August 5, 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah's interrogation
using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN began, CIA
Headquarters autliorized the proposed interrogation plan for al-Najjar, to include the use of loud
music (at less than the level that would cause physical harm such as permanent hearing loss),
worse food (as long as it was nutritionally adequate for sustenance), sleep deprivation, and
hooding.^^^
More than a month later, on September 21, 2002, CIA interrogators
described al-Najjar as "clearly a broken man" and "on the verge of complete breakdown" as
result of the isolation.^^^ The cable added that al-Najjarwas willing to do whatever the CIA
officer asked.
In October 2002, officers from the U.S. military conducted a short
debriefing of al-Najjar at DETENTION SITE COBALT and subsequently expressed an interest
in a more thorough debriefing.^^^ On November 2002, a U.S. military legal advisor visited
DETENTION SITE COBALT and described itas a"CIA detentioi^acility/^ioting that "while
CIA is the only user of the facility they contend it is a [Country facility."^^"^
The U.S. military officer also noted that the junior CIA officer designated as warden of the
facility "has little to no experience with interrogating or handling prisoners." With respect to al-
Najjar specifically, the legal advisor indicated that the CIA's interrogation plan included
"isolation in total darkness; lowering the quality of his food; keeping him at an uncomfortable
temperature (cold); [playing music] 24 hours a day; and keeping him shackled and hooded." In
addition, al-Najjar was described as having been left hanging—which involved handcuffing one
or both wrists to an overhead bar which would not allow him to lower his ai*ms—for 22 hours
each day for two consecutive days, in order to "'break' his resistance." It was also noted al-
Najjar was wearing a diaper and had no access to toilet facilities.
niilitary legal advisor concluded that, because of al-
Najjar's treatment, and die concealment of the facility from the ICRC, military participation in
al-Najjai*'s interrogation would involve risks for the U.S. military HHm. The legal advisor
reconmiended briefing the CIA's detention and interrogation activities to U.S.
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: ABU ZUBAYDAH - SENSITIVE ADDENDUM TO DCl DAILY 1630
OPS UPDATE -26 JULY; date: July 26,2002.
DIRECTOR BIHI (052309Z AUG 02). The OLC opinion that reviewed and approved the use ofCIA's
enhanced inteiTogation tecliniques, signed on August 1, 2002, was specific to Abu Zubaydali. The Office of Legal
Counsel did not produce legal opinions for al-Najjar or other detainees held by or for the CIA until August 2004.
2 '^ [REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP 02)
[REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP
November 2002, Memorandum for
Subject: Legal Analysis ofJU Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in
[REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITECOBA^TX^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
November 2002, Memorandum for
Subject: Legal Analysis of Personnel Participating in Interrogationat the CIA Detention Facility in
[REDACTED] (aka"[DETENTION SITECOBAL22i_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_
November 2002, Memorandum for
Subject: Legal Analysis ofHI Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in
[REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]'
TOP SECRET// //NOFORN




[combatant command] to alert the command of the risks prior to the U.S. military
being involved in any aspect of the interrogation of al-Najjar.-^^ According to the CIA
inspector general, the detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar "became the model" for
handling other CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT.-^^ The CIA disseminated one
intelligence report from its detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar,^^^
4. Death of Gul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive
Interrogation Techniques at DETENTIONSITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General
Review Reveals Lack of Oversight of the Detention Site
In November 2002, ALEC Station officers requested that CIA
contract interrogator Hammond DUNBAR, one of the two primary interrogators of Abu
Zubaydah in August 2002, travel to DETENTION SITE COBALT to assess a detainee for the
possible use ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogationtechni^^ While DUNBAR was present at
DETENTION SITE COBALT, he assistedfl^^HllB [CIA OFFICER I] in the
interrogations of Gul Rahman, a suspected Islamic extremist. As reported to CIA Headquarters,
this interrogation included "48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness,
isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment." CIA Headquarters did not approve these
interrogation techniques in advance. Upon receipt of these cables, however, officers at CIA
Headquarters responded that they were "motivated to extract any and all operational information
on al-Qa'ida and Hezbi Islami from Gul Rahman" and suggested that "enhanced measures"
might be needed to gain Gul Rahman's compliance. CIA Headquarters also requested that a
psychological assessment of Rahman becompleted.^^^ Prior to DUNBAR's departure from the
detention site on November |, 2002, [a few days before the death ofGul Rahman] DUNBAR
proposed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on other detainees and offered
suggestions to [CIA OFFICER 1], the site manager, on the use of such techniques.^^^
On November!, 2002, [CIA OFFICER 1] ordered that
Gul Rahman be shackled to the wall of his cell in a position that required the detainee to rest on
the bare concrete floor. Rahman was wearing only a sweatshirt, as [CIA OFFICER 1]
had ordered that Rahman's clothing be removed when he had been judged to be uncooperative
during an earlier interrogation. The nextday, the guards found Gul Rahman's dead body. An
internal CIA review and autopsy assessed that Rahman likely died from hypothermia—in part
November 2002, Meinor^um for
Subject: Legal Analysis ofdHPersonnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in
[REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").
^^^A^ording to tlie IG report, "in late July or early August 2002, asenioroperationsofficer^ TDY to |
HH interrogated aparticularly obstinate detainee [Ridha al-Najjar] at detention facility
that was used before [COBALT] wasopened. Theofficerdrafteda cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately,
becam^h^mjj®' [COBALT]." See April 27, 2005, report by the CIA Inspector General, Death ofaDetainee |llllllllllllllll^^^l (2003-7402J[G)^e^fe^nt^iew Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Inten'ogations forCounterterrorism Purposes, ^^^BHH||^Pnn0^003; Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of
Interrogations for Counterterrorism Pu^posesTlt^^^^^l, April 2, 2003.









from having been forced to siton the bare concrete floor without pants.^^^ [CIA
OFFICER I's] initial cable to CIA Headquarters on Rahman's death included a number of
misstatements and omissions that were not discovered until internal investigations into Rahman's
death.^^^
death of Gul Rahman resulted in increased attention to CIA
detention and interrogation activities inCountry | by CIA Headquarters. The CTC formally
designated the CTC's Renditions Group^^"^ as the responsible entity for themanagement and
maintenance of all CIA interrogation facilities, including DETENTION SITE COBALT, in early
December 2002.-^^ Despite this change, many of the sameindividuals within the CIA—
including DUNBAR, officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and officers within ALEC
Station who had recommended the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against
Gul Rahman—^remained key figures in the CIA inteiTogation program and received no reprimand
or sanction for Rahman's death. Instead, in Maich 2003, just four months after the death of Gul
Rahman, the CIA Station in Country |recommended that^^^^fm^^^^I^OFFICER 1]
receive a "cash award" of $2,500 for his "consistently ikii wini "t^lIA
OFFICER 1] remained in his position as manager of the detention site until July 2003 and
continued to be involved in the interrogations of other CIA detainees. He was formally certified
as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical portion of his training requirement was
waived because ofhis past experience with interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT.-^^
Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subject: Death
Investigation - Gul RAHMAN. Otlier contributing factors were identified as dehydration, lack of food, and
iiTiraobilit^u^^|shor^^
30211 See Volume and 111 for additional details.
As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and InteiTogations
Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG."
2'"nil 11 nil DEC02)
27^ DIRECTOrI^^I^^I^I^^^I^ In late 2005, the CIA convened an Accountability Board to review the
actions of CIA personnel in Gul Rahman's death. The board recommended that the executive director "impose a 10
day suspension without pay" on I^BUI |CIA OFFICER 1], and noted that this action would "strike the
appropriate balance between: I) the fact that [miil^l OFFICER 1]] was the only individual who made
decisions that led directly, albeit unintentionally, to Rahman's death, and 2) the significant weight the Board
attached to the mitigating factors at play in this incident." {See Memorandumfor Executive Director from
HI, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, re: Report and Recommendations of the Special Accountability
Board Regarding the Death ofAfghar^etainee Gul Rahman.) On February 10, 2006, however, the CIA Executive
Director K.B. Foggo notified ||[H|H [CIA OFFICER 1] that he intended to take no disciplinary action against
liim. In his memo describing that decision, the executive director stated: "Wliile not condoning your actions, it is
imperative, in my view, that they... be judged within the operational context that existed at the time of Raliman's
detention. Cable traffic reviewed by the board shows conclusively that Headquarters generally was awaie of, andBosed no objections to, the confinement conditions and interrogation techniques beii^ imposed on Rahman as late as
I November. On that date. Headquarters notified [the CIA Station in COUNTRY |]... that it was 'motivated to
extract any and all operational information' from Rahman, that it rated achieving Rahman's cooperation to be of
'great importance' and that it acknowledged that Ralunan 'may need to be subjectedtoenhancedm
measures to induce him to comply." (See February 10, 2006, Memorandum for [^HI^HHH OFFICER
1]], CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director, re; "Accountability Decision.")
Witli regard to the death of Gul Raliman, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "Most egregiously, we believe that
CIA leaders erred in not holding anyone formally accountable for the actions and failure of management related to
the death of Gul Raliman at [COBALT] in 2002. We understand the reasoning underlying CIA management's
decision to overturn an accountability board recommendation that would have imposed sanctions on the least




Later investigations of DETENTION SITE COBALT conducted
by tlie CIA inspector general and the deputy directorof operations following the death of Gul
Rahman found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—and other coercive
interrogation techniques—was more widespread than was reportedin contemporaneous CIA
cables. Specifically, the interrogation techniques that went unreported in CIA cables included
standing sleep deprivation in which a detainee's arms were shackled above his head, nudity,
dietary manipulation, exposure to cold temperatures, cold showers, "rough takedowns," and, in
at least two instances, the use of mock executions
NovembeM8^002^taf^min the CIA's Office ofInspector
Oeneralcontacted^^^^miCTC Legal, to indicate their interest in being
briefed by CTC on the detention facility in Country At their meeting with the DDO and the
chief ofCTC on November |, 2002, the OIG staff explained that, while in that counti'y on a
separate matter, the staff had overheard a conversation that included references to "war crimes"
and "torture" at a CIA detention facility and were therefore seeking to follow-up on this
information. According to notes from the meeting, the DDO described the "most recent event
concerning Gul Rahman"—his death, which occurred on November H, 2002.^^^
experienced officer involved. The mostjunior in the chain of command should nothave to bear the full weight of
accountability when larger, systemic problems exist and when they are tlmist into difficult battlefieldsituationsby
theirsupervisors and givena risky anddifficult task and littlepreparation or guidance. Still, it is hard to accept that
a CIA officer does not beai'at least some responsibility for his or her actions,even under trying circumstances."
Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003)
(2003-7123-IG), May 7, 2004;Memorandum for Deputy Directorof Operations, from January
28, 2003, Subiect^^thInvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA Inspector General, Report ofInvestigation, Death of a
Detainee (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. Inspector General records of the interview of a senior CIA
debriefer indicated that, "[d]uring the two weeksof interrogation training, she heaid stories of [COBALT] detainees
being 'hung for days on end,' not beingfed, mock assassinations, and at leastone case of a detaineebeing
repeatedly choked/^Thesenio^ also informed the Office ofInspector General tliat, "[s]he heard that while
at [COBALT] aka "CIA OFFICER 2"] had hung detainees up for long periodswith their toes
barely touchin^h^round." {See interview report, 2003-7123-IG, Review ofInterrogations for Counterterrorism
Purposes, April 5, 2003.) DUNBAR described a "rough takedown" following the death of Gul
Raliman at COBALT. "According to [DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions
team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door
of Rahman's cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his
clothesand securedhim withMylartape. Theycovered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long
corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped himandpunched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it
was obvious they were not tryingto hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As
they ran him along the corridor, a couple of timeshe fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of
the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a numberof abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothingthat required
medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after his death. Rahman had a
number of surface abrasions on his shoulders,pelvis, arms, legs, and face.) At this point, Rahman was returned to
his cell and secured. [DUNBAR] stated that [tl^HIHrih [CIA OFFICER 1]] [the CIA officer in charge of
DETENTION SITE COBALT] may have spoken to Rahman for a few moments, but he did not know what
[HHI [CIA OFFICER 1]] said. [DUNBAR] stated that after sometliing like this is done, interrogators should
speak tothe prisone^o^givethen^om tothink about.'" {See Memorandum forDeputy Director of
Operations,from January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.)
See Notes ofNovember 2002, meetin^A^REDACTE^
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In January 2003, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson began a
formal review of the death of Gul Rahman and began a separate review of the entire CIA
Detention and Interrogation Program. The resulting Special Review of Counterterrorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities ("Special Review") found that there were no guidelines
for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT
prior to December 2002, and that interrogators, some with little or no training, were "left to their
own devices in working with detainees.
The Inspector Generars Special Review also revealed the lack of
oversight of DETENTION SITE COBALT by CIA leadership. DCI Tenet stated that he was
"not very familiar" with DETENTION SITE COBALT and "whaUh^I^s doing with medium
value targets,"^^^ Associate Deputy Director of Operations stated that he was
unaware that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were being used there.^^^ In August
2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller relayed that he was under the impression that
DETENTION SITE COBALT was only a holding facility and that he had "no idea who is
responsible for [COBALT].Senior Deputy GeneralCounsel John Rizzo informed the OIG
that he knew little about DETENTION SITE COBALT and that his focus was on DETENTION
SITE GREEN and DETENTION SITE BLUE.-^^ CTC Chief ofOperations ••
stated that he had much less knowledge of operations at DETENTION SITE
COBALT, and that the CIA's GREEN and BLUE detention sites were much more important to
him.^^^ Finally, Chiefof CTCJose Rodriguez stated thathe did not focus on DETENTION
SITE COBALT because hehad "other higher priorities."^^^
5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation TechniquesNot Reviewedby
the Department ofJustice Included in the Training Syllabus
See Office of Inspector General Special Review of CounterterrorismDetention and Interrogation Activities
(September2001-October 2003), May 7, 2004, p. 52. According to an OIGinterviewwitli an analyst who
conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, "indicative of the lack of intenogators was the fact that
[^1^1 [CIA OFFICER 1]] enlisted a [REDACTED] case officer friend... toconducUnteirogation
[DETENTION SITE COBALT] after he completed his [REDACTED] business in
{See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review ofInterrogations for CounterteiTorisrnPurposesTHHBBBI'
8, 2003.) Inspector General records of an interview with a senior CIA debriefer indicate that the debriefer, "heard
prior to taking the [intenogator] training that people at [COBALT] had debriefeddetainees on tlieir own, sometimes
going out to the site at night." {See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Reviewof Inteixogations for CounterteiTorism
Purposes, April 5, 2003.) As describedelsewhere, DCI Tenet issued formal intenogation guidelines
for the program on January 28, 2003. {See Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential
Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence,
January 28, 2003.)
Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, memorandum
dated, Septembe^^003^^^
Interview of Office of tlie Inspector General, September 9, 2003.
283 Interview of Scott MuUer, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector
General, August 20, 2003.
Interview of John Rizzo, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,
August 14, 2003^^^^^^^^^^
Interview of Office of the Inspector General, February 11, 2003.
286 Interview of Jose Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 12,
2003.
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The CIA's CTC Renditions Group began preparing for the first
CIA interrogator training course in August 2002—during the period in which Abu Zubaydah was
being interrogate^jsing the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniquesatDETENTTON SITE
GREEN. the CIA's chief ofinterrogations,andf^^l^^l^mi, the CIA
officer with OTS who had spent | years as a SERE Instructor with JPRA, led the interrogation
training. The first interrogation training, conducted with the assistance of JPRA personnel,
occurred from November 12, 2002, to November 18, 2002.^^^ The class included eight students
who were seeking to become CIA interrogators and three students seeking to support the CIA
interrogation process.The CIA training program involved 65 hours of instruction and training
on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including at least two interrogation techniques
whose legality had not been evaluated by the Department of Justice: the "abdominal slap" and
the "finger press." Although a number of personnel at CIA Headquarters reviewed the training
materials, there are no CIA records of any CIA officer raising objections to the techniques being
included in the syllabus.-^®
6. Despite Recommendationfrom CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen
Potential Interrogators in 2002 and 2003
On NovemberH^002^f^ the completion of the first formal
tminin^lass7^^^^ |^CTC Legal, asked CTC attorney
to "[m]ake it known that from now on, CTC/LGL must vet all personnel who are
enrolled in, observing or teaching - or otherwise associated with - the class."^^^
added:
"Moreover, we will be forced to Disapprove [sic] the participation of specific
personnel in the use of enhanced techniques unless we have ourselves vetted
December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogatior^n^xploitation (HVTIE) Training
Seminar 12-18 No^^pilo^unning) at 4. See also email from: to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], subject: Formation of a High Value Target Interrogation team (describing initial
training plan and requirements); date: August 30,2002, at 8:30 AM.
December 4, 2002, Training Report, High ValueTarget Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training
Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running).
December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training
Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running), at 15.
See, for example, email from: to: [REDACTED]; subject: HVT training
date: October 10, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: |HHiiHif>
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: HVT trainine^ate^cto^r 10, 2002; November 1, 2002,
Memorandum for: Director, DCI CounterterroristCenter, from Chief, Renditions Group,
CTC, re: Request for use of Military Trainers in Support of Agency Interrogation Course, REFERENCE: Memo for
D/CTC from C/RG/CTC^lt^^M^2, Same Subject.
2 '^ Email from: |^ H||HH^HypCTC/LGL; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],EYES ONLY; date: November B|, 2002, at03:13:01 PM. As
described above, Gul Rahmai^ikel^ro^ to death atDETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of
November 2002. email, hov^ever, appears to have been drafted before the guards had
found Gul Rahman's body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211
describing the guards observing Gul Rahman alive in the morning ofNovember |, 2002. Gul
Rahman's death appeared in cable traffic at least
to provide the impetus for email.
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them and are satisfied with their qualifications and suitability for what are
clearly unusual measures that are lawful only when practiced correctly by
personnel whose records clearly demonstrate their suitability for that role. The
vetting process will not be that dissimilar from the checks that are provided by
the OIG, OS, etc. in certain cases before individuals are promoted or receive
awards, and the selection and training of aggressive interrogators certainly
warrants a similar vetting process.
UN¥) The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, objected to this approach.(TS//
stating;
"I do not think that CTC/LGL should or would want to get into the business of
vetting participants, observers, instructors or others that are involved in this
program. It is simply not your job. Your job is to tell all what are the
acceptable legal standards for conducting interrogations per the authorities
obtained from Justice and agreed upon by the White House,"^^^
(T!8^^mi|||||H//NF) Contrary to statements later made by CIA Director Michael
Hayden and other CIA officials that "[a]ll those involved in the questioning of detainees are
carefully chosen and screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity,CIA
records suggest that the vetting sought by did not take place. The Committee
reviewed CIA records related to several CIA officers and contractors involved in the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted interrogations. The Committee
identified a number of personnel whose backgrounds include notable derogatory information
calling into question their eligibility for employment, their access to classified information, and
their participation in CIA interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, the derogatory information
was known to the CIA prior to the assignment of the CIA officers to the Detention and
Interrogation Program. This group of officers included individuals who, among other issues, had
engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management issues, and
had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.
7. Bureau ofPrisons "WOW'ed" by Level ofDeprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site
In December 2002, the CIA's Renditions Group sent a team of
recently trained interrogators to DETENTION SITE COBALT to engage in inteiTogations. The
interrogation plans proposed by that team for at least three detainees at DETENTION SITE
Email from:
[REDACTED],
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED],
PM.
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COBALT included the use of interrupted sleep, loud music, and reduction in food quality and
quantity. Less than a month after the death of Gul Rahman from suspected hypothermia, the
plans also called for detainees' clothes to be removed in a facility that was described to be 45
degrees Fahrenheit. CIA Headquarters approved the proposals for these detainees, whom the
CIA described as "Medium Value."-^^
Prior to this, in November 2002, a delegation of several officers
from the Federal Bureau of Prisons conducted an assessment of DETENTION SITE COBALT.
Following the November B, 2002, through November 2002, visit,^^^ CIA officers in Countiy
I remarked that the Federal Bureau ofPrisons assessments, along with recommendations and
training, had "made a noticeable improvement on how the day to day operations at the facility
are performed," and made the detention site a "more secure and safer working environment for
officers."'^^
On December 4, 2002, officers at CIA Headquarters met with
individuals from the Federal Bureau of Prisons to learn more about their inspection of
DETENTION SITE COBALT and their training ofmH|| security staff.During that
meeting, the Federal Bureau of Prisons personnel described DETENTION SITE COBALT and
stated that there was "absolutely no talking inside the facility," that the guards do not interact
with the prisoners, and that"[e]verything is done in silence and [in] the dark."^®® According to a
CIA officer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons staff also commented that "they were 'WOW'ed'" at
first by the facility, because:
"They have never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived,
i.e., constant white noise, no talking, everyone in tiie dark, with the guards
wearing a light on their head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an
interrogation cell, detainees constantly being shackled to the wall or floor, and
the starkness of each cell (concrete and bars). There is nothing like this in the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. They then explained that they understood the
mission and it was their collective assessment that in spite of all this sensory
deprivation, the detainees were not being treated in humanely [sic]. They
explained that the facility was sanitary, there was medical care and the guard
force and our staff did not mistreat the detainee[s]."^®^
By the end of December 2002, the CIA Renditions Group that had
visited DETENTION SITE COBALT had concluded that the detention facility's initial "baseline
conditions" involved so much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact
296 31118 DIRECTOR••
CIA detainee Gul Rahman died at DETENTION SITE COBALT at the end of the Federal Bureau of Prisons visit
to the CIA detention site.
[REDACTED] 30589 (271626Z NOV 02)
299 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002.
300 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002.
3°'Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date:
December 5, 2002.




on the inten'ogations. The team thus recommended that "experts and authorities other than the
individuals who crafted the process" review the interrogation process and conditions, and that a
legal review be conducted.^®^ CIA Headquarters does not appear to have taken action on these
recommendations.
8. The CIA Places CIA Detainees in Country | Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the
MON Standardfor Detention
^ spring of 2003, the CIA continued to hold detainees at
facilities in CountryB who were known not to meet the MON standard for detention. CIA
officer [CIA OFFICER 1] described the arrangement he had with Country |
officers in an email, writing:
|. They also happen to have 3 or 4 rooms where they can lock up people
discretely [sic]. I give them a few hundred bucks a month and they use the
rooms for whoever I bring over - no questions asked. It is vei7 useful for
housing guys that shouldn't be in [DETENTION SITE COBALT] for one
reason or another but still need to be kept isolated and held in secret
detention."^®^
cables indicate that CIA officers transferred at least four
detainees to these Country | facilities because they did not meet the standard for CIA detention
under the MON.^^^
In total, four CIA detention facilities were established in Country
CIA records indicate that DETENTION SITE COBALT held a total of 64 detainees during
the period of its operation between Septem^r 2002 anc^^H2004, while DETENTION SITE
GRAY held eight detainees between 2003 and ^003. The CIA later
established two other Cl^acilities in^Countr^B: DETENTION SITE ORANGE, which held
34 detainees between |^^^004and DETENTION SITE BROWN, which
held 12 detainees between^^B 2006 and 2008.^®^
CIA document entitled Renditions Group Interrogation Team (RGIT), Baseline assessment for MVT,
Detainee/Prisoner management, December 30, 2002. The CIA does not appear to have taken action on this
recommendation.
[CIA OFFICER 1]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Thanks and Query re: List of
I^^IH^^I^HdETAINEES; date: March 14, 2003.
The cables did not explain any legal basis for detaining individuals who did not meet the detention requirements
of the September 17, 2001, MON. HEADQUARTERS I
36682 38836(B^^^^^M); HEADQUARTERS|
_ 41204 dHl^^KALEC••
See Volume III for additional information.
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9. DCI TenetEstablishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation;
Formal Consolidation of Program Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not
Resolve Disagreements Among CIA Personnel
In late Januaiy 2003, in response to the death of CIA detainee Gul
Rahman and the use of a gun and a drill in the CIA interrogations of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
(described later in this summary), DCI Tenet signed the first formal interrogation and
confinement guidelines for the program."*^^ In contrast to proposals from late 2001, when CIA
personnel expected that any detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards, the
confinement guidelines signed in January 2003 set forth minimal standards for a detention
facility. The confinement guidelines required only that the facility be sufficient to meet basic
health needs, meaning that even a facility like DETENTION SITE COBALT, in which detainees
were kept shackled in complete dai-kness and isolation, with a bucket for human waste, and
without notable heat during the winter months, met the standard.^^^^
The guidelines also required quarterly assessments of the
conditions at the detention facilities. The first quarterly review of detention facilities covered the
period from January 2003 to April 2003, and examined conditions at DETENTION SITE
COBALT, as well as at DETENTION SITE BLUE in a different country. Country At that
time, DETENTION SITE BLUE, which was initially designed for two detainees, was housing
five detainees. Nonetheless, the site review team found that conditions at DETENTION SITE
BLUE —including the three purpose-built "holding units"—met "the minimum standards set by
the CIA" in the January 2003 guidance. Detainees received bi-weekly medical evaluations,
bmshed their teeth once a day, washed their hands prior to each meal, and could bathe once a
week. Amenities such as solid food, clothing (sweatshirts, sweatpants, and slippers), reading
materials, prayer rugs, and Korans were available depending on the detainee's degree of
cooperation with interrogators.
The first quarter 2003 review also found that conditions at
DETENTION SITE COBALT satisfied the January 2003 guidance, citing "significant
improvements" such as space heaters and weekly medical evaluations. The review noted that a
new facility was under construction in Country |[ to replace DETENTION SITE COBALT, and
that this new detention facility, DETENTION SITE ORANGE, "will be a quantum leap
forward" because "litj will incorporate heating/air conditioning, conventional plumbing,
appropriate lighting, shower, and laundry facilitles."^^^ DETENTION SITE ORANGE opened) i
in 1^(12004. Although some of the cells at DETENTION SITE ORANGE included plumbing,
Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17
September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Directorof Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.
^"'Guidelineson Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17
September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Directorof Central Intelligence, Januaiy 28, 2003.
CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May
22,2003.
CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditionsfor CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May
22, 2003.
'^®CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May
22,2003.
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detainees undergoing interrogation were kept in smaller cells, with waste buckets rather than
toilet facilities.^
The DCl's January 2003 interrogation guidelines listed 12
"enhanced techniques" that could be used with prior approval of the director of CTC, including
two—use of diapers for "prolonged periods" and the abdominal slap—that had not been
evaluated by the OLC. The "enhanced techniques" were only to be employed by "approved
interrogators for use with [a] specific detainee." The guidelines also identified "standard
techniques"—including sleep deprivation up to 72 hours, reduced caloric intake, use of loud
music, isolation, and the use of diapers "generally not to exceed 72 hours"—that required
advance approval "whenever feasible," and directed that their use be documented. The "standard
techniques" were described as "techniques that do not incorporate physical or substantial
psychological pressure." The guidelines provided no description or further limitations on the use
of eitherthe enhanced or standard interrogation techniques.^^^
Although the DCl interrogation guidelines were prepared as a
reaction to the death of Gul Rahman and the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques on
*Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, they did not reference all interrogation practices that had been
employed at CIA detention sites. The guidelines, for example, did not address whether
interrogation techniques such as the "rough take down,"^^^ the use ofcold water showers,^ '^^ and
prolonged light deprivation were prohibited. In addition, by requiring advance approval of
"standard techniques" "whenever feasible," the guidelines allowed CIA officers a significant
amount of discretion to determine who could be subjected to the CIA's "standard" interrogation
techniques, when those techniques could be applied, and when it was not "feasible" to request
advance approval from CIA Headquarters. Thus, consistent with the interrogation guidelines,
throughout much of 2003, CIA officers (including personnel not trained in interrogation) could,
at their discretion, strip a detainee naked, shackle him in the standing position for up to 72 hours,
and douse the detainee repeatedly withcold water^^^—without approval from CIA Headquarters
if those officers judged CIA Headquarters approval was not "feasible." In practice, CIA
personnel routinely applied these types of interrogation techniques without obtaining prior
approval.^
311 3741
Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17
September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence,January 28, 2003.
For adescription ofthe "rough takedown," see Memorandum for Deputy Director ofOperations, from HHI
Januai-y 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.
One cold water shower was described by a CIA linguist; "Rahman was placed back under the cold water by the
guards at [CIA OFFICER l]]'s direction. Rahman was so cold that he could barely utter his alias.
According to [tlie on-site linguist], the entire process lasted no more tlian 20 minutes. It was intended to lower
Rahman's resistance and was not for hygienic reasons. At the conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one
oftlie four sleep deprivation cells where hewas left shivering for hours oroveniiglUwitlUii^and chained over his
head." See CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG),
April 27, 2005.
Water dousing was not designated by the CIA as a "standard" interrogation technique until June 2003. In
January 2004 water dousing was recategorized by the CIA as an "enhanced" inteiTogation technique.
See Volume III for additional information.
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The DCI interrogation guidelines also included the first
requirements related to recordkeeping, instaicting that, for "each interrogation session in which
an enhanced technique is employed," the field prepare a "substantially contemporaneous
record... setting forth the nature and durationof each such technique employed, the identities of
those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approvalcable.In practice, these
guidelines were not followed.
There were also administrative changes to the program. As noted,
on December 3, 2002, CTC's Renditions Group formally assumed responsibility for the
management and maintenance of all CIA detention and interrogation facilities.^^^ Prior to that
time^h^nterrogation program was "joined at the hip" with CTC's ALEC Station, according to
I^H^IcTC Legal, although another CTC attorney who was directly involved in the
program informed the CIA OIG that she "was never sure what group in CTC was responsible for
interrogation activities.Even after the formal designation of the CIA's Renditions Group,
tensions continued, particularly between CTC personnel who supported SWIGERT and
DUNBAR's continued role, and the Renditions Group, which designated as the
321
3'^ DIRECTOR•• (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR (311702Z JAN 03). Despite the formal record
keeping requirement, the CIA's June 2013 Response argues that detailed reporting on the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques at CIA detentionsites was not necessary, stating: "First, the decline in reporting over time
on the use of enhanced techniques, which the Study characterizes as poor or deceptive record keeping, actually
reflects the matiuationof the program. In early 2003, a process was put in place whereby interrogators requested
permission in advance for interrogation plans. The use of these plans for each detainee obviated the need for
reporting in extensive detail on the use of specific techniques, unless there were deviations from the approvedplan."
As detailed in the Study, the process put in place by the CIA in early 2003 explicitly required record keeping,
including "the nature and duration of each such techniqueemployed, the identities of those present, and a citation to
the required Headquarters approval cable." That requirement was never revised.
Subsequent to the January 2003 guidance, many cables reporting the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques listed the techniques used on a particular day, but did not describe the frequency with which those
techniques were employed, nor did they integrate the specific techniques into narrativesof the interrogations. As the
CIA interrogation programcontinued, descriptions of the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTOgation techniques were
recorded in increasinglysummarized form, providing little infomiationon how or when the techniqueswere applied
during an interrogation. There aie also few CIA records detailing the rendition process for detainees and their
transportation to or between detention sites. CIA records do include detainee comments on their rendition
experiences and photographs of detainees in the process of being transported. Based on a review of the
photographs, detainees transported by the CIA by aircraft were typically hooded with their hands and feet shackled.
The detainees wore large headsets to eliminate their ability to hear, and these headsets were typically affixed to a
detainee's head with duct tape that ran the circumferenceof the detainee's head. CIA detainees were placed in
diapers and not permitted to use the lavatory on the aircraft. Depending on the aircraft, detainees were either
strapped into seats during the flights, or laid down and strapped to the floor of the plane horizontally like cargo. See
CIA photographs of renditions among CIA materials provided to the Committee pursuant to the Committee's
document requests, as well as CIA detainee reviews in Volume III for additional informationon the transport of CIA
detainees.
DIRECTORlllllllll^^ 03)
^20 Interview ofHHHHH' [REDACTEDUREDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector
General, August 20,2003. Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the
Inspector General, February 14, 2003. CTC Chief of Operations told the Inspector General that the program was
handled by the Abu Zubaydah Task Force. See February 11, 2003, interview report of Office
of the Inspector General.
As noted, the CIA's Rendition Group is variablyknown as the "Renditions Group," the "Renditions and
Detainees Group," the "Renditions, DetentionSjan^nterroeation^roi^^ the initials, "RDI" and "RDG."
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CIA's chief interrogator.^^- As late as June 2003, SWIGERT andDUNBAR, operating outside
of the direct management of the Renditions Group, were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE
to both interrogate and conduct psychological reviews of detainees.^^^ The dispute extended to
interrogation practices. The Renditions Group's leadership considered the waterboard, which
Chief of Interrogations was not certified to use, as "life threatening," and
complained to the OIG that some CIA officers in the Directorate of Operations believed that, as a
result, the Renditions Group was "running a 'sissified' inten'ogation program."^^"^ At the same
time, CIA CTC personnel criticized the Renditions Group and^|^H for their use of painful
stress positions, as well as for the conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT.-^ '^'
(i:!8y'^|||||[|H|||HH||||//NF) There were also concerns about possible conflicts ofinterest
related to the conti'actors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR. On January 30, 2003, a cable from CIA
Headquarters stated that "the individual at the interrogation site who administers the techniques
is not the same person who issues the psychological assessment of record," and that only a staff
psychologist, nota contractor, could issue anassessment of record."^^^ In June 2003, however,
SWIGERT and DUNBAR were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to interrogate KSM, as
well as to assess KSM's "psychological stability" and "resistance posture.As described later
in this summary, the contractors had earlier subjected KSM to the waterboard and other CIA
enhanced interrogation techniques. The decision to send the contract psychologists to
DETENTION SITE BLUE prompted an OMS psychologist to write to OMS leadership that
Interview of by [REDACTE^^n^^DACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General, April
3, 2003. Febniaiy 21, 2003, interview report, Office of the Inspector General. Hanunond
DUNBAR told the Office of Inspector General that there was "intiigue" between the RDG and him and SWIGERT,
and "there were emails coming to [DETENTION SITE BLUE] that questioned [his] and [SWIGERT]'s
qualifications." See Interview of Hammond DUNBAR, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the
Inspector GeneraljFebruary4^^
Email from: to: cc:^^^
mm, IIIIII^^^HiHB^lHll^^Hrsubje^Re: ^||RDGTa^ng for IC Psychologists
[DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT]; date: June 20, 2003, at 5:23:29 PWrji^^^HOMS expressed concern that "no
professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR|sUatmudgiTient^^sycho^ assess^ the
subjects of their enhanced measures." (See email from: cc:
; subject: Re:f^|RDG
Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 20,2003, at 2:19:53 PM.) Tlie CIA's June 2013
Response states that CIA "Headquarters established CTC's Renditions and Detentions Group CTC/RDG as the
responsible entity for all CIA detention and interrogationsites in December2002, removing any latent institutional
confusion."
Interview ofHmmiH, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General,
February 21, 2003. The chief of interrogations, told the Inspector General that the waterboard was
overused with Abu Zubaydah and KSM and was ineffective in tlie interrogations of KSM. (See Interview of
by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ofthe Office ofthe Inspector General, Marcl^, 2003.) One doctor
involved in CIA interrogations using the waterboard intenogation technique stated that ||^^| "has ahuge bias
against the waterboard b/c he's not approved to use it. Tlie reverse is tm^nh^ontrac^^guy^SWIGER^and
DUNBAR] who have avested interest in favor ofit." See email from: ||||||||||||||^||||||||||||||m.
cc: [REDACTED]; subject: re: More; date^prim^003, at 08:11:07 AM.
March 10, 2003, interview report of Office ofthe Inspector General. Interview ofHIH
n,by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 27, 2003. Interview
of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. March
24, 2003, interview report of Office of tlie Inspector General.
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"[a]ny data collected by themfrom detainees with whom they previously interacted as
interrogators will always be suspect."^-^ then informed the management of
the Renditions Group that "no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and
DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced
measures." At the end of theirdeployment, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided
their assessment of KSM and recommended thathe should be evaluated on a monthly basis by
"an experienced interrogator known to him" who would assess how forthcoming he is and
"remind him that there are differing consequences for cooperating or notcooperating."-^^^ In his
response to the draft Inspector General Special Review, noted that "OMS
concerns about conflict of interest... were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the
same individuals applied an EIT which only they were approved to employ,judged both its
effectiveness and detainee resilience, and implicitly proposed continued use of the technique - at
a daily compensation reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators who could not
use the technique."^ '^
D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
7. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters AboutAl-Nashiri's Levelof
Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques
'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,^^- assessed by the CIA to be an al-
Qa'ida "terrorist operations planner" whowas "intimately involved" in planning both the USS
Cole bombing and the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was captured in the United
Arab Emirates in mid-October 2002.-^^-^ He provided information while in the custody of a
foreign government, including on plotting in the Persian Gulf,^^"^ and was then rendered by the
The email,whichexpressed concern thatSWIGERT and DUNBAR would interfere withon-site psychologists,
stated that, "[a]lthough these guys believe that their way is the only way, there should be an effort to define roles and
responsibilitie^efor^h^-arroganc^n^iarc^isi^volv^ntounpro^ contlic^ the field." See email
from: to: subject: ^i|||RDG
Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 16, 2003, at 4:54:32 PM.
Email from: to:
I; subject: Re: Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBARand
SWIGER^ate:June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM.
12168(301822ZJUN 03). The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "In practice, by April2003, [CIA]
staff psychologists had taken over almost all of theprovisions of support to the RDI program. As it concerned
[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR], however, theappearance of impropriety continued, albeit to a lesser degree, because
they were occasionally asked to provide input to assessments on detainees whom they hadnot interrogated"
(emphasis added). The CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. For example, in June 2003, SWIGERT and
DUNBAR provided an assessment on KSM, a detainee whom they had interrogated.
Memorandum for Inspe^r General, Attention: Assistant IG for Investigations, [REDACTED], from[REDACTED], M.D., |||||||||Medical Services
For other reportini
TOP SECRET/;
• re Draft Special Review-Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), at 13.
For more information on al-Nashiri, see detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III.
333 alec^M"
See i^H36595




from al-Nashiri while he was in foreign government custody, see
'/NOFORN




CIA to DETENTION SITE COBALT inCountry | on November 2002, where he was held
for H days before being transferred to DETENTION SITE GREEN on November 2002.*^^^
At DETENTION SITE GREEN, al-Nashiri was interrogated using the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, including being subjected to the waterboard at least three times.In
December 2002, when DETENTION SITE GREEN was closed, al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah
were rendered to DETENTION SITE BLUE.^^^
(T8^^H|||||mi||||||/^NF) In total, al-Nashiri was subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques during at least four separate periods,with each period typically ending
with anassessment from on-site interrogators that al-Nashiri was compliant and cooperative.^^^
Officers atCIAHeadquai^ disagreed with these assessments, with the deputy chief ofALEC
Station, commenting that DETENTION SITE BLUE interrogators should
not make "sweeping statements" in cable traffic regarding al-Nashiri's compliance.Officers
at CIA Headquarters sought to reinstate the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
based on their belief that al-Nashiri had not yet provided actionable intelligence on imminent
attacks.
Shortly after al-Nashiri arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE, CIA
interrogators at the detention site judged al-Nashiri's cooperation and compliance by his
engagement and willingness to answer questions, while CIA Headquarters personnel judged his
compliance based on the specific actionable intelligence he had provided (or the lack thereof).
For example, in December 2002, interrogators informed CIA Headquarters that al-Nashiri was




For disseminated intelligence, see
29768 (^^HNOV02);




NO:V02)[^^Bi 11344^H|PI NOV 02).78275 (M^HdEC 02)
Al-Nashiri's time at DETENTION SITE COBALT is not well documented in CIA records. As described
elsewhere, standard operating procedure at COBALT at the time included total light deprivation, loud continuous
music, isolation, and dietary manipulation. Based on CIA records, the other four "enhanced interrogation" periods
of al-Nashiri took place at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December5-8, 2002; December 27, 2002 - January 1,
2003; January 9-10, 2003; and January 15-27, 2003. See•••l^O (111541Z DEC 02); 10078(211733Z DEC 02)^^^^Bi0140 (q31727ZJAf^rALi^^ (191729Z JAN 03).
339 Email from: to: •••M, [REDACTED]; cc;
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] follow-up; date: December 15,
2002.
See, for example, ALEC]||H(072315Z DEC 02); ALEC (130352Z DEC 02); ALEC Jjj^l(180247Z DEC 02); ALEC HBI(191729Z JAN 03); CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation:
Unauthorized Interrogation Tecliniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003. See
also CIA Office of InspectorGeneral report,Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September
2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), released on May 7, 2004.
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"a compliant detainee" who was not "withholding important thi'eat information." '^^ ^ Officers
from the CIA's ALEC Stationat CL\ Headquarters responded:
"it is inconceivable to us that al-Nashiri cannot provide us concrete leads....
When we are able to capture other terrorists based on his leads and to thwart
future plots based on his reporting, we will have much more confidence that he
is, indeed, genuinely cooperative on some level."^"^^
Later, after multiple follow-up debriefings, DETENTION SITE
BLUE officers againwrote that they had "reluctantly concluded" thatal-Nashiri was providing
"logical and rational explanations" to questions provided by CIA Headquarters and therefore
they recommended "against resuming enhanced measures" unless ALEC Station had evidence
al-Nashiri was lying.^"^^ A cable from the detention site stated:
"without tangible proof of lying or intentional withholding, however, we
believe employing enhanced measures will accomplish nothing except show
[al-Nashiri] that he will be punished whether he cooperates or not, thus eroding
any remaining desire to continue cooperating.... [The] bottom line is that we
think [al-Nashiri] is being cooperative, and if subjected to indiscriminate and
prolonged enhanced measures, there is a good chance he will either fold up and
cease cooperation, or suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by
the statute. Therefore, a decision to resume enhanced measures must be
grounded in fact and not general feelings."^"^
2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations;
Interrogator Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill
After the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of Base sent two
interrogators back to the United Statesbecause of "prolonged absences from family" and the
"facUha^nhan^d measures are no longer required for al-Nashiri," CIA Headquarters sent
lllimillll^^HI [CIA OFFICER 2], aCIA officer who had not been trained or qualified
as an interrogator, to DETENTION SITE BLUE to question and assess al-Nashiri.
3^2 alec
10030 (111541Z DEC 02)
(180247Z DEC 02)
10085 (230906Z DEC 02)
10085 (230906Z DEC 02)
10040 (122122Z DEC02^rior to [CIA OFFICER 2's] deployment, CIA records
included numerous concerns about |BHH [CIA OFFICER 2's] anger management,
information on BHH [CIA OFFICER 2] and other CIA personnel in the
program with similar alarming issues in their background, see Vohime III. The CIA's June 2013 Response states
that: "I
some of the | officers mentioned in theStudy—havebeen
exclude^^Tiucl^^hed^^ information was not in fact available to senior managers making assignments |
" Notwithstandin^h^IA's June 2013 assertion, as detailed in Volume III, senior
managers were aware of concerns related toH|^ ^H[CIA0FFICER2]priOT to his deployment.
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In late December 2002, following a meeting at CIA Headquarters
to discuss resuming the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri,
the chief of RDG^"^^—^theentimhat managed the CIA's Detention and
InteiTogation Program—objected to sending l^lHi OFFICER 2]tothed^ntion site
because he "had not been through the interrogation training" and because "had
heard from some colleagues that [|H^H[C1A0FFICER 2]] was too confident, had a
temper, and had some securityjssues7^_^^^B^^B later learned from other CIA officials that
"[CTC chief of operations OFFICER 2]] at
[DETENTION SITE BLUE] over the holidays." HIHHtoldtiie Office of Inspector
General that "his assessment is that the Agency management felt that the [RDG] interrogators
were being too lenient with al-Nashiri and that lUlBl [CIA OFFICER 2]] was sent to
[DETENTION SITE BLUE] to 'fix' the situation.
[CL\ OFFICER 2] anived at DETENTION SITE
BLUE on December 2002, and the CIA resumed the use of its enhanced interrogation
techniques on al-Nashiri shortly thereafter, despite the fact tiiat [CIA OFFICER 2]
had not been trained, certified, or approved to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
[CIA OFFICER 2] wrote in a cable to CIA Headquarters that "[al]-Nashiri responds
well to harsh treatment" and suggested that the interrogators continue to administer "various
degrees of mild punishment," but still allow for "a small degree of 'hope,' by introducing some
'minute rewards.
//NF) It was later learned that during these interrogation sessions,
[CIA OFFICER 2], with the permission and participation of the DETENTION SITE
BLUE chief ofBase, who also had not been trained and qualified as an intemjgato^sed a series
of unauthorized interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri. For example,
OFFICER 2] placed al-Nashiri in a "standing stress position" with "his hands affixed over his
head" for approximately two and ahalfdays^^^M^ater, during the course of al-Nashiri's
debriefings, while he was blindfolded, |H|||||[|H [CIA OFFICER 2] placed apistol near al-
Nashiri's head and operated a cordless drill near al-Nashiri's body.^^^ Al-Nashiri did notprovide
any additional threat information during, orafter, these interrogations.^^^
As described, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also refened to as the "Renditions Group," the
"Rendition, Detention, and Intenogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogationsfor Counterterrorism Purposes,
February 23, 2003.
IBB 10140 (031727Z JAN 03)
email from: subject: EYES ONLY - [HHBHH] ONLY
- MEMORANDUM FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22,2003. In an April 12, 2007, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence hearing. Senator Carl Levin asked the CIA Directorif the CIA disputed allegations in an International
Committee of the Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[pjrolonged stress standing
position,naked, arm[s] chainedabove the head...."The CIADirector responded, "Not above the head. Stress
positionsare partof the EITs, and nakedness were part of the EITs,Senator." See SenateSelect Committee on
Intelligence Hearing Transcript, dated April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
See, for example, CIA Office of Inspector General, Reportof Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation
Techniques at [DETENTIONSITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003; email from: [DETENTION SITE
BLUE] COB to: subject: EYES ONLY - [••BHll ONLY -
MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003.
For additional details, see Volume III.
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Based on a report from CTC, the CIA Office of Inspector General
conducteda review of these interrogation incidents, and issued a report of investigation in the
fall of 2003.^^^ The Office ofInspector General later described additional allegations of
unauthorized techniques used against al-Nashiri by [CIA OFFICER 2] and other
interrogators, includingslapping al-Nashiri multiple times on the back of the head during
inten'ogations; implying thathis mother would be brought before him and sexually abused;
blowing cigar smoke in al-Nashiri's face; giving al-Nashiri a forced bath using a stiff brush;and
using improvised stress positions that causedcuts and bruises resulting in the interventionof a
medical officer, who was concerned that al-Nashiri's shoulders would be dislocated using the
stress positions.^^^ When interviewed by the Office ofInspector General, the DETENTION
SITE BLUE chief ofBas^t^d he did not object to using the gun and drill in the interrogations
because he believed [CIA OFFICER 2] was sent from CIA Headquarters "to resolve
the matter of al-Nashiri's cooperation" and that he believed [CIA OFFICER 2] had
permission to use the interrogation techniques.^ '^^ The chief of Base added that his own on-site
approval was based on this and "the pressure he felt from Headquarters to obtain imminent threat
information from al-Nashiri on 9/11-style attacks.In April 2004, m|||| [CIA OFFICER
2] and the chief of Base were disciplined.^^^
3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Useof the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques Against Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional
TechniquesMight "Push [Al-Nashiri] Over TheEdge Psychologically, " Refers to the
CIA Program As a "Train Wreak[sic] Waiting to Happen "
CIA Office of InspectorGeneral, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at
[DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003.
CIA Officeof Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program,
(2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
CIA Officeof Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at
[DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unautliorized InteiTogation Techniques at
[DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29,2003.
[CIA OFFICER 2] received a one-year Letterof Reprimand, was suspended for five days without pay,
andwasprohibited from promotions, within-grade step increases, quality step increases, or permanent salary
increases during that one-year period. The decision did not affect IHHH [CIA OFFICER 2's] eligibility to
receive Exceptional Performance Awards, bon^^^^^^M^^to^^MT|^ ^^^g^ition. See\
CIA OFFICER 2] retired from the CIA on 2004. {See
I.) On
June20,2005, the CIAdirector of transnational issues, aware of [CIA OFFICER 2's] problematic
background, approved [CIA OFFICER2's] employment on a CIA contract because the project was
"mission critical" and "no other contractorwith the neededskills was available.'
The chief of Base received a two-year Letter of
Reprimand and a ten-day suspension without pay,andwas prohibited from receiving any bonusawards from the
CIA duringthe periodof reprimand. On 2003,prior to the implementation of theprohibitions, this
individual retired from the CIA. See \
TOP SECRET/i /NOFORN




On January 2003, CIA contractor DUNBAR arrived at
DETENTION SITE BLUE to conduct a "Psychological Interrogation Assessment" to judge al-
Nashiri's suitability for the additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and
develop recommendations for his interrogation. The resulting interrogation plan proposed that
the interrogators would have the "latitude to use the full range of enhanced exploitation and
interrogation measures," adding that "the use of the water board would require additional support
from" fellow CIA contractor Grayson SWIGERT. According to the interrogation plan, once the
interrogators had eliminated al-Nashiri's "sense of control and predictability" and established a
"desired level of helplessness," they would reduce the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques and transition toa debriefing phase once again.^^^
(T!S^|H||H^^^^^^JF)After receiving the proposed interrogation plan for al-Nashiri on
January2l720037^HHBBB' CIA's chief of interrogations—whose presence had
previously prompted al-Nashiri to tremble in fear^^"^—emailed CIA colleagues to notify them that
he had "informed the front office of CTC" that he would "no longer be associated in any way
with the interrogation progi'am due to serious reservation[s] [he had]abo^he current state of
affairs" and would instead be "retiring shortly." In the same email, wrote, "[t]his is a
train wreak [sic] waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell offthe train before it happens."^^^
HH drafted a cable for CIA Headquarters to send to DETENTION SITE BLUE raising a
number of concerns that he, the chief of interrogations, believed should be "entered for the
record." The CIA Headquarters cable—which does not appear to have been disseminated to
DETENTION SITE BLUE—included the foUowing:
"we have serious reservations with the continued use of enhanced techniques
with [al-Nashiri] and its long term impact on him. [Al-Nashiri] has been held
for three months in very difficult conditions, both physically and mentally. It
is the assessment of the prior inteiTOgators that [al-Nashiri] has been mainly
truthful and is not withholding significant information. To continue to use
enhanced technique[s] without clear indications that he [is] withholding
important info is excessive and may cause him to cease cooperation on any
level. [Al-Nashiri] may come to the conclusion that whether he cooperates or
not, he will continually be subjected to enhanced techniques, therefore, what is
the incentive for continued cooperation. Also, both C/CTC/R^^hief ofCTC
RDG and HVT Inter^ator [|^H^^H] who
departed [DETENTION SITE BLUE] in J[(january, believe continued
enhanced methods may push [al-Nashiri] over the edge psychologically."^^®
102671
According to a December 12, 2002, CIA cable, al-Nashiri "visibly and markedly trembles with fear every time he
sees 10038 (122119Z DEC 02).
Email from: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: date: January 22, 2003.
Despite this notificationT^^HI^^Bdid not imr^diately resign from the interrogation program.
Email from: [REDACTED], |
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subiect^CON^NS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR
NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. |BH[iiH> referenced in the passage as a"HVT Interrogator," was tlie chief
of interrogations.
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The draft cable from
responsibility" concerns, stating:
//NOFORN
also raised "conflict of
"Another area of concernis the use of the psychologistas an interrogator. The
role of the ops psychologist is to be a detached observer and serve as a check
on the interrogator to prevent the interrogator from any unintentional excess of
pressure which might cause permanent psychologicalharm to the subject. The
medical officer is on hand to provide the same protection from physical actions
that might harm the subject. Therefore, the medical officer and the
psychologist should not serve as an interrogator, which is a conflict of
responsibility. We note that [th^ropose^lan] contains a psychological
interrogation assessment by psychologist [DUNBAR] which
is to be carried out by interrogator [DUNBAR]. We have a problem with him
conductingboth roles simultaneously."^ '^
Rather than releasing the cable that was drafted by CIA
Headquarters approved a plan to reinstitute the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques against al-Nashiri, beginning with shaving him, removing his clothing, and placing
him in a standing sleep deprivation position with his aims affixed over his head.^^^ CIA cables
describing subsequent interrogations indicate that al-Nashiri was nude and, at times, "put in the
standing position, handcuffed and shackled."^^^ According tocables, CIA interrogators decided
to provide al-Nashiri clothes to "hopefully stabilize his physiological symptoms and prevent
them from deteriorating,"^^ noting ina cable the next day that al-Nashiri was suffering from a
head cold which caused his body to shake for approximately ten minutes during an
interrogation.365
Beginning in June 2003, the CIA transferred al-Nashiri to five
different CIA detention facilities before he was transferred to U.S. military custody on
September 5, 2006.^^^ In the interim, he was diagnosed by some CIA psychologists as having
"anxiety" and "major depressive" disorder,^^^ while others found no symptoms of either
illness.He was a difficultand uncooperative detainee and engaged in repeated belligerent
acts, includingattempts to assault CIA detention site personneland efforts to damage items in his
Email fiom: to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR
NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. As noted above, personnel from CIA's Office of Medical Services raised the
same concerns about medical and psychological personnel serving both to assess the health of a detainee and to
participate in theinterrogation process.
DIRECTOR•• (230008Z JAN 03)
10296 (251U3Z JAN 03), 10306 (261403Z JAN 03)
3^2 director (201659Z JAN 03
10289 (241203Z JAN 03);
10309 (261403Z JAN 03)
10312 (270854Z JAN 03)
~^*(031945Z SEP 06);HEADQUARTERS
(051613Z SEP 06)
1242 (050744Z SEP 06); HEADQUARTERS
See, for example,
2038
11247 (14132IZ APR 03);
2169 (251133Z MAR 05);
1756 (190800Z SEP 03).
(021841Z AUG 04); ••• 2709 (271517Z APR 06);
(271517Z APR 06)
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Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his
food, and complained of bodily pain and insomnia.^^^ At one point, al-Nashiri launched a short
lived hunger strike that resulted in the CIA force feeding him rectally.^^^
October 2004, 21 months after the final documented use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract
interrogator DUNBAR and another CIA interrogatorconcluded that al-Nashiri provided
"essentially no actionable information," and that "the probability that he has much more to
contribute is low."^^^ Over the course of al-Nashiri's detention and interrogation by the CIA, the
CIA disseminated 145 intelligence reports based on his debriefings. Al-Nashiri provided
information on past operational plotting, associates whom he expected to participate in plots,
details on completed operations, and background on al-Qa'ida's structure and methods of
operation.^^^ Al-Nashiii did notprovide the information that theCIA's ALEC Station sought
and believed al-Nashiri possessed, specifically "perishable threat information to help [CIA]
thwart future attacks and capture additional operatives."-^ '^^








1959(111700Z DEC 04); |
2038 (211558Z JAN 05); 1091 (031835Z NOV 03);
1266 (052309Z JAN 04); •[^••H^^m63T(271^0Z MAR 04).
1203 (231709ZMAY04)r|HHH 1^02(231644Z MAY 04)
3^2 1343 (271356Z Od 04). in the final years of al-Nashiri's detention, most of the intelligence
requirements for al-Nashiri involved showingal-Nashiriphotographs. In June 2005, the DETENTION SITE
BLACK cliief of Base suspended even these debriefings because it was "the very, very rare moment" that al-Nashiri
wouldrecognize a photogi*aph, and becausethe debriefings often werethe "catalyst" for his outbursts. Seej^ml2474 (251622Z JUN 05).
While still in the custody of a foreign government, prior to liis rendition to CIA custody, al-Nasliiri provided
details on multiple terrorist plots in which he was involvedprior to his detention, including the attacks against the
USS Cole and the MVLimburg,plans to sink oil tankers in the Strait of Honnuz, plans to attack warships docked at
ports in Dubai and Jeddah, and his casingof a Dubai amusement park. This information was disseminatedin
intelli
custod of a foreisn
intelligence, see
374 ALEC
//NE) According to CIA records, three weeks after|
and political leadership ofCountry | agreed to host a CIA detention facility, the CIA
informed the U.S. ambassador, because, as was noted in a cable, by not doing so, the CIA was
1029 (291750Z JUN 06);
1716(180742ZSEP 04);
2474 (251622Z JUN 05);
1142 (041358Z AUG 06);
3051 (301235Z SEP 05);
2673 (02145IZ AUG 05);
1356 (011644ZJUL04);
1962 (121029Z DEC 04);
36595
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"risking that he hear of this initiative" from Country | officials.^^^ As was the case inother host
countries, the ambassador in Country | was told by the CIA not to speak with any other State
Departmentofficial about the arrangement,^^^
of the CIA detention facility in Country ^|CTC Legal, warned ofpossible legal actions against CIA
employees in countries that "take a different view of the detention and interrogation practices
employed by [th^I^V^^^I^lirthe^^commendedagain^^ CIA facilities
in countries that 378
advice was not heeded and, in December 2002, the two individuals then being
detained by the CIA in Country | (Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) were
transferred to Country
The agreement to host a CIA detention facility inCountry [
crea^ multiple, ongoing difficulties between Country | and the CIA. Country |'s||t||
mm proposed a written "Memorandum ofUnderstanding" covering the relative roles and
responsibilities of the CIA and which the CIA ultimately refused to sign.^®^®
Fou^TTonthsaftCT site began hosting CIA detainees. Country | rejected the transfer
of which included Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. The decision was
reversed only after the U.S. ambassador intervened with the political leadership ofCountry | on
th^CIA|^ chal^^ The following montlMh^CI^^ovided $| million to CountryB's
which officials, for
Country | political leadership, indicated that Country | was now flexible with regard to the
numberof CIA detainees at the facility and when the facility would eventually be closed.^^^ The
facility, which was described^ the CIA as "over capacity," was nonetheless closed, as had been




The CIA insisted be redacted in the CommitteeStudy prior to the Study
beinerelocatedtothe U.S. Senate from the off-site research facility.
78275^^^1 DEC 02)[REDACTED] 1888 ["
[REDACTED] 2666J
3^2 HEADQUARTERS
[REDACTED] 3280 According to the cable, the CIA Station speculatedthat the change of
position was "at least somewhat attribut£ible... toour gift of$H million...."
See Volume I for additional details.
[REDACTED] 7526 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED])
[REDACTED] 7849 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]^^^^^^^^^
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|//NP) According to CIA cables, years later, officials in
reacted with "deep shock and regret'
was
[[Country |] officials were "extremely upset"^^^ at the




of President Bush's September 200^ubli^cknowledgmen^nh^IA program.^^^ The CIA
Station, for its part, described the ^ "serious blow*' to the
bilateral relationship.^^^
F. The Detention and InteiTogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh
1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior
to Rendition to CIA Custody
September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was assessed
by the CIA to be a facilitator for the September 11, 2001, attacksand an associate of the 9/11
hijackers.^^^ While targeting another terrorist, Hassan Ghul, Hjj^l Pakistani officials
unexpectedly captured bin al-Shibh during raids in Pakistan on Septemberll^2002.^^® On
September |||, 2002, bin al-Shibh was rendered to a foreign government,
Approximately five months later, on February |, 2003, bin al-Shibh was rendered from the
custody of to CIA custody, becoming the 41®' CIA detainee.^^^
CIA Headquarters-
As with Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, personnel at
-often in ALEC Station—overestimated the information bin al-Shibh would
have access to within al-Qa'ida, writing that bin al-Shibh "likely has critical information on
upcoming attacks and locations of senior al-Qa'ida operatives."^^^ Later, after binal-Shibh was
interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for an estimated 34 days, the
CIA's ALEC Station concluded that bin al-Shibh was not a senior member of al-Qa'ida and was
not in a position to know details about al-Qa'ida's plans for future attacks.In another parallel,
officers at CIA Headquarters requested and directed the continued use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh when CIA detention site personnel recommended
endingsuch measures.^^^
38'' [REDACTED] 9210 (231043Z SEP 06)
388 [REDACTED] 7839 ([REDACTED]). Email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; subject: BOMBSHELL;
date: [REDACTED]. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CIA Prisons in
[Country ll; date: [REDACTED]. EmaU from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: I think|] had to react [REDACTED], date: [REDACTED].
389 alec (222334Z SEP 01); ^^192^ (15SEP 01)
390 ALEC (292345Z AUG 02)'ALEclm (lUSSlZ SEP 02). Tlie CIA represented to policymakers
and others—inaccurately—tliat "as a result of the use of EITs" Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin
al-Shibh that played a "key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh." See section of this summary on the
"Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" and Volume II for additional details.
See 225081
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Ramzi bin al-Shibh was initially interrogated by a foreign
government,^^^ While officers at CIA Headquarters were dissatisfied with the intelligence
production from his five months of detention in foreign governmentcustody, CIA officers in that
country were satisfied withbin al-Shibh's reporting.^^^ Those CIA officers wrote that bin al-
Shibh had providedinformation used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including
information on potential fiiture threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow
Airport an^^Nashiri's planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula. The CIA
officers [in-country] also noted that they found bin al-Shibh's information to be generally
accurate and that they "found few cases wherehe^enly/clearly misstated facts.In a cable
to CIA Headquarters, the CIA officers in IHHH country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was
being held] concluded, "overall, he provided what was needed." The same cable stated that bin
al-Shibh's interrogation was similar to other interrogations they had participatedin, and that the
most effective interrogation tool was having information available to confront him when he tried
to mislead or provide incomplete information.^^^ Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in
2005 that the most significantintelligence derived from bin al-Shibh was obtained during his
detention in foreign governmentcustody,which was prior to his rendition to CIA custody and
the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation technique
2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi BinAl-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use ofNudity and
Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Templatefor Future Detainees
ALEC ^^B(111551ZSEP02)
DIRE^^OR^^H DEC 02)
22888 (240845Z FEB 03)
22888 (240845Z FEB 03)
400
Despite the aforementioned assessments from CIA officers in
conce^ng bin al-Shibh's cooperation, officers atCIA Headquarters decided the CIA
should obtain m custody ofbin al-Shibh and render him to DETENTION SITE BLUE in
Country On February |, 2003, in anticipationofbinal-Shi^ arrival, inten-ogators at the
detention site, led by the CIA's chief interrogator, prepared an interrogation plan
for bin al-Shibh.'^ ®^ The plan became a template, and subsequent requests to CIA Headquarters
to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against other detainees relied upon near
identical language."^^^
According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the "mostsignificant" reporting from Ramzibin al-Shibh on potential
future attacks wasbackground information related to al-Qa'ida's plans to attack Heathrow Airport. According to the
CIA, Ramzibin al-Shibhprovided "useful intelligence," including an "overview of the plot" that was then used in
the interrogation of other detainees. {See ALEC HlHI (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided the
majority ofthis information in mid-October 2002, while in foreign government custody. See CIA f
''02 10361
^°^nii^ncluded Khaled Shaykh Mohammed (^H||^Hl065^030904Z MAR 03)); Hambali I
Yasir al-Jaza'iri (||H^^Hl0990j||^ ^^^HH||||B Abd al-Latif al-
Barql^^^Hl2348 •^•il^^AjHambaliandujlie^^^HII^HHIHl^^ (132049Z AUG
Kll M III I ' I








The interrogation plan proposed that immediately following the
psychological and medical assessments conducted upon his arrival, bin al-Shibh would be
subjected to "sensory dislocation.'"^^ The proposed sensory dislocation included shaving bin al-
Shibh's head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white lights, keeping
him "unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool temperatures," and shackling him "hand
and foot with arms outstretched over his head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed
to support his weight with his arms).'"" '^' Contrary to CIA representations made later to the
Committee that detainees were always offered the opportunity to cooperate before being
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the plan stated that bin al-Shibh would
be shackled nude with his arms overhead in a cold room prior to any discussion with
interrogators or any assessment of his level ofcooperation."^*^^ According to a cable, only after
the interrogators determined that his "initial resistance level [had] been diminished by the
conditions" would the questioning and interrogation phase begin."^^^
The interrogation phase described in the plan included near
constant interrogations, as well as continued sensory deprivation, a liquid diet, and sleep
deprivation. In addition, the interrogation plan stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques would be used, including the "attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial
slap... the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep
deprivation beyond 72 hours, and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh's] level of
»»408
resistance.
Based on versions of this interrogation plan, at least six detainees
were stripped and shackled nude, placed in the standing position for sleep deprivation, or
subjected to other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an
inteiTogator in 2003."^®^ Fiveof these detainees were shackled naked in the standing position
with their hands above their head immediately after their medical check.'^ ^® These interrogation







This included AsaduUaMDIRECTOR FE|^3))^bi^fasi^Wa^'iri
135558 mar03)); Suleiman Abdullali•^•^^^^^^•35787^^H|MAR
03); Abu Hudhaifa^HiHHIiH^H^^'7<^\M^ 03)); Hambali^Hljl^^^^^^lmin^ AUG 03)); and Majid Khan
146471 (241242rMAY03rHHHHHHH39077 (271719ZMAY03)).
For additional infonnation, see Volume III. In an April 12,2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
hearing, Senator Levin asked the CIA Director if the CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of the
Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[p]rolonged stress standing position, naked, arm[s]
chained above the head..." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs,
and nakedness were part of tlie EITs, Senator." Senate Select Committeeon InteUigence, Hearing Transcript, dated
April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
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plans typically made no reference to the information the interrogators soughtand why the
detainee was believed to possess the information."* '^
3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was
Cooperative
When CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE assessed
that bin al-Shibh was cooperativeand did not have additional knowledge of future attacks,
CIA Headquarters disagreed and instructed the interrogators to continue using the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, whichfailed to elicit the information sought by CIA
Headquarters.'*^^ On February 11, 2003, interrogators asked CIA Headquarters for questions that
ALEC Station was "85 percentcertain [bin al-Shibh ] will be able to answer," in order to verify
bin al-Shibh's level of cooperation.'* '^* The interrogators stated that information from Abu
Zubaydah and al-Nashiri suggested that bin al-Shibh would not have been given a new
assignment or trusted with significant information given his high-profile links to the September
11, 2001, attacks."*^^ They further stated that bin al-Shibh had "achieved substantial notoriety
after 11 September," but was still unproven in al-Qa'ida circles and may have "been privy to
information more as a bystander than as an active participant."'*^^
The CIA's ALEC Station disagreed with the assessment of the
detention site personnel, responding that it did not believe the portrayals of bin al-Shibh offered
by Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were accurate and that CIA Headquarters assessed that bin al-
Shibh must have actionable information due to his proximity to KSM and CIA Headquarters'
belief that bin al-Shibh had a history of withholding information from interrogators. ALEC
Station wrote:
"As base [DETENTION SITE BLUE] is well aware, Ramzi had long
been deliberately withholding and/or providing misleading information to
his interrogators in [a foreign government].... From our optic, it is
imperative to focus Ramzi exclusively on two issues: 1) What are the
next attacks planned for the US and 2) Who and where are the operatives
inside the United States.'"*'^
' See Volume Til for additional information.
-"2 ||[^^H^52 (121723Z FEB 03)
-•'3 (131444Z FEB 03)|^ ^^BHfl0446 (1 li754Z FEB 03). The Committee was informed that the CIA's standard practice during
coercive interrogations was to ask questions to whichinteiTogators alreadyknew the answers in order to assess the
detainee's level of cooperation. Hie Committee was further informedthat only after detainees were assessedto be
cooperative did inteiTogators askquestions whose answers were unknown to theCIA. See, for example, Transcript
ofSSCni^ng, April 12, 2007 (testimony of CIA Director Michael Hayden) (DTS #2007-3158).
HH 10452 (121723Z FEB 03). In June 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibl^^icipated with KSM in an interview
with the al-Jazeera television network on the 9/11 attacks. DIRECTOR (112136Z SEP 02).
'»'®^^^^0452 (121723Z FEB 03)
ALEC^IH (131444Z FEB 03). Contrary to the statement in the CIA cable, as described, CIA officers in the
country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh washeldprior to beingrendered to CIA custody wrote that Rainzi bin al-Shibh
had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential
Kir 'iM III' Iiikimumi




The ALEC Station cable stated that bin al-Shibh had ''spent
extensive time with [KSM]," and "must have heard discussions of other targets." The cable
added that "HQS strongly believes that Binalshibh was involved in efforts on behalf of KSM to
identify and place operatives in the West." The February 13, 2003, cable concluded:
"We think Binalshibh is uniquely positioned to give us much needed
critical information to help us thwart large-scale attacks inside the United
States, and we want to do our utmost to get it as soon as possible. Good
luck."4i8
CIA officers at DETENTION SITE BLUE therefore continued to
use the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques against bin al-Shibh for approximately three
additional weeks after this exchange, including sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation,
facial holds, attention grasps, abdominal slaps, facial slaps, and walling.'^ ^^ Binal-Shibh did not
provide the information sought on "operatives inside the United States" or "large-scale attacks
inside the United States.""^^^
4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody ofa Foreign
Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the
CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed As "Sir"
and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains ofStomach Pain
CIA records indicate that the CIA interrogators at DETENTION
SITE BLUE questioning Ramzi bin al-Shibh were unaware ofthe intelUgencebh^l^^
)reviouslv provided in foreign government custody, even though
and the intelligence from those interrogations had been disseminated by
the CIA. On multiple occasions, personnel at the detention site drafted intelligence reports that
contained information previously disseminated from interrogations of bin al-Shibh while he was
in foreign government custody, under the faulty understanding that bin al-Shibh was providing
new information."^^^
future threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow aiiport and al-Nashiri's planning for potential
operations in tlie ArabianPeninsula. The CIA officers in that countryalso noted that tliey found Ramzi bin
al-Sliibh's information to be ceneralW accurate, and that they "found few cases where he openly^learly misstated
facts." The CIA officers in concluded, "overall, [Ramzi bin al-Shibh] provided what was needed." See
22888 (240845Z FEB 03).
ALEC M (131444Z FEB 03)
See, for example,••• 10525 (200840Z FEB 03) and I^Hi 10573 (241143Z FEB 03). For further
detail, see the detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume III.
See detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume IE for additional information.
See, for example, CIA |
[^Siyjll^l^^^^^BCdescribing the foreign government's interrogators' "plan
to ask Binalshibh toclarify his statements that Mohamed Atta, Marwan el-Shehhi, andZiadJ^ah could not agree
on the wisdom of targetincnuclea^cilitieO^^H^^Bl0568(23^ FEB 03); |H1H 20817
•; CIA CIA




Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to interrogation techniques and
conditions of confinement that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA inten-ogators used
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for behavior adjustment purposes, in response to
perceived disrespect, and on severaloccasions, before bin al-Shibh had an opportunity to
respond to an inten'ogator's questions or before a question was asked. The CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques wereapplied when bin al-Shibh failed to address an interrogator as
"sir," when inteiTogators noted bin al-Shibh had a "blank stare" on his face, and when bin al-
Shibh complained of stomach pain.'^ ^^ Further, despite CIA policy at the time tokeep detainees
under constant light for security purposes, bin al-Shibh was kept in total darkness to heighten his
sense of fear."^^^
CIA psychological assessments of bin al-Shibh were slow to
recognize the onset of psychological problems brought about, according to later CIA
assessments, by bin al-Shibh's long-term social isolation and his anxiety that the CIA would
return to using its enhanced inten"ogation techniques against him. The symptoms included
visions, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm."^^"^ In April 2005, a CIA psychologist
stated that bin al-Shibh "has remained in social isolation" for as long as two and half years and
the isolation was having a "clear and escalating effect on his psychological functioning." The
officer continued, "in [bin al-Shibh's] case, it is important to keep in mind that he was previously
a relatively high-functioning individual, making his deterioration over the past several months
more alarming.'"^^^ The psychologist wrote, "significant alterations to RBS'[s] detention
environment must occur soon to prevent further and more serious psychological disturbance.
On September 5, 2006, bin al-Shibh was transferred to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba."^^^ After his arrival, bin al-Shibh was placed on anti-psychotic medications.'^ "'^
The CIA disseminated 109 intelligence reports from the CIA
interrogations of Ramzi bin al-Shibh."^^^ ACIA assessment, which included intelligence from his
04
10582 (242026Z FEB 03); HIBI10627 (281949Z FEB 03)
10521 (191750Z FEB 03). The cable refeiTed to keeping bin al-Shibh in darkness as a "standard
interrogation technique." Thesame cable states that during the night of Febniary 18,2003, the light went out in bin
al-Shibh's cell and that "[w]hen security personnel anived to replace the bulb, binal-Shibh wascowering in the
comer, sliivering. Security personnel notedthat he appearedrelievedas soon as Hie light was replaced."
1759 (021319Z OCT 04); HEADQUARTERSBHlm40023Z NOV 05); •HHlSOO(171225Z NOV 04);(140915ZNOV 04); •^••1930 (061620Z DEC04)^^^^^B
2207(111319Z APR 05)rHBH[2210a41^7Z APR 2535(051^5Z JUL 05);
2589 (120857ZJlJl705)nBiHH 2830 (291304Z AUG 05); HliH 1890 (171225Z NOV
20083IZ NOV 04); CIA document entitled, "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, P
141507Z APR 05); HH|M|25^(051805Z JUL 05); ||m|^|| 2210(141507Z APR05);(051805Z JULoH)!!}^^^2830 (291304Z AUG 05);
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time in foreign government custody, as well as his reporting in CIA custody before, during, and
after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,'^ ^® concluded that:
"Much of [bin al-Shibh's] statements on the 11 September attacks have been
speculative, and many of the details could be found in media accounts of the
attacks that appeared before he was detained. In the few instances where his
reporting was unique and plausible, we cannot verify or refute the
information... he has been sketchy on some aspects of the 9/11 plot, perhaps in
order to downplay his role in the plot. His information on individuals is non
specific; he has given us nothing on the Saudi hijackers or others who played a
role... The overall quality ofhis reporting has steadily declined since 2003.'"^^^
G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
7. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody
at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques
The capture of KSM was attributable to a single CIA source who
first cameto the CIA's attention in the spring of 2001."^^^ Thesource
led the CIA and Pakistan authorities directly to KSM. KSM was held in Pakistani
custody from the time ofhis capture on March 1, 2003, to March |, 2003, and was interrogated
by CIA officers and Pakistani officials. According to CIA records, while in Pakistani custody,
KSM was subjected to some sleep deprivation, but there are no indications of other coercive
interrogation techniques being used.'^ ^^ While KSM denied knowledge of attack plans and the
locations of Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,'^ '^^ he did provide limited information on
various al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives who had already been captured. KSM's willingness to
discuss operatives when confronted with information about their capture—behavior noted by
CIA officers on-site in Pakistan—was a recurring theme throughout KSM's subsequent detention
and inten-ogation in CIA custody
Less than two hours after KSM's capturc^nticipa^g KSM's
arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, the chief ofinterrogations, BHIHI' sent an email
to CIA Headquarters with the subject line, "Let's roll with the new guy." The email requested
permission to "press [KSM] for threat info right away.'"^^^ Later thatday, CIA Headquarters
authorized to use a number of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against
Ramzi bin al-Shibh was immediately subjected to die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION
SITE BLUE.
"31 ALEC•• (302240Z JUN 05)
For more details, see section of this summary on the capture of KSM and additional information in Volume IL
141403 (020949Z MAR 03)
[41484 (0313I5Z MAR 03)|4I564 (041307ZMAR03);i^^HH41592 (051050Z MAR 03). For details on KSM's
detention in Pakistani custody, see the KSM detainee review in Volume IlL
Email from: [REDACTED]; to; jj^HIII^Hii' subject: Let's Roll with the new guy;
date: March 1, 2003, at 03:43:12 AM.
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KSM. The cable from CIA Headquarters did not require that non-coercive inten*ogation
techniques beused first."^^^ On March 2003, two days before KSM's arrival at the detention
site, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan for
According to CIA records, interrogators began using the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT a "few minutes" after the
questioning of KSM began. KSM was subjected to facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab,
stress positions, standing sleep deprivation^wi^ihisl^ atorabove head level), nudity, and
water dousing."^^^ Chief ofInterrogations |^|m|||[ also ordered the rectal rehydration of
KSM without a determination of medical need, a procedure that the chief of interrogations would
later characterize as illustrative of the interrogator's "total control over the detainee.'"^® At the
end of the day, the psychologist on-site concluded that the interrogation team would likely have
more success by "avoiding confrontations that allow [KSM] to transform the interrogation into
battles of will with theinterrogator.'"^^ KSM's reporting during his first day in CIA custody
included an accurate description of a Pakistani/British operative, which was dismissed as having
been provided during the initial "'throwaway' stage" of information collection when the CIA




34354 (•§• MAR 03); DIRECTOR |
34491 (051400Z MAR 03)
34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of |
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 27 March 2003.
34575
"Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - PreciousTruths, Surroundedby a Bodyguardof Lies," IICT,
April 3,2003. KSM also named three individuals who, he said, worked on an al-Qa'ida ant^ax program that was
still in its "earliest stages." Tliey were led, he said, b |^Omar|^ h^iadbeena^ inthecountr£of^H
The group also included Abu Bakr al-Filistini. (See 34475
would later state that "Yazi£Me^l-Qa'ida's anthraxefifotir(5ec^ |^^ fo769 (120937Z MAR 03).) Yazid
Sufaat, who had been in [foreign government] custody since 2001, had long been suspectedof
articipating in al-Qa'ida chemical and biological activities. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to:
_mii^^^iimiHcc:
, II I II I II III II I II I II III II I II I II III [REDACTED], [REDACTED];
subject: FOR COORD by noon please: Yazid Sufaat PDB; date: March 14, 2003, at 09:05 AM; email from:
[REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: RESPONSE - INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED TO
USAMA BIN LADIN ASSOCIATE YAZID SUFAAT; date: March 6, 2003, at 12:50:27 PM;
email from: to: [REDACTED]; SUBJECT: Re: KSM on WMD; date: March 12, 2003, at
08:28:31 AM.) Adraft PDB prepared on March 17, 2003, states that "Sufaat's own clauiis to ||||||||||^| [foreign
government] authorities and personal background tracks with KSM's assertions." (See"KSM GuardingMost
SensitiveInformation," labeled "For the President Only 18 March2003," stamped0319 ksmupdate.doc 17 March
2003.) On April 3, 2003,an IICTanalysis stated thatKSM "likelyjudges that information related to Sufaatabeady
has been compromised since his arrest." (See "KhalidShaykhMuhammad'sTlireat Reporting - Precious Truths,
Sur^nded by a Bodyguard ofLies," IICT, April 3, 2003.) CIA analysis from 2005 stated that
[a foreign government holding Sufaat] was likely to have known details of Yazid's involvement in al-
Qa'ida's anthrax program by early2002," although that information was not provided at the time to the CIA. (See
CIA Duectorate ofIntelligence; "Al-QaMd^^nthra^^Program Emerge in a Key Reporting Stream; New
Insights into Yazid Sufaat's Credibility #2005-3264).) Al-Filistini was later
captured and detained by the CIA. Whilebeing subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques he
changed his description of al-Qa'ida's anthrax efforts multiple times. On August 1, 2003, Abu Bakr al-Filistini, also
knownas Samr al-Barq, told CIA interrogators that"we never madeanthrax." At the time, he was being subjected
to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and was told that the harsh treatment would not stop until he "told
the truth." According to cables, crying, al-Barq then said "I made theanthrax." Asked if he was lying, al-Barq said
111! I (III I
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March 5, 2003, and March 6, 2003, while he was still at
DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM was subjected to nudity and sleep depnvation^On March
5, 2003, KSM was also subjected to additional rectal rehydration,"^"^^ which I^^^HOMS,
described as helping to "clear a person's head" and effective in getting KSM
to talk."^ On March 6, 2003, ^ "'softer Mr. Rogers' persona" after the
interrogation team concluded that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had caused KSM
to "clamup.'"^"^^ During this session KSM was described as "more cooperative," and the day's
interrogation was deemed the "best session held to date" by the interrogation team."*^^ During
this period KSM fabricated information on an individual whom he described as the protector of
his children."^^ That information resulted in the capture and CIA detention of two innocent
individuals.'^^
2. The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTIONSITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard
Prior to His Arrival
Within hours of KSM's capture, ALEC Station successfully argued
that CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR should take over the interrogation of KSM upon
KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE.^^ On March 3, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved
an interrogation plan indicating that KSM "will be subjected to immediate interrogation
techniques," and that "the interrogation techniques will increase in intensity from standard to
that he was. After CIA intenogators "demonstrated the penalty for lying," al-Barq again sUitedth^'I made the
anthrax" and then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made anthrax. {See 1015 (012057Z
AUG 03).) Two days later, al-Barq stated that he had lied about the anthrax production "only because he thought
thatwaswhatintenjoga^ 5ee^^^^HlOn (030812Z AUG 03).
^^•••^••11^4575
I I li III to: [REDACTED]; cc; [REDACTED], subject: Re:
Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: |m|||||||||^|||||rto; [REDACTED]; cc: H|H|
t: Re: Update; date: March 6, 2003, at 4:51:32 PM.
34573 (061751Z MAR 03); .34614 (071551Z MAR 03)
34573 (061751Z MAR 03); 34614 (071551Z MAR 03)
In June 2004, KSM described his reporting as "all lies." 34569 (061722Z MAR 03);
1281 (I30801Z JUN 04).
The two individuals, Sayed Habib and Shaistah Habibullali Khan, entered Cl/^ustod^t^pri^n^uW 2003
respectively, and were released inAugustandFebiiiary20 (See 5712|; email from: to: [REDACTED]^REDACTED]^u^ct:
planned release of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; ||||||m|||||||||||^^^^^^^^m.
CIA document, "Additional Details for DCIA on Sayed Habib's Arrest and Detention.") The CIA's June 2013
Response states tliat tlie detention of the two individuals "can only be considered 'wrongful' after the fact, not in the
light of credible information available at tlie time and in a context in which plot disruption was deemed an urgent
national priority." Tlie CIA's June 2013 Response furtlier states that KSM's reporting on March 6, 2003, was
"credible" because, at tlie time, "[CIA] assessed that Khalid Shaykli Muhammad (KSM) had moved to a more
cooperative posture as his interrogation progressed." A reviewof CIA records indicates that the CIA subjected
KSM to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the following day. The use of the techniques continued until
March 25,2003, and included 183 applications oftlie waterboard. See im^m 10711
Interview of ||||H||HH [REDACTED] and [REDACreDj^ffic^f the Inspector General, April 3,
to:^^^^^^^^H|||M^^^^^Hp|H^rom^^H|||||PHm^c^RED^TED],
[REDACTED],[REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACrED]^subjectJCSN^^ March I, 2003, at 07:07:33 AM.




enhanced techniques commensurate with [KSM's] level of resistance, until he indicates initial
cooperation." '^^ ^ On March |, 2003, the day ofKSM's amval atDETENTION SITE BLUE, the
on-site medical officer described the use of the waterboard on KSM as inevitable;
"[T]he team here apparently looks to use the water board in two different
contexts. One is as a tool of regression and control in which it is used up front
and aggressively. The second is to vet information on an as needed basis.
Given the various pressures from home vs what is happening on the ground, I
think the team's expectation is that [KSM] will [be] getting treatment
somewhere in between. I don't think they believe that it will be possible to
entirely avoid the water board given the high and immediate threat to US and
allied interests. It is an interesting dynamic because they are weU aware of the
toll it will take on the team vs. the detainee. The requirements coming from
home are really unbelievable in terms of breadth and detail.'"^^^
Meanwhile, OMS completed draft guidelines on the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically addressing the waterboard interrogation
technique. These guidelines were sent to the medical personnel at the detention site. The
guidelines included a warning that the risk of the waterboard was "directly related to number of
exposures and may well accelerate as exposures increase," that concerns about cumulative
effects would emerge after three to five days, and that there should be an upper limit on the total
number of waterboard exposures, "perhaps 20 in a week." CIA records indicate that, as of the
day of KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the interrogation team had not reviewed the
draft OMS guidelines."^^-
KSM arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE at approximately 6:00
PM local time on March |, 2003, and was immediately stripped and placed in the standing sleep
deprivation position."^^^ At6:38 PM, after the medical and psychological personnel who had
traveled with KSM from DETENTION SITE COBALT cleared KSM for the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, the detention site requested CIA Headquarters' approval to begin the
interrogation process."^^"^ The detention site received the approvals at 7:18 PM,"^^^ at which point
the interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM."^^^
Between March 2003^n^March^2003, contractors
SWIGERT and DUNBAR, and a CIA interrogator, the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against KSM, including nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention
450 10654 (030904Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR
SWIGERT and CIA interro
2003. DIRECTOR
"*5' Email from: [REDACTED];
1 2003, at3:51:09 AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to:






I(041444Z MAR 03). The initial approval was for
The authorization was extended to DUNBAR on March |,
cc: I; subject: Technique; date: March
|; subject: Re: Technique; date:
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grab and insult slap, the facial grab, the abdominal slap, the kneeling stress position, and
walling."^^^ There were no debriefers present. According to the CIAinterrogator, during KSM's
first day at DETENTION SITE BLUE^WIGERTan^UNBAR first began threatening KSM's
children.latertold the inspector general that
these threats were legal so long as the threats were "conditional.'"^^^ On March 9, 2003, KSM
fabricated information indicating that Jaffar al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together"^^^
because, as he explained on April 23, 2003, he "felt some pressure to produce information about
operations in the United States in the initial phases ofhis interrogation.'"^^
On March 2003^DeputyChiefof ALEC Station
and a second ALEC Station officer, arrived at DETENTION SITE
BLUE to serve as debriefers. The detention site also reportedly received a phone call ft^om CIA
Headquarters conveying the views of the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt on
the inteiTOgation of KSM.'^ ^^ Pavitt latertold the inspector general thathe "did notrecall
specifically ordering that a detainee be waterboarded right away," but he "did not discount that
possibility." According to records of the interview, "Pavitt did recall saying, 'I want to know
what he knows, and I want to know it fast,""^^^ The on-site medical officer later wrote in an
email that the CIA interrogators "felt that the [waterboard] was the big stick and that HQ was
more or less demanding that it beused early and often.'"^ '^^
3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant
Fabricated Information
On March 10, 2003, KSM was subjected to the first of his 15
separate waterboarding sessions. The first waterboarding session, which lasted 30 minutes (10
more than anticipated in the Office of Legal Counsel's August 1, 2002, opinion), was followed
by the use of a horizontal stress position that had not previously been approved by CIA




2003. Interview of I
October 22, 2003.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorisra Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG),
January2004.
-*^0 10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as 10741 (100917Z MAR
03)
•••• 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as |
Interview of|BHHIIIIIH< [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General, 30 April
2003. "
Interview of James Pavitt, by [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21,
2003.
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10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM.
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medical officer from reporting on the interrogation directly to OMS outside of official CIA cable
traffic^^^
March 12, 2003, KSM provided information on the Heathrow
Airport and Canary Wharf plotting. KSM stated that he showed a sketch in his notebook of a
building in Canary Wharf (a major business district in London) to Ammar al-Baluchi.'^ ^^ He also
provided statements about directing prospective pilots to study at flight schools,and stated that
Jaffar al-Tayyar was involved in the Heathrow Plot."^^^ KSM retracted all of this information
laterin his detention.'^ ^^ There are noCIA records indicating that these and other retractions
were assessed to be false.
The March 12, 2003, reporting from KSM on the Heathrow Airport
plotting was deemed at the time by CIA interrogators to be an effort by KSM to avoid discussion
of plotting inside the United States and thus contributed to the decision to subject KSM to two
waterboarding sessions that day."^ '^ During these sessions, KSM ingested a significant amount of
water. CIA records state that KSM's "abdomen was somewhat distended and he expressed water
when the abdomen was pressed.'"^^^ KSM's gastric contents were sodiluted by water that the
medical officer present was "not concernedabout regurgitated gastric acid damaging KSM's
esophagus.The officer was, however, concerned about water intoxication and dilution of
electrolytes and requested that the interroga^s use saline in future waterboarding sessions.
The medical officer later wrote to ^^H^I^MS that KSM was "ingesting and aspiration [sic]
a LOT of water," and that "[i]n the new technique we are basically doing a series of near
drownings.'"^^^ During the day, KSM was also subjected to the attention grasp, insult slap,
abdominal slap, and walling."^^^
March 13, 2003, after KSM again denied that al-Qa'ida had
operations planned for inside the United States, CIA interrogators decided on a "day of intensive
Email fiom: [REDACTED]; to:
3/10; date: March 11, 2003, at 8:10:39 AM.
10798 (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as
10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as
10778 (121549Z MAR 03)jdis^minated as
12141 (272231ZJUN 03); 22939 (031541Z JUL 04);
disseminated as
HHHI10787 (130716Z MAR 03). The CIA would later represent that the information KSM provided on the
Heathrow plotting wasan example of theeffectiveness of the waterboard interrogation technique, listing the
Heathrow Plot as one of the "plots discoveredas a result of ElTs" in a briefing on the waterboard for the President
in November 2007. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated
Novembe^ 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation forPOTUS meeting."
"^2 10800(131909^AR 03)
Interviewof by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Officeof the InspectorGeneral,May 15,
2003.
10800 (131909Z MAR 03); Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED],
Office of the Inspecto^eneral^/Iay 15, 2003.
from: ||||||H||||||^^ cc: subject: More; date: April
10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM. Emphasis in the original.
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Page 86 of 499
476
UNCLASSIFIED
I; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP
10883 (182127Z MAR 03),
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET// //NOFQRN
waterboard sessions.'"^^^ During the first of three waterboarding sessions that day, interrogators
responded to KSM's efforts to breathe during the sessions by holding KSM's lips and directing
the water at his mouth."^^^ According to a cablefrom thedetention site, KSM "wouldbegin
signaling by pointing upward with his two index fingers as the water pouring approached the
established time limit." The cable noted that "[t]his behavior indicates that the subject remains
alert and has become familiar with key aspects of the process.CIA records state that KSM
"yelled and twisted" when he was secured to the waterboard for the second session of the day,
but "appeared resigned to tolerating the board and stated he had nothing new to say" about
terrorist plots inside the United States."^^^
Prior to the third waterboard session of that calendar day, the on-
site medical officer raised concerns that the waterboard session—which would be the fourth in
14 hours—would exceed the limits included in draft OMS guidelines that had been distributed
the previous aftemoon."^^^ Those draft guidelines stated that up to three waterboard sessions in a
24-hour period was acceptable.'^ '^ ^ At the time, KSM had been subjected to more than65
applications of water during the four waterboarding sessions between the afternoon of March 12,
2003, and the morning of March 13, 2003. In response to a request for approval from the chief
of Base, CTC attorney assured detention site personnel that the medical officer
"is incorrect that these guidelines have been approved and/or fully coordinated.""^^^
sent an email to the detention siteauthorizing the additional waterboai*ding session."^^"^ Despite
indications from that the detention site personnel would receive a formal authorizing
cable, no such authorization from CIA Headquarters was provided. At the end of the day, the
medical officer wrote ^HmOMS that "[tjhings are slowly evolving form [sic] OMS being
viewed as the institutional conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are dedicated to
maximizing the benefit in a safe manner and keepingeveryone's butt out of trouble." The
medical officer noted that his communication with jl^HlOMS was no longer "viewed with
suspicion.On the afternoon of March 13, 2003, KSM was subjected to his third waterboard
session of that calendar day and fifth in 25 hours. CIA records note that KSM vomited during
and after the procedure.
477 10804 (140710Z MAR 03); 10790 (130946Z MAR 03)
Interview of••••I, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office oftlie Inspector General, April 30,
2003. The interviewee was a CIA interrogator for KSM at the CIA detention site.
10790 (130946Z MAR 03)
10791 (131229Z MAR 03)
[REDACTED]; to: cc: Jose
Rodriguez; subject^rejEyesOnly - Legal and Political Quandyr7^ateJMard^3, 2003, at 11:28:06 AM.
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP
3/10; date: March 12,2003, at 2:09:47 PM.
h'om: to: [REDACTED]; cc:
Rodriguez; subjectJleJEYE^NLY - Legal and Political Quandary; date^larcM3^003^8^0^n AM.
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, jjjBBHlHHIi' I^HI
subject: EYES ONLY - Use of Water Board; date: March 13,
2003, at 08:28 AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: cc: subject: Re: State cable; date:
March 13, 2003, at 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had written thar|]^iT^oin^h^^ra mile to
try to handle this in a non confrontational manner.'* Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
•HjjjHH; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 5:17:07 AM.
^^86^HB^03(131929ZMAR03)




Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters began reevaluating the use of
the waterboard interrogation technique. According to a March 14, 2003, email from an
interrogator who was not at DETENTION SITE BLUE, but was reviewing cable traffic, the
"[ojverall view seems to be" that the waterboard "is not working in gaining KSM['s]
compliance.'"^^^ The deputy chief of the CIA interrogation program responded in agreement,
adding that "[a]gainst KSM it has proven ineffective," and that "[t]he potential for physical harm
is far greater with the waterboard than with the other techniques, bringing into question the issue
of risk vs. gain...." The deputy chief further suggested that the waterboard was
counterproductive, stating that "[w]e seem to have lost ground" with KSM since progress made
at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and as a result, the CIA should "consider the possibility" that
the introduction of the waterboard interrogation technique "may poison the well.""^^^ The email
in which these sentiments were expressed was sent to the CTC attorney
overseeing the interrogation of KSM. Despite these reservations and assessments, the
waterboarding of KSM continued for another10 days.'^ '^ ^
On March 15, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm
references in signals intercepts on al-Qa'ida's efforts to obtain "nuclear suitcases.
Subsequent signals intercepts and information from a foreign government would later indicate
that the nuclear suitcase threat was an orchestrated scam."^^^ KSM was waterboarded a second
time that day after failing to provide information on operations against the United States or on al-
QaMda nuclear capabilities."^^^ During the waterboarding sessions that day, the application of the
interrogation technique further evolved, with the interrogators now using their hands to maintain
a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and mouth in an effort to make it impossible
for KSM to ingest all the water being poured."^^^ At onepoint, SWIGERT and DUNBAR waited
for KSM to talk before pouring water over his mouth.
from: •^^•1; to; cc: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: re Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - As of 1000 HRS 14 Mar 03; date: March 14,
2003, at 10:44:12 AM.
^^^EmaiHronr to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
BBBBBBBtsu^ectTreSummary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - As of1000 HRS 14 MAR 03; date: March
14, 2003, at 02:02:42 PM.
5eedet^d review of these sessions in Volume III.
10831 (151510ZMAR 03); ^^11 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); ^••110849 (161058Z MAR
03); Interviewof by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the InspectorGeneral,
May 15, 2003.
The original reporting, that al-Qa'ida had purchased nuclear suitcases in Yemen, was later determined to be
based on an effort by unknown Yemenis to sell "suitcase weapons" to al-Qa'ida. Al-Qa'ida operatives concluded
that the offer was a scam. See 74492 (250843Z JUL 03), disseminated as
HEADQUARTERS (092349Z DEC 04).
"^2 HHi 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); 10831 (151510Z MAR 03)
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: Re: Sitrep as of AM 3/15;
date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 A.M. Interviewof||||^ ^ |^^ ^^WREDACTED] and [REDACTED],
Office of the Inspector General, May 15,2003. See also interviewof^B||||tH|^|, by [REDACTED] and
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. The descriptions of the use of the waterboard
interrogation techniqu^gaii^ were provided by these two on-site medical officers.
Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15,
2003.
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March 17, 2003, and into the morning of
Marchl8720037^^|HilHH, exchanged emails with the medical officer
at DETENTION SITE BLUE on the waterboarding of KSM. According to the
waterboard inten'ogation technique had "moved even further from the SERE model.'"^^^
also wrote:
"Truthfully, though, I don't recall that the WB [waterboard] produced anything
actionable in AZ [Abu Zubaydah] any earlier than another technique might
have. This may be different with KSM, but that is still as much a statement of
faith as anything else - since we don't seem to study the question as we go...
it's been many more days of constant WB repetitions, with the evidence of
progress through most of them not being actionable intel but rather that 'he
looks like he's weakening.' The WB may actually be the best; just don't like
to base it on religion.'"^^^
On March 18, 2003, KSM was confronted with the reporting of
Majid Khan, who was then in thecustody of a foreign government,"^^^ regarding plotting against
gas stations inside the United States, information that KSM had not previously discussed. In
assessing the session, DETENTION SITE BLUE personnel noted that "KSM will selectively lie,
provide partial truths, and misdirect when he believes he will not be found out and held
accountable." On the other hand, they wrote that "KSM appears more inclined to make accurate
"95 Email to: [REDACTED]; from:
March 17, 2003, at 01:11:35 PM.
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc:
2003, at 10:52:03 AM.
Majid Khan, who was arrested on March 5, 2003, provided extensive infonnation prior to being rendered to CIA
custody. This included information on lyman Paris, Uzhair (Paracha) and his fatiier, Aafia Sidiqqi, his transfer of
al-Qa'ida funds to a Bangkok-based Zubair, and his discussions with KSM regarding various proposed plots. Majid
Khan also provided assistance to the CIA in its efforts to locateAmmar al-BaluchiJncludm al-
Pakistani. (See MW 13697 (080730Z MAR 03); ••^•13765
144244 (161423Z APR^3)-MW^M44684 (250633Z APR 03);
13678 (070724Z MAR 03); ••••m85 •||^^^Hn^^Hn908 (26025IZ MAR
03); 13826 (190715Z MAR (200454Z MAR 03X^^^Mn8901
13686 (071322Z MAR03)?^HH 13932 (271244Z MAR^^^BI^I 13710
(081218Z MAR 03).) After being rendered to CIA custody, Majid Khan was subjected by the CIA to sleep
deprivation, nudity, and dietary manipulation^andmayhavebeens^ to an ice water bath. (See \
139077 (271719Z MAY 03); 39099 (281 lOlZ MAY 03); |
I Briefing for tlie Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 14, 2008;|41772(121230ZJUL 03); ••^•||||||||^H^42025^^^^^^p; email|, [REDACTED]7^^^^^^^ |^, and subject, "Re: ihope the
approvals for enhanced comes through quickly for tliis guy... this does not look good"; date: June 30, 2003.) A
June 2006 CIA email stated that Majid Klian said he "fabricated a lot of his early [CIA] interrogation reporting to
stop... what he called 'torture.'" According to the email, Klianstated that he was "hung up" for approximately one
day in a sleep deprived position and thaMieprovided "ever^^ the^ante^^iea^^et out ofthe situation."(See email from: [REDACTED] ••C0bJH|H||||H|, [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED], |m|^H|^^|P^ibjectr|||Hfre^est for prozac; date: June 16, 2006.) As
detailed in this summary and in more detail in Volume 11, the CIA inaccurately attributed information provided by
Majid Khan in foreign government custody to tlie CIA interrogations of KSM.
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disclosures when he believes people, emails, or other source material are available to the USG
for checking his responses.
The same day, KSM provided additional information on the
Heathrow Airport plotting, much of which he would recant in 2004."^^^ KSM also discussed
Jaffar al-Tayyar again, prompting the detention site personnel to refer to the "all-purpose" al-
Tayyar whom KSM had "woven... into practically every story, each time with a different
role."^°° After KS^^iad included al-Tayyar in his discussion of Majid Khan's gas station plot,
KSM debriefer in email that "[t]oday [al-Tayyar's] working with Majid
Khan, yesterday the Londoncrowd, the day before Padilla - you get the point."^^^ Beginning the
evening of March 18, 2003, KSM began a period of sleep deprivation, most of it in the standing
position, which would last for seven anda half days, or approximately 180 hours.^®-
On March 19, 2003, the interrogators at the detention site decided
to waterboard KSM due to KSM's inconsistent information about Jaffar al-Tayyar's passport.^^^
According to CIA cables, after assuming his position on the waterboard, KSM "seemed to lose
control" and appeared "somewhat frantic," stating diat he "had been forced to lie, and ma[k]e up
stories about" Jaffar al-Tayyar because of his interrogators.KSM then stated that his
reporting on al-Tayyar's role in Majid Khan's plotting was a "complete fabrication" and that al-
Tayyar had been compromised as an operative and that as a result, al-Tayyar could not be used
for a terrorist operation.^"^ In response, the interrogators told KSM that they only wanted tohear
hin^p^ ifhe was revealing information on the next attack.^®^ Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
later told the inspector general that it was around this time that contract interrogator
DUNBAR stated that "he had not seen a 'resistor' [sic] like KSM, and was 'going to go to school
on this guy.'"^^^ According to CIA records, the interrogators then "devote[d] all measures to
pressuring [KSM] on the single issue of the 'next attack on America,"' including attention grabs,
insult slaps, walling, water dousing, and additional waterboard sessions.
(^¥8/J|||||||||||mi|^^^|//NF) On March 20, 2003, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques throughout the day, including a period of "intense questioning
10884 (182140Z MAR 03)
10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as HI ^^^39 (031541Z JUL 04). CIA
records indicate that CIA officers believed that KSM's recantations were credible. See KSM detainee review in
Volume ni.
500 10884 (182140Z MAR 03)
Email from: [REDACTED], OFFICE:
18,2003, at 08:16:07 PM.
-'"^^^M|10884 (182140Z MAR 03);
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10902 (201037Z MAR 03)
10894 (191513Z MAR 03);
10902 (201037ZMAR 03)
Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the InspectorGeneral, April 3,
2003.
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03)
TOP SECRET//
I; to: [REDACTED]; subject: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March
10888 (190805Z MAR 03); 10999 (260835Z MAR
10902 (201037Z MAR 03)
10902 (201037Z MAR 03)





and walling."^®^ KSM was described as "[t]ired and sore," with abrasions on his ankles, shins,
and wrists, as well as on the back of his head. '^® He also suffered from pedal edema resulting
from extended standing.^^^ Afterhaving concluded that there was "no further movement" in the
interrogation, the detention site personnel hung a picture of KSM's sons in his cell as a way to
"[heighten] his imagination concerning where they are, who has them, [and] what is in store for
them."^^2
The waterboarding of KSM on March 21, 2003, and March 22,
2003, was based on a misreading of intelligence provided by Majid Khan bvDeputyChief of
ALEC Station According to a cable from the CIA's Khan,
who was in foreign government custody, had stated that KSM wanted to use "two to three
unknown Black American Muslim converts who were currently training in Afghanistan," to
"conduct attacks" on gas stations in the United States, and that "KSM was interested in usin^
anyone with US status to assist with this operation.Upon receipt of this reporting,
wrote in an email "i love the Black American Muslim at AQ camps in Afghanuistan [sic] ...
Mukie [KSM] is going to be hatin' life on this one."^^"^ However, her subsequent questioning of
KSM was not based on Khan's actual reporting, which was about potential operatives already in
Afghanistan, but rather something Khan had not said—that KSM directed him to make contact
with African-American converts in the United States.^^^ According to CIA records, in a
"contentious" session that lasted for hours and involved the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, KSM "flatly denied" any efforts to recruit African-American Muslim
converts, KSM was then waterboarded. '^^ Later in the day, facing the threat of a second
waterboarding session, KSM "relented and said that maybe he had told Khan that he should see
if he could make contact with members of the Black American Muslim convert community."
The CIA interrogators then returned KSM to the standing sleep deprivation position without a
second waterboarding session.^^^
The next day, March 22, 2003, interrogators subjected KSM to
"intense" questioning and walling, but when KSM provided no new information on African-
American Muslim converts or threats inside the United States, he was subjected to additional
10916 (210845Z MAR 03);
10916 (210845Z MAR 03)
10909 (201918Z MAR 03)
Interviewof^^HjjjimiH, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October
22,2003j|||^Bl0917(^907Z MAR 03).
13839 (201434Z MAR 03)
Email to: from: [REDACTED] OFFIC&^HH^[DETENTION SITE BLUE]; subject: Re:
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waterboarding.^^^ An hour later, KSM stated that he was "ready to talk."^^^ He told the CIA
interrogators that he had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American
Muslim converts, a mission he said had been prompted by discussions with a London-based
shaykh whose bodyguards had families in Montana.^^® KSM alsostated thathe tasked Majid
Khan with attending Muslim conferences in the United States to "spot and assess potential
extremists" who would assist in the gas stationplot.^^^ In June 2003, KSM admitted that he
fabricated the story about Abu Issa al-Britani and Montana, explaining that he was "under
'enhanced measures' when he made these claims and simply told his interrogators what he
thought they wanted tohear."^^^ In August 2003, KSM reiterated that hehad no plans torecruit
or use "black American Muslim" converts operationallyIn December 2005, he denied ever
asking Majid Khan to recruit converts or attend Islamic conferences.^^"^
On March 24, 2003, KSM underwent his fifteenth and final
documented waterboarding sessiondue to his "intransigence" in failing to identify suspected
Abu Bakr al-Azdi operations in the United States, and for having "lied about poison and
biological warfare programs."^^^ KSM was described in the session as being "composed, stoic,
and resigned."^^^
That evening, the detention site received two reports. The first
recounted the reporting of Majid Khan, who was still in the custody of a foreign govermnent, on
Uzhair, who ran the New York branch of his father's Karachi-based import-export business, and
on Uzhair's father/''-^ According to Khan, his meetings with the two were facilitated by Ammar
al-Baluchi.^^^ The second report described the reporting of lyman Paris, who was in FBI
custody, on a plot to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn Bridge and exploration of plans
to derail trains and conductan attackin Washington, D.C.^-^ KSM, whomdetention site
personnel described as "boxed in" by the new reporting,^^® then stated that Uzhair's father, Sayf
al-Rahman Paracha, had agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States.^^^ As described
529 WHDC
530
10941 (221506Z MAR 03); ••• 10950 (222127Z MAR 03). One cable from DETENTION
SITE BLUE hypothesized that KSM was lying inorder to force the CIA interrogators to apply the CIA's enhanced
inteiTogation techniques: "[T]he enhanced measures resulting from his lying in [sic] details could be a resistance
strategy to keep the interrogationfrom threatening issues... [KSM's] apparent willingness to provoke and incur the
use of enhancedmeasures mayrepresent a calculated strategy to either: (A) redirect the courseof the interrogation;
or (B)toattempt to cultivate somedoubt that he hadknowledgeof any current or future operationsagainst the US."
SeeJ^g^ 10950 (222127Z MAR 03).
^^^Fi0950 (222127Z MAR 03)5201094^221610^MAR 03), disseminated as 10948 (222101Z MAR 03),
disseminated as
10942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as
12095 (222049Z JUN 03)
12558 (04I938Z AUG 0^
31148 (171919Z DEC 05);
10983 (242321Z MAR 03);
10974 (241834ZMAR 03);
31147 (171919Z DEC 05), disseminated as
10972 (241122Z MAR 03)
10983 (242321Z MAR 03)
See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah
Paracha.
13890 10984 (24235IZ MAR 03)
I(242226ZMAR^3)?B|^Hi^83 (242321Z MAR 03)
10983 (242321ZMAR 03)
10984 (24235IZ MAR 03), disseminate^^
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elsewhere in this summary, the purported parties to the agreement denied that such an agreement
existed.''^ ^ In confirming Paris's reporting, KSM exhibited what the Interagency Intelligence
Committee on Terrorism would later describe as an effort to "stay obvious/general" and "provide
little information that might enable the US to thwart attacks.
With the exception of sleep deprivation, which continued for one
more day, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogationtechniques against KSM stopped abruptly
on March 24, 2003.^^"^ There are no CIA records directing the interrogation team to cease using
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, nor any contemporaneous
documentation explaining thedecision.^^^
4. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSMEnds, the
CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information
On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Ten'orism produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded
by a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding or lying about
terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States. It also identified contradictions
between KSM's reporting on CBRN and other sources.
24, 2003, PBI Director Robert Mueller began seeking
direct PBI access to KSM in order to better understand CIA reporting indicating threats to U.S.
cities.^^^ Despite personalcommitments from DCI Tenet to DirectorMueller that access would
be forthcoming, the CIA's CTC successfully formulated a CIA position whereby the FBI would
According to one cable, KSM did not volunteer the purported smugglingplot, but rather was asked about it by
interrogators. (See ALEC (052230Z MAY 03). All partiesto^epurported plot - Paracha and Amma^-
Balucht - denied any agreement had been reached. DIRECTOR m[(^^29Z JUN 03), disseininated as H
39239 (301600Z MAY03)il^B 13588 (171505Z JUL 03);
mill nil MIBrrT^^PZ JUN 03), disseminated as 39239
(301600Z MAY 03); ALEC HH (012248Z APR 03).) With regard tothe explosives smuggling reporting, the
former chief of the Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March 2003 email; "again, anotlier ksm op worthy of the lamentable
knuckleheads... why 'smuggle' in explosives when you can get tliemhere? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular
explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks an^ot
m:Bi
|; subject: see|; to:
highlight: again, anotlier ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:29:08 AM.
-''33 ••• 10985 (242351Z MAR 03). "Klialid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths,
Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," ITCT, April 3, 2003.
Sleep deprivation was extended for an additional day, although it was intemipted by"catnapping." See \
10999 (260835Z MAR 03).
^35 For additional details, see KSM detainee review in Volume 111.
536 "Khaiid Shaykh Muhammad's Tlireat Reporting - PreciousTruths, SuiTounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT,
April 3, 2003.
^3^ Email fi'om: HHjjjjjjjH L. Pavitt; HHUBH; John H. Moseman;
Jose Rodriguez;^||||||||||||||||^^BHrand||||i|||BlllHH' subject: Mueller's Interest in FBI Access to KSM;
date: April 24, 2003, at 10:59:53 AM.
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not be providedaccess to KSM untilhis anticipated transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Neither
the CIA nor the FBI knew at the time that the transferwould not occur until September2006.^^^
Between April 2003 and July 2003, KSM frustrated the CIA on a
number of fronts. On May 7, 2003, after more than two months of conflicting reporting, ALEC
Stationconcluded that KSM "consistently wavers" on issues of UBL's location, protectors, and
hosts, and that his information "conveniently lack[s] sufficient detail [to be] actionable
intelligence.On June 12, 2003, CIA Headquarters indicated that it "remain[ed] highly
suspicious that KSM is withholding, exaggerating, misdirecting, or outright fabricating
information onCBRN issues." '^^ '' At the end of April 2003, KSM was shown pictures of the
recently captured Ammaral-Baluchi and Khalladbin Attash, after which he provided additional
information related to their plotting in Karachi.^"^^ ALEC Station wrote in a May 20,2003, cable
that "[w]e consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this] information to be a serious concern,
especially as this omission may well have cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been
diligent in following up on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash,
and other probable operatives involved in the attack plans." '^^ ^
May and June 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash
provided reporting that contradicted KSM's statements about the Heathrow Airportplotting and
included information that KSM had not provided.^"^^ After KSM was confronted with this
reporting, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station wrote in an email, "OK, that's it...
yet again he lies and ONLY ADMITS details when he knows we know them from someone
Memorandum for: James L. Pavitt; Jose Rodriguez;
from: subject: Update: Director Mueller - DCI Tenet Conversation on KSM; date: June 4, 2003,
at05j4^2 PM. Note for: James L. Pavitt; from;cc: Jose Rodriguez,Bi
subject: Director MuellerPlans to Call DCI on KSM Issue; date: May 21, 2003, at 08:40:22 PM. In
addition to the FBI, seniorCIAofficers, including CTC's representatives to the FBI, complained about the
limitations on thedissemination of intelligence derived fromCIA interrogations and the impact those limitations had
on counterterrorism analysis. The CTC's representative to the FBI described this to the OIG as a "serious concern."
He stated that the compartmentation of interrogation information resulted in
delays in dissemination that could result in informationbeing "missed." He also stated that the CIA's
compartmentation of information preventedhimfrompi^ding totl^^ insight into the value/credibility
ofintelligence reports." (See interview ofIBIHBH' t>y IHHHil' Office ofthe Inspector General,
August 18,2003.) Among theotherCIAofficers expressing theseconcerns were the deputy chiefof CTC's Al-
Qa'ida Department, who told the OIG that limited acces^^operational traffic "has had an impact on [analysts'] full
knowledge of activities, andthus their analysis." (See Memorandum for the Record; subject:
Meetingwith DeputyChief,Counterterrorism CenterAl-Qa'ida Department; July 28, 2003.) The Directorof
Analysis at CTC described analysts' limited access to information as a "continuing problem." (See August 18,
2003, Memorandum for theRecord, meeting with Counterterrorism Center, Director of Analysis, Office of the
Inspector General.) The CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence told the OIG that limitations on the dissemination of
operational information prevented the "fiill cadre of analysts" from reviewing the intelligence and that, as a result,
"we^losing analytic ability to look at [foreign intelligence] in a timely manner." See interview of[
m, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 12, 2003.
ALEC^HH(072002ZMAY 03)
DIRECTOR^BH (121550Z JUN 03)
^^•^^34 (30I710Z APR 03); 11448 (301141Z APR 03)
ALEC]BH (022012Z MAY 03). See information in diis summaiy and Volume II on the "Karachi Plot" for
additional information.
See detainee reviews for Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in Volume III for additional information on
the reporting the detainees provided.
TOP SECRET//^^^^BB|m^m§V?4QFQRN




On April 19, 2003, KSM was questioned for the first time about summer 2002
reporting from Masran bin Arshad, who was in the custody of a foreign government, regarding
the "Second Wave" plot. Informed that bin Arshad had been detained, KSM stated, "I have
forgotten about him, he is notin my mind at all."^"^^ In response, ALEC Station noted that it
"remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent
where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS."^"^^ In June
2003, almost three months after the CIA had stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques
against KSM, senior ALEC Station and RDG officers met at least twice to discuss concerns
aboutKSM's lack of cooperation.^"^^ As an ALEC Station cable noted at the time, "KSM's
pattern of behavior over the past three months, trying to control his environment, lying and then
admitting things only when pressed that others have been caught and have likely admitted the
plot, is a cause for concem." '^^ ^ In an email, oneCIA officer noted that "what KSM's doing is
fairly typical of other detainees... KSM, Khallad [bin Attash], and others are doing what makes
sense in their situation - pretend cooperation."'''^ ^
In the fall of 2003, after KSM's explanations about how to decrypt
phone numbers related to British operative Issa al-Britani (KSM did not identify the operative as
"Issa al-Hindi," or by his true name, Dhiren Barot) yielded no results, and after KSM
misidentified another individual, known not to be Issa, as Issa, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
stated in an email that KSM was "obstructing our ability to acquire good
information," noting that KSM "misidentifie[s] photos when he knows we are fishing" and
"misleads us on telephone numbers.Later, after KSM's transfer to DETENTION SITE
BLACK, ALEC Station wrote that KSM "may never be fully forthcoming and honest" on the
topic of UBL's whereabouts.^^^ Despite repeated challenges, KSM maintained thathe lacked
information on UBL's location.^^-
for; from: subject:
Action detainee branch; date: June 12, 2003 (emphasis in tlie original).




[REDACTED];subject: Khallad & KSM DetaineeCase Discussion; date: June 18, 2003, at 10:09 AM;
ALEC ^^•0p2258Z JUN 03).
ALEC^BH(302258Z^ 03)
Email to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], |
L[REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: KSM's passive restraint - please let me know if you
have comments for a memo to the DCI^ate^un^4^003^^27|0^M^^
^^^mai^om^^H|PH||||||HuoJ^PI||||^^m,||^m^^|[[^^^|!|^^H^||H|^|7[REDACT^]rccr^^|^^^|; subject: KSM and Khallad Issues;
date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM.
55' ALECMB(111932ZNOV 03)
552 10400 (161754Z NOV 03). KSM, who was with Ayman al-Zawaliiri the day befor^^ March 1,
2003, capture, first informed the CIA oftliis fact more than a month later, on April 3, 2003. See m||||m|| 11139
(051956Z APR 03).
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KSM was transferred to DETENTION SITE|, 2005,^^^ to DETENTION SITE BROWN on March 2006,^^"^ and to U.S. military detention
at Giiantanamo Bay, Cuba, on September 5, 2006.^"^^ The CIAdisseminated 831 intelligence
reports from the interrogations of KSM over a period of 3.5 years. While KSM provided more
intelligence reporting than any other CIA detainee (nearly 15 percent of all CIA detainee
intelligence reporting), CIA records indicate that KSM also received the most intelligence
requirements and attention from CIA interrogators,debriefers, analysts, and senior CIA
leadership. Further, as noted, a significant amountof the disseminated intelligence reporting
from KSM that the CIA identified as important threat reporting was later identified as
fabricated.^^^
on
H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
I. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003
While the CIA held detainees from 2002 to 2008, early 2003 was
the most active period of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Of the 119 detainees
identified by the Committee as held by the CIA, 53 were brought into custody in 2003, and of the
39 detainees the Committee has found to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, 17 were subjected to such techniques between January 2003 and
August 2003. The CIA's enhanced interrogations during that time were primarily used at
DETENTION SITECOBALT and DETENTION SITEBLUE.^^^ Otherinterrogations using the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques took place at a CIA in Country |, at which
at least one CIA detainee was submerged in a bathtub filled with ice water.^^^
In 2003, CIA interrogators sought and received approval to use the
CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against at least five detainees prior to their arrival at a
CIA detention facilityIn two of those cases, CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA's
2218 |; HEADQUARTERS
12214 (050539Z SEP 06)
See KSM detainee review in Volume TIL
For more information, see detainee reviews and reports in Volume III for Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Muhammad Umar
'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah, Abu Khalid, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Abu Yasir
al-Jaza'iri, Suleiman Abdullah, Abu Hazim, Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim, Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash,
Laid Ben Dohman Saidi aka Abu Hudhaifa, Majid Khan, Mohd Farik bin Amin aka Abu Zubair, Samr Hilmi Abdul
Latif al-Barq, Bashir bin Lap aka Lillie, and Riduan bin Isomuddin aka Hambali.
For example, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to this technique at the safehouse. {Seeemail from: [REDACTED];
to: [REDACTEDl^ubiect^^emo; date^[arct^5^004.) The incident wa^^portedtottieCIAinspectorgeneral.
See from: to: [REDACTED], illriHiHiilH'
subiect^u^elcon^t^a^ 17, 2004, at 11:24 AM. See also claims related to the treatment of
Majid Khan. See Briefmgfor the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence,
Implementation of Central Intelligence Agency Secret Detentionand Interrogation Program,March 14, 2008.
559 director (012214ZMAR 03); DIRECTOR•• (040049Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR ••{
(252003Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR (162224Z MAY 03); HEADQUARTERS •• (102352Z SEP 03)
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enhanced interrogation techniques before they were requested by CIA personnel at the detention
560
sites.
2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country' | and DETENTION SITE
VIOLET in Country |
The CIA entered into an agrcemen^^ the
in Country | to host aCIA detention facility itj|^^^m||2002.^^'
CIA Headquarters invited the CIA StationinCoun^ | to identify ways to support the
in Country | to "demonstrate to and the highest levels ofthe [Country |]
government that we deeply appreciate their cooperation and support" for the detention
)rogram.^^^ The Station responded with an $| million "wish list"
CIA Headquarters provided the Station with $| million more than was
requested for the purposes of the |||^| subsidy.^^ CIA detainees were transferred to
DETENTION SITE BLACK inCountry | in the fall of2003.^^^
In August 2003, the U.S. ambassador in Country | sought to
contact State Department officials to ensure that the State Department was aware of the CIA
detention facility and its "potential impact on our policy vis-a-vis the [Country |]
govemment."^^ The U.S. ambassador was told by the CIA Station that this was not possible,
and that no one at the State Department, including the secretary of state, was informed about the
CIA detention facility in Country |. Describing the CIA's position as "unacceptable," the
ambassador then requested a signed document from "at least the President's National Security
Advisor" describing the authorities for the program, including a statement that the CIA's
interrogation techniques met "legal and human rights standards," and an explicit order to him not
to discuss the program with thesecretary of state.^^^ CIA Headquarters then sought the
intervention of Deputy Secretary of State Richaid Armitage, who called the U.S. ambassador.
Deputy Secretary Armitage told the CIA to keep him and the secretary of state informed so that
they would not be caught unaware when an ambassador raised concerns.
Nearly a year later, in May 2004, revelations about U.S. detainee
abuses at the U.S. military prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, prompted the same U.S. ambassador in
Country | to seek information on CIA detention standards and interrogation methods.-''^ '' In the
fall of2004, when |BiU.S. ambassador to Country | sought documents authorizing the
program, the CIA again sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary Armitage, who once again





According to a cable from CIA Headquarters, detainees arrived in Country
^•,2003. HEADQUARTERS |
[REDACTED]
568 £,Y^ail from: II^II^BIII^Ktor^^llllllllllllllll^^ subject; Re; DDCI-Armitage call on [Country |]
Detention Facility; date: August®, 2003.
5'^ '' [REDACTED] 6762 (BIBmAY 04)





made "strong remarks" to the CIA abouthow he and the secretary of state were "cut out of the
NSC [National Security Council] clearance/coordination process" with regard to the CIA
program. According to CIA records, Armitage also questioned the efficacy of the program and
the value of the intelligence derived from the program.^^^ Whileit is unclearhow the
ambassador's concerns wereresolved, helater joined the chief of Station in making a
presentation to Country |'s ||H^| on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The
presentation talking points did not describe the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but
represented that "[w]ithout the full range of these interrogation measures, we would not have
succeeded in overcoming the resistance of [Khalid Shaykh Muhammad] and other equally
resistant HVDs." The talking points included many of the same inaccurate representations'^^
made to U.S. policymakers and others, attributing to CIA detainees critical information on the
"Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," the "Second Wave Plot," and the "Guraba Cell"; as well as
intelligence related to Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, Hambali, Jose Padilla, Binyam
Mohammed, Sajid Badat, and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The presentation also noted that the president of
the United States had directed that he not be informed of the locations of the CIA detention
facilities to ensure he would not accidentally disclose the information.'^^
a separate country, Country |, the CIA obtained the approval of
the and the political leadership to establish a detention facility before
informing the U.S. ambassador.'^ ^ As the CIAchief of Station statedin his request to CIA
Headquarters to brief the ambassador. Country |'s
)robablv would ask the ambassador about theCIA detention facility.'^ "^ After!
delayed briefing the for
months, to the consternation oftheCIAStation^whichwa^ political approval prior to the
arriva^^l^detainees '^^ ^rh^^^^^^^Hj^^^^HI^ICountry |ofhcial outside of
the the was described as
"shocked," but nonetheless approved.'^ ^
(TS/fl||||^^||||||||H||||/^^^) By mid-2003 the CIA had concluded that its completed, but still
unused "holding cell" in Country | was insufficient, given the growing number ofCIA detainees
in the program and the CIA's interest in interrogating multiple detainees at the same detention
site. The CIA thus sought to build a new, expanded detention facility in the countryThe CIA
Lotus Notes message from Chief of Station to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from:
I; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED],|; subject: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec ArmitageTdateT^^^lll^^ljjlat7:40:43 PM.
The CIA's June 2013 Response states that"witli regard to the Study's claims that the StateDepartment was 'cut out'
of information relating to theprogram, therecord shows that theSecretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State...
wereawareof the sites at die time theywere operational." As detailed throughout the Committee Study, CIA
records indicate the secretary of statewas notinformed of theCIAdetention sitelocations. During meetings witli
theCIAin thesummer of 2013, the Committee requested, but was notprovided, documentaiy evidence to support
the assertion in the CIA's June 2013 Response.




See Volume I for additional details.
[REDACTED] 4076 [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 32266 [REDACTED]
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also offered $| million to the to "show appreciation" for the




detention site, he was told
discontinued.^^^ when thefacilityrcc^ed its first CIA detainees,
informed the CIA^^I^^^Il that the of Country | "probably has an
incomplete notion[rcgardingtl^^ actual function, i.e., he probably believes that it is
some sort of center.
in Coun
I»579 plan tp construct the
expanded facility was approved by the of Count
developed complex mechanisms to
in order to provide the $| million
complicated the arrangements
r^uested an update on planning for the CIA
inaccurately—that the planning had been
m582
3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
Without CIA Headquarters Authorization
cables from the spring of 2003 and afterwards describe
multiple examples of interrogation practices at CIA detention sites that were inconsistent with
the CIA's detention and interrogation guidelines. CIA officer^^ETENTION SITE
COBALT—led principally by Chief ofInterrogations ^—also described a number
of interrogation activities in cables that were not approved by CIA Headquarters, CIA
Headquarters failed to respond, inquire, or investigate:
• Cables revealing that the CIA's chief of interrogations used water dousing against
detainees, including with cold water and/or ice water baths, as an interrogation technique
without prior approval from CIA Headquarters
HEADQUARTERS
[REDACTED] 4088
See Volume I for additional details.
*^8' [REDACTED] 5293
582 [REDACTED] 5417
details on detainees in Count
39042
See also FREDACTEDl 5327
MAY 03);
39582 (041743Z JUN 03);
38597 (201225Z MAY 03);
Water dousing was categorized as a "standard|^ interTOgatioiUecl^^
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Page 99 of 499
UNCLASSIFIED
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38596 (201220Z MAY 03);
38557 (191641ZMAY 03);
39101 ••• MAY 03).
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Cables and records indicating thatCIA detainees who were undergoing or had undergone
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were subjected to rectal rehydration,
without evidence of medical necessity, and that others were threatened with it;^^"^
Cables noting that groups of four or more interrogators, who required practical
experience to acquire their CIA interrogation "certification," were allowed to apply the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a group against a single detainee;^^^ and
See 34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of







;email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: ^^H^^^Hj^^^^^^ubiectjRejUpdate; date:
at 4:51:32PMr^^^| 12385 (222045Z JUL03)!^^HFo415|H|||H||. In
addition to the rectal rehydration or feeding of al-Nashiri, KSM and Majid Klian, describedelsewhere, there is at
leas^n^^ord ofAb^ubayd^^^eiving "rectal fluid resuscitation" for "partially refusing liquids." {See|B|||^^|i0070 Marwan al-Jabbur was subjected to whatwasoriginallyrefe^ a
cabl^^i^|enei^," but was later acknowledged toberectal rehydration. {See
email from: to: ^•^^•••jR^ACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: TASKING - PvTHj^^Bd^March 30, 2007; DTS #2007-1502.)
Ramzi bin al-Sliibh, Khallad bin Attash and Adnan al-Libi were threatened with rectal rehydration. {See10415^PHHB|;•••12385 (222045Z JUL 03); from: •••IHIH; to:
iiii|i II I li ilii il Evaluation/Update J|||(047); date: March2004.) CIA medical officers discussed
rectal rehydration as a means of behavior control. As one officer wrote, "[w]hile IV infusion is safe and effective,
we were impresse^witluh^ncillat^ffectivenes^^ectann^sion on endin^tfi^waterrefijsaiinas^ case."
{See froinJI^^^B^BII; to subject: Re: (048);
date: February ^7200^) The same officer provided adescription of the procedure, writing that "[r]egarding the
rectal tube, if you place it and open up the IV tubing, the flow will self regulate, sloshingup the large intestines."
Referencing the experience of the medical officerwho subjected KSMto rectal rehydration, the officer wrote that,
"[w]hat I infer is that you get a tube up as far as you can, then open the IV wide. No need to squeeze the bag - let
work." (5e^mail from to ^Hi
^ntl [REDACTED], February 27, 2004, Subject: Re^^^J(048)^The same
email exchange included a description of a previous application of the technique, in which "we used the largest Ewal[sicHub^e had." {See email from: [REDACTED]; to {{^^•^^^•||fcccJ^ED ACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: (048);date: February
2004, at 11:42:16 PM.) As described in the context of the rectal feeding of al-Nashiri, Ensure was infused into al-
Nashiri "in a forward-facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso." {See (231709Z
MAY 04).) Majid KhanV^uncl^ray/^on^^ ofhummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins was "pureed" and
rectally infused. {See ^^^••^•••3240 (231839Z SEP 04).) The CIA's June 2013 Response does
not address the use of rectal feeding with CIAdetainees, but defends the use of rectal rehydration as a "well
acknowledged medical technique." CIA leadership, including General Counsel Scott Muller and DDO James Pavitt,
was also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with "excessive force" on two detainees at
DETENTION SITE COBALT. CIA attorney mmHHIH was asked to follow up, although CIA records do not
indicate any resolution of the inquiry. CIA records indicate that one of the detainees, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, was later
diagnosed with chronic hemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and symptomatic rectal prolapse. See email from:
[REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: ACTIONS
from the GC Updat^hi^^ornine^ateT^^^^^^^I, at 12:15 PM; email from: to:[REDACTED]; cc: BHHHjBjREDACTro], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: ACTIONS from the
GC Update this Momjng^ate^^Bmimi|, at 1:23:31 PM; email from:[REDACTED]; cc: ^^^I^^HTfREDACTED]; subject: Re: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Mominj
REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: December |, 2003, at 10:47:32 AM; •• 3223
HEADQUARTERS
38130 (121722Z MAY 03); 38584
38127 (121714ZMAY 03);^||^^^^^^B 38161
/NOFORN
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Cables revealing that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used at CIA
that were not designated as CIA detention sites.^^^
(131326Z MAY 03);
(121709Z MAY 03).
See, for example, \
In the first half of 2003, the CIA interrogated four detainees with
medical complications in their lower extremities: two detainees had a broken foot, one detainee
had a sprained ankle, and one detainee had a prosthetic leg.^*^^ CIA interrogators shackled each
of these detainees in the standing position for sleep deprivation for extended periods of time until
medical personnel assessed that they could not maintain the position. The two detainees that
each had a broken foot were also subjected to walling, stress positions, and cramped
confinement, despite the note in their interrogation plans that these specific enhanced
interrogation techniques were not requested because ofthe medical condition of the detainees.^^^
CIA Headquarters did not react to the site's use of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques
despite the lack of approval.
Over the course of the CIA program, at least 39 detainees were
subjected to one or more of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.CIA records
indicate that there were at least 17 CIA detainees who were subjected to one or more CIA
enhanced interrogation techniques without CIA Headquarters approval. This count includes
detainees who were approved for the use of some techniques, but were subjected to unapproved
techniques, as well as detainees for whom interrogators had no approvals to use any of the
techniques. This count also takes into account distinctions between techniques categorized as
"enhanced" or "standard" by the CIA at the time they were appliedThe 17 detainees who
38595 (201216ZMAY 03); | 38126
35341 39098139042(^^MMAY03)jemailfr^^ to:
[REDACTED]; subject: Memo; date: 2005-8085-IGj^^^^^^^^H|| 39101
MAY 03); •^••H||HH37708 (051225Z MAY 03); (271719Z
MAY 03); 39099 (281101Z MAY 03).
For more details, see detainee reviews for Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah; Abu Hazim al-Libi;
Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim; and Khallad bin Attash.
The two detainees were Abu Hazim al-Libi and Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim.
This is a conservative estimate. CIA records suggest that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques may have
also been used against five additional detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT in 2002, which would bring the
number ofCIA detaineessubiecte^(Hh intenogation techniques to 44. Those additional
detainees were [DETAINEE R], who was approved for the CIA's enlianced
interrogation techniques, but whose records do not refer to the use oftlie tecliniques (ALEC jlHIii dHliHHH
I)); Ayub Murshid Ali Salih andHa41AzizAhmadA^ whose records refer t^^ac^^leep^unio^^
application ofsleep deprivation (||^|^^^H|^^^^Hf28132 (101143Z OCT 02);
27964 (071949Z OCT 02)); Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah, who later told debriefers that, when he was first
captured, he "had to stand up for five day^traigh^nc^nswe^uestions'' and "was also forced to strip naked and
stand in front of a female interrogator" 14353 (231521Z APR 03)); and Sa'id Salili Sa'id,
who later told debriefe^that he was "mistreated and beaten by Americans while bUnd-folded and stripped down to
his underwear in HH " 13386 (090154Z JAN 03)). See also detainee reviews in
Volume III for more information.
The CIA's June 2013 Responseobjects to the Committee's count, arguing that "[n]o more than seven detainees
received enhanced techniques prior to written Headquarters approval." The CIA's June 2013 Response then asserts
diat "the Study miscounts because itconfusestheuseofstandar^echn^^ did not require prior approval at the
TOP




were subjected to techniques without the approval of CIA Headquarters were: Rafiq Bashiral-
Hami,^^^ Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihandi,^^^ Hikmat Nafi Shaukat,^^^ Lufti al-Arabi al-Gharisi,
Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani aka Abu Badr,^^^ Gul Rahman,Abd al-Rahim al-
tlme they were administeredwithenhanced techniques that did." This statement in the CIA's June 2013 Response is
inaccurate. First, prior to January 2003, theCIAhad not yet designated any technique as a "standard" technique.
Because sleep deprivation was includedin the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum approving the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, the Committee included, among the 17, CIA detainees
subjectedto sleep deprivation without CIA Headquarters authorization prior to January 2003. In January2003,
sleep deprivation under a specific time limitwascategorized as a "standard" CIA interrogation technique. Second,
the January 2003 guidelines state thatadvance CIAHeadquarters approval was required for "standard" techniques
"whenever feasible." For this reason, tlieCommittee did not includecases where CIA interrogators failed to obtain
authorization in advance, but did acquireapproval withinseveral days of initiating the use of the "standard"
techniques. Finallywater dousing was not characterized as a "standard" technique until June 2003. {See
DIRECTOR||||||l£ll^ DIRECTOR (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR•• (311702Z
JAN 03); 39582(041743ZJUN 03).) In numerous cases prior to June 2003, water
dousing was expli^ly described in CIA cables as an "enhanced" interrogation technique. {See, for example,
DIRECTOR lllllllipi (I01700Z FEB 03).) The Committee thus included, among the 17, CIA detainees subjected to
water dousing prior to June 2003 without CIA Headquarters authorization. The distinction between standard and
enhanced interrogation techniques, which began in January2003, waseliminated by CIA leadership in 2005. See
Volume I and Volume III for additional details.
Rafiq Bashir al-Hami was subjected to 72 hours ofslee^epnvationbetweenh^^ arrival atDETENTION SITE
COBALT and his October 2002, interrogation. See ||||g||||^m|||^m|m^ 28297 HHHilHii-
Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihani was subjected to 72 hours ofsleepdeprivationbetw^ arrival at DETENTION
SITE COBALT and his October 2002, interrogation. See 28462
CIA cablesfrom October2002noted thatShaukat was"tired from his regimen of limited sleepdeprivation." See
29381Lufti al-Arabi al-Gharisi underwent at least two 48-hour sessions of sleej^^givation in October 2002. See
29036 and 29352
Abu Badr was subjectedtoforcedstandii^^ grasps, and cold temperatures without blankets in
November 2002. See 29963
596 CIA interrogators used sleep deprivation, facial slap, use of cold (including cold cells and cold showers),
takedowns/^ietar^miliPulatioiLil^^iilj-SSiii^lii^EP"^^ '^® Rahinan. See |29520 29520J29770^^^^^^H^H||^^^^Hint^iewof [CIA OFFICER December
2002; ^^m^^^^^^^Hntervie^o^iammond DUNBAR, January 9, 2003; Memorandum for Deputy Director
of Operati^nsr^oiti^^ January 28, 2003, Subiect^eatlUnvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA
InspectorGeneral,Reportof Investigation, Deathof a Detainee (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005; and
CIA InspectorGeneral,SpecialReview, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September 2001 -
October 2003), May 7, 2004.
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Nashiri,^^^ Ramzi bin al-Shibh,^^^ Asadallah,^^^ Mustafa al-Hawsawi,^*^^ Abu Khalid,^^^ Laid bin
Duhman aka Abu Hudhaifa,^^^ Abd al-Karim,^®^ Abu Hazim,^"'^ Sayyid Ibrahim,Abu Yasir
al-Jaza'iri,*^^^ and Suleiman Abdullah.^®^ In everycase exceptal-Nashiri, the unauthorized
Abd al-Raliira al-Nasliiri was subjected to unapproved nudity and approximately two-and-a-half days of sleep
deprivation in December 2002, with his arms shackled over his head for as long as 16 hours. See email from:
[DETENTION SITE BLUE] to; subject; EYES ONLY -
[^••1^1] ONLY ~ MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003.
The facial hold was used against Ramzi bin al-Shibh multipletimes without approval. See m|||^^U0415
10429 (101215Z FEB 03); 10573 (241143Z FEB 03)r^^H 10582
(242026Z FEB 03); (252002Z FEB 03); 10602 (262020Z FEB 03); 1^633(011537Z MAR 03)rand^|^| 10704 (071239Z MAR 03).
Interrogators used water dousing, nudity, and cramped confinement on Asadallah witliout having sought or
received authorization from CIA Headquarters. Bathing detainees did not require authorization by CIA
Headquarters; however,as describedin CIA cables, the application of "bathing" in the case of Asadallaliwas done
punitively and was used as an interrogation technique. Nudity was also used in conjunction widi water
dousing/bathing and laterasaninte^^ techmque^ithou^pp^^ fi^om CIA Headquarters. See
134241 and 34310
Mustafa al-Hawsawi was subjected to water dousing without approval from CIA Headquarters. See
••••••• (081207Z APR 03).
Interrogators used sleep deprivation against AbiHChali^rio^^eekin^uthorizatioi^roiT^I^i^dquarters,
andthen^iledtoobta^^ authorizatioi^5e^^^PH|B|||imii 35193 and
mmilimilimil^l 35341 m^mnil^ljjlf Abu KhaUd had been in CIA custody for 17 days prior to
the use of the technique. Advance autiiorization from CIA Headquarters was therefore "feasible," and thus required
under the guidelines.
Hudhaifa was subjected to baths in which ice water was used, standing sleep deprivation for 66 hours that
was discontinued due to aswollen leg attribute^^rolongec^anding^mdity^n^ietar^nanipu^^ (5e^mail
from: to; [REDACTED], |^H|||||||||||^H, llHIHiiH' 1^1ject: our telecom; date: March ^7^04; CIA Office of Inspector General Report; 2005-8085-IG;
39098 39042 MAY and
39101 HI^ImAY 03).). No request or approval for the use ofstandard or
enhanced interrogation tecliniques could be located in CIA records.
Abd al-Karim, who suffered from a foot injury incurred during Ills capture, was subjected to cramped
confinement, stres^ositions, and walling despite CIA Headquarters having not approved their use. See
DIRECTOR ^^HImAY 03); and DIRECTOR
Abu Hazim, who also had afoot injury incun^^unn^u^apture^^subjecte^^walling^e^te CIA
Headquaiters having not approved its use. (See 36908 and
37410 (291828Z APR 03).) Nudity^ietar^riani^^ facial grasp were used on
Abu Hazim at least 13 days prior to receiving approval. 37411 (291829Z APR 03);
WIO (291828Z APR 03);••••^^••3^3
DIRECTOR HiiHiMAY 03).
CIA cables indicate that Sayyid Ibraliim was subjected to sleep deprivation from January 27^004,toJanuary 30,
2004, whichexceeded the 48hoursapproved by CIAHeadqi^ters. See HEADQUARTER^^^^B (272155Z
JAN 04); ||^^^H1303]^P||WAN04XH •^•jAN 04); ••••1303[AN04)lMH^lliT|H|H|j^
During March 2003 intenogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri was "bathed," a term
used to describe water dousing, which was considered at the time to be an enhanced intenogation technique. (See
••{^^••••^l 35558 •••§ MAR 03).) Water dousing had not been approved, and the subsequent
request, by DETENTION SITE BLUE, to use theCWsenhan^ inteiTogation techniques on al-Jaza'iri, did not
include water dousing. See 10990
Intenrogators requested approvals to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Suleiman Abdullah,
including water dousing. CIA Headquarters tlien approved other techniques, but not water dousing. (See
•HlHilHHBi! 36559•••••I; DIRECTOR Suleiman
Abdullah was nonetheless subjected to water dousing
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interrogation techniques were detailed in CIAcables, but CIA Headquarters did not respond or
take action against the CIA personnel applying the unauthorized interrogation techniques.
This list does not include examples in which CIA inten-ogators
were authorized to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but then implemented the
techniques in a manner that diverged from the authorization. Examples include Abu Zubair^®^
and, as detailed, KSM, whose intenogators developed methods of applying the waterboard in a
manner that differed from how the technique had previously been used and how it had been
described to the Department of Justice. This count also excludes additional allegations of the
unauthorized use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^®
Over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,
numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques by untrained
interrogators. As noted, the CIA did not conduct its first training course until November 2002,
by which time at least nine detainees had already been subjected to the techniques.^The DCI's
January 28, 2003, guidelines, which stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
The CIA's June 2013 Responsestates that the CIA "conducted at least 29 investigationsof RDI-relatedconduct,
plus two wide-ranging reviews of the program... one involved the death of an Afghan national who was beatenby a
contractor. The individual involved wasprosecuted by the Department of Justice and convicted of a felony charge.
Another case involved a contractor whoslapped, kicked, and struckdetainees while they werein military custody.
... [T]hecontractorwas terminated from the CIA,had his securityclearances revoked, and was placedon a
contractor watch list." However, the two specific examples providedin the CIA's June 2013 Response refer to
detainees who were never part of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. On November 6, 2013, the CIA
provided a list of "IG Investigations Concerning Detention, Interrogations, and Renditions." The list of 29 included
14 investigations that were diiectly related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Four additional
investigations wererelatedto detainees who claimed theyhad been subjected to abuse in transit from CIA custody
to U.S. mihtary custody at Guantanamo Bay. The remaining 11 investigations were unrelated to tlie CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Prograi^5e^TS #2013-3250.
CIA chief of interrogations, placed a broomstick behind the knees of Zubair when Zubair was in a
stress position on liis knees on the floor. Although stresspositions had been approvedfor Zubair, the use of the
broomstick was not approved. See April 7, 2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel, CIA Rendition, Detention, and
Interrogation Programs, at 22.
Majid KhmUm^laimecHhatJ^ 2003, he was subjected to immersion in atub that was filled with ice and
water. {See Briefing for the SenateSelectCommittee on Intelligence, Implementation
of Central Intelligence Agency Secret Detentionand Interrogation Program,dated March 14, 2008.) While CIA
cables do not confirm bathingor waterdousing. Chiefof Interrogations subjected AbuHudhaifa to
m^una^orized) "icy water" bath at the same ^^^^^vhere^jid Khan was held. (See email from:
to: [REDACTE^^REDACTED], subject:
telecon; date: email from: [REDACTED] to:
subject: Memo; dateTHjimm.) Ayub Murshid Ali Salih and Ha'il Aziz Ahmad al-Maythali were described
a^ioMiavin^lept^Ithoueh it is unclear from CIA records whethe^I^ntenjogatore kept them awake. {See
28132 (101143Z OCT 02) and 2^7^64 (071949Z OCT 02).)
Basliir Nasri Ali al-Marwalah told debriefers at Guantanamo Bay that he was "tortured" at DETENTION SITE
COBALT with five days of continual standing andnudity. (See 14353(231521ZAPR
03).) Sa'id Salih Sa'id likewise informed debriefera at Guantanamo that he was "beaten" while blind-folded in CIA
custody. {See 13386 (090154Z JAN 03).) Sixteen other detainees were held at
DETENTION SITECOBALT between September and December 2002, a periodduring wliich exposure to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques such as sleep deprivation and nudity cannot be determined based on the
lack of details in CIA cables and related documents.
December4, 2002, TrainingReport, HighValue Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training
Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running).
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"may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with specific detainees," raised the
additional issue of approved techniques used by unapproved interrogatorsThe January 28,
2003, DCI guidelines did not explicitly require CIA Headquarters to approve who could use the
CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques, including techniques that were not previously
considered "standard" and that would later be reclassified as "enhanced" interrogation
techniques. Rather, the DCI guidelines required only that "all personnel directly engaged in the
interrogation" be "appropriately screened," that they review the guidelines, and that they receive
"appropriate training" in the implementation of the guidelines.^
4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing Without Department ofJustice Approval;
Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding
CIA Headquarters approved requests to use water dousing, nudity,
the abdominal slap, and dietary manipulation, despite the fact that the techniques had not been
reviewed by the Department of Justice.^ '^^ Interrogators used the water dousing technique in
various ways. At DETENTION SITE COBALT, detainees were often held down, naked, on a
tarp on the floor, with the tarp pulled up around them to form a makeshift tub, while cold or
refrigerated water was poured on them.^^^ Others were hosed down repeatedly while they were
shackled naked, in the standing sleep deprivation position. These same detainees were
subsequently placed inrooms with temperatures ranging from 59 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.^^^
by or
03).) On May 17 and 18, 2003,
Attash under the supervision of
water dousing. See
(201225Z MAY 03).
DIRECTORnil (302I26Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR•• (311702Z JAN 03). The DCI guidehnes provided
no further information, other than to note that the screening should be "from the medical, psychological, and
security standpoints."
See, for example, DIRECTOR (10I700Z FEB 03).
In the case of Abu Hudhaifa, and allegedly Majid Khan, intenogators placed the detainee in an actual tub in a
CIA when employing water dousing that included ice water.
CIA cable records often describe tlie detainees as naked after tlie water dousing, while other records omit such
detail. See Volume III for additional information.
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Iunder^^^^^^
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on bin
I, including facial grabs, facial insult slaps^abdomina^^ and
38557 (191641Z MAY 03); g||||||||^||^|^||^ 3339^
'^2 DIRECTOR director (311702Z JAN 03). For example, on May |,
2003, CIA interrogatorjtllBiHH applied three facial attention grabs, fiv^aciaHnsul^l^s, and tliree
abdominalslapstoAbd^ underthesupemsioj^fCI/^nterrogator [CIA OFFICER 1].
(See 37821 ) HII lia^ ^een approved by CIA Headquarters
to employ the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques on al-Karim; approval had only been provided for |
[CIA OFFICER I] to use the CIA's enhance^nterrogation techniques. (See DIRECTOR
III.) On CIA interrogatorBmHIH' under tlie supervision of conducted an
intenogation ofAbd al-Karim in which intenogators used the facia^ttentioi^r^faciaHi^^ and abdominal
al-Karim. (See 38583 ) ll^^^lhad
approved by CIA Headquarter^^mpl^ the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against Abd al-Karim. In
another example, on^B||B^^HpETENTION SITE COBALT requested approval for certified intenogatorsjjjjjlljj^l^^ and [CIA OFFICER 1] to use the CIA'senhance^^iTogatiorUechn^^
Kliallad bin Attash, and for tliree other interrogators, HIHHIil^^ndJ|i|H|HHIHHl to
also use the techniquesj|unde^^ supervision of senior certified intenogator[||§^(]7^5^
H|[||H 38325 ) CIA Headquarters approved the use ofCIA's enhanced
intenogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash, but the approval cable did not include approval for participation




Other accounts suggest detainees were water doused while placed on a waterboard. '^^ Although
CIA Headquarters approved theuse of the "waterdousing" interrogation technique on several
detainees, interrogators used it extensively on a number of detainees without seeking or
obtaining prior authorization from CIA Headquarters.^^^
(TS/^H(^^^^U^^}F^runtenjoeation sessions on April 5, 2003, and April 6, 2003,
seniorCIAinterrogator another interrogator used the waterdousing
technique on detainee Mustafa al-Hawsawi at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Hawsawi later
described the session to a different CIA interrogator, who wrote that al-
Hawsawi might have been waterboarded or subjected to treatment that "could be
indistinguishable from the waterboard."^^^ Anemail from the interrogator stated that:
"We did not prompt al-Hawsawi - he described the process and the table on
his own. As you know, I have serious reservations about watering them in a
prone position because if not done with care, the net effect can approach the
effect of the water board. If one is held down on his back, on the table or on
the floor, with water poured in his face I think it goes beyond dousing and the
effect, to the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water board.
I have real problems with putting one of them on the water board for 'dousing.'
Putting him in a head down attiaide and pouring water around his chest and
face is just too close to the water board, and if it is continued may lead to
problems for us."^-^
Several months later, the incident was referred to the CIA inspector
general for investigation. A December 6, 2006, inspectorgeneral report summarized the findings
of this investigation, indicating that waterwas poured on al-Hawsawi while he was lying on the
floor in a prone position, which, in the opinion of at least one CIA interrogatorquoted in the
report, "can easily approximate waterboarding."^-^ The OIGcould not corroborate whether al-
Hawsawi was strapped to the waterboard when he was interrogated at DETENTION SITE
COBALT. Bodi of the interrogators who subjected al-Hawsawi to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on April 6, 2003, said that al-Hawsawi cried out for God while the
Email from;
Email from:
J^ng [REDACTED] account; to:
and subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003.
Foradditional details, seeVolume III^
Email from: using [REDACTED] account;
su^j^^^j^^^^^jjidMt; date: November 21, 2003.
^^^^^^^u^ng [REDACTED] account; to:
and subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003. Volume III of tlie
Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a wooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed
in thefullCommittee Study, there are norecords of theCIAusing thewaterboard interrogation technique at
COBALT. The waterboard device in thephotograph is surrounded bybuckets, with a bottle of unknown pink
solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of waterboard. In
meetings between theCommittee staffandtheCIA in the summer of 2013, theCL\ was unable to explain thedetails
of the photograph, to includethe buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at
DETENTION SITE COBALT.
CIAOIGDisposition Memorandum, "Alleged Useof Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case2004-
7604-IG, December 6, 2006.
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water was being poured on him and one of the interrogators asserted that this was because of the
cold temperature of the water. Both of the interrogators also stated that al-Hawsawi saw the
waterboard and that its purpose was made clear to hira. The inspector general report also
indicates that al-Hawsawi's experience reflected "the way water dousing was done at
[DETENTION SITE COBALT]," and that this method was developed with guidance from CIA
CTC attorneys and the CIA's Office of Medical Services.^^^
Inuring the same time that al-Hawsawi claimed he was placed on
the waterboard in April 2003, a CIA linguist claimed that CIA detainee Abu Hazim had also
been water doused in away that approximated wate^arding.^^^ alinguist in
Country^^HH from HIHI' ^003, until 2003, told the OIG that;
"when water dousing was used on Abu Hazim, a cloth covered Abu Hazim's
face, and [CIA OFFICER 1]] poured cold water directly on Abu
Hazim's face to disrupt his breathing. [Th^ingui^said that when Abu
Hazim turned blue, Physician's Assistant [^H^^|] removed the cloth so
that Abu Hazim could breathe."^^'^
allegation was reported to the CIA inspector general on
August 18, 2004. The CIA reported this incident as a possible criminal violation on September
CIA OIG Disposition Memorandum, "AllegedUseof Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case 2004-
7604-lG, December 6, 2006.
An accusation related to an additional detainee was included in a September 6, 2012, Human Rights Watch report
entitled, "Delivered Into Enemy Hands." The report asserts that documents and interviews of former detainees
contradict CIA claims that "only three men in US custody had been waterboarded." Specifically, the report states
that Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, "provided detailed and credible testimony that he was waterboarded
on repeated occasions duringUS intenogations in Afghanistan." According to the report, Mohammed Shoroeiya
stated that a hood was placed over his head and he was strapped to a "wooden board." Tlie former CIA detainee
stated that after being strapped to the waterboard, "then they start with the water pouring... They start to pour water
to the point where you feel like you are suffocating." As detailed in the full Committe^h^, Mohammed
Shoroeiya,aka Abd al-Karim, was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE on April 2003.
Wliile there are no CIA records of Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, being subjected to the waterboard at
DETENTION SITE ^||H, the full nature of the CIMn^ogations at DETENTION SITE remains
largely unknown. Detainees at DETENTION SITE |BI|Hi subjected to techniques that were not recorded
in cable traffic, including multiple periods of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation,
extended isolation, reduced quantity and quality offood, nudity, and "rough treatment." As described^^ol^e III
oftlie Committee Study includes aCIA photograph ofawooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE |m[||||||. As
detailed in the full Committee Study, there are no recordsof the CIA using the waterboard intenogation technique at
DETENTION SITE waterboard device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of
unknown pink solution (filled two thirdsof tlie way to the top)and a watering can restingon the wooden beamsof
waterboard. In meetings between the Committee staff and tlieCIA in the summer of 2013, tlie CIA was unable to
explain the details ofthe photograpM^nclude the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's
presence at DETENTION SITEI^BB- response to the allegations in the September 2012 Human Rights
Watchreport, the CIA stated: "The agency has beenon the record that thereare three substantiated cases in which
detainees were subjectedto the waterboarding technique underthe program." See "Libyan Alleges Waterboarding
by CIA, Report Says," New York Times, September 6, 2012.
CIA IG Disposition Memo,"Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December6, 2006. 2004-77717-
16.
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10, 2004, to the U.S. Attorney's Office in the EasternDistrictof Virginia.^^^ The inspector
general report concluded that therewas nocorroboration of the linguist's allegation, stating,
"[t]here is no evidence that a cloth was placed over Abu Hazim's face during water dousing or
that his breathing was impaired.
5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques
In the summer of 2003, the CIA captured three Southeast Asian
operatives: Zubair,^-^ Lillie,^^^ and Hambali. (These captures are discussed later in this
summary in the section entitled, "The Capture of Hambii.")^^^
August 2003, Hambali was captured and transferred to CIA
custodyDespite assessments that Hambali was cooperative in the interview process without
"the use of more intrusive standard interrogation procedures much less the enhanced measures,"
CIA interrogators requested and obtained approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques on Hambali approximately a month after his transfer to CIA custodyIn late 2003,
Hambali recanted most of the significant information he had provided to interrogators during the
use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, recantations CIA officers assessed to be
credible.^^^ According to a CIA cable:
CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717-
16.
626 CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of UnauthorizedTechniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717-
84854^
87617 impilj^l 87426 (111223Z AUG 03). Lillie was subjected to die
CIA's enhanced inteiTOgation techniques almost immediately upon his anival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, on
August |, 2003. H^wa |^strippe^nii^lo^thing," and "placed in acell in the standing sleep deprivation position,
in darkness." {See 1242 (151914ZAUG 03).) A day later an interrogation plan for
Lillie, including the use oftheCIA^senhancedii^rrogation techniques, was submitted toCIA Headquarters on
August |, 2003. {See 1243 (152049Z AUG 03).) CIA Headquarters approved the use
ofthe CIA's enhancedinten-ogati^^ on Lillie on the following day, August |, 2003. {See
HEADQUARTERS |||m||| (llHHI AUG 03).) As described, the Committee's count of detainees subjected to
unauthorized techniques did not include detainees such as Lillie, who were subjected to the CIA's "standard"
techniquesprior to authorization from CIA Headquarters, but for whom authorization from CIA Headquarters was
acquiredshortly thereafter. As noted, tlieJanuary 2003 guidelines requiredadvanceapproval of such techniques
"whenever feasible."629 ••^••19515 HHH B7414
'Hambali Capture." For additional details, see Volume II.
^^"^^^^•87617
631 1271 AUG 03); 1267 AUG 03).
The cable also noted that CIA contractor Hammond DUNBAR had arrived at the detention site and was
participatingin Hambali's interrogations as an interrogator. The "psychological assessment"portion of the cable
was attributed to a CIA staff psychologist, however, and not to DUNBAR.
CIA officers interrogating Hambali in November 2003 wroteabout Hambali's "accountof how, through
statements read to liim and constant repetition of questions, he was made aware of what type of answers his
questioners wanted. [Hambali] said he merely gave answers that were similar to what was being asked and what he
infened the interrogator or debriefer wanted, and when the pressure subsided or he was told that the information he
gave was okay, [Hambali] knew that he had provided the answer that was being sought." The cable states, "Base
assesses [Hambali]'s admission of previous fabrication to be credible. [Hambali]'s admission came after three
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"he had provided the false information in an attempt to reduce the pressure on
himself ... and to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali]
assessed thequestioners wanted to hear."^^^
officers later suggested that the misleading answers and
resistance to interrogation that CIA interrogators cited in their requests to use the CIA*s
enhanced interrogation techniques against Hambali and an associated CIA detainee, LilHe, may
not have been resistance to interrogation, but rather the result of issues related to culture and
their poor English language skills.
6. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters
Questions Detention ofDetainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S.
Military Custody and Heldfor An Additional Four Years
In October 2003, the CIA interrogated Arsala Khan, an Afghan
national in his mid-fifties who was believed to have assisted Usama bin Laden in his escape
through the Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001.^^^ After 56hours of standing sleep deprivation,
Arsala Khan was described as barely able to enunciate, and being "visibly shaken by his
hallucinations depicting dogs mauling and killing his sons and family." According to CIA
cables, Arsala Khan "stated that [the interrogator] was responsible for killing them and feeding
them to the dogs."^^^
Arsala Khan was subsequently allowed to sleep.^^^ Twodays later,
however, the interrogators returned him to standing sleep deprivation. After subjecting Khan to
21 additional hours of sleep deprivation, interrogators stopped using the CIA's enhanced
weeks of daily debriefing sessions with [tlie case officer] carried out almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia. [Hambali]
has consistently waimed to [tlie case officer's] discussions with him, and has provided to [the case officer]
additional information that he had avoided in tlie past... More tellingly, [Hambali] has opened up considerably to
[the case officer] about his fears and motivations, and has taken to trusting [the case officer] at his word. [Hambali]
looks to [the case officer] ashis sole confidant and the one person who has [Hambali]'s interest inmind^^J^5e^^
BIH (301055Z NOV 03). Tliis cable appears to have been retransmitted the following day as
1144 (010823Z DEC 03).
®3H|||||11^(301055ZNOV03)
1072 (110606Z OCX 03)^^^^^Bl075(lJ^28Z OCX 03); 1142 (301055Z NOV 03);
(08I459Z DEC 03); 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). After an Indonesian
speaker was deployed to debrief Hambali, the debriefer "got the distinct impression [Hambali] was just responding
'yes' in the typical Indonesian cultural manner when they [sic] do not comprehend a question." Xhe CIA cable then
noted that, "lj]ust to clarify, [the Indonesian speaking debriefer] then posed the same question in Indonesian," and
"[w]itliout pause, [Hambah] rephe^witf^direct contradiction, claiming tliat on 20 September 2001, he was in
Karachi, not Qandahar." (See 1^75 (111828Z OCX 03).) A January 2004 cable stated that "Lillie is of
limited value," adding that "[h]is English is very poor, and we do not have a Malay linguist." See
j^miH 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). See also detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information.
<^3SWASHINGX0N|
^^^^Hm^^^^^Hl393^01006Z OCX 03). Xhe information was also released in|48122mi^^mi|||. CIA records indicate that the CIA's interrogations ofArsala Khan resulted
in one disseniinated intelligencerepo^ derived from information Khat^roWde^h^a^Mi^j^rienced the
hallucinations. via CIA WASHINGXON DC
<53^ ^^^^^^^^^Bi3^201006Z OCX 03)
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interrogation techniques "[d]ue to lack of information from [Arsala Klian] pinning him directly
to a recent activity.Three days after the reporting about Khan's hallucinations, and after the
interrogators had alreadysubjected Khan to the additional 21 hours of standing sleepdeprivation
(beyond the initial 56 hours), CIA Headquarters sent a cable stating that RDG and the Office of
Medical Services believed that Arsala Khan should not be subjected to additional standing sleep
deprivation beyond the 56 hours because of his hallucinations.^^'^
After approximately a month of detention and the extensive use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Arsala Khan, tlie CIA concluded that the
"detainee Arsala Khan docs not appear to be the subject involved in... current plans or activities
against U.S. personnel or facilities," and recommended that he be released to his village with a
cash payment.^® CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITECOBALT instead transferred him to
U.S. military custody, where he was held for an additional four years despite the development of
significant intelligence indicating that the source who reported that Arsala Khan had aided
Usama bin Laden had a vendetta against Arsala Khan's family.^^
7. A YearAfter DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA Reports "Unsettling Discovery
That We Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little"
In the fall of 2003, CIA officers began to take a closer look at the
CIA detainees being held in Country raising concerns about both the number and types of
detainees being held by the CIA. CIA officers in Country | provided a list ofCIA detainees to
CIA Headquarters, resulting in the observation by CIA Headquarters that they had not previously
had the names of all 44 CIA detainees being held in that country. At the direction of CIA
Headquarters, the Station in Country | "completed an exhaustive search ofall available records
in an attempt to develop a clearer understanding of the [CIA] detainees." A December 2003
cable from the Station in Country | to CIA Headquarters stated that;
"In the process of this research, we have made the unsettling discovery that we
are holding a number of detainees about whom we know very little. The
majority of [CIA] detainees in [Country || have not been debriefed for months
and, in some cases, for over a year. Many of them appear to us to have no
further intelligence value for [the CIAl and should more properly be turned
over to the [U.S. military], to [Country |] authorities or to third countries for
further investigation and possibly prosecution. In a few cases, there does not
appear to be enough evidence to continue incarceration, and, if this is in fact
















Records indicate that all of these CIA detainees had been kept in
solitary confinement. The vast majority of these detainees were later released, with some
receiving CIA payments for having been held in detention.
8. CIA Detention Sites in Country | Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support
the Interrogations ofDetainees
Throughout 2003, the CIA lacked sufficient personnel and
adequate translators to conduct debriefings and interrogations in Counti7 Because of this
personnel shortage, a number of detainees who were transferred to CIA custody were not
inten-ogated or debriefed by anyone for days or weeks after their arrival at CIA detention
facilities in Country As noted inacable from the CIA Station in Country |, inApril 2003:
"Station is supporting the debriefing and/or interrogation of a lai'ge number of
individuals... and is constrained by a lack of personnel which would allow us
to fully process them in a timely manner."^^
I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues
1. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care
While CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice in
July 2002 "that steps will be taken to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way
exacerbated by the use of these [enhanced inteiTogation] methods,"^"^^ CIA Headquarters
informed CIA interrogators that the interrogation process would take "precedence" over Abu
Zubaydah's medical care.^"^^ Beginning on August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was kept naked, fed a
"bare bones" liquid diet, and subjected to the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. '^^ ® On August 15, 2002, medicalpersonnel described how Abu Zubaydah's
interrogation resulted in the"steady deterioration" of his surgical wound from April 2002. '^^ ^ On
This included Sa^ Habib Zarmein ("a nominal payment"), Modin Nik Mohammed ($H|), and Ali
Saeed Awadh ($|HH). See Volume III for additional details.
For detailed information, see Volume III.
36229 (060943Z APR 03). See also detainee reviews for Lillie, Hambali, Mustafa al-
Hawsawi, and Suleiman Abdullah.
See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee,
Assistant Attorn^ General, Office ofLegal Counsel, August 1, 2002, InteiTogation ofal Qaeda Operative."
ALEC H|B|(18232.1Z JUL 02)
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information, as well as email from:
[REDACTED], to: [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15, 2002, at 06:54
AM.
An email to OMS stated: "We are currently providing absolute minimum wound care (as evidenced by the steady
deterioration of the wound), [Abu Zubaydah] has no opportunity to practice any form of hygienic self cai*e (he's
filtliy), the physical nature of this phase dictates multiplephysical stresses(liis reaction to today's activity is I
believe the culprit for the superioredgesepara^n), and nutrition is bare bones (six cans ofensure daily)." See
email from: [REDACTED], to: HHHUII and [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15,
2002, at 06:54 AM.
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August 20, 2002, medical officers wrote that Abu Zubaydah's woundhad undergone
"significant" deterioration.^^^ Later, after one ofAbu Zubaydah's eyes began todeteriorate,^ '^
CIA officers requested a test of AbuZubaydah's other eye, stating that the request was "driven
by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian concern for AZ." The cable relayed, "[w]e have a
lot riding upon his abihty to see, read and write."^^^
In April 2003, CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each
broke a foot while trying to escape capture and were placedin castsCIA cablesrequesting
the use of the CIA's enhanced inten*ogation techniques on the two detainees stated that the
interrogators would "foregocramped confinement, stresspositions, walling, and vertical
shackling (due to [the detainees'] injury)."^^"^ Notwithstanding medical concerns related to the
injuries, both of these detainees were subjected to one or more of these CIA enhanced
interrogation techniques prior to obtaining CIA Headquarters approval.^^^
I" the case of Abu Hazim, on May 4, 2003, the CIA regional
medical officer examined Abu Hazimand recommended that he avoid all weightbearing
activities for an additional five weeks due to his broken foot.^^^ In the case of Abd al-Karim, on
April 18, 2003, a CIA physician assistant recommended that al-Karim avoid extended standing
for "a couple of weeks."^^^ Six days later, onApril 24, 2003, CIA Headquarters reviewed x-rays
of al-Karim's foot, diagnosing him with a brokenfoot, and reconmiending no weight bearing and
the use of crutches fora total of three months.^^^ Despite these recommendations, on May 10,
650
With regard to Abu Hazim,on April 24, 2003,an additionalCIA Headquarters approval cable was sent to
DETENTION SITE COBALT authorizing interrogator IH||H|||||||^||||||i to use the attention grasp, facial insult
slap, abdominal slap, water dousing, and slee^eprivatwrui^^^io^; the cable did not approve the use of
walling or the facial hold. (See DIRECTOR B||| Despite tlie lack of approval, walling was
used against Abu Hazim on April28-29, 2003, and the facial hold was used on April 27, 2003.
37411 (291829Z APR 03); 37410 (291828Z APR 03);
37509 (021309^MA^^3V^A May 10,2003, CIA Headquarters cable approved walling and the facial
grasp. (See DIRECTOR 03).) Abd al-Karimwas also subjected to unapprovedCIA
enhanced interrogation techniques that the detention site initially indicated would not be used due to the detainee's
injuries. Without approval from CIA Headquarters, CIA interrogators subjected Abd al-Karim to cramped
confinement^n^£r^^ 2003; stress positions on Apri^^003^ndwalling on April 21, and 29, 2003. (See
37121 (221703Z APR 03); 37152 (231424Z APR 03);
37202 (250948Z APR 03); 37508 (021305Z MAY 03).) On
May 10, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved an expanded list of CIA enhanced interrogation techniques that could be
used against Abd al-KarimJncl^ing walling and stress positions. See DIRECTOR MAY 03).
DIRECTOR ••• MAY 03)
36862 (181352Z APR 03)
DIRECTOR I
KM M III
Page 112 of 499
10647 (201331Z AUG 02); 10654 (211318Z AUG 02);
AUG 02)
Records indicate that Abu Zubaydah ultimatelylost the eye. See 11026(070729ZOCT 02).
1^679 (250932Z AUG 02); 11026 (070729Z OCT 02)
44147 ^^••^H[^^H||^^^Hy6862(m352Z APR 03)
36862 APR
To accommodate Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries, the cable stated that, rather than being shackled
standing during sleep deprivation, the detainees would be "seated, secured to a cell wall, with intermittent
disruptions ofnormal sleeping patterns." For water dousing^he detaineesM^ would be "wrapped in





2003, CIA interrogators believed that both Hazim and al-Karimwere "strong mentally and
physically due to [their] ability to sleep in the sitting position."^^^ On May 12, 2003, a different
CIA physician assistant, who had not been involved in the previous examinations determining
the need for the detainees to avoid weight bearing, stated that it was his "opinion" that Abu
Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries were "sufficiently healed to allow being placed in the
standing sleep deprivation position."^^^ Hefurther reported that hehad"consulted with [CIA's
Office of Medical Services] via secure phone and OMS medical officer concurred in this
assessment."^^^ CIA Headquarters approved the use of standing sleep deprivation against both
detainees shortly thereafter.As a result, both detainees were placed in standing sleep
deprivation. Abu Hazim underwent52 hours of standing sleep deprivationfrom June 3-5,
2003,^^^ and Abd al-Karim underwent an unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation on
May 15, 2003.^^^
detainee Asadallah was left in the standing sleep deprivation
positiondespite a sprained ankle. Later, when Asadallah was placed in stress positions on his
knees, he complained of discomfort and asked to sit. Asadallah was told he could not sit unless
he answered questions truthfully
2. CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues
Psychological and behavioral problems experienced by CIA





38262 (150541Z MAY 03);
38161 (131326ZMAY03)
38161 (131326ZMAY03)
MAY 03) for Abu Hazim; and DIRECTOR|
39582 (041743Z JUN 03);
38365 (170652Z MAY 03)
Asadallah was also placed in a"small isolation bo^^o^^riinutes^vi^ authorizatior^n^ithoiit discussion
of how the technique would affect hisankl^(5^^|H[^^^^^^^^^^^^4098
34294 34nO^|HB|iH.)
While CIA records contain information on other detainee medical complaints (see Volume III), those records also
suggest that detainee medicalcomplaints could be underreported in CIA medical records. For example,CIA
medical records consistently report that CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh had no medical complaints. However,
CIA interrogation records indicate that when bin al-Shibhhad previouslycomplained of ailments to CIA personnel,
he was subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogationtechniques and told by CIA inte^ogators that liis medical
condition was not of concern to the CIA. (5ee |H|HH 10591 (252002Z FEB 03); m[||p||| 10627 (281949Z
FEB 03).) In testimony on April 12, 2007, CIA Director Michael Haydenreferenced medical care of detainees in
the context of the ICRC report on CIA detentions. Hayden testified to the Committee; "The medical section of the
ICRC report concludes that the association of CIA medical officerswitlithe intenogation program is 'contrary to
international standaids of medical ethics.' That is just wrong. Tlie role of CIA medical officers in tlie detainee
program is and always has beenand always will be to ensure thesafety and thewell-being of the detainee. The
placement of medical officers during the interrogation techniques represents an extra measure of caution. Our
medical officers do not recommend the employment or continuation of any procedures or techniques. The allegation
in the report that a CIA medical officer threatened a detainee, stating that medical care was conditional on
cooperation is blatantly false. Healthcare has always beenadministered basedupon detaineeneeds. It's neither
policy nor practice to link medical care to anyotheraspect of thedetainee program." This testimony was
incongruent with CIA records.
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management challenges for the For example, later in his detention, Ramzi bin al-Shibh
exhibited behavioral and psychological problems, including visions, paranoia, insomnia, and
attempts at self-harm.^^^ CIA psychologists linked bin al-Shibh's deteriorating mental state to
his isolation and inability to cope with his long-term detention.^^^ Similarly, 'Abd al-Rahim al-
Nashiri's unpredictable and disruptive behavior in detention made him one of the most difficult
detainees for the CIA to manage. Al-Nashiri engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including
throwing his food tray,^^^ attempting to assault detention site personnel,and trying to damage
items inhis cell.^^^ Over a period ofyears, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff ofdrugging or
poisoning his food andcomplained of bodily painandinsomnia.^^^ As noted, at one point, al-
Nashiri launched a short-lived hungerstrike, and the CIA responded by force feeding him
rectally.^^^ An October 2004 psychological assessment ofal-Nashiri was used by the CIA to
advance its discussions with National Security Council officials on establishing an "endgame"
for the program.^ '^^ InJuly 2005, CIA Headquarters expressed concern regarding al-Nashiri's
"continued state of depression and uncooperative attitude."^"^^ Days latera CIA psychologist
assessed that al-Nashiri was on the "verge of a breakdown."^^^
Beginning in March 2004, and continuing until his rendition to
U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay in September 2006, Majid Khan engaged in a series of
hunger strikes and attempts at self-mutilation that required significant attention from CIA
detention site personnel. In response to Majid Khan's hunger strikes, medical personnel
Foradditional details, see Volume III.
•••• 1759 (0213I9ZQCT04);HEADQUARTERSl|^ Hm40023ZNOV05);|
(171225Z NOV 04); (140915ZNOV 04); (06I620Z DEC 04);
2207(1113I9Z APR 05)I^^^Hl2210a^7Z APR05)~|^|H2535 (051805Z JUL05);
^^••^9 (120857ZJUL05)n^^ |^2830 (29I304Z AUG 05); 1890 (171225Z NOV
040r^^B^^^^893^00831Z NOV 04); CIA document entitled, "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, 12
April2007T||^ BIB2210(141507Z APR 05); •^^••25^(051805Z JUL 05); 2210(141507Z APR05)r^H|||[B225 (051805Z JUL05)I^B|| 2830 (291304Z AUG 05);





05); 2023 (151735Z JAN 05);
(282019Z NOV 03)




2515 (301946Z JUN 05);
1_142 (041358Z AUG 06);





1029 (291750Z JUN 06)
2474 (251622ZJUN 05); 2673 (021451Z AUG 05);
See, for example,
1959(111700Z DEC 04);
1356 (011644Z JUL 04); (140917Z NOV 04);
I II II III I III I nil 1959 (111700Z DEC 04);
2038 (211558ZJAN05)^^^BPHIHi 1091 (031835Z NOV 03);
1266 (052309Z JAN 04); ^••••|^HT63?(271^0Z MAR 04).
1^11^^^11203 (231709ZMAY04)7^^H^U 1202 (231644Z MAY04). CIA records indicate that at
least five detainees were subjected to rectalrehydration or rectal feeding; Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,
Khalid Shaykh MohammadjMaiid^ and Marwan al-Jabbur. See Volume III for additional details.
Email from; ••••••; to: [DETENTION SITE BLACK|j|Hcc:
subject: InteiTogator Assessments/Request for Endgame Views; date: October 30, 2004.
HEADQUARTERS ^^1(282217Z JUL 05)
CIA Sametime exchange, dated 29/JUL/05 08:01:51 - 08:50:13; between and I
TOP SECRET//





implemented various techniques to provide fluids and nutrients, including the use of a
nasogastric tube and the provision of intravenous fluids. CIA records indicate that Majid Khan
cooperated with the feedings and was permitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients himself.^^^
After approximately three weeks, the CIA developeda more aggressive treatment regimen
"without unnecessary conversation."^^^ Majid Khan was then subjected to involuntary rectal
feeding and rectal hydration, which included two bottles of Ensure. Later that same day, Majid
Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hunmius, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins, was "pureed"
and rectally infused.®^^ Additional sessions ofrectal feeding and hydration followed.^^^ In
addition to his hunger strikes, Majid Klian engaged in acts of self-harm that included attempting
tocuthis wrist on two occasions,^^^ an attempt tochew into his arm at the innerelbow,^^^ an
attempt tocut a vein in the top of his foot,^^^ and an attempt to cut intohis skin at theelbow joint
using a filed toothbrush.^^"^
J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003
1. Administration Statements About the Humane Treatment ofDetainees Raise Concerns at
the CIA About Possible Lack ofPolicy Supportfor CIA Interrogation Activities
On several occasions in early 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott
Muller expressed concern to the National Security Council principals, White House staff, and
Department of Justice personnel that the CIA's program might be inconsistent with public
statements from the Administration that the U.S. Government's treatment of detainees was
"humane."^^^ CIA General Counsel Muller therefore sought to verify with White House and
Department of Justice personnel that a February 7, 2002, Presidential Memorandum requiring the





n 3237 (230552Z SEP 04)
3240 (231839ZSEP04)
13259 (261734Z SEP 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "rectal
rehydration" is a "well acknowledged medical technique to addresspressinghealth issues." A follow-up CIA
document provided on October 25,2013 (DTS #2013-3152), states that "[fjrom a health perspective, Majid Klian
became uncooperative on 31 August 2004, when he initiated a hunger strike and before he underwent rectal
rehydration... CIA assesses that the use of rectal rehydrationis a medically sound hydration technique...." Tlie
assertion that Majid Khan was "uncooperative" prior to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding is inaccurate. As
described in CIA records, prior to being subjected to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding, Majid Khan cooperated





3694 (301800Z NOV 04); 4242 (191550Z MAR 05);
[4250 (221213ZMAR 05)
n 3724 (031723Z DEC 04)
3835 (260659Z DEC 04)
14614 (071358Z JUN 05)
Febmary 12,2003, MFR from Scott Muller, Subject: "Humane" treatmentof CIA detainees; March 7, 2003,
Memorandum for DDCIA from Muller, Subject: Proposed Response to Human Rights Watch Letter.
January 9, 2003, Draft Memorandum for Scott Mueller [sic], General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency,
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral^Offic^^^ga^o^^ re: Application ofthe President's
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discussions in early 2003, the White House press secretary was advised to avoid using the term
"humane treatment" when discussing thedetention of al-Qa'ida and Taliban personnel.^^^
In mid-2003, CIA officials also engaged in discussions with the
Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and attorneys in the White House on whether
representations could be made that the U.S. Government complied with certain requirements
arising out of the Convention Against Torture, namely that the treatment of detainees was
consistent with constitutional standards in the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.In
late June 2003, after numerous inter-agency discussions, William Haynes, the general counsel of
the Department of Defense, responded to a letter from Senator Patrick Leahy stating that it was
U^Sjolicy to compl^witl^hes^tantods.^^^ According to amemorandum from the CIA's
H^BcTC Legal, August 1, 2002, OLC opinion provided alegal
"safe harbor" for the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques.The August 1, 2002,
opinion did not, however, address the constitutional standards described in the letter from
William Haynes.
In July 2003, after the White House made a number of statements
again suggesting that U.S. treatment of detainees was "humane," the CIA asked the national
security advisor for policy reaffirmation of the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation
techniques. During the time that request was being considered, CIA Headquarters stopped
approving requests from CIA officers to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^ '^
Because of this stand-down, CIA interrogators, with CIA Headquarters approval, instead used
repeated applications of the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques. These "standard"
techniques were coercive, but not considered to be as coercive as the CIA's "enhanced"
interrogation techniques. At this time, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours was considered an
February 7, 2002, Memorandum on the Geneva Convention (HI) of 1949 to the Release of an al Qaeda Detainee to
the Custody of the CIA. The memorandum statedthat neither al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detaineesqualified as prisoners
of war under Geneva, and that Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a
conflict, did not apply toal-Qa'ida orTaliban detainees
March 18, 2003, Memorandum for the Recordfrom Subject: meeting with DOJ and NSC
Legal Adviser.
See, for example, March 18, 2003, email firom: HHIHHH; to: Scott Muller; subject: Memorandum for
the Record - Telcoi^itl^LC^^: March 13, 2003^mailft2mj^ott W. Muller; to: Stanley M. Moskowitz, John
H. Moseman; cc: HjH^H^^H^oht^. Rizzo, subject: Interrogations; date: April 1,2003, at
1:18:35 PM; emailfromT^^^^^^H; to: Scott Muller; cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Black letter law on Interrogations; Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and
Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel; date: April 17, 2003.
June 25, 2003, Letter from William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense to Patrick
Leahy, United States Senate.
June 30, 2003, Memorandumfor the Record from Subject: White House Meeting on
Enhanced Techniques (DTS #200^659)^^^^^
See, for example, email fi-om: to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: FYI - Draft
Paragraphs for the DCI on the Legal Issues on Interrogation, as requested by the General Counsel; date: March 14,
2003; June 26, 2003, Statementby the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture,
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.htm; email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman,|; cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on
Administration Detainee Policy; date: June27,2003; July 3, 2003, Memorandum for National Security Advisor
fromDirectorof Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Subject: Reaffirmation of the Central Intelligence Agency's
Interrogation Program.
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"enhanced" interrogation technique, while sleep deprivation under 72 hours was defined as a
"standard" CIA interrogation technique. To avoid using an "enhanced" interrogation technique,
CIA officers subjected Khallad bin Attash to 70 hours of standing sleep deprivation, two hours
less than the maximum. After allowing him four hours of sleep, bin Attash was subjected to an
additional 23 hours of standing sleep deprivation, followed immediately by 20 hours of seated
sleep deprivation.^^^
Unlike during most of the CIA's interrogation program, during the
time that CIA Headquarters was seeking policy reaffirmation, the CIA responded to infractions
in the interrogation program as reported through CIA cables and other communications.
Although Hmm, the chief of the intenrogations program in RDG, does not appear to have
been investigated or reprimanded for training interrogators on the abdominal slap before its use
was approved,training significant numbers of new inten-ogators to conduct interrogations on
potentially compliant detainees,or conducting large numbers of water dousing on detainees
without requesting or obtaining authorizationthe CIA removed his certification to conduct
interrogations in late July 2003 for placing a broom handle behind the knees of a detainee while
that detainee was in a stress position.^^^ CIA Headquartersalsodecertified two other
interrogators, [CIA OFFICER 1] and HIHHH' period,
although there are no official records of why those decertifications occun*ed.^^^
2. The CIA Provides Inaccurate Information to Select Members of the National Security
Council, Represents that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Loss ofLife,
Possibly Extensive Policymakers Reauthorize Program
^003, DCI Tenet and CIA General Counsel Muller
attended a meeting with Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Rice, Attorney
General Ashcroft, and White House Counsel Gonzales, among others, seeking policy
Bin Attash has one leg, which swelled during standing sleep deprivation, resulting in the transitionto seated sleep
deprivation. He was also subjected to nudity and dietary manipulationduring this period. See 12371
(212J21Z JUL 03); 12385 (222045Z JUL 03); and 12389 (232040Z JUL 03).
693 Training and Curriculum, November 2, 2002, at 17.
694 Training and Curriculum, November2, 2002, at 17.
See, for example, 10168 (092130^A^^nterview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of
InteiTogations for Countertenorism Puq^oses, 2003; CIA Office of Inspector General,
Special Review: Countertenorism Detention and Inten'ogation Activities(Septei^^ -October 2003) (2003-
7123-IG), MayJ7^2004jHM| 10168 (092130Z JAN 03)J||||||||i|^^ 340981|M179£62200ZFEB 03)^^^^^^^^^^H34294|
34310 |^^^^^^^^H^757 (101742Z MAR 03);
135025 (16132IZ MAR 03).
April 7,2005, BriefingforBlueRibbonPai^^ Renditio^ Detention, and Interrogation Programs at22;
Memorandum for Chief,|||mm||||mi|||B|, via CTC Legal from Cliief, CTC/RDG, July 28, 2003,
Subject: Decertification of former Interrogator. Document not signed by
available for signature."
See Memorandum for Chief,
because he was "not
via
UNCLASSIFIED
ICTC Legal from Chief, CTC/RDG, July
28, 2003, Subject: Decertification of former Intenogator, signed by [CIA OFFICER 1] on July
29, 2003; and April 7,2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel: CIA Rwjdition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs
at 22; Memorandum for Chief, HjjjHHUHiHH' HH Legal from Chief, CTC/RDG, July 28,
2003, Subject: Decertification of former Intenogator.
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reaffirmation of its coercive interrogation program. The presentation included a list of the CIA's
standard and enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA General Counsel Muller also provided a
description of the waterboard inten'ogation technique, including the inaccuraterepresentation
that it had beenused against KSM 119 times and Abu Zubaydah 42 times.^^^ The presentation
warned National Security Councilprincipals in attendance that "termination of this programwill
result in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA officers further noted that 50 percent of CIA
intelligencereports on al-Qaida were derivedfrom detainee reporting, and that "major threats
were countered and attacks averted" because of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. The CIA provided specific examples of "attacks averted" as a result of using the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including references to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi,
the HeathrowPlot, the Second Wave Plot, and lyman Faris,^^^ Asdescribed later in this
summary, and in greater detail in Volume 11, these claims were inaccurate. After the CIA's
presentation, Vice President Cheney stated, and National Security Advisor Rice agreed, that the
CIA was executing Administration policy in carrying out its interrogation program.^®®
The National Security Council principals at the July 2003 briefing
initially concluded it was "not necessary or advisable to have a full Principals Committee
meeting to review and reaffirm the Program."''®^ A CIA email noted that the officialreasonfor
not having a full briefing was to avoid press disclosures, but added that:
"it is clear to us from some of the runup meetings we had with [White House]
Counsel that the [White House] is extremely concerned [Secretary of State]
CIA records indicate that KSM received at least 183 applications of the waterboard technique, and that Abu
Zubaydali received at least 83 applications of thewaterboard technique. In April 2003,CIA InspectorGeneral John
Helgerson asked GeneralCounsel Scott Muller aboutthe repetitious use of the waterboard. In early June 2003,
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and the Vice President's Counsel, David Addington, who were aware of the
inspectorgeneral's concerns,asked Mullerwhether the numberof waterboard repetitions had been too high in light
of tlie OLC guidance. This question prompted Muller to seek information on the use of the waterboard on Abu
Zubaydah and KSM. (See interviewof Scott Muller, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003; and email from: Scott Muller; to: John Rizzo; cc:
[REDACTED], ••••1, [REDACTED]; subject: "Report from
Gitmo trip (Not proofread, as usual)"; date: June |, 2003, 05:47 PM.) As Muller told the OIG, he could not keep up
withcable traffic from CIA detainee interrogations and instead received monthly briefings. According to OIG
records of the interview, Muller "saidhe doesnotknow specifically how [CIA guidelines on intenogations] changed
because he does not get that far down into the weeds," and "each detainee is different and those in the field have
somelatitude." (See interview of ScottMuller, Office of the Inspector General, August 20,2003.) Despitethis
record and others detailed in the full CommitteeStudy, the CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that the CIA's
"confinementconditions and treatment of high profiledetainees like Abu Zubaydahwere closely scrutinizedat all
levels of management from the outset."
August5, 2003Memorandum for the Record from ScottMuller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29
July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003.
August 5, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of the Interrogation Program
on 29 July 2003. A briefing slide describing the"Pros" and "Cons" associated with the programlisted the following
under the heading "Con": (1) "Blowback due to public perception of 'humane treatment,'" (2) "ICRC continues to
attack USG policy on detainees," and (3) "Congressional inquiries continue." See Volume n for additional details.
August5, 2003,Memorandum for theRecord from ScottMuller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program,July
29, 2003.
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Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going
"702
on.
National Security Advisor Rice, however, subsequently decided
that Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should be
briefed on the CIA interrogation program prior to recertification of thecovert action^^^ As
described, both were then formally briefed on the CIA program for the first time in a 25 minute
briefing on September 16, 2003
On September 4, 2003, CIA records indicate that CIA officials may
have provided Chairman Roberts, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, and their staff directors a briefing
regarding the Administration's reaffirmation of the program^®^ Neither the CIA nor the
Committee has a contemporaneous report on the content of the briefing or any confirmation that
the briefing occurred.
K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress,
and the U.S. Supreme Court
1. ICRC Pressure Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department ofDefense Official Informs the
CIA that the U.S. Government "Should Not Be in the Position of Causing People to
Disappear"; the CIA Provides Inaccurate Information on CIA Detainee to the
Department ofDefense
f^N¥) In January 2004, the ICRC sent a letter to |
indicating that it was aware that the United States Government was holding
unacknowledged detainees inseveral facilities in Country | "incommunicado for extensive
periods of time, subjected to unacceptable conditions of internment, to ill treatment and torture,
while deprived of any possible recourse." '^'^ According to the CIA, the letter included a "fairly
complete list" ofCIA detainees to whom the ICRC had not had access.^^^ This prompted CIA
Headquarters to conclude that it was necessary to reduce the number of detainees in CIA
custody The CIA subsequently transferred at least 25 of its detainees in Country | to the
U.S. military and foreign governments. The CIA also released five detainees.^^^
Email from; John Rizzo; to: subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 3J, 2003.
August 5,2003, Memorandumfor the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program, July
29, 2003.
September 26,2003, CIA Memorandumfor the Recordfrom Muller, Subject: CIA Intenogation Program.
September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing
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(TS/^|||||||||[|||H||||||/^^) The CIA provided afactually incorrect description to the
Department of Defenseconcerning one of the 18 CIA detainees transferred to U.S. military
custody in March 2004. The transfer letter described CIA detainee Ali Jan as "the most tmsted
bodygua^f Jaluluddin Haqqani (a top AQ target of the USG)" who was capUired in the village
of oi^un^H, 2002.^^^ Although there was an individual named Ali Jan captured in
the village of on June 2002^^^CIArccords indicate that he was not the detainee
being held by the CIA in the Country facility. The Ali Jan in CIA custody was
apprehended circa early August 2003, during the U.S. military operation in
Zormat Valley, Paktia Province, Afghanistan.'^ ^^ CIA records indicate that Ali Jan was
transferred to CIA custody afterhis satellite phonerang whilehe was in military custody, and the
translator indicated thecaller was speaking in Arabic.^^^ After his transfer to U.S. military
custody, Ali Jan was eventually released on July I, 2004.^^4
In response to the ICRC's formal complaint about detainees being
kept inCountry | without ICRC access. State Department officials met with senior ICRC
officials in Geneva, and indicated that it was U.S. policy to encourage all countries to provide
ICRC access to detainees, including Country While the State Department made these
official representations to the ICRC, theCIA was repeatedly directing the same country to deny
the ICRC access to the CIA detainees. In June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S.
ambassador in that countr^^eliverademarche, "in essence demanding [the country] provide
full access to all [country detainees," which includeddetainees beingheld at
theCIA's behest.^These conflicting messages from the United States Government, as well as
increased ICRC pressure on the country for failing to provide access, created significant tension
between the United States and the country in question.^^^
that year, in advance of a National Security Council
Principals Committee meeting on September 14, 2004, officials from the Department of Defense
called the CIA to inform the CIA that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz would not
support the CIA's position that notifying the ICRC of all detainees in U.S. Governmentcustody
would harm U.S. national security. According to an internal CIA email following the call, the
deputy secretary of defense had listened to the CIA's arguments for nondisclosure, but believed
that it was time for full notification. The email stated that the Department of Defense supported
the U.S. Government's position that there should be full disclosure to the ICRC, unless there
were compelling reasons of military necessity or national security. The email added that the
March 4, 2004, Letter from Jose Rodriguez, Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center to Thomas O'Connell,
Assistant Secretary of Defense. Special Operations/LowIntensity Conflict.
' I II I i|
2296 (101709Z 04)
2296 (101709Z 04)
Details in June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale.
^••^^•^^•1234^
HEADQUARTERS^^^^II^j^^^^^^^J. During this same period, countries whose nationals were in
CIA custody were issuing demarchesT^^^^^Bi issued ademarche to Country B in 2004, and |
issued a demarche to the U.S. in 2004^Sgg^^BB||^BmB|^M 2274
92037, and 93291
For more information, see Volume I.
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Department of Defensedid not believean adequate articulation of military necessity or national
security reasons warranting nondisclosureexisted, that "DoD is tired of 'taking hits' for CIA
'ghost detainees,'" and that the U.S. government"should not be in the position of causing people
to 'disappear.
Despite numerous meetings and communications within the
executive branch throughout 2004, the United States did not formally respond to the January 6,
2004, ICRC letter until June 13, 2005.^^^
2. CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program
"Imbalanced and Inaccurate," Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to
Limit Further Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector
General
The CIA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was first
informed of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in November 2002, nine months
after Abu Zubaydah became the CIA's first detainee. As described, the information was
conveyed by the DDO, who also informed the OIG of the death of Gul Rahman. In January
2003, the DDO further requested that the OIG investigate allegations of unauthorized
inten'ogation techniques against 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Separately, the OIG "received
information that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an
overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights," according to
the OIG's Special Review.^^®
During the course of the OIG's interviews, numerous CIA officers
expressed concerns about the CIA's lack of preparedness for the detention and interrogation of
Abu Zubaydah.^^^ OtherCIA officers expressed concern about the analytical assumptions
driving interrogations,^^- as well as the lackof language andcultural background among
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD's position on ICRC notification; date: September 13, 2004.
June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale.
Special Review, Counterterrorism Detentionand Interrogation Activities (September2001 - October 2003)
(2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, (DTS #2004-2710).
The chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site told the OIG that "[t]he Reports
Officers did not know what was required of them, analysts were not knowledgeable of the target, translators were
not native Arab speakers, and at least one ofthe [chiefs ofBase] had limited fielc^xperience/\^e Interview report
of [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 20, 2003. According to of CTC Legal,
there was no screening procedure in place for officers assigned to DETENTION SITE GREEN. See interview of
b^REDACTED^md [REDACTED, Office ofthe Inspector General, February 14, 2003. See
also interview of||||HHHHIiH' Office ofthe Inspector General, March 24,2003.
In addition to the statements to the OIG describe^bove^eg^ing the interrogation ofAbu Zubaydah, CIA
officers expressed more general concerns. As noted, the assumptions at CIA Headquarters that
Abu Zubaydah "knew everything about Al-Qa'ida, including details ofthe nex^ttack^Jjeflect^iow "the 'Analyst
vs. Interrogator' issue ha[d] been around from 'day one.'" {See interview of Office of the
Inspector General, February 27, 2003.) According to Chief of InteiTogations^H^H^HTsu^ct matter experts
often provided interrogation requirements that were "not valid or well thought out," providing the example of
Mustafa al-Hawsawi. (See interview of j^^^^^^H^ffic^^h^iTspecto^eneral, April 7, 2003.) Senior CIA
III! MUM I




members of the interrogation teams7^^ Some CIA officers described pressure from CIA
Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, which they attributed to faulty
analytical assumptions about what detainees should know.^^"^ As the chief of RDG,|, stated to the OIG in a February 2003 interview:
"CTC does not know a lot about al-Qa'ida and as a result, Headquarters
analyst^a^ constructed 'models' ofwhat al-Qa'ida represents to them.
noted that the Agency does not have the linguists or subject
matter experts it needs. The questions sent from CTC/Usama bin Laden
(UBL) to the interrogators are basedon SIGINT [signals intelligence] and
other intelligence that often times is incomplete or wrong. When the detainee
does not respond to the question, the assumption at Headquarters is that the
detainee is holding back and 'knows' more, and consequently. Headquarters
recommends resumption of EITs. This difference of opinion between the
interrogators and Headquarters as to whether the detainee is 'compliant' is the
type of ongoing pressure the interrogation team is exposed to.
believes the waterboard was used 'recklessly' - 'too many times' on Abu
Zubaydah at [DETENTION SITE GREEN], based in pai'ton faulty
intelligence."^-^
interrogator toldtheOIG that interrogators "suffered from a lackof substantive requirements from
CIA Headqu^te^" and that "in every case so far, Headquarters' model ofwhat the detainee should know is
flawed." told the OIG that "I do notwant to beat a man up based on what Headquarters sayshe should
know," commenting that, "Iwant my best sho^i^ometfiing he (the detainee) knows, not afishing expedition on
things he should know." (See interview of Office of the Inspector General, April 30,2003.) Two
interviewees told the OIG tha^jequirem^ts were sometimes based on inaccurate orimproperly translated intercepts.
5e^ntervi^ ofinterrogator Office ofthe Inspector General, March 24, 2003; Interview of|_
[former chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site]. Office of the
Inspector General, May 29, 2003.
One interviewee noted that several interrogators with whom he had worked insisted on conducting inteiTogations
in English to demonstrate theirdominance over thedetainee. (See intei-view report of Office of
the Inspector General, Maich 17, 2003.) TheCIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that"[t]heprogram
continued to face challenges in identifying sufficient, qualified staff~ particularly language-quahfied personnel -- as
requirements impose^^Agen^ involvement in Iraq increased."
According to]|^|^H||^m| of CTC Legal, "[t]he seventh floor [CIA leadership] can complicate tlie process
because of the mindsetthatinterrogations are thesilverbullet [andCIAleadership is] expecting immediate results."(Se^ntCTview of||^m||H|[|, Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003.) Senior Intenogator ijjH
provided the exampleof Khallad bin Attash, who,he told the OIG, was determined by the chiefof Baseat
DETENTIO>^IT^^UE not to "warrant" the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. According to ||^||^|,
debriefer called ALEC Station andtoldthem to "go to the mat" in advocating for theuseof theCIA's
enhanced interroption techniques, claiming that bin Attash was holdingbackinformation. (See interview of
I Office ofthe Inspector General, April 30, 2003.) described the "inherent tension
that occasionally exists between officers at the interrogation facilities and those at Headquarters whoview the
detainee^r^ithholdinginformation." provided the exampleof^u Yassir al-Jaza'iri. (See interview
of Office of the Inspector General, May 8, 2003.) alsodescribed disagreements on
whetherto subjectdetaineesto the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a "field versusHeadquarters issue."
(See interview of Office of the InspectorGeneral, August 18, 2003.) As described, interviewees also
described pressur^ron^I^Ieadquarters related tothe interrogations ofKSM and Abu Zubaydah.
Interview of Office of the Inspector General, February 21, 2003.




senior interrogator, informed the OIG that
differences between CIA Headquarters and the interrogators at the CIA detention sites were not
part of the official record. According to "all of the fighting and criticism is done over
the phone and is not put into cables," and that CIA "[cjables reflect things that are 'all rosy.'"^^^
As is described elsewhere, and reflected in the final OIG Special
Review, CIA officers discussed numerous other topics with the OIG, including conditions at
DETENTION SITE COBALT, specific inteiTogadons, the video taping of interrogations, the
administration of the program, and concerns about the lack of an "end game" for CIA detainees,
as well as the impact of possible public revelations concerning the existence and operadon of the
CIA's Detention andInterrogation Progi-amJ-^
In January 2004, the CIA inspector general circulated for comment
to various offices within the CIA a draft of the OIG Special Review of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program. Among other matters, the OIG SpecialReview described divergences
between the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques as applied and as described to the
Department of Justice in 2002, the use of unauthorized techniques, and oversight problems
related to DETENTION SITE COBALT. The draft OIG Special Review elicited responses from
the CIA's deputy director for operations, the deputy director for science and technology, the
Office of General Counsel, and the Office of Medical Services. Several of the responses—
particularly those from CIA General Counsel Scott Mullerand CIA Deputy Director for
Operations James Pavitt—were highly critical of the inspector general's draft Special Review.
General Counsel Muller wrote that the OIG Special Review presented "an imbalanced and
inaccurate picture of the Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," and claimed
the OIG Special Review, "[o]n occasion," "quoted or summarized selectively and misleadingly"
from CIA documents.^^^ Deputy Directorfor Operations James Pavitt wrote that the OIG
Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and
saved lives," and that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our
successes." Pavitt attached to his response a document describing information the CIA obtained
"as a result of the lawful use of EITs" that stated, "[t]he evidence points clearly to the fact that
without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist
Interview of^^H^H||||||||||, Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003.
DDO Pavitt described possible public revelations related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program as
"the CIA's worst nightmare." Interviewof James Pavitt,Officeof the InspectorGeneral, September21, 2003.
Accordingto OIG recordsof an interview with DCITenet, "Tenet believesthat if the general public were to find out
about this program, many would believewe are torturers." Tenet added, however, that his "only potential moral
di lemma would be if more Americans die at the hands of teiTorists and we had someone in our custody who
possessed information thatcouldhaveprevented deaths, butwehadnotobtained such information." See interview
of GeorgeTenet, Officeof the InspectorGeneral, memorandum dated,September8, 2003.
See CIA Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Interrogation Program
Special Review, dated February 24, 2004 (200^12MG^^^^^^^^^^^
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attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casiialties."^-^ A review of CIA records found
that the representations in the Pavitt materials were almostentirely inaccurateJ^^
addition to conveying inaccurate information on the operation,
management, and effectiveness of the CIAprogram, CIA leadership continued to impede the
OIG in its efforts to oversee the program. In July 2005, Director Goss sent a memorandum to the
inspector general to "express several concerns regarding the in-depth, multi-faceted review" of
the CIA's CTC. The CIAdirector wrote that he was "increasingly concerned about the
cumulative impact of the OIG's workonCTC's performance," adding that "I believe it makes
sense to complete existingreviews... before openingnew ones." DirectorGoss added, "[t]o my
knowledge, Congress is satisfied that you are meetingits requirements" with regard to the CIA's
Detentionand Interrogation Program.^^^ At the time, however, the vice chairman of the Senate
SelectCommittee on Intelligence was seeking a Committee investigation of the CIA program, in
part because of the aspects of the program that were not being investigated by the Office of
Inspector General.^^^ In April 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden had his "Senior
Councilor"—an individualwithin the CIA who was accountable only to the CIA director—
conduct a review of the inspector general's practices. Defending the decision to review the OIG,
the CIA told the Committee that there were "morale issues that the [CIA] director needs to be
mindful of," and that the review had uncovered instances of "bias" among OIGpersonnel against
the CIA's Detentionand Interrogation Program.^^^ In 2008, the CIA directorannounced the
results of his review of the OIG to the CIA work force and stated that the inspector general had
"chosen to take a numberof steps to heighten the efficiency, assure the quality, and increase the
transparency of the investigative process."^^"^
3. The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special ReviewRecommendation to Assess
the Effectivenessof the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
The final May 2004 OIG Special Review included a
recommendation that the CIA's DDO conduct a study of the effectiveness of the CIA's
interrogation techniques within 90 days. Prompted by the recommendation, the CIA tasked two
seniorCIA officers to lead "an informal operational assessment of the CIAdetainee program."
The reviewers were tasked withresponding to 12 specific terms of reference, including an
assessment of "the effectiveness of each interrogation technique and environmental deprivation"
™Memorandum tothe Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February
27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004.
730 Pqj. additional information, see Volume II.
July 21, 2005, Memorandum for Inspector General from Porter J. Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency re:
New IG Work Impacting the CounterTerrorism Center.
Transcript of business meeting, April 14, 2005 (DTS #2005-2810).
Committee Memorandum for theRecord, "Staff Briefing with BobDeitz onhisInquiry into theInvestigative
Practices of the CIA Inspector General," October 17, 2007 (DTS #2007-4166); Committee Memorandum for the
Record, "Notes from MeetingswithJohn Helgerson and Bob Deitz in late 2007 and early 2008" (DTS #2012-4203);
Committee Memorandum fortheRecord, "StaffBriefing with CIA Inspector General John Helgerson" (DTS #2007-
4165).
Letter from DCIA MichaelHayden to SenatorJohn D. RockefellerIV, January 29, 2008 (DTS#2008-0606).
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to determine if any techniques ordeprivation should be "added, modified, ordiscontinued."^^^
According to a CIA memorandum from the reviewers, their review was based on briefingsby
CTC personnel, "a discussion with three senior CTC managers who played key roles in running
tlie CIA detainee program," and a review of nine documents, including the OIG Special Review
and an article by the CIA contractors who developed the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, Hammond DUNBAR and Grayson SWIGERT^^^ As described in this summary,
and in more detail in Volume H, these documents contained numerous inaccurate representations
regarding the operation andeffectiveness of theCIA program. There are no records to indicate
the two senior CIA officers reviewed the underlying interrogation cables and intelligence records
related to the representations. Their resulting assessment repeated information found in the
documents provided to them and reported that the "CIA Detainee Program is a success,
providing unique and valuable intelligence at the tactical levelfor the benefit of policymakers,
war fighters, and the CIA's covert action operators." The assessment also reported that
regulations and procedures for handling detainees were"adequate and clear," and that the
program had responded swiftly, fairly, and completely to deviations from the structured
program.^^^ Nonetheless, the assessment came to the conclusion that detention and
interrogations activities should not be conductedby the CIA, but by "experienced U.S. law
enforcement officers," stating:
"The Directorate of Operations (DO) should not be in the business of nmning
prisons or 'temporary detention facilities,' The DO should focus on its core
mission: clandestine intelligence operations. Accordingly, the DO should
continue to hunt, capture, and render targets, and then exploit them for
intelligence and ops leads once in custody. The management of their
incarceration and interrogation should be conducted by appropriately
experienced U.S. law enforcement officers, because that is tlieir charter and
they have the training and experience.
assessment noted that the CIA program required significant
resources at a time when the CIA was already stretched thin. Finally, the authors wrote that they
"strongly believe" that the president and congressional oversight members should receive a
735 j2, 2004, Memorandumfor DeputyDirector for Operations from Chief, Information
Operations Center, and HenryCrumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Directorfor
Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review ofCIA Detainee Program/
736 12, 2004, Memorandum for DeputyDirector for Operations from Chief, Information
Operations Center, and HenryCrumpton, Chief,National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Directorfor
Operations, withthe subject line,"Operational Review ofCIA Detainee Program." The CIA's June 2013 Response
states, "[w]e acknowledge tliat tlie Agencyened in permitting the contractors to assess tlieeffectivenessof enhanced
techniques. They shouldnot have been considered for sucha role given theirfinancial interestin continued
contracts from CIA."
May 12,2004, Memorandum for DeputyDirectorfor Operations from Chief, Information
Operations Center, and HenryCrumpton, Chief,National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Directorfor
Operations reOperational Review ofCIA Detainee Program. For additionalinfomiati^^ Volume II.
May 12,2004, Memorandum for DeputyDirector for Operations from Chief, Information
Operations Center,and Henry Crumpton, Chief,National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Directorfor
Operations reOperational Review ofCIA Detaine^rogran^^^^^^^^^^
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comprehensive update on the program, "[g]iven theintense interest andcontroversy surrounding
the detainee issue."^^^
On January 26, 2005, DCI Goss forwarded the senior officer
review to Inspector General John Helgerson/"^^ The DCI asked whether the review would satisfy
the inspector general recommendation for anindependent review of the programJ"^^ On January
28, 2005, the inspector general responded that the senior officer review would notsatisfy the
recommendation fo^TMndepet^ent review.^"^^ The inspector general also responded to a
concern raised by H^|^^|OMS that studying the results of CIA interrogations would
amount to human experimentation, stating:
"I fear there was a misunderstanding. OIGdid not have in mind doing
additional, guinea pig reseai'ch on human beings. What we are recommending
is that the Agency undertake a careful review of its experience to date in using
the various techniques and that it draw conclusions about their safety,
effectiveness, etc., that can guide CIA officers as we move ahead. We make
this recommendation because we have found that the Agency over the decades
has continued to get itself in messes related to interrogation programs for one
overriding reason: we do not document and learn from our experience - each
generation of officers is left to improvise anew, with problematic results for
our officers as individuals and for our Agency. We are not unaware that there
are subtleties to this matter, as the effectiveness of techniques varies among
individuals, over time, as administered, in combination with one another, and
so on. All the more reason to document these important findings."^"^^
I" November and December 2004, the CIA responded to National
Security Advisor Rice's questions about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques by asserting that an effectiveness review was not possible, while highlighting
examples of "[k]ey intelligence" the CIA represented was obtained after the use of the CIA's
enhancedinterrogation techniques. The December 2004 memorandum preparedfor the national
security advisor entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,"
begins:
May 12, 2004 Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information
Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for
Operationsre Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program.
See Volume I for additional information.
Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,
[REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regardim
Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,]
[REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regardint
Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,]
|; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED],
)rt; date: January 28, 2005.|; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED],
OIG Report; January 28, 2005.|; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding OIG Report; date: January 28, 2005. Tlie CIA's June 2013
Response maintains that"[a] systematic study over time of theeffectiveness of thetechniques would have been
encumbered by a number of factors," including "Federal policy on the protection of human subjects andthe
impracticability of establishing an effective control group."
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"Action Requested: None, This memorandum responds to your request for an
independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced
interrogation techniques. There is no way to conduct such a study. What we
can do, however, if [sic] set forth below the intelligence the Agency obtained
from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any
information of intelligence [value].
(T8/^BimHiH^^^) Under a section ofthe memorandum entitled, "Results," the CIA
memo asserts that the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced inten'ogation techniques, as part of
a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots [and] capture
additional terrorists." The memorandum then lists examples of "[k]ey intelligence collected
from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," which led to "disrupte[ed]
terrorist plots"and the "capture [of] additional terrorists." The examples include: the "Karachi
Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," "the 'Second Wave'" plotting, the identification of the "the Guraba
Cell," the identification of "Issa al-Hindi," the airest of Abu Talha al-Pakistani, "Hambali's
Capture," information on Jaffar al-Tayyar, the "DirtyBomb"plot, the arrest of Sajid Badat, and
information on Shkai, Pakistan. CIA records do not indicate when, or if, this memorandum was
provided to the national security advisor. '^^ ^
a subsequent CIA memorandum, dated March 5, 2005, concerning
an upcoming meeting between the CIA director and the national security advisor on the CIA's
progress in completing the OIG recommended review of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques states, "we [CIA] believe this study is much needed and should be
headed up by highly respected national-level poHtical figures with widely recognized reputations
for independence andfairness."^"^^
On March 21, 2005, the director of the CTC formally proposed the
"establishment of an independent 'blue ribbon' commission... with a charter to study our
Errs."^"^^ The CIA then began the process of establishing a panel that included
and
Both panelists received briefings and papers from CIA
personnel who participated in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. H||[m| [the
first panelist] wrote: "It is clear from our discussions with both DO and DI officers that the
program is deemed by them to be a great success, and I would concur. The EITs, as part of the
overall program, are credited with enabling the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional
terrorists, and collect a high volume of useful intelligence on al-Qa'ida (AQ).... There are
accounts of numerous plots against the US and the West that were revealed as a result of HVD
December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,'
Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation Tecliniques."
December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,'
Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." Italics in original.
March 5, 2005, Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with NationalSecurity Advisor re CIA Proposal for
Independent Studyof the Effectiveness of CTCIntenogation Program'sEnhanced Interrogation Techniques.
March 21, 2005, Memorandumfor Deputy Director for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI
CounterteiTorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Studyof theCTC Rendition, Detention, and
Interrogation Programs.
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interrogations." He also observed, however, that "[n]either my background nor field of expertise
particularly lend themselves to judgin^h^fectiveness of interrogation techniques, taken
individually or collectively."^"^^ second panelist] concluded that "there is no
objective way to answer the question of efficacy," but stated it was possible to "make some
general observations" about theprogram based on CIA personnel assessments of "the quality of
the intelligence provided" by CIA detainees. Regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, he wrote: "here enters the epistemological problem. Wecan never
know whether or not this intelligence could have been extracted though alternative procedures.
Spokesmen from within the organization firmly believe it could not have been."^"^^
4. The CIA Wrongfully DetainsKhalidAl-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountabilityfor
Officer Involved
After the dissemination of the draft CIA Inspector General Special
Review in early 2004, approvals from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques adhered more closely to the language of the DCI guidelines. Nonetheless, CIA
records indicate that officers at CIA Headquarters continued to fail to properly monitor
justificationsfor the capture and detention of detainees, as well as the justificationfor the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on particular detainees.^^®
Por example, on January H, 2004, the CIA rendered German
citizen Khalid al-Masri to aCountry | facility used by the CIA for detention purposes. The
rendition was based on the determination by officers in the CIA's ALEC Station that "al-Masri
knows key information that could assist in thecapture of otheral-Qa'ida operatives that pose a
serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests and who may be planning
terrorist activities.The cable did not state that Khalid al-Masri himself posed a serious threat
of violence or death, the standard requiredfor detention under the September 17, 2001,
Memorandum of Notification (MON).
CIA debriefing cables from Country | on January 27, 2004, and
January 28, 2004, note that Khalid al-Masri "seemed bewildered on why he has been sent to this
particular prison,"^^^ and was "adamant that [CIA] has the wrong person."^^^ Despite doubts
from CIA officers in Country | about Khalid al-Masri's links to terrorists, and RDG's
concurrence with those doubts, differentcomponents within the CIA disagreed on the process for
his release.^^"^ As later described by the CIA inspector general, officers in ALEC Station
continued to think that releasing Khalid al-Masri would pose a threat to U.S. interests and that
748 September 2, 2005 Memorandum from I
TOP SECRETA
Ito Director Porter Goss, CIA re Assessment of EITs
Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II.
September 23, 2005 Memorandum from |||||||||m||||| Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence
Agency re Response to Request from Directorfor Assessment of EIT Effectiveness. For additional information, see
Volume II.
For additional information, see Volume III.
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monitoring should be required, while those in the CIA's Division did not want to notify
the German government about the rendition of a German citizenJ^"' Because of the significance
of the dispute, the National Security Council settled the matter, concluding that al-Masri should
be repatriated and that the Germans should be told about al-Masri's renditionJ^^
Khalid al-Masri was transferred from Country |
to After al-Masri arrived in^|BI> officers released him and sent him toward
a fake border crossing, where the officers told him he would be sent back to Germany because he
had entered illegally At the time of his release, al-Masri was provided 14,500
Euros,^^^ as well as hisbelongingsJ^®
the CIA inspector general issued a Report of
Investigationon the rendition and detention of Khalid al-Masri, concluding that "[a]vailable
intelligence information did not provide a sufficient basis to render and detain Khalid al-Masri,"
and that the "Agency's prolonged detention ofal-Masri was unjustified."^^^ OnOctober 9, 2007,
the CIA informed the Committee that it "lacked sufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri,"
and that the judgment by operations officers that al-Masri was associated with terrorists who
posed a threat to U.S. interests "was not supported by available intelligence/^^^eCIA director
nonetheless decided that no further action was warranted against then the
deputychief of ALEC Station, who advocated for al-Masri's rendition, because "[t]he Director
strongly believes that mistakes shouldbe expected in a business filled with uncertainty and that,
when they result from performance that meets reasonable standards, CIA leadership must stand
behind tlie officers who make them." The notification also stated that "with regard to
counterterrorism operations in general and the al-Masri matter in particular, the Director believes
the scale tips decisively in favor of acceptingmistakes that over connect the dots against those
that under connect them."^^^
CIA Officeof InspectorGeneral, Reportof Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German CitizenKlialid
al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.
CIA Officeof InspectorGeneral, Reportof Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of GermanCitizen Khalid
al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.
^^042655
Using May 2004 exchange rates, this amounted to approximately $17,000.
'''' 42655
CIA Officeof InspectorGeneral, Reportof Investigation, The Rendition and Detentionof German Citizen Klialid
al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.
Referring to and a secondCTC officernamed in the OIG's Reportof Investigation, the
notification to Congressstated that the director "does notbelievethat... the performance of the two named CTC
officers fall below a reasonable level of professionalism,skill, and diligence as defined in CIA's Standard for
Employee Accountability." The notification also stated that therewas a "high tlireat environment" at the time of the
rendition, which "was essentially identical to the one in which CTC employees, including the two in question here,
previously had beensharply criticized for notconnecting the dots priorto 9/11." The notification acknowledged "an
insufficient legal justification, which failed to meet tlie standard prescribedin tlie [MON]," and refened to the acting
generalcounsel the taskof assessing legaladviceand personal accountability. Based on recommendations fiom the
inspectorgeneral,the CIA "developeda template for rendition proposals tliat makes clear what information is
required, including the intelligence basis for that information." (See Congressional notification, with the subject,
"CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri,"
dated October 9, 2007 (DTS #2007-4026).) The last CIA detainee, Muhammad Raliim, had already been rendered
to CIA custody by the time ofthis notification^Th^CIA^^un^Ol^Respon^points to areview ofanalytical
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5. Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information—Including Information on a Key UBL
Facilitator—Prior to the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
foreign authorities captured Hassan
Ghul in the Iraqi Kurdistan I iiiiiii mi Iiiiii ii iB 'INM ' lli i his identity was confirmed on
January 2004^^ Ghul was rendered from U.S. military custody to CIA custody at
DETENTION SITE COBALT on January H, 2004.^^^ The detention site interrogators, who,
according to CIA records, did not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, sent
at least 21 intelligence reports to CIA Headquarters based on their debriefings of Hassan Ghul
from the two days he spent at the facility
As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II,
CIA records indicate that the most accurate CIA detainee reporting on the facilitator who led to
Usama bin Laden (UBL) was acquired from Hassan Ghul—prior to the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^ Ghul speculated that "UBL was likely living in [the]
training arising out of the al-Masri rendition, but states that, "[n]onetheless, we concede that it is difficult in
hindsight to understand how the Agency could make such a mistake, take too long to correct it, determine that a
flawed legal interpretation contributed, and in theend only hold accountable three CTC attorneys, two of whom
receive^nl^i^m^dmonition."
21753j^^^H|^|; HEADQUARTERS •• JAN 04)
HEADQUARTERS CIA confirmed that the individual detained matched the
biographical data on Hassai^hul^Chalid ShtiykhM^ammad and Khallad bin Attash confirmed that a photo
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As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was
cooperative prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In an interview with the CIA
Officeof InspectorGeneral,a CIA officerfamiliar with Ghul's initial interrogations stated,"He sang like a tweetie
bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset." {See December 2, 2004, interview with
[REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, ) CIA records reveal that Ghul's
information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti wasdisseminated while Ghulwasat DETENTION SITECOBALT, prior to
the initiationof the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On April 16,2013, tlieCouncil on Foreign Relations
hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film, "Manhunt." Tlie forum included former CIA officer Nada
Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul provided the critical information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to
Kurdish officialsprior to entering CIAcustody. When askedabout the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds,
111! M III I











Peshawar area," and that "it was well known that he was always with Abu Ahmed [al-
Kuwaiti]."^^^ Ghul described Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant,who
couriered messages to al-Qa'ida's chief of operations, and listed al-Kuwaiti as one of three
individuals likely with Ghul further speculated that:
"UBL's security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely
lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan.... Ghul speculated
that Abu Ahmed likely handled all of UBL's needs, including moving
messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi]...."^^^
During this same period, prior to the use of the CL\'s enhanced
interrogation techniques, Ghul provided information related to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu
Faraj al-Libi (including his role in delivering messages from UBL), Jaffar al-Tayyar, 'Abd al-
Hadi al-Iraqi, Hamza Rabi'a, Shaik Sa'id al-Masri, Sharif al-Masri, Abu 'Abd al-Rahman al-
Najdi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, and numerous other al-Qa'ida operatives. He also provided
information on the locations, movements, operational security, and training of al-Qa'ida leaders
living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as on the visits of other leaders and operatives to Shkai.^^^
Ghul's reporting on Shkai, which was included in at least 16 of the 21 intelligence reports,
confirmed earlier reporting that the Shkai valley sei-ved as al-Qa'ida's command and control
center afterthegroup's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.^^"^ Notwithstanding these facts, in March
Bakos stated: . .honestly, Hassan Ghul.. .when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally
was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house. He wasn't locked up in a cell. He wasn't handcuffed to
anything. He was—he was having a free flowing conversation. And there's—you know, there's articles in Kurdish
papers about sort of their interpretation of tlie story and how forthcoming he was." (See
www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560.) Given the unusually high number of intelligence
reports disseminated in such a short time period, and the statements of former CIA officer Bakos, the Committee
requested additional information from the CIA on Ghul's interrogation prior to entering CIA custody. The CIA
wrote on October 25, 2013: "We have not identified any information in our holdings suggesting that Hassan Gul
first provided information on Abu Ahmad while in [foreign] custody." No information was provided on Hassan































Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date;
December 30, 2005, at 8:14:04 AM.




2005, the CIA represented to the Department of Justice that HassanGhul's reporting on Shkai
was acquired ''after''' the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniquesJ^^
After two days of questioning at DETENTION SITE COBALT
and the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports, Ghul was transferred to DETENTION SITE
BLACKJ^^ According to CIA records, upon arrival, Ghul was "shaved and barbered, stripped,
and placed in the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head" with plans
to lower hishands after two hours^ '^' The CIA interrogators at the detention site then requested
to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, writing:
"[the] interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the
initial contact, that his ai-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S.
military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical
contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the
approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift
[Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these
increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and
reliable information in a timely manner."^^^
(^FS/4|^H|||||||^^H||//NE) CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day.^^^
Following 59 hours of sleep deprivation,^^*^ Hassan Ghulexperienced hallucinations, but was told
by a psychologist that his reactions were "consistent with what many others experience in his
condition," and that he should calm himself by telling himself his experiences are normal and
will subside when he decides to be truthfiil.^^^ The sleep deprivation, as well as otherenhanced
interrogations, continued,^^- as did Ghul's hallucinations.''^ ^ Ghul also complained ofback pain
and asked to see a doctor,^^"^ but interrogators responded that the "pain was normal, and would
stop when [Ghul] was confirmed as telling the tnith." A cable states that "[i]nterrogators told
[Ghul] they did not care if he was in pain, but cared only if he provided complete and truthful
information.A CIA physician assistant later observed that Hassan Ghul was experiencing
"notable physiological fatigue," including "abdominal and back muscle pain/spasm, 'heaviness'
and mild paralysis of arms, legs and feet [that] are secondary to his hanging position and extreme
March 2, 2005, Memorandum for SteveBradbury from Legal Group, DCI
Counterterrorist Center, re: Effectiveness of theCIA Counterterrorist Intenogation Techniques. Italics in original.








JAN 04); 1312IBIJAN 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response
states that when hallucinations occurredduringsleepdeprivation, "medical personnel intervenedto ensure a
detainee would be allowed a period of sleep." Asdescribed in this summary, andmore extensively in Volume III,
CIA records indicate that medical personnel did notalways intervene andallowdetainees to sleepafterexperiencing
hallucinations.
1299••• JAN 04)
1299 04). See Volume III for similar statements made to CIA detainees.
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degree of sleep deprivation," but that Ghul was clinically stable and had "essentially normal vital
signs," despite an "occasional premature heart beat" that the cable linked toGhul's fatigueJ^®
Throughout this period, Ghul provided no actionable threat information, and as detailed later in
this summary, much of his reporting on the al-Qa'ida presence in Shkai was repetitive of his
reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Ghul also provided no
other information of substance on UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti7^^ Nonetheless, on
May 5, 2011, the CIA provided a document to the Committee entitled, "Detainee Reporting on
Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists Hassan Ghul as a CIA detainee who was subjected to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and whopmvided^TierOne|Mnfo
Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin."^^^ Hassan Ghul was
later released
6. Other Detainees Wrongfully Held in 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques; CIA Ojficer Testifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do
Anything Like What You Have Seen " in Abu Ghraib Photographs
In March 2004, the CIA took custody of an Afghan national who
had sought employment at a U.S. military base because he had the same name (Gul Rahman) as
an individual believed tobe targeting U.S. military forces in Afghanistan.^^^ During theperiod
in which the Afghan was detained, the CIA obtained signals intelligence of their true target
communicating with his associates. DNA results later showed conclusively that the Afghan in
custody was not the target. Nonetheless, the CIA held the detainee in solitary confinement for
approximately a month before he was released with a nominal payment.^^^
In the spring of 2004, after two detainees were transferred to CIA
custody, CIA interrogators proposed, and CIA Headquarters approved, using the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on one of the two detainees because it might cause the detainee to
provide information that could identify inconsistencies in the other detainee's storyAfter
both detainees had spent approximately 24 hours shackled in the standing sleep deprivation
position, CIA Headquarters confirmed that the detainees were former CIA sources.^^"^ The two
detainees had tried to contact the CIA on multiple occasions prior to their detention to inform the
CIA of their activities and provide intelligence. The messages they had sent to the CIA
ISOSH^HJAN 04)
See Volume II for additional information.
See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dated May 5,2011, which includes a document
entitled, "Background Detainee Infomiation on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart




The individual detained and the individual believed to be targeting U.S. forces were different from the Gul
RtJiman who died at DETENTION SITE COBALT.
2Q33
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were not translated until after the detainees were subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques
During this same period in early 2004, CIA inten^ogators
interrogated Adnan al-Libi, a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. CIA Headquarters
did not approve the use of the CIA's enhanced techniques against al-Libi, but indicated that
interrogators could use "standard" interrogation techniques, which included up to 48 hours of
sleep deprivationJ^^ CIA interrogators subsequently reported subjecting Adnan al-Libi to sleep
deprivation sessions of 46.5 hours, 24 hours, and 48 hours, with a combined three hours of sleep
between sessions.^^^
Beginning in late April 2004, a number of media outlets published
photographs of detainee abuse at the Department of Defense-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The
media reports caused members of the Committee and individuals in the executive branch to focus
on detainee issues. On May 12, 2004, the Committee held a lengthy hearing on detainee issues
with Department of Defense and CIA witnesses. The CIA used the Abu Ghraib abuses as a
contrasting reference point for its detention and interrogation activities. In a response to a
question from a Committee member, CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin said, "we are not
authorized in [the CIA program] to do anything like what you have seen in those
photographs.In response, a memberof the Committee said, "I understand," and expressed
the understanding, consistent with past CIA briefings to the Committee, that the "norm" of CIA's
interrogations was "transparent law enforcement procedures [that] had developed to such a high
level... that you could get pretty much what you wanted." The CIA did not correct the
Committee member's misunderstanding that CIA interrogation techniques were similar to
techniques used by U.S. law enforcement.^^^
7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the
Techniques on an IndividualBasis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single
Source Information
May 2004, the OLC, then led by Assistant Attorney General
Jack Goldsmith, informed the CIA's Office of General Counsel that it had never formally opined
on whether the use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques in the CIA's program was
'^'5 HEADQUARTERS •
Volume III.
See Volume Iand II, including HEADQUARTER^^^HJ||H||^ ^B^H- I" November 2003, CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller sent an email to lll^^l^l^^uggesting "changing the sleep deprivation line
a^ic^etweer^nhanced and standard from 72 to 48 hours." (See November 23, 2003, email from Scott Muller to
John Rizzo, Subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident.) OnJanuary 10, 2004,CIA Headquarters
informed CIA detention sites ofthe change, stating that sleep depri^tion over 48 hours would now be considered an
enhanced" interrogation technique. See HEADQUARTERS (101713Z JAN 04).
1S88 (091823Z MAR 04); 1889 (091836Z MAR 04).
Tliereis no indication in CIA records thatCIA Headquailers addressed the repeateduseof "standard" sleep
deprivation againstAdnan al-Libi. Formore information, see Volume in detainee report for Adnan al-Libi.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332).
Transcript ofSenate Select Committee oi^ntelligenc^iearir^ (DTS #2004-2332).
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consistent with U.S. constitutional standards.Goldsmith also raised concerns about
divergences between the CIA's proposed enhancedinterrogation techniques, as described in the
August 1, 2002, memorandum, and their actual application, as described in the CIA Inspector
General's Special Review.In late May 2004, DCI Tenet suspendedthe use of the CIA's
"enhanced" and "standard" interrogation techniques, pending updated approvals from the
OLC.^®^ On June 4, 2004, DCI Tenet issued a formal memorandum suspending the use of the
CIA's interrogation techniques, pending policy and legal review.^®^ The same day, the CIA
sought reaffirmation of the program from the National Security Council.^^ National Security
Advisor Rice responded, noting that the "next logical step is for the Attorney General to
complete the relevant legal analysis now in preparation."^^^
H' ^004, a foreign government captured Janat Gul, an
individual believed, based on reporting from a CIA source, to have information about al-Qa'ida
plans toattack the United States prior to the 2004 presidential election.^®^ InOctober 2004, the
CIA source who provided the information on the "pre-election" threat and implicated Gul and
others admitted to fabricating the information. However, as early as March 2004, CIA officials
internally expressed doubts about the validity ofthe CIA source's information.^®^
On July 2, 2004, the CIA met with National Security Advisor Rice,
other National Security Council officials, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, as well as the
attorney general and the deputy attorney general, to seek authorization to use the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, specifically onJanat Gul.^®^ The CIA represented that CIA
800 25^ 2004, Talking Points for DCI TelephoneConversation with Attorney General: DOJ's Legal Opinionre
CIA's Counterterrorist Program (CT) Interrogation. Letter from AssistantAttorney General Jack L. Goldsmith UI to
Director Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).
May 27, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith to General Counsel Muller.
May 24, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from subject: Memorandumof Meeting with the
DCI RegardingDOJ's Statementthat DOJ has RenderedNo LegalOpinion on WhetherCIA's Use of Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques wouldmeetConstitutional Standards. Memorandum for Deputy Directorfor Operations
from Director of Central Intelligence, June 4. 2004, re: Suspension of Use of InteiTOgation Techniques.
June 4, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, re:
Suspension of Use of IntenogationTechniques. On June2, 2004, George Tenet informedtlie Presidentthat he
intendedto resign from liis positionon July II, 2004. The WhiteHouseannounced the resignationon June 3, 2004.
June 4, 2004, Memorandum for the National Security Advisor from DCI George Tenet, re: Review of CIA
Interrogation Program.
June 2004, Memorandum for the Honorable George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence from Condoleezza
Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, re: Review ofCIA'^ nteiTOgation Program.
^"^••••|39^4 •• 3121
The former chief of the CIA's Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March |, 2004, email that the reporting was "vague"
and "worthless in terms of actionable intelligence." He suggested that the reporting "would be an easy way [for al-
Qa'ida] to test" the loydty of the source, given al-Qa'ida's knowledgethat leaked threat reporting "causes panic in
Wasliington." (See from: to: ^^||||^HI||||Hi[> [REDACTED],|; subject: could AQ b^estin^^ASSE^Y] and [source name REDACTED]?;date: March 2004, at 06:55 AM.) A^^tatior^ffi^^^BHjHHHBexpresse^imilaj^o^s ir^^
to the See emailfrom^^^^HH^^^^|;tor||||||||^^|; cc:[REDACTED], jMUJjU^Jsnhject: Re: could A^b^^ing [ASSE^f^n^source name
REDACTED]?; date: March •, 2004, at 07:52:32 AM). See also •••• 1411 (^•^^•04).
July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting witliNational Adviser Rice in the White House SituationRoom, re
Interrogations and Detainee Janat Gul, July 2, 2004.
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"interrogations have saved American lives," that more than half of the CIA detainees would not
cooperate until they were interrogated usingthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,and
that "unless CIA interrogators can use a full range of enhanced inteiTogation methods, it is
unlikely thatCIA will beable to obtain current threat information from Gulin a timely
manner."^^^ Janat Gul was not yet in CIA custody.
On July 6, 2004, National Security Advisor Rice sent a
memorandum to DCI Tenet stating that the CIA was "permitted to use previously approved
enhanced interrogation methodsfor Janat Gul, with the exception of the waterboard." Rice
offered "to assist [the CIA] in obtaining additional guidance from the Attorney General and NSC
Principals on an expedited basis" and noted the CIA's agreement to provide additional
information about the waterboard technique in order for the Departmentof Justice to assess its
legality. Rice's memorandum further documented that the CIA had informed her that "Gul
likely has information about preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as a result of
Gul's close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots.
In a meeting on July 20, 2004, National Security Council
principals, including the vice president, provided their authorization for the CIA to use its
enhanced interrogation techniques—again, with the exception of the waterboard—on Janat Gul.
They also directed the Departmentof Justice to prepare a legal opinion on whether the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques were consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution.On July 22, 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent a letter to
Acting DCI John McLaughlin stating that nine interrogation techniques (those addressed in the
August 1, 2002, memorandum, with the exception of the waterboard) did not violate the U.S.
Constitution or any statute or U.S. treaty obligations, in the context of the interrogation of Janat
Gul. '^"^ For the remainder of2004, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques on three
detainees—Janat Gul, Sharif al-Masri, and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—with individualized
approval from the Department of Justice.^^^
being rendered to CIA custody on July 2004, Janat Gul
was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including continuous sleep
deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, and walling,until he
At the timeof thisCIA representation, the CIA had held at least109detainees andsubjected at least33 of them
(30 percent) to tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
July6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to
the Honorable George Tenet, Director ofCentral Intelligence, re Janat Gul. CIA Request forGuidance Regarding
Interrogation of Janat Gul, July 2, 2004.
For additional details, see Volume III.
July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to thePresident for National Security Affairs, to
the HonorableGeorge Tenet, Directorof Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul.
July 29,2004, Memorandum forthe Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, "Principals Meeting
relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004."
Theone-paragraph letter didnot provide legal analysis or substantive discussion of theinterrogation techniques.
Letterfrom Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCIMcLaughlin, July22, 2004(DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4).
See Volume III for additional details.
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experienced auditory and visual hallucinations. '^^ According to a cable, Janat Gul was "not
oriented to time or place" and told CIA officers that he saw "his wife and children in the mirror
and had heard their voices in the white noise."^^^ The questioning of Janat Gul continued,
although the CIA ceased using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for several days.
According toa CIA cable, "[Gul] asked todie, or justbe killed."^^^ After continued
interrogation sessions with Gul, on August 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that the
interrogation "team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information.On
August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that Janat Gul "is believed" to possess
threat information, and that the "use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that
information."^^^ On that day, August 21, 2004,CIAinterrogators resumedusing the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul.^^^ Gul continued not to provide any reporting on
the pre-election threat described by the CIA source.^^^ On August 25, 2004, CIA interrogators
sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul "may not possess all that [the CIA]
believes him to know."^^ The interrogators added that "many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida
are derived from single source reporting" (the CIA source).^^^ Nonetheless, CIA interrogators
continued to question Gul on the pre-election threat. According to an August 26, 2004, cable,
after a 47-hour session of standing sleep deprivation, Janat Gul was returned to his cell, allowed
to remove his diaper, given a towel and a meal, and permitted to sleep.^^^ In October 2004, the
CIA conducted a||B||B source who had identified Gul as having knowledge of
attack planning for the pre-election threat. ||^mi|^^HI||||i> the CIA source admitted to
fabricating the information.^^^ Gul was subsequently ti^ansferred to a foreign government. On







Janat Gul never provided the threat information the CIA originally
told the National Security Council that Gul possessed. Nor did the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against Gul produce the "immediate thi-eat information that could save
American lives," which had been the basis for the CIA to seek authorization to use the
techniques. As describedelsewhere in this summary, the CIA's justification for employing its
enhanced interrogation techniques on Janat Gul—the first detainee to be subjected to the
techniques following the May 2004 suspension—changed over time. After having initially cited
Gul's knowledge of the pre-election threat, as reported by the CIA's source, the CIA began
representing that its enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Gul to deny the





). See Volume III for additional information.
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Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from StevenG.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attome^General^ffic^^ega^ou^l, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
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August 11, 2004, in the midst of th^ntemjgation of Janat Gul
using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA attorney wrote a letter
to Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin with "brief biographies" of four individuals
whom the CIA hoped to detain. Given the requirement at the time that the CLA seek individual
approval from the Department of Justice before using the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques against a detainee, the CIA letter states, "[w]e are providing these preliminary
biographies in preparation for a future request for a legal opinion on their subsequent
interrogation in CIA control." Two of the individuals—Abu Faraj al-Libi and Hamza Rabi'a—
had not yet been captured, and thus the "biographies" made no reference to their interrogations
or the need to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The third individual, Abu Talha
a^akistani^a^i^oreign government custody. His debriefings by aforeign government, |
described in the letter as "only moderately effective" because Abu
Talha was "distracting [those questioning him] with noncritical information that is truthful, but is
not related to operational planning." The fourth individual, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, was also
ir^or^n government custody and being debriefed by foreign government officials
According to the letter, Ghailani's foreign government debriefings were "ineffective"
because Ghailani had "denied knowledge of current threats." The letter described reporting on
the pre-election threat—much of which came from the CIA source—in the context of all four
individuals.^^*^ Ahmed Ghailani and Abu Faraj al-Libi were eventually rendered to CIA custody
and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
On September 2004, after the CIA had initiated a
counterintelligence review of the CIA source who had reported on the pre-election threat, but
prior to the CIA source's the CIA took custody of Sharif al-Masri, whom the CIA
source had reported would also have information about the threat.Intelligence provided by
Sharif al-Masri while he was in foreign government custody resulted in the dissemination of
more than 30 CIA intelligence reports.^^^ After entering CIA custody, Sharifal-Masri expressed
his intent to cooperate with the CIA, indicating thathewasfng^ ofinterrogations because
he had been tortured while being interrogated in The CIA nonetheless
sought approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Masri because of
his failure to provide information on the pre-election threat.^^"^
After approximately a week of interrogating al-Masri using the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation that coincided with
UnitedStates Obligations UnderArticle 16 of theConvention AgainstTorture to CertainTechniquesthat May Be
Usedin the Interrogationof High Valueal QaedaDetainees, at 11. See sectionof this summaryand Volume II
entitled, "The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to EnhancedInterrogation Techniques Help ValidateCIA
Sources."
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auditory hallucinations, CIA interrogators reported that al-Masri had been "motivated toSpate" at the time of his arrival.^^^ Despite al-Masri's repeated descriptions of torture in
the CIA transferred al-Masri to that government's custody after approximately thi*ee
months of CIA detention.
As in the case of Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, the CIA's requests
for OLC advice on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ahmed
Khalfan Ghailani were based on the fabricated reporting on the pre-election threat from the same
CIA source.^^^ Like Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, Ghailani also experienced auditory
hallucinations following sleep deprivation.^^^ As described in this summary, after having opined
on the legality of using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on these three individual
detainees, the OLC did not opine again on the CIA's enhanced interrogation program until May
2005.
8. Country ^Detains Individuals on the CIA's Behalf
Consideration ofadetention facility in Country | began in
2003, when the CIA sought to transfer Ramzi bin al-Shibh from the custody of a foreign
government to CIA custody.liiHHBHIHHHilimH!' which had not yet informed the
country'political leadership of the CIA's request to establish a clandestine detention facility in
Country [ surveyedpotential sites for the facility, while the CIA set aside $| million for its
construction.'^ '^ " In 2003, the CIA arrangedfor a "temporary patch" involving placing two
CIA detainees (Ramzi bin al-Shibh and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) within an already existing
Country | detention facility, until the CIA's own facility could be built.^"^^ That ^ring, as the




See letter from Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Actin^Assi^nt Attorney
General, August 25, 2004 (DTS #2009-.1809WNote: At various times during this perio^jj^B^^s identified as
both CIA associate general counsel and |||H||||[|CTC Legal). See also aletter from Assistant
General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, September 5, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). A CIA
email sent prior to the CIA's request for advice from the OLC indicated that tlie judgment that Ghailani had
knowledge of tenorist plotting was speculative: "Although Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, his
respected role in al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some
knowledge about ongoing attack planningagainsttheUm States homelandjandtheoi^^ involved." (See
email from: •••H, CTC/UBLd|||||H||^| (formerly ALEC^^HHIH; to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: derog information for ODDO on TaIha, Ghailani, Hamza
RabT^n^AbuFaraud^ AugusnO^OO^^Gl^lani was rendered to CIA custody on September ^2004. (See
3072 lllHflHIi ) began using its enhanced interrogation techniques
on Ghailani on September 17,2004, as the CIA was iniUatin^t^ountmnteUi^^ ofthe source who






8''- While CIA Headquarters offered $| million to Country | for hosting aCIA detention facility, |
precluded the opening of the facility. Only$lmillionwa^m^^^^i^ Station for support to the
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CIA Headquarters directed the CIA Station in Count
Headquarters could support Country |'s
submitted relatively modest proposals, CIAI^dquarters reiterated the directive, adding that the
Station shoul^rovid^"wish list." '^'^ Ii^^B|2003, the Station proposed amore expansive $|||
million in subsidies.^"^^ jjH^ubsidy payments, intended in part as
compeimtion for support ofthe CIA detention program, rose as high as $| miUion.^"^^ By
IHBH 2003, after an extension of five months beyond the originally agreed upon timeframe
for concluding CIA detention activities in Country |, both bin al-Shibh and al-Nashiri had been
transferred out of Country | to the CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.^"^^
9. U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case ofRasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA
Detaineesfrom Guantanamo Bay to Country^
Beginning in September 2003, the CIA held a number of detainees
at CIA facilities on the grounds of, but separate from, the U.S. military detention facilities at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. '^^ '^ In early January 2004, the CIA and the Department ofJustice began
discussing the possibility that a pending U.S. Supreme Court case, Rasul v. Bush, might grant
habeas corpus rights to the five CIA detainees then being held at a CIA detention facility at
to ^think big" about how CIA
After the Station initially
although CIA Headquarters askedthe CIA Station to "advise if additional funds may be needed to
keep [the facility] viableover the coming year and beyond." CIA Headquarters added, "we cannot haveenough
blacksite hosts, and we are loathe to let one we have slip away."Countiylne^hoste CIA detainees. See
HEADOUAR [REDACTBD] 5298 iHHHljH; HEADQUAR
ALEC interview on the CIA program, noted that the
program had "more money than we could possibl^pen^^hc^ht, and itturned out to be accurate." In the same
interview, he stated that "in one case, we gave $|,000,0001
Myself and Jos6 [Rodriguez]
We never counted it. I'm not about to count
did not identify thethat kind ofmon^for a receipt." The boxes contained one hundred dollar bills.
recipient ofthe $| million. See transcript ofOral History Interview, Interviewee:
13, 2006, Interviewer: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
ALEC••
ALEC
8^^ See DTS #2010-2448.
[REDACTED] 2498
April 2003, Memorandum for Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from |
Rendition and Detainee^roup^ia^H|^^^^^B|, Counterterrorist Center, Chief of Operations,
Chief, IIIIIIBIII^II^^HIHTSubjec^Reqi^s^^Relocat^iig^Value Detainees to an Interim
Detention Facility at Guantanamo. See also DIRECTOR CIA detainees were held at
two facilities at Guantanamo Bay, DETENTION SITE MAROON and DETENTION SITE PsfDIGO. {See
Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, Coverage Period: ) A third
CIA detention facility, DETENTION SITE REI
13897 3445
9754 8405^m^^Hi^^H8'^081
and September 1, 2006, Memorandum of AgreementBetween the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)Concerning the Detention by DODof Certain Terrorists at a Facility at Guantanamo Bay
Naval Station.
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Guantanamo Shortly after these discussions, CIA officers approached the
in Country | to determine if it would again be willing to host these CIA detainees, who would
remain in CIA custody within an already existing Country | facility. '^*® By January |, 2004, the
in Country | had agreed to this arrangement for a limited period oftime.^^^
(TS/^^BHUHI^^) Meanwhile, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller asked the
Department of Justice, the National Security Council, and the White House Counsel for advice
on whether the five CIA detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay should remain at Guantanamo
Bay or be moved pending theSupreme Court's decision.^^^ After consultation with the U.S.
solicitor general in February 2004, the Department of Justice recommended that the CIA move
four detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay pending the Supreme Court's
resolution of the case.^^^ The Departmentof Justice concluded that a fifth detainee, Ibn Shaykh
al-Libi, did not need to be transferred because he had originally been detained under military
authority and had been declared to the ICRC.^^"^ Nonetheless, by April 2004, all five CIA
detainees were transferred from Guantanamo Bay to other CIA detention facilities.
856 2004, CIA detainees in a Coun
pain from other detainees presumed to be in the
facility.^^^ When the CIAchiefof Station approached the
Shortly after placing CIA detainees within anal^dy existing
Country 1 facility fora second time, tensions arose between the CIA andCountry |
facility claimed to hear cries of
[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Detainees inEmail fiom: Scott W. Muller; to:
Gitmo; date: January |, 2004.
S50 See HEADQUARTERS ••• [REDACTED] 1845 The CIA's long-
term facility in Country which the CIA Station in Country | had warned was adrain on the Station's resources,
had not yet been completed. See [REDACTED] 1785
[REDACTED] 1679H||^|HHi
Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt,
[REDACTED], [REDACTED],
February |, 2004.
Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt,
[REDACTED], [REDACTED],
February |, 2004.




I; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED],|; subject: CIA Detainees atGITMO; date:
I; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED],|; subject: CIA Detainees atGITMO; date:
; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED],




See, for example, [REDACTED] 16791
Country |, see Volume I.
Among tiiedetaineesm^ this claim was Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, who had previousl;^eei^ndered from CIA
custody to ALibyan national, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi reported while in BB|custody tliat Iraq
was supporting al-Qa'ida and providing assistance with chemicaland biologicalweapons. Some of this information
was cited by Secretary Powell in his speech to the United Nations, and was used as a justification for the 2003
invasion ofIraq. Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted the claim after he was rendered to CIA custody on February |, 2003,
claiming that he had been tortured by the IHHH, and only told tliem what he assessed they wanted tohear. For
more details, see Volume IIL While in CounfrJ^^ibHol^I^ebnefer^iat the "sobbing and yelling" he
11)1 MUM
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Iabout the accounts ofthe CIA detainees, the stated with "bitter
dismay" that thebilateral relationship was being "tested."^^^ There were also counterintelligence
concerns relating to CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who had attempted to influence a Country
I officer.^^^ These concerns contributed to a request from in
2004 for the CIA to remove all CIA detainees from Country
(^S/^^H^^^^^B^PMj^^^H|2004^heiUhe chief of Station in Country | again
appi*oacheTthe^^ |^||||||||||||||HH^^^HH|H|^ with allegations from CIA detainees
about the mistreatment of Country | detainees^^^^| in the facility, the chief of Station
received an angry response that, as he reported to CIA Headquarters, "starkly illustrated the
inherent challenges [of]
According to the chief of Station, Country | saw the CIA as
"quemlous and unappreciative recipients of their I cooperation."^^' By the end of
2004, relations between the CIA and Country | deteriorated, particularly with regard to
intelligence cooperation.®^^" The CIA detainees were transferred out ofCountry |
2005.«63
(TS// Beginning in 2005, the
in Country | insisted, over the CIA's opposition, to brief Country |'s on
the effort to establish a more permanent and unilateral CIA detention facility, which was under
constmction. A proposedphonecall to the Vice President Cheney to
solidify support for CIA operations inCountry | was complicated by the fact that Vice President
Cheney had not been told about the locations of the CIA detention facilities. The CIA wrote that
there was a "primary need" to "eliminate any possibility that could
explicitly or implicitly refer to the existence of a black site in [the country]" during the call with
the vice president.^^"^ There are no indications that the call occurred. The of
Country | nonetheless approved the unilateral CIA detention facility, which cost$| million, but
was never used by the CIA.^^^ By 2006, the CIA was working widi Country | to
866decommission what was described as the "aborted" project.
heard reminded him of what he previously endured in
been tied up and beaten. See [REDACTED] 1989
[REDACTED] 20101
[REDACTED] 2010
[REDACTED] 2317 TheCIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]t was only as leaks
detailing the program began to emerge that for^n partners felt compelled to alter the scope oftheir involvement.'
As described above, the tensions with Country Jwere unrelated topress leaks.
[REDACTED] 2602
5&&[REDAOEDn318^^HH^H; [REDACTED] 31281 ••••••; and [REDACTED]
2783 BIBHUHI- Country | officials refuse^^rovid^h^IA with counterterrorism information,
including informationobtained through CIA-funded See [REDACTED] 31281
8" HEADQUARTERS
8^-' HEADQUARTERS
8''-'' [REDACTED] andCTCmmRDG, "Evolution of the Program.'
[REDACTED] 3706 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET/^
custody and it sounded to him like a prisoner had
/NOFORN




L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced,
Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of
Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem"
In the fall of 2004, CIA officers began considering "end games," or
the final disposition of detainees in CIA custody. A draft CIA presentation for National Security
Council principals dated August 19, 2004, identified the drawbacks of ongoing indefinite
detention by the CIA, including: the need for regular relocation of detainees, the "tiny pool of
potential host countries" available "due to high risks," the fact that "prolonged detention without
legal process increases likelihood of HVD health, psychologicalproblems [and] curtails intel
flow," criticism of the U.S. government if legal process were delayed or denied, and the
likelihood that the delay would "complicate, and possibly reduce the prospects of successful
prosecutions of these detainees.CIA draft talking points produced a month later state that
transfer to Department of Defense or Department of Justice custody was the "preferred endgame
for 13 detainees currently in [CIA] control, none of whom we believe should ever leave USG
custody.""^^^
2004, the overwhelming majority of CIA
detainees—113 of the 119 identified in the Committee Study—had already entered CIA custody.
Most of the detainees remaining in custody were no longer undergoing active interrogations;
rather, they were infrequently questioned and awaiting a final disposition. The CIA took custody
of only six new detainees between 2005 and January 2009: four detainees in 2005, one in 2006,
and one—the CIA's final detainee, MuhammadRahim—in 2007.^^^
I" 2004, CIA detainee^ere beingheldinUirc^oui^^ at
DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country |, at the^Ifacility in
Country I, as well as atdetention facilities in Country DETENTION SITE VIOLET in
Country | opened inearly 2005.*^^^ On April 15, 2005, the chief ofBase at DETENTION SITE
BLACK inCountry | sent the management ofRDG an email expressing his concerns about the
detention site and the program in general. He commented that "we have seen clear indications
that various Headquarters elements are experiencing mission fatigue vis-a-vis their interaction
with the program," resulting in a "decline in the overall quality and level of experience of
deployed personnel," and a decline in "level and quality of requirements." He wrote that
because of the length of time most of the CIA detainees had been in detention, "[the] detainees
have been all but drained of actionable intelligence," and their remaining value was in providing
"information that can be incorporated into strategic, analytical think pieces that deal with
motivation, structiu-e and goals." The chief of Base observed that, during the course of the year,
the detention site transitioned from an intelligence production facility to a long-term detention
facility, which raised "a host of new challenges." These challenges included the need to address
CIA PowerPoint Presentation, CIA Detainees: Endgame Options and Plans, dated August 19, 2004.
September 17, 2004, DRAFT Talking Points for tlie ADCI: EndgameOptions and Plans for CIA Detainees.
The CIA took custody of Abu Faraj al-Libi, Abu Munthir al-Magrebi, Ibrahim Jan, and Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi in
2005, and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi in 2006.
Thefirst detainees aiTived inCountry [ in 2003. CIA detainees were heldwithin anexisting Country
I facility in Country | from m to 2003, and then again beginning in m 2004. For additional
information, see Volume I.
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the "natural and progressive effects of long-tenn solitaryconfinementon detainees" and ongoing
behavioral probleras.^^^
(T8//H^^HH|//NF) With respect to the personnel at DETENTION SITE BLACK, the
chief of Base wrote:
"I am concerned at what appears to be a lack of resolve at Headquarters to
deploy to the field the brightest and most qualified officers for service at [the
detention site]. Over the course of the last year the quality of personnel
(debriefers and [security protective officers]) has declined significantly. With
regard to debriefers, most are mediocre, a handfull [sic] are exceptional and
more than a few are basically incompetent. From what we can determine there
is no established methodology as to the selection of debriefers. Rather than
look for their best, managers seem to be selecting either problem,
underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or whomever
seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time. We see no evidence
that thought is being given to deploying an 'A-Team.' The result, quite
naturally, is the production of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelhgence....
We have seen a similar deterioration in die quality of the security personnel
deployed to the site.... If this program truly does represent one of the agency's
most secret activities then it defies logic why inexperienced, marginal,
underperforming and/or officers with potentially significant
[counterintelligence] problems are permitted to deploy to this site. It is also
important that we immediately inact [sic] some form of rigorous training
program."872
A CIA OIG audit completed in June 2006 "found that personnel
assigned to CIA-controlled detention facilities, for the most part, complied with the standards
and guidelines in carrying out their duties and responsibilities." The OIG also found that,
"except for the shortage of debriefers, the facilities were staffed with sufficient numbers and
types of personnel." The lack of debriefers, however, was described as "an ongoing problem"
for the program. According to the audit, there were extended periods in 2005 when the CIA's
DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Country | had either one orno debriefers. At least twice in
the summerof 2005, the chiefof Station in that country requested additional debriefers, warning
that intelligence collection could suffer. Months later, in January 2006, the chief of Base at the
detention site advised CIA Headquarters that "the facility still lackeddebriefers to support
intelligence collection requirements, that critical requirements were 'stacking up,' and that gaps
in thedebriefing of detainees were impacting thequantity and quality of intelligence reporting
and would make the work of future debriefers more difficult.
Email from: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to;
subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005.
^^^maUfrom: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to:
HlfjUBHIHI' subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005.
Report of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention FacilitiesOperated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandumof
Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14,2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. As further described in the
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M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005
1. Department ofJustice Renews Approvalfor the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques in May 2005
acting assistant attorney general for
OLC, Steven Bradbury, issued two legal memoranda. The first analyzed whether the individual
use of the CIA's 13 enhanced interrogation techniques—including waterboarding, as well as a
number of interrogation techniques that had been used in 2003 and 2004, but had not been
analyzedin the original August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum—were consistent with the criminal
prohibition on torture.^ '^^ The second memorandum considered thecombined use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^ Both legal memoranda concluded that the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate the torture statute.
^005, the CIA inspector general, who had been
provided with the two OLC memoranda, wrote a memo to the CIA director recommending that
the CIA seek additional legal guidance on whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
and conditions of confinement met the standard under Article 16 of the Convention Against
Torture.^^^ The inspectorgeneralnoted that "a strong case can be made that the Agency's
authorized intenogation techniques are the kinds of actions that Article 16 undertakes to
prevent," adding that the use of the waterboard may be "cruel" and "extended detention with no
clothing would be considered 'degrading' in most cultures, particularly Muslim." The inspector
general further urged that the analysis of conditions was equally important, noting that the
inspector general's staff had "found a number of instances of detainee treatment which arguably
violate the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and/or degrading treatment."^^^
Committee Study, the Inspector General audit described how the CIA's detention facihties were not equipped to
providedetainees witlimedical care. The audit describedunhygienic food preparation, including at a facility with a
"rodent infestation," and noted that a physician assistant attributed symptoms of acute gastrointestinal illness and
giardiasis experienced by six staff and a detainee to food and watercontamination. Tlie audit further identified
insufficient guidelines covering possible detainee escape or the death of a detainee.
See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven
G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of LegalCounsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al
Qaeda Detainee.
See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven
G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of
High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
May 26, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General,
re: Recommendation for Additional Approach to Department of JusticeConcerning Legal Guidanceon Intenogation
Techniques.
May 26, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central LitelligenceAgency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General,
re: Recommendation for Additional Approach to Department of JusticeConcerning Legal Guidance on Interrogation
Techniques.
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On May 30, 2005, a third OLC memorandumexamining U.S.
obligations under the Convention Against Torture was completed.^^^ The conclusions in this
opinion were based largely on the CIA's representations about the effectiveness of the CIA
interrogation program in obtaining unique and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence."
As described later in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, the CIA's effectiveness
representations were almost entirely inaccurate.
2. Abu Faraj Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA *s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to
Department of Justice Memorandum on U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against
Torture; CIA Subjects Abu Faraj Al-Libi to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques When He Complains ofHearing Problems
Ori May 2, 2005, when Abu Faraj al-Libi, al-Qa'ida's chief of
operations, was captured in Pakistan, theOLC had not yet issued the three aforementioned May
2005 legal memoranda.^^^ CIA officers described Abu Faraj al-Libi's capture as the "most
important al-Qa'ida capture since Khalid Shaykh Muhammad."^^^ Shortly afteral-Libi's
capture, the CIA began discussing the possibility that Abu Faraj al-Libi might be rendered to
U.S. custody.^ '^
On May |, 2005, four days before the rendition of Abu Faraj al-
Libi to CIA custody, Director of CTC Robert Grenier asked CIA Director Porter Goss to send a
memorandum to the national security advisor and the director of national intelligence "informing
them of the CIA's plans to takecustody of Abu Faraj al-Libi and to employ interrogation
techniques if warranted and medically safe."^^^ On May 24, 2005, theWhite House informed the
CIA that a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting would be necessary to
discuss the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, but the
travel schedule of one of the principals was delaying sucha meeting.^^^ CIA Director Goss
instructed CIA officers to proceed as planned, indicating thathe would call the principals
individually and inform them that, if Abu Faraj al-Libi was found not to be cooperating and there
were no contraindications to such an interrogation, he would approve the use of all of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques other than the waterboard, without waiting for a meeting of
SeeMemorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven
G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office ofLegal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application
of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture toCertain Techniques that May Be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
For more infomiation on Abu Faraj al-Libi's detention and interrogation, see Volume III.
HEADQUARTERSHM (251840ZMAY05^^
See, for example, 1085 (describing meetings on May 6 and 7, 2005).
May |, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, via Acting Deputy Director, Central
IntelligenceAgency, ExecutiveDirector, Deputy Directorfor Operationsfrom Robert Grenier, Director, DCI
Counterterrorist CenteTjrejlnterrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.
Email froiir^m^^^p|; to; Robert Grenier, John Mudd, [REDACTEDl, [REDACTED1, |
I^^IHBTrEDACTED], cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; date: May 24,
2005.
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the principals.Abu Faraj al-Libi was rendered to CIAcustody at DETENTION SITE
ORANGE on May 2005,^^^ and transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK on May H,
2005.^^^
on May 2005, CIA Director Goss formally notified National
Security AdvisorStephenHadley and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte
that Abu Faraj al-Libi would be rendered to the unilateral custody of the CIA.^^^ Director Goss's
memorandum stated:
"[sjhould Abu Faraj resist cooperating in CIA debriefings, and pending a
finding of no medical or psychological contraindictations [sic], to
interrogation, I will authorize CIA trained and certified interrogators to employ
one or more of the thirteen specific interrogation techniques for which CIA
recently received two signed legal opinions from the Departmentof Justice
(DOJ), Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that these techniques, both individually
andusedcollectively, are lawful."^^^
The memorandum from Director Goss described Abu Faraj al-Libi
as holding the third most important positionin al-Qa'ida, and "play[ing] a leading role in
directing al-Qa'ida's global operations, including attack planning against the US homeland."
Abu Faraj al-Libi was also described as possibly overseeing al-Qa'ida's "highly compartmented
anthrax efforts."^^^
On May 2005, one day after al-Libi's arrival at DETENTION
SITE BLACK, CIA interrogators received CIA Headquarters approval for the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogationtechniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi.CIA interrogators began using the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi on May 28, 2005, two days before
the OLC issued its memorandum analyzing whether the techniques violated U.S. obligations
under the Convention Against Torture.^ '^
The CIA intenogated Abu Faraj al-Libi for more than a month
using tlie CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques. On a number of occasions, CIA
interrogators appliedthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to Abu Faraj al-Libi when he
Email from: to: Robert Grenier, John Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED],!
IHiH' I^I^^Hj^DACTED], ••••, cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject:Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL;date; May 24,
2005^
88-'' ^
887 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from
PorterGoss, Director, CenUal Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re: Interrogation Planfor AbuFaraj al-Libi.
888 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from
PorterGoss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.
889 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from
Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re; Intenogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.
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complained of a loss of hearing, repeatedly telling him to stop pretending he could not hear
well.^^^ Although the interrogators indicated that they believed al-Libi's complaint was an
interrogation resistance technique, Abu Faraj al-Libi was fitted for a hearing aid after his transfer
to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay in 2006.^^^ Despite the repeated and extensive use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, CIA Headquarters
continued to insist throughout the summer and fall of 2005 that Abu Faraj al-Libi was
withholding information and pressedfor the renewed use of the techniques. The use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Faraj al-Libi was eventually discontinued
because CIA officers stated that they had no intelligence to demonstrate that Abu Faraj al-Libi
continued to withhold information, and because CIA medical officers expressed concern that
additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "may come with unacceptable
medical or psychological risks."^^"^ After the discontinuation of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, the CIA asked Abu Faraj al-Libi about UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti for thefirst time.^^^ Abu Faraj al-Libi denied knowledge of al-Kuwaiti.^^^
3. CIA Acquires Two Detaineesfrom the U.S. Military
Another legal issue in late 2005 was related to the U.S. Department
of Defense's involvement in CIA detention activities. In September 2005, the CIA and the
Departmentof Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding on this subject,^^-^^ and the U.S.
military agreed to transfer two detainees, Ibrahim Jan and Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi, to CIA custody.
Both were held by the U.S. military withoutbeing registered with the ICRC for over 30 days,
pending their transfer to CIA custody.The transfer of Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi took place
notwithstanding Department of State concerns that the transfer would be inconsistent with
statements made by the secretary of state that U.S. forces in Iraq would remain committed to the
law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions.^^^
Email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]7HHHBii' [REDACTED], subject:
IResponse to DDO Taskingof 7 July on Abu Faraj Interrogation; date: July 8, 2005, at 06:16 PM.
DIRECTOR•• (121847Z JUL 05); HEADQUARTERS AN 04); illi 20361
(291232Z JAN 04); DIRECTOR•• (040522Z MAY 04)
•• 29454 (131701Z JUL 05)
Memorandum of Understanding ConcerningDOD Support to CIA with Sensitive Capture and Detention
Operations in the War on Terrorism.
^^^5^mail from: [REDACTED], •••; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
••I, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD Request for
a list of HVTs not to be issued ISN numbers. The email stated: "In conjunction with discussions between CIA and
DoD over the weelcend regarding our request to have the military render Ibraliim Jan to our custody and NOT
issuing him an ISN number, DoD has requested CIA provide a list of HVTs to whom, if captured, the military
should NOT issue ISN numbers" (emphasis in original)^ee ||H|^|l505jH|H||| OCT 05).
July 2005 Memorandum for Joint Staff (HmA Interim Guidance
Regarding (^^^m
nil 'ill III ^
Page 148 of 499




In late 2005, during the period the U.S. Senate was debating the
Detainee Treatment Act baning "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,the
CIA subjected Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi to its enhanced interrogation techniques.^®^ A draft
Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) stated that Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi provided "almost no information
that could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots"—the type of information
sought by the CIA, and the CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation
techniques.^^^ Later, the statement that Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi provided "almostno information that
could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots" was deleted from the draft
PDB.^®^ Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi remained in CIA custody until earlySeptember2006, when he was
transferred to U.S. military custody in Iraq.^^
4. The CIA Seeks "End Game "for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to Limited Support From
Liaison Partners
Email from: [REDACTED]; to; [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
II^Himill [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; Subject: McCain Amendment on Detainee Treatment; date: October
6, 2005, at 12:37 PM.
According to CIA records, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to nudity, dietary manipulation, insult slaps,
abdominal slaps, attention grasps, facial holds, walling, stress positions,and water dousing with 44 degree
Fahrenheit water for 18 minutes. He was shackled in the standing position for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation,
and experienced swelling in his lower legs requiring blood thinner and spiriil ace bandages. He was moved to a
sitting position, and his sleep deprivation was extended to 78 hours. After the swelling subsided, he was provided
with more blood thinner and was returned to the standing position. The sleep deprivation was extended to 102
hours. After four hours of sleep, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to an additional 52 hours of sleep deprivation,
after which CIA Headquarters infomied interrogators that eight hours was the minimum rest period between sleep
deprivation sessions exceeding 48 hours. In addition to the swelling, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi also experienc^an edema
on his head due to walling, abrasions on his neck, and blisters on his ankles from shackles. SeeW^B^M 1810
IDEC 05); 1813 DEC 05);••• 1819 ^^HpEC05)J|^^l1847
IDEC 05); HHH 05); HEADQUARTERS^^!••j^DEC^). See
additional informationonAbuJ£faraWmqHi^olum^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
titled: December
13, 2005, ALT ID#: -2132586. Director Goss notified the national security advisor that he had authorized the use of
die CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques on Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi because "CIA believes that Abu Ja'far possesses
considerable operational information about Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi." See December 1, 2005, Memorandum for the
National Security Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, from Porter Goss, Central Intelligence Agency,
subject, "CounterteiTonstlnterrogationTechnique^^
PDB Draft titled: December 2005, ALT
ID: 20051217 PDB on Abu Jafar al-Iraqi. Urging the change to the draft PDB, one of the interrogators involved in
Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi's interrogation wrote, "If we allow the Director to give tliis PDB, as it is written, to the President,
I would imagine the President would say, 'You asked me to risk my presidency on your intenogations, and now you
give me this that implies the intenogations are not working. Why do we bother?' We think the tone of the PDB
should be tweaked. Some of the conclusions, based on our experts' observations, should be amended. The glass is
half full, not half empty, and is getting more full every day." See email from: [REDACTED]
^••1; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED];
subiect^D^n [Abu Ja|fo^Mraqi]^te: December 15, 2005, at 12:25 AM.
2031 In June 2007, inaccurate information about the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Ja'fai* al-Iiaqi was provided to the Committee. See CIA Response to
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for die Record, June 18,2007 (DTS #2007-2564); |
32732 ••• 0cr05)^^l|||| 32707HpHOCr05)^HHH 32726••• OCT 05);f^lO ^HHOCT^^•^•32944^HHB0^^^




(TS/^^Hp||[^H|//NF) In early 2005, the CIA again sought an "endgame" policy for its
detainees, citing its unstable relations with host governments and its difficulty in identifying
additional countries to hostCIA detention facilities.^®^ Talking points prepared for the CIA
director for a meeting with the national security advisor made the following appeal:
"CIA urgently needs [thePresidentof the United States] and Principals
Committee direction to establish a long-termdisposition policy for the 12
High-Value detainees (HVD)s we hold in overseas detention sites. Our liaison
partners whohost these sites aredeeply concerned by [REDACTED]^®^ press
leaks, and they are increasingly skeptical of the [U.S. government's]
commitment to keep secret their cooperation.... A combination of press leaks,
international scrutiny of alleged [U.S. government] detainee abuse, and the
perception that [U.S. government] policy on detainees lacks direction is
eroding our partners' trust in U.S. resolve to protect their identities and
supporting roles. If a [U.S. government] plan for long-term [detainee]
disposition does not emerge soon, the handful of liaison partners who
cooperate may ask us to close down our facilities on their tenitory. Few
countries are willing to accept the huge risks associated with hosting a CIA
detention site, so shrinkage of the akeady small pool of willing candidates
could force us to curtail our highly successful interrogation and detention
program. Fear of public exposure may also prompt previously cooperative
liaison partners not to accept custody of detainees we have captured and
interrogated. Establishment of a clear, publicly announced [detainee]
'endgame' - one sanctioned by [the President of the United States] and
supported by Congress - will reduce our partners' concerns and rekindle their
enthusiasm for helping the US in the War on Terrorism."^^^
I" March 2005, talking points prepared for the CIA director for a
discussion with the National Security Council Principals Committee stated that it was:
The CIA's June 2013 Response states that an "important factor" contributing to the slowerpace of CIA detention
operations was al-Qa'ida's relocation to the FATA, which"made it significantly morechallenging [for the Pakistani
government] to mount capture operations resulting in renditionsand detentionsby the RDI program." A reviewof
CIA records by the Committee found that legal, policy, and otheroperational concerns dominated internal
deliberations abou^e program. In 2005, CIA officers asked officials to render two detainees to CIA
one mifjfll and one HH. neither
detainee was transferred to CIA custody. CIAofficersnoted that obtainingcustody of detainees held by a foreign
government during this period was becoming increasingly difficult, highlighting diat IHlHjHHliiHIHH
In March 2006, Director
Goss testified to the Committee thatlack(rfspacewas the limiting factor in taking custody of additional detainees.
See HEADQUAJRTERSHH^H|H||||HhEADQUARTERS HI^Hl^H^^ail from:[REDACTED], l^^^Kto: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],!
[REDACTEDUREDACrED]^[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: for coord, pis: D/CIA
talkin^oint^ll^miPIII^Ire rendition ofj
6702|||||B|||fH|^ |^ntIEADQUARTERS transcript of Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).
906 Text redacted by the CIA priorto provision to Committee members at the U.S. Senate.
SeeCIA document dated, January 12,2005, entitled, "DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting withNational
Security Advisor."
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"only a matter of time before our remaining handful of current blacksite hosts
concludes that [U.S. government] policy on [detainees] lacks direction and...
[the blacksite hosts] ask us to depart from their soil.... Continuation of status
quo will exacerbate tensions in these very valuable relationships and cause
them to withdraw their critical support and cooperation with the [U.S.
government]."^®^
During this period, the U.S. solicitor general, however, expressed
concern that if CIA detainees were transferred back to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, they might be
entitled to file a habeas petition and have access to an attorneyMeanwhile, the National
Security Council continued to discuss a public roll-out, and as described later in this summaiy,
the CIA engaged the media directly in order todefend and promote the program.^^®
The question of what to do with the remaining detainees in CIA
custody remained unresolved throughout 2005, during which time the CIA pursued agreements
with additional countries to establish clandestine CIA detention facilities.^'^ The Detainee
Treatment Act was passed by Congress on December 23, 2005, as part of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Yeai* 2006. That day, the CIA suspended its interrogation program
again. '^^ As described later in this summary, in February 2006, the CIA informed the National
Security Council principals that the CIA would not seek continued use of all of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. '^^
5. Press Stones and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees
Result in the Closing ofCIA Detention Facilities in Countries | and |
In October 2005, the CIA learned that Washington Po^Hjeporter
Dana Priest had information about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,
negotiations with the Washington Post in which it sought to prevent the newspaper from
publishing information onthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. '^"^ Fearful that
See CIA Talking Points for Principals Committee Meeting on Long-Term Disposition of High-Value Detainees,
8 March 2005.
See email from: to: John Rizzo; subject: Meeting this am with WH counsel on endgame
planning; date: January 14,2005.
Email &omJHHH^p; to^H^^HHccOREDA^D], [REDACTED], John
A. Rizzo, subject: Re: Brokaw Take
date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. In 2006, Vice PresidentCheneyexpressed resei-vations about any public
release of informationregarding the CIA program. See CIA Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED],
C/CTCjlHI' subject, "9March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting on Detainees."
Negotiations with Countries | and | tohost CIA detention facilities are described in this summary, and in
greater detail in Volume I.
HEADQUARTERS (232040Z DEC 05)
9'^ DDCIA Talking Points for 10 February 2006 Un-DC re Futureof the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention,
andIntenogation Program - Interrogation Techniques.
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TOP SECRET// /NOFORN




the CIA recommended the
immediate transfer of CIAdetainees to Department of Defense custody When the
Department of Defenserejected the proposal, the National Security Councildirected the CIA to
prepar^ther options.^^^ Meanwhile, two U.S. ambassadors, one in and another in
inquired whether Secretary ofState Rice had been briefed on the impending
Washington Post article and sought to speak to the secretary herself to ensure that the CIA
program was authorized. According to CIA documents, Secretary Rice was not aware of the
specific countries where the CIA detention facilities were located.^^^ In lieu of a phone call from
Secretary Rice, the CIA recommended that the State Department's CounterteiTorism Coordinator
and former CTC DDO, Henry Crumpton, call the ambassadors.^^^ The Washington Post
published an article about CIA detention sites on November 2, 2005.^^^
The publicationofthe Washington Post article resulted in a
demarche to th^Unite^StatesfromJ^^BHH^^ which also suggested that
contribution jjj^^^H^^^H^^^^^^ould be in jeopardyThe United States also
received ademarch^^m^^^^H^ |^|.^-^ According to aCIA cable, U.S.
representatives to "if another shoe were to drop," there would be
considerable ramifications for U.S. relations with on a number of issues that
depended on U.S. credibility in theareaofhuman rights. The representatives also "questioned
whether the gravity of thispotential problem is fully appreciated in Washington."^--
The other options put forward by the CIA were transfer of CIA detainees which the CIA
anticipated would release thedetainees after a short period. The CIA also proposed its own outright release of the
detainees. See CIA document entitled D/CIA Talking Points for use at
HEADQUARTERS
Talking Points for Dr. J.D. Crouch fortelephone calls to Ambassadors in [REDACTED] regarding possibility of
forthcoming Dana Priest press article; email from:
Principals Meeting (2005).
I; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTE^^REDACTED]; subject: Phone Call with State/L re Ambassadors who want to
speak to the SecState^datej^^PHmi, at06:45 PM.
Email fiom: ^^HHRtoTiREDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Phone Call with State/L re Ambassadors who want tospeaktotheSec^ate; date: October
24, 2005, at 06:45 PM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: •••••I, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTCDUREDACTEDU^DACTED]; subject: Phone caU from S/CT
Amb. Hank Crumpton to Ambassador in ^^te: November 1, 2005, at 6:13:21 PM.
After the subsequent press revelations, the U.S. ambassador in Country | asked again about whether the secretary of
state had been briefed, prompting the CIA Station in Countiy | tonote in a cable that briefing U.S. officials outside
of the CIA "would bea significant departure from current policy." See [REDACTED] HI [REDACTED].
See "CIA
Post, November 2, 2005.|. See cable to [REDACTED] at HEADQUAR |
cables to [REDACTED] at HEADQUAR and HEADQUAR
cable to [REDACTED] at HEADQUA^|; Memorandum from D/CIA Goss to Hadley, Townsend and Negroponte,
Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons," the Wasliin
TOP SECRET/.





catalogued how the Washington Post story created
tensions in its bilateral counterterrorism relations with allies and determined that:
"[t]he article is prompting our partners to reassess the benefits and costs of
cooperating with the [U.S. government] and CIA. These services have
conducted aggressive, high-impact operations with CIA against... targets,
including We no longer expect the services to be as
aggressive or cooperative.»923
In April 2006,
informed CIA officers that press stories on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program led
the government to prohibit from providing "information that could lead to the
rendition or detention of al-Qa'ida or other terrorists to U.S. Government custody for
interrogation, including CIA and the Department ofDefense."^^"^
M^dia leaks also created tensions with countries that had hosted or
continued to host CIA detention facilities. For example, leaks prompted Country | officials to
convey their intent to communicate directly with the Departments ofJustice andState^^iey
then formally demarched the U.S. government.^"^ As late as H 2009, the
Country | raised with CIA Dii'ector Panetta the "problemoftheseojet detention facility" that
had "tested and strained" the bilateral partnership. The ofCountry | also stated
that assurances were needed that future cooperation with the CIA would be safeguarded.^^^
After publication of the Washington Post article,
Countt^^demanded^e closure of DETENTION SITE BLACK within | hours.^^^ The CIA
transferred the H|| remaining CIA detainees out ofthe facility shortly thereafter.^^^
[REDACTED]
See email from: HHHH^^MjtoOREDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTEdT^^^H^H, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject:
sensitive do not forward - draft intel; date: April 7, 2006, at 04:12:59 AM. See also September 2, 2006, Fax from
DD/CTC, to Steve Bradbury, John BellingerIII, Steve Cambone, foi-warding September 1, 2006
Memorandum, "Anticipated Foreign Reactions to the Public Announcement of die US Secret Terrorist Detention
Center." |||||||B begun raising legal and policy concerns related to [an^otential] support and assistance to the
CIA in rendition, detention, and interrogation operations in Marcl^005j|||fcfficer^ndicate^haUl^ believed
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the prohibited
H from aiding or assisting in these CIA operations. For iilililiinnNM^^iiimil iinHjh i' il (iiiii imi ilmiil
Renditions and Detention, see email from: [REDACTED]^OS John A. Rizzo^c^REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: more from ReTHlH
11:09 AM.
"[REDACTED] article fallout." According to CIA records, the ofCountry | was "very angry"
about press reports, which, he believed, would be "exploited by radical elements" to "foment increa^hostility
toward [Country J] government." [REDACTED] DIRR|||||||||||| [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] |||H||
[REDACTED]. CIA records further state that the press reporting would"put considerablestrain on the
relationship." (See "[REDACTED] article fallout.") Despite this record, andother records in the full Committee
Study, theCIA'sJune 2013 Response state£"[w]efound noevidence that the RDI program in any way negatively
affected US relations overall with Countr
[REDACTED] 23281
927 [REDACTED] 7885 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED])
528 [REDACTED] 4895 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED])
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Country | officers refused to admit CIA detainee Mustafa
Ahmad al-Hawsawi to a local hospital despite earlierdiscussions withcountry representatives
abou^ow adetainee's medical emergency would be handled.^^^ While the CIA understood the
officers' reluctance to place a CIA detaineein^ocal hospital given media reports, CIA
Headquarters also questioned the "willingness of to participate as originally
agreed/planned with regard to provision of emergency medical care."^^^ After failing to gain
assistance from the Department of Defense,the CIA was forced to seek assistance from three
third-party countries in providing medical care to al-Hawsawi and four other CIA detainees widi
acute ailments. Ultimat^, th^CI^pai^heB|||H^^^^^^H|^ Bmorcthan$ |^ million for
the treatment of
fo^h^reatmen^f and made arrangements for
and to be treatedin^HBj^^^The medical issues resulted in the closing
of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Countryjfin|B|| 2006.^^^ The CIA then transferred its




Meanwhile, the pressures on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program brought about by the Washington Pos^t^ prompted die CIA to consider new options
among what it called the "[d]windling pool partners willing to host CIA Blacksites."^^^
The CIA thus renewed earlierefforts to establish a detention facility in Country The CIA had
earlier provided $| million to Country |'s in preparation for apotendal CIA
^tention site, prompting thechiefof Station to comment, "Do you realize you can buy [Country
^7"939 December |, 2005, the chief of Station in Country | met with the
who was not concerned about the CIA's detention of terrorists in his
country, but wanted assurances that the CIA interrogation program did not include the use of




See CIA Request Letter to DOD for Medical Assistance, dated
UNCLASSIFIED
__MM •' 2006, from DCIA Porter Goss. This
letter was written four days after theCIA Headquarters cable noting theemerging difficulties in relying on host-
country medical care. See also CIA document entitled. Summary and Reflections of Chief of Medical Services on
OMS Participation in the RDI Program. While the document is undated, it includes infomiation updated through
2007.
5eeCI^(^umententitled/|C0^ TO FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT," date not listed.
•^^•7719 See also CIA document entitled, "COMPENSATION TO LIAISON FOR
MEDICAL TREATMENT," date not listed, which indicates that the total compensation provided was $Bm.
Summary and Reflections of Chiefof Medical Services on OMSParticipation in ttieRDI Program.
SeeVolume I foradditional details.
4118 HEADQUARTERS
See CIA Counterterrorlst Rendition, Detainee, andInteiTogation ProgramTdatedlBFebrucu-y 2006, "Un-DC"
Meeting slides.
Transcript ofOral History Interview, Interviewee: |B||^H|||||||| (RJ) - October 13, 2006, Interviewer:
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
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torture.^"^® In providing his approval, the agreed to a request from the chief
of Station not to inform the U.S. ambassador in Country The CIA also reached an
agreement with another country, Country to establish a CIA detention facility in that country
and arranged with the leadership ofCountry | not to inform tlie U.S. ambassador there.^"^^ The
CIA ultimately did not detain individuals in either counti7.
In late October 2005, days before the publication of the
Washington Post article, the CIA asked aseparate country. Country |, to temporarily house B
CIA detainees.The chief of Station briefed the U.S. ambassador in Country who requested
that the National Security Council and the White House be bnefe^rnh^lan.^"^ There are no
CIA records to indicate the briefing occurred. Country |'s |||^m||||||||m provided
approval, while seeking assurances that the CIA would develop acontingenc^lai^i^as^ie
detention site was exposedinthem^^ the CIA Station and the
considered in Countiy CIA Headquarters directed that a
long-term CIA detention facility be established in the country. Counti7 ['s
approved a plan to build a CIA detention facility ^ut
noted his ongoing concerns about the lack of a CIA "exit strategy.
The lack of emergency medical care for detainees, the issue that
had forced the closing of DETENTION SITE VIOLETin Country was raised repeatedly in
the context ofthe construction ofthe CIA detention facility in Country |. On March 2006,
CIA Headquarters requested that the CIA Station in Country | ask Counti'y | to arrange discreet
access to the nearest hospital and medical staff. The cable stated that the CIA "look[s] forward
to a favorable response, prior to commencing with the construction of our detention facility.
Construction nonetheless began on the facility without the issue of emergency medical care
having been resolved. In ^Hj2006, after the deputy chief of the CIA Station in Counti'y |, the
deputy chief of RDG, and an OMS officer met with officers, the Station reported
that the establishment ofemergency medical care proximaHothesitewas^^i^^ In
July 2006, an OMS representative informed the chief of
CIA Headquarters that the facility inCountry | "should not be activated without a clear,











subject: ||H|||| CTC^^I leetin
discussion is also referenced in




re. date; '^ •57:2^M. The June
I; Memorandum for the Record; to: C/CTCj^H;from:
^and Recommendations. As described, in June 2006, the CIA
inspector general issued an audit tliatconcluded that while CIAdetention facilities lacked sufficient debriefers, they
"were constructed, equipped, and staffed to securely and safely contain detainees and prompt intelligence
exploitation of detainees." The audit furtlier determined that the facilities "are not equippedto provide medical
treatment to detainees who have ordevelopseriousphysica^^iei^^ and operable plans are not in place
III! 11 III I I III! I III 11
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By the time a CIA team visited the Country | detention site inlate
2006, the CIA had akeady invested $B million in the new facility. Describing the absence of
adequate emergency medical care options as "unacceptable," the chief of RDG recommended in
a draftmemo thatconstruction efforts beabandoned for this reason.^^® Thefollowing day, an
edited versionof the same memo described the issue as a "challenge," but did not recommend
that the CIA cease constm^ion of the facility.^^^ The resulting CIA detention facility, which
would eventually cost $|H million, was never used b^he CIA. Press reports about the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program that appeared in ||^| and m eventually forced the CIA
y|g( 952to pass possession of theunused facility to the Country | government.
In early January 2006, officials at the Department of Defense
informed CIA officers that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had made a formal decision not to
accept any CIA detainees at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.^^^ At the time, the
CIA was holding 28 detainees in its two remaining facilities, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, in
Country |, and DETENTION SITE ORANGE, in Country In preparation for a meeting
with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on January 6, 2006, CIA Director Goss was provided a
document indicating that the Department of Defense's position not to allow the transfer of CIA
detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay "would cripple legitimateend game
planning" for the CIA.^^^ The talking points for that meeting suggested that Director Goss tell
Secretary Rumsfeld that the:
"only viable 'endgame' for continued US Government custody of these most
dangerous terrorists is a transfer to GTMO... [a]bsent the availability of
GTMO and eventual DoD custody, CIA will necessarily have to begin
transferring those detainees no longer producing intelligence to third countries,
to provide inpatientcare for detainees," andconcluded that CIA detention facilities were not equipped to provide
emergency medical care to detainees. The audit team did not visit the facility in Country but stated, with regard
to another country, Country |, that "CIA funds have been wasted in constructing and equipping a medical facility
that was laterdetermined not to be a viable option for providing inpatient care for detainees." See Reportof Audit,
CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17September 2001 Memorandum of Notification, Report
No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14,2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. The CIA's supervised the
CIA's Renditions and Detention Group.
^^J|||H||Hp|2006, Memorandum for the Record, to: C/CTCHjl, from: C/CTCm^RDG, re: Site Visit to
^^^^^^^HpH2006, Memorandum for the Record, to: C/CTC|^ |^, from: C/CTC||^ H/RDG, re: Site Visit
to IIIII^HIII^Vand Recommendations (2).
Congressional Notification: Central Intelligenc^gen^Response to Host Country Government Order to Vacate
an Inactiv^lacksit^et^tion Facility, #2009-3711); SSCI Memorandum for the
Record, CIA Document, RDI Program Background Brief for Leon Panetta, 2009.
DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA
Detainees on GTMO.
See CIA Memo, "As of01 January 2006, therew^ 28 HVDs inCIA custody." As noted above, DETENTION
SITE VIOLET inCountry | would beclosed in 2006.
DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA
Detainees on GTMO.
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which may release them, or [the CIA itself may need to] outright release
them."^^^
After Secretary Rumsfeld declined to reconsider his decision not to
allow the transfer of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, CIA officers
proposed elevating the issue to the president. CIA officers prepared talking points for Director
Goss tomeet with the president onthe "Way Forward" onthe program onJanuary 12, 2006.^^^
The talking points recommended that the CIA director "stress that absent a decision on the long-
term issue (so called 'endgame') we are stymied and the program could collapse of its own
weight." '^'^ There are no records to indicate whether Director Goss made this presentation to the
president.
2005 and 2006, the CIA transferred detainees from its custody to
at least nine countries, includinji
as well as to the U.S. military in Iraq. Many of these
detainees were subsequently released.^^^ ByMay 2006, the CIA had 11 detainees whom it had
identified as candidates for prosecution by a U.S. military commission. The remaining detainees
were described as having "repatriation options open."^^°
6. The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following
the Detainee Treatment Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Following the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act in December
2005, the CIA conducted numerous discussions with the National Security Council principals
about modifications to the program that would be acceptable from a policy and legal standpoint.
In February 2006, talking points prepared for CIA Director Goss noted that National Security
Advisor Stephen Hadley:
"asked to be informed of the criteria CIA will use before accepting a detainee
into its CIA Counterten-orist Rendition, Detention, and InteiTOgation Program,
stating that he believed CIA had in the past accepted detainees it should not
have."^^^
The CIA director proposed future criteria that would require not
only that CIA detainees meet the standard in the MON, but that they possess information about
threats to the citizens of the United States or otiier nations, and that detention in a CIA facility
DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretaiy of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA
Detainees on GTMO.
DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with tlie President, re: Way Forward on Counterterrorist
Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program.
DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Way Forward on CounterteiTorist
Rendition, Detention and Intenogation Program.
See Volume I for additional details.
960 jyjgy |g^ 2006, Deputies Committee (Un-DC) Meeting, Preliminary Detainee End Game Options. For additional
information, see Volume I.
DCIA Talking Points for 9 February2006 Un-DC,re: Future of the CIACounterterrorist Rendition,Detention,
and Interrogation Program - Detainees.




wa^pprapriate for intelligence exploitation.^^^ Afew months later, Legal,
wrote to Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury suggesting a
modified standard for applying the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The suggested new
standard was that "the specific detainee is believed to possess critical intelligence of high value
to the United States." While the proposed modification included the requirement that a detainee
have "critical intelligence of high value," it represented an expansion of CIA authorities, insofar
as it covered the detention and interrogation of an individual with information that "would assist
in locating the most senior leadership of al-Qa'ida of [sic] an associated terrorist organization,"
even if that detainee was not assessed to have knowledge of, or be directly involved in, imminent
terrorist threats.^^^
Discussions with the National Security Council principals also
resulted in a March 2006 CIA proposal for an interrogation program involving only seven of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial
grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab.^^"^ This proposal was notacted upon at
the time. The proposal for sleep deprivation of up to 180 hours, however, raised concerns among
the National Security Council principals.^^^
In April 2006, the CIA briefed the president on the "current status"
of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. According to an internal CIA review, this
was the first time the CIA had briefed the president on the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.^^^ As previously noted, the president expressed concern at the April 2006 briefing
about the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the
bathroom on himself."^*^^
On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the
case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, concludingthat the military commission convened to try Salim
DCIA Talking Points for 9 February 2006 Un-DC, re: Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention,
and Intenogation Program - Detainees.
Letter from Legal ActingAssistant Attorney General Bradbury,May 23, 2006.
(DTS#2009-1809); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency,
from StevenG. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re;
Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A toCertain Techniques That May be Used in the InteiTogation of a
High Value al Qaeda Detainee (DTS #200^^l0^a^), citing Fax for Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney
Genera^ffice of Legal Counsel, fromBH^^^H> Assistant General Counsel, CIA (Jan. 4, 2005) ('January 4
Fax'); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior DeputyGeneralCounsel,Central IntelligenceAgency,
from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re:
Application of 18U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A tothe Combined Useof Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of
HighValueal QaedaDetainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 10);Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputy
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel,May 30, 2005,Re: Application of UnitedStates Obligations Under Article 16 of
the Convention AgainstTortureto Certain Techniques tliatMay be Used in the Interrogation of High ValueAl
Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11).
DCIA Talking Points for 9 March 2006 PrincipalsCommittee Meeting.
Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED], C/CTCH, re: 9March 2006 Principals Committee
Meeting on Detainees.
See CIA document entitled, "DCIA Meeting with the President/^atedApril 8, 2006.
Email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Dr. [SWIGERT's] 7 June
meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.
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Hamdan, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, was inconsistent with statutory requirements and
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The implication of the decision was that treating
a detainee in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 would constitute
a violation of federal criminal law. CIA attorneys analyzed the Hamdan decision, noting that it
could have a significant impact on "current CIA interrogation practices.Their memorandum
also referenced that Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury had the "preliminary
view ... that the opinion 'calls into real question' whether CIA could continue its CT
interrogation program involving enhanced interrogation techniques," as the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques "could be construed as inconsistent with the provisions of Common
Article 3 prohibiting 'outrages upon personal dignity' and violence to life and person."^^^
The case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a
draft memorandum on the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.^^® The CIA did not use itsenhanced inten-ogation techniques again
until July 2007, by which time the OLC had interpreted the Military Commissions Act, signed by
the president on October 17, 2006, in such a way as to allow the CIA to resume the use of the
techniques.^^^
N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program
L President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program
After significant discussions throughout 2006 among the National
Security Council principals, the Department of Defenseultimately agreed to accept the transfer
of a number of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody
(U) On September 6, 2006, President George W. Bush delivered a public speech acknowledging
that the United States had held al-Qaida operatives in secret detention, stating that the CIA had
employed an "alternative set of procedures" in interrogating these detainees, and describing
information obtained from those detainees while in CIA custodyAs described later in this
summary, the speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, contained
CIA memorandum from tlie CIA's Office of General Counsel, circa June 2006, entitled, "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld."
CIA memorandum from the CIA's Office of General Counsel, circa June 2006, entitled, "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld."
Email from: [REDACTED]; cc: Rizzo; subject; FW: Summary
of Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM. Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility;
Report, Investigation into the Office of LegalCounsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central
IntelligenceAgency's Useof 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected TeiTorists, July 29, 2009 (DTS
#2010-1058).
Memorandum for Jolin A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel,Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Acting AttorneyGeneral, Officeof Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the
War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Intenogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
See Volume I for details on these discussions.
September6, 2006,The White House,PresidentDiscusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected
Terrorists.
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significant inaccurate statements, especially regarding the significance of information acquired
from CIA detainees and the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques.
(U) In the speech, the president announced the transfer of 14detainees to Department of
Defense custody at Guantanamo Bay and the submission to Congress of proposed legislation on
military commissions.^^^ As all other detainees in the CIA's custody had been transferred to
other nations, the CIA had no detainees in its custody at the time of the speech.^^^
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees
After Their Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006
After the 14 CIA detainees arrived at the U.S. military base at
Guantanamo Bay, they were housed in a separate building from other U.S. military detainees and
remained under the operational control of the CIA.^^^ In October 2006, the 14 detainees were
allowed meetings with the ICRC and described in detail similar stories regarding their detention,
treatment, and interrogation while in CIA custody. The ICRC provided information on these
claims to the CIA.^^^ Acting CIA General CounselJohn Rizzoemailed tiieCIA directorand
other CIA senior leaders, following a November 8, 2006, meeting with the ICRC, stating:
"[a]s described to us, albeit in summary form, what the detainees allege
actually does not sound that far removed from the reality... the ICRC, for its
part, seems to find their stories largely credible, having put much stock in the
fact that the story each detainee has told about his transfer, treatment and
conditions of confinement was basically consistent, even though they had been
incommunicado witheach otherthroughout their detention by us."^^^
In February 2007 the ICRC transmitted to the CIA its final report
on the "Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' in CIA Custody." The ICRC report
concluded that "the ICRC clearly considers that the allegations of the fourteen include
descriptions of treatment and interrogation techniques - singly or in combination - that amounted
to torture and/orcruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."^^® Notwithstanding Rizzo's comments,
the CIA disagreed with a number of the ICRC's findings, provided rebuttals to the ICRC in
See Volume I and Volume II for additional infomiation.
September 6, 2006, TheWhite House, President Discusses Creation of Militiury Commissions to TrySuspected
Terrorists.
See Volume III for additional information.
CIA Background Memo for CIA Director visit to Guantanamo, December |, 2006, entitled Guantanamo Bay
High-Value Detainee Detention Facility.
^^^mai^roi^|^^^^^^H|CTC/LGL; to; John Rizzo,[REDACTEDl,
•^•^•,^^^^^Br[REDACrEDUREDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: subject: 8 November 2006 Meeting v '^ith ICRC reps; date:
November 9, 2006, at 12:25 PM.
Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, Michael J. Morell; cc:
[REDACTED]; subject: Fw: 8 November 2006 Meeting with ICRC Reps; date: November 9,
2006, at 12:25 PM.
February 14, 2007, Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel,
International Committee of theRed Cross, |
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writing, and informed the Committee that "numerous false allegations of physical or threatened
abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the report undermine its overall
credibility.The ICRC report was acquired by The New York Review ofBooks and posted on
theReview'?, website in April 2009.^*^^ The Committee found theICRC report to be largely
consistent with information contained in CIAinterrogation records.^^^
3. The CIA Considers Future of the Program Following the Military Commissions Act
noted, in June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a draft legal memorandum on the impact of the
Detainee Treatment Acton the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^"^ The administration
determined that the CIA would need new legislation to continue to use the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.The Military Commissions Act addressed the issues raised by the
Hamdan decision and provided the president the authority to issue an Executive Order detailing
permissible conduct under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The bill passed the
Senate on September 28, 2006, and the House ofRepresentatives the following day.^^^
On November |, 2006, when Abd Kadi al-Iraqi was rendered to
CIA custody, the draft Executive Order and an updated OLC memorandum had not yet been
prepared.^^^ Although Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was consistently assessed as beingcooperative,
CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatmentof Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in
CIA Custody. At a Committee Hearing on April 12, 2007, CIA Director Hayden emphasized die close relationship
tlie CIA had with thelCR^^I^eliev^ur contacts with the ICRC have been very useful. I have met wit^
I, tlie for the Red Cross, on several occasions atCIA. It appears that ~
]is arunner and he's promised to bring his gear with him next time he comes to Langley so that we can
jog on the compound."), but emphasized the errors in the ICRCreport, stating: "While CIA appreciates the time,
effort, and good intentions of the ICRC in forming its report, numerous false allegations of physical or threatened
abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the reportundermine its overall credibility." (See SSCI Hearing
Transcript, dated April 12, 2007 (DTS# 2007-3158).) As is describedin more detail in Volume II, Director
Hayden's statements to the Committee regarding the ICRC report includedsignificant inaccurate infomiation.
See Assets/nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/022/icrc—report.pdf and detainee reviews and reports in Volume
III.
CIA officers in RDG and OMS prepared a number of documentsdisputing tlie ICRC allegations. See document
entitled, "CIA Comments on the Febmary 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees'
in CIA Custody." See Volumes I and III for additional infonmtion.
Email from: ^o: [REDACTED]; cc: John Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary
of Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM.
Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury told tlie Department of Justice's Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) that officialsfrom the Departments of State,Defense, and Justice met with the president and
officials from the CIA and the NSC to consider the impact of the Hamdan decision, and that it was clear from tlie
outset that legislation would have to be enacted to address the applicationof Common Article 3 and the War Crimes
Act to the CIA interrogation program. As the OPR report noted, ''Hamdan directly contradicted OLC's January 22,
2002 opinion to the White House and the Department ofDefense, which had concluded that Common Article 3did
not apply to capturedmembers of al Qaeda." See Department of JusticeOfficeof Professional Responsibility;
Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central
Intelligence Agency's Use of EnhancedInterrogation Techniques on Suspected Tenorists, July 29, 2009 (DTS
#2010-1058).
S. 3930 passed the Senate by a vote of 65-34 (RecordVote Number: 259) and the House by a vote of 250-170
(Roll no. 508). It was signed into law on October 17, 2006.
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interrogators also believed he was withholding information on operational plots and the locations
ofhigh-value targets.^^^ The CIA believed his February 2007 supported this
conclusion,prompting discussions at CIA Headquarters about the possible use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques against him. By the end of the month, however, the CIA had
determined therewas "insufficient intelligence...that [Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi] possesses actionable
information... to justify theuseof theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
(TS//^|||||||||||||||||||||||/^^) In October 2006, apanel of CIA interrogators recommended that
four CIAenhanced interrogation techniques—the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, nudity,
and the waterboard—^be eliminated, but that the remainder of the interrogation techniques be
retained.^^^ Under this proposal, the CIA would have been authorized to subject detainees to
dietary manipulation, sleepdeprivation, the facial slap, the facial grasp, the attention grab,
walling, stress positions, and waterdousing. There are few CIA records describing the panel's
deliberations, or the CIA's response to its recommendations. The panel proposed dropping two
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—nudity and the abdominal slap—that the CIA
director had proposed retaining in March 2006, while recommending that the CIA retain three
other techniques— walling, stress positions, and water dousing—that had not otherwise been
requested for retention.^^^
4. The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program AfterPassage of the
Military Commissions Act
Iri the spring of 2007, the OLC completed a draft of a legal opinion
concluding that the use of the CIA's seven proposed enhanced interrogation techniques—sleep
deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the
attention grab—would be consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and the Military Commissions Act. This draft generated significant disagreement
between the State Department's legaladvisor, John Bellinger, and the Acting Assistant Attorney





1370 (071318Z NOV 06);(271250Z NOV 06);^^^! 1703 (040918Z DEC 06)
(Q81606ZJAN 07); ^^1^1956 (15121IZ JAN 07);
2065 (081633Z FEB 07)
^^"Ei^lTom: ICTC/LGL; to;
HHII; subject: What needs to occur before we ask for EITs on
07); date: February 9, 2007.
See October 23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from
^^^Se^^ber23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from Chief, [
mm and DCIA Talking Points for 9March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting.
February 9, 2007, letterfrom John B. Bellinger III,Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Steven G. Bradbury,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice. At the time, there were internal
disagreements within the CIAabout whether theCIAshouldhavea detention and interrogation program. An April
2007 Sametime communication between the chief of CTC and another senior CIA leader described these
disagreements and how CIA leadership responded to them. According to "[REDACTED]
was carping to [REDACTED] and Jose [Ro^iguez^as^rid^^^haUi^nd^ichael] Sulick (!) had a long talk
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2007, in an effort to gain Secretary Rice's support, the CIA
asked CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR to brief Secretary Rice on the CIA's
inten'ogation program. During that briefing, Secretary Rice expressed her concern about the use
of nudity and a detainee being shackled in the standing position for the purpose of sleep
deprivation. According to CIA records, in early July 2007, after the capture of Muhammad
Rahim, Secretary Rice indicated that she would not concur with an interrogation program that
included nudity, but that she would not continue to object to the CIA's proposed interrogation
program if it was reduced to six of the enhanced inteiTogation techniques listed in the draft OLC
memorandum: (1) sleep deprivation, (2) dietary manipulation, (3) facial grasp, (4) facial slap,
(5) abdominal slap, and (6) the attention grab.^ '^^
5. Muhammad Rahim, the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA's
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence
On June 25, 2007, al-Qa'ida facilitator Muhammad Rahim was
captured in Pakistan.^^^ Based onreports of debriefings of Rahim in foreign government custody
and other intelligence, CIA personnel assessed that Rahim likely possessed information related
to the location of Usama bin Laden and otheral-Qa'ida leaders.^^^ On July 3, 2007, Acting CIA
General Counsel John Rizzo informed Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury that
the CIA was anticipating a "new guest," and that the CIA "would need the signed DOJ opinion
'in a matterof days.'"^^^
Muhammad Rahim was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION
SITE BROWN in Country | on B 2007."® Upon his arrival, CIA
interrogators had a single discussion with Rahim during which he declined to provide answers to
questions about threats to the United States and the locations of top al-Qa'ida leaders.Based
on this interaction, CIA interrogators reported that Rahim was unlikely to be cooperative. As a
and agree tlieCIA is off the track and rails... that we shouldnot be doingdetention,rendition, interrogation."
Referringto a CIA leadershipmeeting that day in whichthe Committee's April 12, 2007, hearing wouldbe
discussed, BHHHstated that: "Iwant to take that [criticism] on by letting all know how importan [sic] this
[hearing] is... and what the leaderships [sic] position is from hayden, kappes and jose... in case there is some
corrosive, bullsliit mumbling and rumblings amongcon^^ - "componenT^^ ofwhich i am
seeing." Sametimecommunication between 12/Apr/07, 09:50:54
to 09:56:57.
Email from: Rodriguez, John Rizzo etc.; subject: EIT briefing for SecState on
June 22, 2007; date: June 22, 2007; July 3, 2007, Steven Bradbury, Handwritten Notes, "John Rizzo"; email from:
John A. Rizzo; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with Bradbury; date:
July 3,2007.
995 1
CIA memorandum titled, CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Renditionof Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007. The
document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled CTC/RDG
Planningfor Possible Rendition of Mohammad Raliim - 25 June 2007. Seealso 2463 (201956ZJUL 07).
Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with
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result, CIA DirectorMichael Hayden senta letter to the president formally requesting that the
president issue the Executive Order interpreting the Geneva Conventions in a manner to allow
the CIA to interrogateRahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A classified
legal opinion from OLC concluding that the use of the CIA's six enhanced interrogation
techniques proposed for useon Rahim (sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, facial grasp,
facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab) did not violate applicable laws was issued on
July 20, 2007. The accompanying unclassified Executive Orderwas issued the same day.^®^®
Although Rahim had been described by the CIA as "one of a handful of al-Qa'ida facilitators
working directly for Bin Ladin and Zawahiri,"^®®^ Rahim remained in a CIA cellwithout being
questioned for a week, while CIA intenrogators waited for approval to use the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against him. '^^ ^^
CIA interrogators initially expressed optimism about their ability to
acquire information from Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A cable
sent from the CIA detention site stated:
"Senior interrogators on site, with experience in almost every HVD [high-
value detainee] interrogationconducted by [CIA], believe the employment of
interrogation with measures would likely provide the impetus to shock
[Rahim] from his current resistance posture and provide an opportunity to
influence his behavior to begin truthful participation."'^ ®^
Pour CIA interrogators present at the CIA detention site began
applying theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on July 21, 2007.^®"'^ According to CIA
records, the interrogators "employedinterrogation measures of facial slap, abdominal slap, and
facial hold, and explained to [Rahim] that his assumptions of how he would be treated were
wrong."'®®^ The inteiTogators emphasized to Rahim that"his situation was the result of his
deception, he would stay in this position until interrogators chose to remove him from it, and he
could always correct a previous misstatement."^®®^ According to thecable describing the
interrogation, Rahim then threatened to fabricate information:
"[Rahim] reiterated several times during the session that he would make up
information if interrogators pressuredhim, and that he was at the complete
1000 j^jiy 2007, letter from Michael Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to President George W.
Bush; Executive Order 13440, July20, 2007; andMemorandum for John A. Rizzo, ActingGeneral Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Acting Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques thatMay Be Used by theCIA in theIntenogation of High Value al
Qaeda Detainees.
CIA memorandum titled, "CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007."
The document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled
"CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007."
2445 (181104Z JUL 07); 2463 (201956Z JUL 07);
2463 (201956Z JUL 07)
2467 (211341Z JUL 07)
2467 (211341Z JUL 07)
2467 (211341Z JUL 07)
12467 (211341ZJUL07)
TOP SECRET// //NOFORN




mercy of the interrogators and they could even kill him if they wanted.
InteiTogators emphasized to [Rahim] that they would not allow him to die
because then he could not give them information, but that he would,
eventually, tell interrogators the truth.
During the interrogation of Rahim using the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, Rahim was subjected to eightextensive sleep deprivation sessions,
as well as to the attention grasp, facial holds, abdominal slaps, and the facial slap.^®^^ During
sleep deprivationsessions, Rahim was usually shackled in a standing position, wearing a diaper
and a pair of shorts.Rahim's diet was almost entirely limited to water and liquid Ensure
meals.CIA interrogators would provide Rahim with a cloth to further cover himself as an
incentive to cooperate. For example, a July 27, 2007, cable from the CIA detention site states
that when Rahim showed a willingness to engage in questioning about "historical information,"
he was "provided a large towel tocover his torso" as a "subtle reward."^®'^ CIA interrogators
asked Rahim a variety of questions during these interrogations, seeking information about the
current location of senior al-Qa'ida leaders, which he did not provide.
1007 2467(211341ZJUL07)
Rahimwas subjected to 104.5hours of sleep deprivation fromJuly 21, 2007, to July 25, 2007. Sleep
deprivation was stopped when Rahim "describedvisual andauditory hallucinations." After Raliim was allowed to
sleepfor eighthours and the psychologist concluded that Rahim hadbeenfaking his symptoms, Raliim was
subjected toanother 62 hours ofsleep deprivation. Athird, 13 hour session, was haltedduet^ limit of 180 hours
of sleep deprivation during a30 day period^SeeJP^^^I 2486 (251450Z JUL07)J^^BH 2491 (261237Z JUL
07)j||||| 2496 (261834Z JUL 07); |H|Bin501 (271624Z JUL 07); JUL 07); and
H^H2^8 (291820Z JUL 07).) On August 20, 2007, Rahim was subjected to afourth sleep deprivation
session. After a session that lasted 104 hours, CIA Headquarters consulted with tlie Department of Justice and
determined that "[tjermination at this point is required to be consistentwitli theDCIA Guidelines, whichlimt sleep
deprivation to an aggregate of180 hours in any repeat any 30 day period." {See HEADQUARTERS ^H|[|
(240022Z AUG 07).) Between August 28, 2007, and September 2,2007^ahim was subjected to three additional
sleep deprivation sessions of 32.5 hours, 12 hours, and 12 hours. {See |^U^^64^291552Z AUG 07);
•liil 2661 (311810Z AUG 07); 2662 (010738Z SEP OT^TandjBHIi 2666 (020722Z SEP 07).)
As described, CIA interrogatorsconducted an eighth sleep deprivation session, lasting 138.5 hours, in November
2007.
2502 (281557Z JUL 07);
^54 (301659Z AUG 07); f
2508 (291820ZJUL07);
2626 (241I58Z AUG 07); [
2661 (31181OZ AUG 07);
12467 (211341Z JUL07^
12558 (08151IZ AUG 07);
^2496 (261834ZJUL 07
12558(08151IZ AUG 07);
2645 (291552Z AUG 07);
12666 (030722Z SEP 07)




2558 (08151 IZ AUG 07)
2644 (281606Z AUG 07);
2661 (311810Z AUG 07);
2570 (101155Z AUG 07);
12476 (231419Z JULOJ^
[2508 (291820Z JUL07);
12570 (101155Z AUG 07);
2645(291552Z AUG 07);
12662 (020738Z SEP 07); [
12671 (061450Z SEP 07). CIA contractor DUNBAR participated inMuhammad Rahim's interrogation
sessions from August 9, 2007, to August 29, 2007. See Volume III for additional details.
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2615 (201528Z AUG 07)
2496 (261834ZJUL 07);
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TOP SECRET// //NOFORN
On September 8, 2007, CIA Director Hayden approved an
extension of MuJiammad Rahim's CIA detention The Director of the National Clandestine
Service Jose Rodriguez disagreed with theapproved extension, writing:
"I did not sign because I do notconcur with extending Rahim's detention for
another 60 days. I do not believe the tools in our tool box will allow us to
overcome Rahim's resistance techniques. J.A.R."^^^^
Shortly after the September 2007 extension, CIA personnel were
directed to stop the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim. Rahim was
thenleft in his cell with minimal contact with CIApersonnel for approximately six weeks.
On September 10, 2007, Rahim's interrogators reported to CIA Headquarters that Rahim had
"demonstrated that the physical coiTective measures available to HVDIs '^^ '^ have become
predictable and beaiable."^^^^ The use ofthe CIA's enlianced interrogation techniques on Rahim
resumed on November 2, 2007, with a sleep deprivation session that lasted until November 8,
2007, for a total of 138.5 hours. This sleep deprivation session, the longest to which Rahimhad
been subjected, was his eighth and final session. Rahim was also subjected to dietary
manipulation during this period.
According to CIA records, intermittent questioning of Rahim
continued until December 9, 2007, when all questioning of Rahim ceased for nearly three weeks.
During this time, CIA detention sitepersonnel discussed and proposed new ways to encourage
Rahim's cooperation. These new proposals included suggestions that Rahim could be told that
audiotapes of his interrogations mightbe passed to his family, or that
CIA memorandum from Director, Counterterrorism Center, to Director, Central
Intelligence Agency, September 7, 2007, Subject:Request to Extend Detention of Muhammad Rahim.
CIA Routing and Record Sheet with Signatures for approval of theMemorandum, "Request to Extend Detention
of Muharrnm^ Rahim," September 5, 2007. J.A.R. are theinitials of the Director of the NCS, Jose A. Rodriguez.
1016 2697 (121226Z SEP 07); CIA memorandum from Director, Counterterrorism
Center, to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, October 31,2007, Subject: Request Approval for theuse of
Enhanced InteiTOgation Techniques; HEADQUARTERS IHI (101710 SEP 07). During this period, contractor
Grayson SWIGERT recommended two approaches. The first was increasing Raliim's amenities over 8-14 days
"before returning to theuseof EITs." The second was"switching from an interrogation approach thatineffect
amounts to a 'battle of wills,' toa 'recruiting' approach that sidesteps theadversarial contest inherent inframing the
session as an interrogation." SWIGERT noted, however, that thelatter approach "is apt tobe slow in producing
information" since intelligence requirements would not be immediately serviced, and "it would work best if [Rahim]
believe^i^ill be hUCIA^usto^indefinitely." (See email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED] and
IHIIII^HIi;cc: HUBHiH Hammond DUNBAR; subject: Some thoughts on [Rahim] interrogation
next steps;date: September 17, 2007, at 4:05 PM.) The CTC's deputy chiefof operations replied that,"It's clear
that the 'harsh' approach isn't going to workandthe more we try variants on it, the more it allows [Rahim] to
believe he has won^Th^uestion iswhether tliat perception will be conveyed in Scenario 2." See email from[REDACTED] to: |H|^ ^Hccj[REDACrcD], Grayson SWIGERT, Hammond
DUNBAR, [REDACTED]7||||||[|^ ^ [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Some thoughts on [Rahim]
interrogation next steps; date: September 17, 2007, at 4:28 PM.
HighValue Detainee Interrogators (HVDI)
'"'^ •[^•2691 (101306ZSEP07)1019 2888 (022355Z NOV 07); 2915 (081755Z NOV 07). Due to the time zone difference,
when this sleepdeprivation session began it was November 2, 2007,at CIAHeadquarters, but November 3, 2007,at
thedetention site.
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Rahim was cooperating with U.S. forces. On December
18, 2007, CIA Headquarters directed the detention site to stand down on the proposals.
The CIA's detention and interrogation of Mohammad Rahim
resulted in no disseminated intelhgence reports.On March B, 2008, Muhammad Rahim was
to where took custod^^^im.
The|BHgovernment immediately transferred Rahim to the custody of
whichpoint Rahimwas transferred back to CIA custody and rendered by the CIA to U.S.
military custody at Guantanamo Bay.'^ ^^
6. CIA After-Action Review of Rahim Interrogation Callsfor StudyofEffectiveness of
Interrogation Techniques and Recommends Greater Use ofRapport-Building Techniques
in Future CIA Interrogations
On April 21, 2008, and April 22, 2008, the CIA's RDG convened
an after-action review of the CIA's interrogation of Muhammad Rahim. According to summary
documents, the CIA review panel attempted to determine why the CIA had been unsuccessful in
acquiring useful information from Rahim. The summary documents emphasizedthat the
primary factors thatcontributed to Rahim's unresponsiveness were the interrogation team's lack
of knowledgeof Rahim, the decision to use the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques
immediately after the short "neutral probe" and subsequent isolation period, the lack of clarity
about whether the non-coercive techniques described in the Army Field Manual were permitted,
the team's inability to confront Rahim with incriminating evidence, and the use of multiple
improvised interrogation approaches despite the lack of any indication that these approaches
might be effective.The summary documents recommended that future CIA interrogations
should incorporate rapport-building techniques, social interaction, loss of predictability, and
deception to a greaterextent.The documents also recommended that the CIA conduct a
13097 (141321Z DEC 07)^^HH 3098
3151 (291607Z DEC 07);
3166 (011404Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS
See Volume II and Volume III for additional information.
m;f|||^|8408 jjj^^^^^^^^^BRecords indicate that Rahim did not depart
his time in nominal^^^Bcustody. See Volume IIIfor additional details on ttiis transfer.
Undated CIA Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, author (REDACTED); Undated CIA
Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Raliim] Lessons
Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerningth^Modificatioi^^lee^Deprivatioi^n^Re^^
Walling as an and Memorandum from
to Director, CTC, May9, 2008,Subject: Results of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Intenogation. A
document drafted by oneof tlie participants prior to the review suggested that"intenselegal/policy scrutiny" was
alsoa negative factor; however, thispointwas not mentioned in anyof the post-review summaries, except in the
context of discussing confusion overwhether particular interrogation methods were legal. The summary documents
state that CIA officers devisedand implemented severaldifferent strategies, one after another. According to one of
the documents, "[t]hese varied strategies were implemented due to frustration and concern regarding the lack of
intelligence production."
"^24 Undated CIA Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA
Memorandum, titled [Raliim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons
Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concemingth Deprivation and Reinstatement of
i( )|| iiii( II ii I i( II (III 11
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survey of interrogation tccliniques used by other U.S. government ageneies and other countries
in an effort to develop effective interrogation methods.'"--^
Muhammad Rahim was the last CIA detainee in the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program.
7. CIA Contracting ExpensesRelated to Company Formed by SWIGERTand DUNBAR
CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, who played a central
role in the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the summer of 2002,
and then used the techniques as contract interrogators, formed a company in 2005
["Company In addition to providing interrogators for the CIA's interrogation program,
Company Y was granted a sole sourcecontract to provide operational psychologists, debriefers,
and security personnel at CIA detention sites.Under the contract. Company Y was tasked
with conducting ongoing conversations with CIA detainees to learn about the terrorist mind set
(this project was named the"Terrorist Think Tank" or "T-^"), developing
strategies, and writing the history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.Later
descriptions of their services note that—on behalfof the CIA—Company Y officers participated
in the interrogations of detainees held in foreign government custody and served as
intermediaries between entities of those governments and the CIA.'^ ^^^"
By 2OO6, the value of the base contract for their company, with all
options exercised, was in excess of$180 million.As ofMay 2007, Company Yhad hired |
former CIA staff officers, many of whomhad previously been involved with the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program. Company Y's chief operating officer was the former
Walling and Memoranduni from
IIIH to Director, CTC, May 9, 2008, Subiect^esults of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation.
Undated CIA Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA
Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons
Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of
Walling as an EIT.
See Volume III for additional information.
1027 Pqj. more infomiation onCIA contracting with [Company Y], seeVolume I.
Letter Y|, attn: Hammond DUNBAR from [REDACTED],
Contracting Officer, re Confirmation of Verbal Authorization to Proceed Not to Exceed (ATP/NTE); email from:
[REDACTED]; to: ••••; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED];
subject: Next Contractual Stepswitl^WIGERT&D^ date: March 2, 2005; March 18, 2005, Letter from[REDACTED], Chief^^H|ta|p|^ ^^^^^^^^^^Company Y], re Letter Contract
Email from: subject: date: June 17, 2005, at 11:08:22
AM^emai^rom:^ to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: PCS CTC officer to [Company Y
location] ("One of the primary functions is to develop and set-up what we call the 'Terrorist Think Tank'
(previously briefed to the DDO and ADDO)which will be critical as we develop our
date: July 12, 2005, at 10:25:48 AM; Justification Date: 28 February 2006, Justification For Other Than Full And
Open Competition, Contractor: [Company Y].
for example, [Company Y] Monthlyreport, Febioiary 2006; [Company Y] Monthly Report, March 2006;
[Company Y] Quarterly, 01 Jan - 31 March 2007.
Justification Date: 25 July 2006,Justification For Other Than Full and Open Competition, Contractor:
[Company Y].
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chief of division of the CIA supervising the Renditions and
Detention Group. In addition, Company Yhired at least | CIA security protective officers to
work on Company Y's CIA contracts. In March 2006, a list of projected staff and contractors
within CIA's Renditions and Detention Group included separate positions.Of those |
positions, H [73%] were for contractors, the majority ofwhom were contractors from
Company gy 2007, RDG reported having | staff officers and
contractors. By 2008, RDG had atotal of positions, with | staff officeiTandJI [85%]
contractors, according to the CIA. 1035
The CIA's contract with Company Y was terminated in mid-2009.
From the time of the company's creation in 2005 thi'ough the close-out of its contract in 2010,
the CIA paid Company Y more than $75 millionfor services in conjunction with the CIA's
Detention and Inten'ogation Program.The CIA also certified Company Y's office in
[, as aSecure Compartmented Infomiation Facility (SCIF), which required
a CIA officer to be detailed to and provided Company Y access to CIA internal
computer networks at its facility. In 2008, the CIA authorized an additional payment to
Company Y of approximately $570,000, after CompanyYindicatedthaUUm for
conducting countersurveillance of its officers when
appeared in the press in conjunction with the program. TheCIAagreed to a $5 million
indemnification contract for the company that covered, among other expenses, criminal
law firm for representation inprosecution.^"^' Company Y hired a prominent
2007,'®^^ and billed the CIA $1.1 million for legal expenses from 2007 through 2012 per its
indemnification agreement. Part of these expenses included legal presentation ata
Committee staff briefing by SWIGERT and DUNBAR on November >, 2008.^^^° Under the
CIA's indemnification contract, the CIA is obligated to pay Company Y's legal expenses
through 2021.'041
1032 dO/CTC^^^RDG Projected Staff &Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006.
1033 dO/CTcHH/RDG Projected Staff &Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006.
June 4, 2007, RDG, Mission Summary.
1035 confirmation, received by telephone on November 16, 2012.
1036 #2009-1258; DTS #2012-4008. CFA paid Company Y $612,000 in 2010 for contract close-out costs. In a
Mai-ch 2009 notification, the CIA also infonned the Committee that, in addition to payments to Company Y,
GraysonSWIGERTand Hammond DUNBARhad received $1.5 million and $1.1 million, respectively, as
individuals. As noted elsewhere, the notification includes inaccurate representations about the effectiveness of the
CIA program. See Congressional Notification, March 18, 2009 (DTS #2009-1258).
Email from: [REDACTED], CTC^M; to: Hammond DUNBAR, Grayson SWIGERT; cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Copy of
Signed IndemnificationAgreemen^ date: July 13, 2007, at 02:22 PM;email from: [REDACTED], Chief, Contract
Law Division; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Modified Indemnification Agmt... New AR 7-17 Waiver Memo,
Too?; date: November 13, 2007, at 10:32 AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: Billing, May-December 2007; date:
August 12, 2008, at 06:42 PM.
1039 Response from the CIA regardingContractCosts for [Company Y], October15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008).
See DTS #2009-0572.
'0'^ ' Response from the CIA regarding ContractCost^o^^Compan^G^cto^^ 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008).
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8. The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Ends
(U) On December 5, 2007, fewer than nine months after Director Hayden told the European
Union that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was not a CIA program, but
"America's program," the House-Senate conference for the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence
Authorization Act voted to include an amendment that banned coercive interrogation techniques
and established the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations as the
interrogation standard for all U.S. government interrogations.The conference report passed
both the House and the Senate with bipartisan majorities.
(U) On March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 that banned coercive interrogations. In a radio address explaining the decision, the
president stated "[t]he bill Congress sent me would take away one of the most valuable tools in
the war on terror—the CIA program to detain and question key terrorist leaders and operatives."
Addressing the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, President Bush stated that
the "main reason" the CIA program "has been effective is that it allows the CIA to use
specialized interrogation procedures to question a small number of the most dangerous terrorists
under careful supervision." The president stated that the CIA program had a "proven track
record," and that the CIA obtained "critical intelligence" as a result of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques related to the Camp Lemonier plotting, the Karachi plotting, the Second
Wave plotting, and the Heathrow Airport plotting. The president then repeated a warning the
CIA had previously provided to the White House, that to "restrict the CIA to [interrogation]
methods in the [Army] Field Manual," "could cost American lives."^^"^ As is described in this
summary, and detailed more extensively in the full Conmiittee Study, the CIA's representations
to the White House regarding the role of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the
thwarting of the referenced plots were inaccurate.
(U) On March 11, 2008, by a vote of 225-188, the House of Representatives failed to override
the presidential veto.^^"^^
(TS//^||||||||||||||H[//NF) In December 2008 and January 2009, CIA officers briefed the
transition team for President-elect Barack Obama on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program. CIA Director Hayden prepared a statement that relayed, "despite what you have heard
or read in a variety of public fora, these [enhancedinterrogation] techniques and this program did
1042 director 1111111 (152227Z MAR 07); House Report 110-478 - Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008, 110"^ Congress (2007-2008), Section 327.
H.R. 2082 passed the House of Representatives on December 13, 2007, by a vote of 222-197 (Roll No: 1160)
and passed the Senate on February 13,2008, by a vote of 51-45 (Record Vote Number: 22).
See "Text: Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill," TheNew York Times, dated March 8, 2008. Located,among
other places, at www.nytiiTies.eom/2008/03/08/washington/08cnd-ptext.html. For an exampleof a previous CIA
briefing to the WhiteHouse with similar assertions, see CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation
Programon 29 July 2003," preparedby CIA General CounselScott Muller,dated August5, 2003; with briefing
slidesentitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003. TheCIAdocument provided to the participants
states, "Termination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." For additional commentary, see
"Veto of Bill on CIA Tactics Affirms Bush's Legacy," The New York Times, dated March 9, 2008.
U.S. House of RepresentativesRoll Call Vote 117 of the 110^ Congress, Second Session, March 11, 2008, 7:01
PM.
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work."^^^ The prepared materials included inaccurate information on the operation and
management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as the same set of
examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the CIA had
provided to policymakers over several years.The examples provided were nearly entirely
inaccurate.
On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order
13491, which required the CIA to "close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that
it currently operates and... not operate any such detention facility in the future." The Executive
Order prohibited any U.S. government employee from using inten'ogation techniques other than
those in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 on Human Intelligence Collector Operations.
1046 Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including
"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefingon RDI Program09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials attached to cover
memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama
National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." Tlie briefing book includes the previously
mentioned, "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting," dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same
intelligence claims found in the document of tlie same name, but dated April 15, 2005.
1047 detailed information, see Volume II.
The Executive Order also stated that the FBI and "other Federal law enforcement agencies" could "continufe] to
use authorized, non-coercive techniques of interrogation tliat are designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not
involve the use of force, threats, or promises." (See Executive Order 13491, "Ensuring Lawful Interrogation,'
January 22, 2009.)
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III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of
the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple
Constituencies
A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations
From 2002 through 2009, in order to obtain policy authorizations
and legal approvals, the CIA made a series of representations to officials at the White House,
the Departmentof Justice, and the Congress, asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques were uniquely effective and necessary to produce otherwise unavailable intelligence
that the U.S. government could not obtain from other sources.The CIA further represented
1049 These representations werealso made by theCIA to other elements of the executive branch, to include the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. As described in thisStudy, the Department of Justice first approved
the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on August 1, 2002.
1050 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding theeffectiveness of the CIA'senhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specificset of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terroristscaptured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of tlieCIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, andresultedin "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see:
(I) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Officeof LegalCounsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
whichrelied on a series of highly specific CIArepresentations on the typeof intelligence acquired from the use of
tlieCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIArepresentations referenced by the
OLC include that the use ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critic^,"
"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential"for the U.S. government to "detect
and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandumfurther states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United
States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal DeputyAssistant Attorney General, Office of LegalCounsel,May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of UnitedStates Obligations UnderArticle 16 of the Convention Against Tortureto CertainTechniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques.
CitingCIA documents and thePresident's September 6, 2006, speech describing dieCIA's interrogation program
(which was basedon CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to servethisparamount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable inteUigence. ...As the President
explained [on September6, 2006], 'by givingus information about ten-orist plans we could not get anywhere else,
the programhas saved innocentlives.'" {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting GeneralCounsel,Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques thatMayBe Used by theCIAin the Interrogation of High Value
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIAbriefings for members of the National Security Council in July andSeptember 2003
represented that "the useof Enhanced Techniques of one Icind or anotherhad produced significant intelligence
information that had, in the view of CIAprofessionals, savedhves," and which warned policymakers that
"[t]ermination of this program will result in lossof life, possiblyextensive." {See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for
the Record fromScott Muller, Subject: Review ofInterrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA
Interrogation Program, July29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member
Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIAInterrogation Program.)
(4) The CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draftSpecial Review of theCIA program, which asserts:
"Information [theCIA] received... as a resultof the lawfuluse of enhancedinterrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly savedcountless American lives inside the United States andabroad. The evidence points clearly to
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that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "saved lives" and "enabled the CIA to disrupt
teiTorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on
al-Qa'ida."^^^' The Departmentof Justice used these representations of effectiveness to assess
the fact tliat without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks
involvinghundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (SeeMemorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt,
DeputyDirectorfor Operations; subject: re (S) Commentsto Draft IG SpecialReview, "Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-lG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for
CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and
the [enhanced interrogation] techniques wereeffective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all,
of the timely intelligence acquiredfrom detainees in this program wouldnot have been discovered or reported by
other means." {See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB.2009" and graphicattachment, "Key Intelligence andReporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Klialid
Shaykli Muhammad (KSM)," including"DCIA Briefingon RDI Program" agenda,CIA document "EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on KeyIntelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include"Background
on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the SenateSelect Committeeon Intelligenceon
March 18,2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258), which provides a list of "some of the
key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributedto the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques, and states: "CIA assesses that most, if not all,of the timelyintelligence acquired from detainees in this
program wouldnot have beendiscovered or reportedby any othermeans." See VolumeII for additional CIA
representations assertingthat tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled die CIA to obtain unique,
otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
1051 Aniongother documents that contain the exact, or similarCIA representations, see\ (1) CIA memorandum for
the Record, "Review of InteiTogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller,
dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29,2003, presented to
senior White House officials widi additional briefings using tlie slides as documented in September 4, 2003, CIA
Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26,2003, Memorandum for the Record
from Scott Muller,Subject: CIA Interrogation Program. (2) CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector Generzil from
James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations,dated Febiiiary 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to
Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment,
"Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. (3) CIA
Directorate of Intelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13^004;
fax to tlie Department of Justice, April 22,2005, entitled, "HI, Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. |i|." This
report was widelydisseminated in the IntelligenceCommunity and a copyof this report was provided to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15, 2004. On March 31,2009, former Vice President Cheney requested
die declassification of tliis Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24,
2009. (4) CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director ofCentral Intelligence/^ubie^
"Effectiveness of the ClACountertei^ Inte^gatior^fechi^ues,'' included in email from:]HHIHiH' to:
^"^t^ibject: on
tecliniques";date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "information paper to Dr.
Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques." (5) CIA Memorandum for^ve Bradbury at Office of
Legal Counsel, Department ofJustice, dated March 2,2005, from 1^1 Legal Group, DCI
Countertenorist Center, subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," (6) CIA
briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA
Detention and Intenogation Program." (7) CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI
Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Inten'ogation (HVDI)Techniques." (8) CIA "Briefing
Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the DepartmentofJustice on April 15, 2005, at
10:47AM. (9) CIA fax to DOJ Command Center^ate^^ril 22, 2005, for Office ofLegal
Counsel, U.S. Depai tment of Justice, from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re:
H, Materials ofKSM and Abu Zubaydah, included CIA Intelligence Assessment "Khalid Shaykli Muhammad:
Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," and CIA document, "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah.; (10) CIA
Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee ReportingPivota^o^i^^a^gains^^a'ida," June 2005, which CIA
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whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were legal;^^^" policymakers at the White
House used these representations—and the legal analysis by the Department of Justice—to
records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1,2005. TheIntelligence Assessment at the
SECRET//NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June3, 2005. OnMarch 31,2009,
former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly
released with redactions on August 24, 2009. (11) CIA memorandum entitled, "Future of CIA's Countertenorist
Detention and Interrogation Program," dated December 23, 2005, from CIA Director Porter Goss toStephen J.
Hadley, Assistantto the President/National Security Advisor, Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to the
President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John D.Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence,
Attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations and Analysis." (12) CIA briefing
document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006
Briefing forChief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs."
(13) CIAbriefing document entitled, "Detainee Intelligence Value Update," dated 11 July 2006, internal document
saved witliin CIA records as, "DNI Memo Intel Value July 11 2006...TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING."
(14) CIAdocument dated July 16, 2006, entitled, "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist
InteiTogations Program," and"CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting theSeptember 6,
2006, speech byPresident George W. Bush acknowledging and describing die CIA's Detention and InteiTogation
Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the
High Value Tenorist Detainee Program." (15) CIA classified statement for the record. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, provided byGeneral Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007, and
accompanying Senate Select Committee onIntelligence hearing transcript, entitled, "Hearing onCentral Intelligence
Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." (16) CIA fax from CIA employee[REDACTED] to U.S.Senate
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on
October 26, 2007, at5:39:48PM,entitled, "Talking Points Appeal ofdie $|H Million reduction in CIA/CTC's
Rendition and Detention Program." (17) "DCIATalking Points: Waterboai'd 06 November 2007," dated November
6, 2007, with thenotation the document was "sent toDCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." (18) CIA
Briefing forObama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and InteiTOgations (RDI)" including "Tab 7,"
named "RDG Copy- Briefing onRDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," prepared "13January 2009." (19) CIA briefing
documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic
attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)."
Tlie documents include "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda,CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with
associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key
Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and
PlotsDisrupted." (20) CIAdocument faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18,2009, at
3:46PM, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258). See also CIA representations detailed in
OLC memorandum forJohn A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven
G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application
of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture toCertain Techniques that May Be
Used in theInterrogation ofHigh Value alQaeda Detainees; and OLC memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbuiy, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel,July 20, 2007,Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the DetaineeTreatment
Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions toCertain Techniques that May BeUsed by the CIA in the
Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
See section of this summary addressingrepresentations to the Department of Justice, as well as Memorandum
for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, August 1,2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative; Memorandum forJohn A. Rizzo,
Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under
Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture toCertain Techniques that May beUsed in the Interrogation ofHigh
Value AlQaeda Detainees; and Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Centi-al Intelligence
Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20,
2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions toCertain Techniques that May beUsed bydieCIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda
Detainees.
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assess whether the CIA interrogation program should be approved as a matter ofpolicy;^®^^ and
members of Congi-ess relied on the CIA representations in overseeing and assessing the program,
providing funding, and crafting related legislation.
Among otherdocuments, see the August 5, 2003, CIA Memorandum for theRecord from Scott Muller from a
July29,2003, National Security Council Principals Meeting with the subject, "Review of Inteaogation Program on
29July 2003," as well as theaccompanying briefing slides, "CIA Interrogation Program, July 29,2003"; March 4,
2005, Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA document, dated March
4, 2005, entitled, "Briefingfor Vice PresidentCheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program"; CIA document,
dated May 2, 2006, entitled, BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OFSTAFF TOTHE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006Briefing for
Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and InteiTogation Programs; CIA document
entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, withthe notation die
document was"sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting"; andCIABriefing for ObamaNational
Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing
on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," prepared "13 Januaiy 2009."
'^ '^ ''Among otherdocuments, see\ (1)CIAtestimony to theSenate Select Conunittee on Intelligence (SSCI) on April
24, 2002, regarding Abu Zubaydali's initial intenogation; (2)CIA written answers to Committee Questions for the
Record, dated August 15,2002, regarding results of Abu Zubaydah's interrogations; (3) CIAtestimony to SSCIon
September 5, 2002, regarding covert detention facilities and results of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation; (4) CIA cable
documenting September 27, 2002, briefing to Chairman Bob Graham and Vice Chainnan Richard Shelby andtheir
staff directors regarding the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the intenogationsof Abu Zubaydah; (5)
CIA Memorandum for the Record documenting February 4, 2003, briefing to SSCI Chairman Pat Roberts and
Committee staffdirectors regarding the CIA's Detention andInterrogation Program; (6) CIA testimony to SSCIon
March5, 2003, regarding the captureand initial interrogation of KSM; (7) CIA witness testimony to SSCIon
March 19,2003, regarding KSM's inten:ogation; (8) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on April 1, 2003, regarding
KSM's capture; (9) April 3, 2003, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment regarding KSM threat
reporting, entitled "Klialid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Tmths, Sunounded by a Bodyguard
of Lies," provided to theSSCI on April 7, 2003; (10) CIA testimony to SSCI on April 30, 2003, regarding detainee
reporting; (11) CIA testimony to SSCI on June25,2003, regarding KSM intenogation; (12)CIA testimony to
SSCI on July 30j2003^reear^g CIA detainee threat reporting; (13) CIA testimony to SSCI on September 3,
2003, regarding '^^ ^ '^^ orities, including CIA detention authorities; (14)CIAprepared briefing for
Chairman Pat Roberts and Vice Chainnan John D. Rockefeller IV entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program: DDO
Talking Points, 04 September 2003"; (15) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on May 12,2004, regarding CIA rolein
abuses at AbuGhraib prison; (16) SSCI staff notes for July 15, 2004,CIA briefingto Chairman Pat Roberts and
Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV regarding the status of the CIA intenogation prograjii; (17) CIA testimony
to SSCIon September 13,2004, regarding CIA and the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; (18) Hand-written notes of
Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV recording a briefing by Jose Rodriguez on March 7, 2005; (19) CIA
Memorandumfor the Record, Subject: Sensitive Issue -Counterterrorism, October 31, 2005, regarding briefing for
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist regarding the DetaineeTreatment Act, and email exchanges between John Rizzo,
lll^^llllllll^, subject: "Re: Immediate Re; Sen. Frist required for briefing on impact of
McCain Amendment"; date: October 31, 2005, and associated records concerning CIA briefings for Senators John
McCain, Tliad Cocluan, Ted Stevens, and John Cornyn; (20) SSCI Memorandumfor die Record, March 8, 2006,
documenting CIA briefing of March7, 2006, to staff on status of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program;
(21) CIA DirectorPorterGoss testimony to the SSCI on March 15,2006,regarding the status of the CIA's
Detention andInterrogation Program; (22) CIA DirectorMichael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on September 6,
2006, regarding the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program, priorto Senateconsideration of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006; (23) CIA Director Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on November 16, 2006,
regarding the CIA's Detention andInterrogation Program, following passage of the Military Commissions Actof
2006; (24) CIA DirectorMichael Hayden testimony to theSSCIon April 12,2007,regarding the CIA's Detention
and Intenogation Program and a reportof the International Committee of the Red Cross; (25) CIA fax from CIA
employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover
sheetentitled, "Talking points," senton October 26,2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed entitled, "Talking Points
Appeal ofthe $Hi Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program"; (26) CIA Director
Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on Decembe^^^OOT^egardin^h^ublic revelation of the CIA's
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CIA presentations to the executive and legislative branches, the
CIA represented thatother parties had consented to, or endorsed, theCIA's interrogation
program. As an example, during a policy review of theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
in July 2003, the CIA informed a subset of the National Security Council principals that theuse
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "approved by the attorney general," and was
"fully disclosed to the SSCIand HPSCI leadership." In the same presentation, the CIA
represented that the CIA interrogation program "had produced significant intelligence
information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives." The CIA then provided
examples of "attacks averted" as a direct result of the CIA interrogation program, and warned
policymakers that "[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly
extensive."'^^^
When the CIA was asked by White House officials to review and
provide furtherevidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in
2004, the CIA responded that it was "difficult, if not impossible" to conduct such a review, but
assured White House officials that "this program works," "the techniques are effective," and the
program produces "results."^®^^ The "results" provided by the CIA consisted of the "disruption"
of specific terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists. The CIA further represented that
the information acquired as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique
and "otherwise unavailable.These specific CIAclaims played an especially important role
destiiiction of videotapes of the interrogations of AbuZubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri; (27) CIA Director
Michael Hayden public testimony to theSSCI onFebruary 5, 2008, regarding waterboarding andCIA
interrogations, priorto Senate vote on February 13, 2008, on the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act
that would have prohibited any member of the U.S. Intelligence Community from using interrogation techniques not
authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual.
Memorandum for theRecord: "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003." Memorandum prepared by
CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, andbriefing slides entitled, "CMInterrogation
Program," dated July29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Those attending themeeting included
thedirector of theCIA, George Tenet; theCIA general counsel, Scott Muller; Vice President Cheney; National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice; White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General John Ashcroft;
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office ofLegal Counsel, Patrick Philbin; and counsel to the National Security
Council, John Bellinger.1056 talking points for the National Security Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting
PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Inten-ogation (HVDI) Techniques," datedMarch4, 2005, for a March
8, 2005, meeting. See also CIA Memorandum for NationalSecurityAdvisorRice entitled, "Effectiveness of the
CIA CounterteiToristInterrogation Techniques," dated December 2004.
1057 pjQiyj 2003 through 2009, the CIA'srepresentations regarding tlie effectiveness of theCIA'senhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific setofexamples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that
theCIA attributed to information obtained from the useof its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted that theintelligence obtained from theuseof theCIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in"saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see:
(1) CIArepresentations in theDepartment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30,2005,
which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from theuse of
theCIA'senhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the
OLC include that theuseof the CIA'senhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" toobtain "critical,"
"vital,"and"otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for theU.S. government to "detect
anddisrupt" terrorist tlireats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[theCIA]ha[s] informed [theOLC] that
the CIAbelieves that thisprogram is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within theUnited
States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo^enio^Deput^enera^oun^ Central Intelligence Agency, from
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in the Department of Justice's legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Departmentof Justice documents stated that an analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005,Re:
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Usedin the Intenogation of High Valueal QaedaDetainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20,2007, wliich alsorelied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the useof theCIA'senhanced interrogation techniques.
CitingCIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's intenogation program
(which was basedon CIA-provided infonnation), tlie OLC memorandum states: 'The CIA interrogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to servetliispaiamount interest [security
of the Nation] by producingsubstantial quantitiesof otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President
explained [on September 6, 2006], *by giving us information about terrorist plans wecouldnotget anywhere else,
the program has saved innocent lives.'" {See Memorandum forJohn A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, fromSteven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal
Counsel, July20, 2007, Re: Application of theWarCrimes Act, tlie Detainee Treatment Act, andCommon Article 3
of tlie Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in tlie Intenogation of High Value
al QaedaDetainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September2003,
which represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of onekindor another had produced significant
intelligence information thathad, in the view of CIAprofessionals, saved lives," and which warned policymakers
that "[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August5, 2003 Memorandum
for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Programon 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA
Interrogation Program, July29,2003; September 4, 2003, CIAMemorandum for the Record, Subject: Member
Briefing; and September 26,2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.)
(4) TlieCIA's response to the Office of InspectorGeneral draft SpecialReview of the CIA program, which asserts:
"Infomiation [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly savedcountless American lives inside the United States andabroad. The evidencepoints clearly to
the fact tliat without tlie use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention
andInterrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date; Febinary 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004,Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Intenogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI progiam worked and tlie
[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other
means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Piogram-
18FEB.2009" and graphicattachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khaiid
Shaykli Muhaimnad (KSM)," including "DCIABriefing on RDIProgram" agenda, CIA document"EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key IntelligenceImpacts Chart: Attaclmient(AZ and KSM),"
"Backgroundon Key IntelligenceImpactsChart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background
on KeyCaptures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence on
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258), wliich provides a list of "some of the
key captures and disrupted plots" tliat the CIA had attributed to theuse of theCIA's enhancedintenogation
techniques, and states: "CIA assesses that most, if not all,of the timely intelligence acquiredfrom detainees in this
program would nothave been discovered or reported by any othermeans." SeeVolume II for additional CIA
representations asserting that theCIA's enhanced intenogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtainunique,
otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
See Volume II for detailed infomiation. The OLC's May 30, 2005, memorandum relied on the CIA's
representations in determining that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques did not violate the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on executive conduct that "shocks the conscience," indicating that this analysis was a
"highlycontext-specific and fact-dependent question." Tlie OLC also linked its analysis of whetherthe use of tlie
CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques was "constitutionally arbitrary" to the representation by the CIA that the
program produced "substantial quantities of otlierwise unavailable actionable intelligence." (See Memorandum for
John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central IntelligenceAgency,from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office o^ega^ounsel^^a^0^005^e: Application ofUnited States
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interrogation techniques was a "highly context-specific, fact-dependent question" and
highlighted the importance of the CIA representation that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques produced "substantialquantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence,"
and were "largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States.
B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques
During the period in which the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program was operational, from 2002 to 2009, there were three reviews that addressed the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: (1) the CIA Office of Inspector
General Special Review, released in May 2004; (2) an internal review conducted by two senior
CIA officers in 2004; and (3) a 2005 "Blue Ribbon" panel consisting of two individuals not
employed by the CIA. According to CIA records, as of the spring of 2007, the CIA had not
"conductedany other studies on the effectiveness of interrogation techniques."^®^^
Each of the previous reviews relied on interviews with CIA
personnel involved in the program, as well as documents prepared by CIA personnel, which
represented that the CIA interrogation program was effective, and that the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques had "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture
Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention AgainstTorture to CertainTechniques that May be Used in the
Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees.) The CIA provided examples of the purported effectiveness of the
CIA^^nhanced interroeatioiHech^ues in response to arequest from the OLC. According to an email ftom H
mCTC Legal Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury explained that
"because the standards under Article 16 [of the Convention Against Torture] require a balancing of the
government's need for the information, it would be quite helpful if we had any case studies or examples to
demonstrate the value ofinformation produced by the program." 5eeemail^romj^^B|J|||(; to:
illljll^H; cc: ^^•^BjREDA^D],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; date: March 2, 2005, 2:32 PM.1059 y^jyiong other documents, seeDepartment ofJustice Office of Legal Counsel memoranda dated May 30,2005,
and July 20, 2007. The May 30, 2005,OLC memorandum repeats additional CIA representations, including that
"enhancedinterrogation techniques remain essential to obtaining vital intelligence necessary to detect and disrupt
such emerging threats" and that the use of the techniques "led to specific,actionableintelligence." The July 20,
2007, OLC memorandum states that the "...use of enhanced interrogation techniques is intended to service this
paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable
intelligence," citingCIA representations to thePresident that theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced
information "we could not get anywhere else,"andthat "the use of suchtechniques savedAmerican lives by
revealing information about planned terrorist plots."
See CIA draft responseto Questions for the Record submitted by the SenateSelectCommittee on Intelligence
afteran April 12, 2007,hearing on theCIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA draft response states
the CIA Blue Ribbon Panel, consistingof two outside reviewers, was the only independent review of the
effectivenessof the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques, and that "CIA had not conducted any other studieson
the effectiveness of [the] interrogation techniques." The final CIA response to tlie Committee states: "The 2004
CIA Officeof the InspectorGeneral reportthat reviewed CIA's counterterrorism detention and interrogation
activities recommended a non-CIA independent experts' review of the effectiveness of each of the authorized EFT
and adetermination regarding thenecessiw for the continue^iseofeach technique. As a result, CIA sought and
obtained the agreement ofMr. |||||||||||||||||||||||| and Mr. to conduct an independent review, which is
also known as the Blue-Ribbon Panel report. Their individual reports are provided at Tabs A and B."
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additional terrorists, and collect a high-volume ofcritical intelligence on al-Qa'ida."^® '^ CIA
personnel represented: "[t]his is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."^°^^
There aie no indications in CIA records that any of the past
reviews attempted to independently validate the intelligence claims related to the CIA's use of its
enhanced interrogation techniques that were presented by CIA personnel in interviews and in
documents. As such, no previous review confirmed whether the specific intelligence cited by the
CIA was acquired from a CIA detainee during or after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, or if the intelligence acquired was otherwise unknown to the United
States government ("otherwise unavailable"), and therefore uniquely valuable.
C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured
Terrorists"
Before the CIA took custody of its first detainee, CIA attorneys
researched the limits of coercive interrogations and the legal definitions of torture. On
November 26, 2001, CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorneys circulated a draft legal
memorandum entitled "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations forCIA Officers."^®^^ The
memorandum listed interrogation techniques considered to be torture by a foreign government
and a specific nongovernmental organization, including "cold torture," "forced positions,"
"enforced physical exhaustion," "sensory deprivation," "perceptual deprivation," "social
deprivation," "threats and humiliation," "conditioning techniques," and "deprivation of
sleep." The draft memorandum described various prohibitions on torture and the potential
use of "necessity" as a legal defense against charges of torture, stating:
"[i]t would, therefore, be a novel application of the necessity defense to avoid
prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved
many lives... A policy decision must be made with regard to U.S. use of
torture in light of our obligations under international law, with consideration
given to the circumstances and to intemational opinion on our current
See: (1) CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation
Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004; (2) May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from
Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Divisions
via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, witii the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee
Program"; and (3) Blue Ribbon Panel Review, including a September 2, 2005, Memorandum from
mllllljl to Director Porter Goss, CIA, entitled "Assessment of EITs Effectiveness," and aSeptember 23, 2005,
Memorandum from to the Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, entitled,
"Response to request from Director for Assessment of BIT effectiveness."
See, among other examples, a June 27,2003, Inspector General interview with CTC's Chief of Operations,
The record ofthat interview (2003-^2MG^t^s: stated that the
Agency's Al-Qa'ida program has been very effective. • views the intelligence as the main criteria
for judging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other tenorists off the
street and to prevent terrorist attacks. Tliis is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."
1063 November26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix,Paragraph5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for
CIA Officers." This document includes information regarding Paragraph 4.
1064 November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix,Paragraph5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for
CIA Officers." See Volume I for additional information.
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campaign against terrorism—states may be very unwilling to call the U.S. to
task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives
On February 1, 2002, a CTC attorney researched the impact of the
application of the Geneva Conventions (GC) on future CIA interrogation activities.The
attorney wrote:
"If the detainee is a POW and enjoys GC coverage, then the optic becomes
how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the convention,
but ultimately saves lives. I believe that [a named CIA attorney!'s papers
reflecting on necessity and anticipatory selfdefense are the two most obvious
defenses available."^^^^
(U) The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) included the "necessity defense"
in its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House Counsel, determining, among other
things, that "under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense mayjustify interrogation
methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture.The OLC memorandum
states:
"It appears to us that under the cun-ent circumstances the necessity defense
could be successfully maintained in response to an allegation of a Section
2340A violation. .. .Under these circumstances, a detainee may possess
Italics added. November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Intenogations: Legal
Considerations for CIA Officers," at L TheCIAwould later repeat bothclaims, representing to seniorofficials and
the Department of Justice that theuseof theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced intelligence that
"saved lives," and that this intelligence wasotherwise unavailable. Further, on August 1, 2002, OLC issued an
unclassified, but non-public opinion, in the form of a memorandum to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales,
analyzing whether certain interrogation methods would violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. The memorandum
provides a similar rationalefor the necessity defense, stating,"certainjustification defenses mightbe available that
would potentiallyeliminatecriminal liability. Standard criminal law defensesof necessity and self-defense could
justify intenogation methods needed to elicit information to prevent a direct and imminent threat to the United
States and its citizens." Thememorandum laterconcludes: "even if an interrogation method might violate Section
2340A, necessity orself-defense coul^rovid^ustifi^ions that would eliminate any criminal liability."
'0^ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and Questioning";
date: February I, 2002.
Italics added. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and
Questioning"; date: February 1, 2002. In response to a requestfrom the Department of Justice's Officeof
Professional Responsibility (OPR), the CIA provided two memoranda- one dated November7, 2001, the other
undated - neither of which discussed thenecessity defense. TheOPR report states: "Although theCIAOffice of
General Counsel (OGC) told us that these were the only CIA memoranda in itspossession oninterrogation policy,
some of the infonnation weobtained from theCIA suggested otherwise. In an internal email message dated
February 1,2002, from CTC attorney [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] refenedto '[CIA Attorney
[REDACTED]] papersreflecting on necessity and anticipatory selfdefense.'" SeeDepartment of Justice, Office of
Professional Responsibility, Report. Investigation intotheOffice of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues
Relating to theCentral Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' onSuspected Terrorists,
July 29, 2009, pp. 31-32.1068 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay C. Bybee, Assistant Attorney
General, Officeof Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, "Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C
2340-2340A," the U.S. Federal Torture Statute.
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information that could enable the United States to prevent attacks that
potentially could equal or surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude.
Clearly, any harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to
insignificance compared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack,
which could take hundreds or thousands of lives."^^^^
According to a report by the Department of Justice Office of
ProfessionalResponsibility (OPR), released in July 2009, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
John Yoo "acknowledged that the CIA may have indirecdy suggested the new sections [related
to Commander-in-Chief authority and possible defenses, including the necessity defense] by
asking him what would happen in a case where an interrogator went 'over the line' and
inadvertently violated the statute." Yoo also told the OPRthat he drafted those relevant sections.
Another senior Department of Justice lawyer at the time, Patrick Philbin, informed the OPR that
when he told Yoo that the sections were superfluous and should be removed, Yoo responded,
"They want it in there." The CIA's former Deputy GeneralCounselJohn Rizzo told the OPR
that the CIA did not request the addition of the sections.In his response to the OPR report,
Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee stated that the "ticking time bomb" that could justify the
necessity defense was, in fact, a "real world" scenario. According to Bybee, "the OLC attorneys
working on the [August 1, 2002] Memo had been briefed on the apprehension of Jose Padilla on
May 8, 2002. Padilla was believed to have built and planted a dirty bomb."^^^^ The August 1,
2002, memorandum states that the "[i]nterrogation of captured al Qaida operatives allegedly
allowed U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to track Padilla and to detain him upon
his entry into the United States."^®^^ This information was inaccurate.
Italics added. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, pp. 39-41. On December 30, 2004, the OLC issued a new
memorandum superseding tlie August 1, 2002, memorandum in its entirety. The OLC wrote that "[b]ecause the
discussion in [the August 1, 2002] memorandumconcerning the President's Commander-in-Chief power and the
potential defenses to liability was- and remains—unnecessary, it hasbeeneliminated from the analysis that follows.
Consideration of the bounds of any such authority would be inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive
that United States personnel not engage in torture." (See Memorandumfor James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney
General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A). No CIA detainees were subjected to
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques between the issuance of the December 2004 memorandum and May
2005, when the OLC opined on the applicationof the federalproliibition on torture to the techniques.
Department of Justice,Office of Professional Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal
Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to tlieCentral Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009, p. 51.
Bybeeresponse,at 74, n. 6, cited in the OPR Report at fn. 171. Department of Justice, Office of Professional
Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Officeof Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning IssuesRelating to
the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected TeiTorists, July 29,
2009.
1072 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.
See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwartingof the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the
Capture of Jose Padilla.




With the issuance on August 1, 2002, of a second OLC
memorandum specific to Abu Zubaydah,^ '^''^ the CIA initiated the use of its enhanced
inten*ogation techniques. After the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah and other CIA detainees to the
techniques, the CIA made increasingly stronger assertions about the effectiveness of the CIA's
interrogation program, eventually asserting that the CIA interrogation program "saved lives,"^^^^
and that the use of the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques was necessary, as the
intelligence obtained could not have been acquired in any other way.
Many of the representations made by the CIA about the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were first made in the spring of
2003 and evolved over the course of the year and into early 2004. In April 2003, CIA officers
told the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) that KSM, who had been subjected to the
techniques between March [j, 2003, and March 25, 2003, was still not fully cooperative. For
example, on April 3, 2003, more than a week after the CIA had discontinued the use of its
enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM, the deputy chief of ALEC Station,
informe^h^O^ that KSM had made "remarkable progress," but there was "alot
more to be done." did not cite any specific intelligence obtained from KSM in this
context.
1077
27, 2003, more than three months after the CIA had
ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, CTC Chief of Operations
told the OIG that he was convinced that KSM "knows more and is just
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of LegalCounsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 1).
Among other documents,see CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Programon 29 July
2003," prepared by CIA GeneralCounsel Scott Muller,dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CIA
Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Memorandum to the
Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Directorfor Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the
subjectline, "Commentsto DraftIG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program'
(2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated
February 24, 2004; and the September 6, 2006, CIA-vetted speech by the President on the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program.
See, among other examples, interview of James Pavitt, by and [REDACTED], Office of the
InspectorGeneral, August21, 2003; Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Directorfor
Operations; subject: re Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation
Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of
CIA's Counterterrorism Detentioi^n^nte^ogation Activities; and a June 27, 2003, Inspector General interview of
the Chief of Operations CTC, record of that interview states: stated
that the Agency's Al-Qa'idaprogram has beenvery effective. views theintelligence as the main
criteria for judging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists
offthe street and tomjeventtenorist attacks. This is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."
Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3,
2003. On Apri^^2003^^TCanalyst told the IG that KSM "has not provided anything significant to date." {^See
interview of^Hm|^|, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 21,
2003.) On April30, 2003,one of KSM's interrogators pointedto "information on hijackings, bridgesin New York,
andnuclear plants," andinfonnation on hidden uranium, which was never found. Seeinterview of ||,by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^ffic^^h^nspecto^en^l, April 30, 2003.
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waiting for us to ask the right questions,"then provided two examples of
information that KSM had not provided until he was asked specifically about the matters by CIA
interrogators: information on the "tallest building in California" plot (also known as the "Second
Wave" plot), and the inclusion of a building in Canary Wharf as a target in the plotting against
Heathrow Airport.Asked if he could think of any instances in which information from CIA
detainees had led to the arrest ofa tenwist, HIHH stated only that Majid Khan provided
information that led to the arrest of lyman Paris by the This information was inaccurate,
as Majid Khan was not in CIA custody when he provided information on lyman Paris.
represented to the OIG that the CIA's inteiTogation
program was "very effective," and that the intelligence obtained from CIA detainees was "the
main criteria for judging the success of the program; specifically, inteUigencethayjasaUowed
CTC to take other terrorists off the street and to prevent tenwist attacks." also
told the OIG that the information obtained from CIA interrogations was "information that CTC
could nothave gotten any otherway."^°^^
(U) On June 26, 2003, President Bush issued a statement for the United Nations International
Day in Support of Victims of Torture. That statement—referencedin multiple news articles—
relayed that the:
"United States is committed to the world-wide elimination of torture and we
are leading this fight by example. I call on all governments to join with the
United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting,
investigating, and prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent
othercruel andunusual punishment."^®^^
The following day, after the Washington Post published an article
on the Administration's detainee policy, CIA Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo called John
Bellinger, the legal advisor to the National Security Council. According to an email from Rizzo
to other senior CIA officers, Rizzo called Bellinger to:
1078 told the OIG that KSM was asked about the plan to hijack an airplane in Malaysia and fly it into
the Library Tower in Los Angeles, which tlie CIA had learnedfrom another detainee. That detainee was Masran bin
Arshad, who was in foreign government custody, told tlie OIG that KSM "provided information on
the Heathrow/Canary Whaif option, buUioUinti^ersonnel at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] asked him about a
picture he drew of an I-beam." See Memorandum for tlie Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of
Operations^_|^ |j|||||||||||[||||^ Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.
Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief ofOperations, |
CounterteiTorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. See sections of this summaiy and Volume II on tlie
Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group, and the Thwarting of the
HeathrowAirportand Canary Whaif Plotting.
1080 Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, Counterterrorist
Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.
See section of this summary and Volume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris.1082 Umill, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief ofOperations, |
Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.
June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture,
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.html.




"express our surprise and concern at some of the statements attributed to the
Administration in the piece, particularly the Presidential statement on the UN
International Day in Supportof Victims of Torture as well as a quote from the
Deputy White House Press Secretary ScottMcClellan thatall prisoners being
held by the USG are being treated 'humanely.
While Rizzo expressed the view that the presidential statement did
not appear to contain anything "we can't live with," Rizzo conveyed to senior CIA leaders that it
"might wellbe appropriate for us to seekwritten reaffirmation by some seniorWhiteHouse
official that the Agency's ongoing practices... are to continue."^^^^
Ori July 3, 2003, DCI George Tenet sent a memorandum to
National Security Advisor CondoleezzaRice seeking reaffirmation of the Administration's
support for the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices. The memorandum
stated that the reaffirmation was sought because:
"recent Administration responses to inquiries and resulting media reporting
about the Administration's position have created the impression that these
[interrogation] techniques are not used by U.S. personnel and are no longer
approved as a policy matter."^"^^
While the CIA was preparing to meet with the White House on the
reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program, CIA personnel provided additional inaccurate
information about the"effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the
OIG, as well as to senior CIA leadership. These inaccurate representations described the
"thwarting" of specific plots and thecapture of specific terrorists attributed to the interrogation
of CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
f/N¥) On July 16, 2003, Deputy Chief o^ALE^tation ||||^^|
was interviewed again by the OIG. In this interview asserted that KSM
"provided information that helped lead to the arrest of lyman Paris, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-
Marri, Majid Khan, and Ammar al-Baluchi.'°^^ These representations were almost entirely
maccurate.
1088
Email from; John Rizzo; to: John Moseman,^^^^}}!^^}' cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William
Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee PoUcy; date: June 27, 2003.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman,H^^^^B; cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William
Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003.1086 j^iy 3^ 2003, CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor from Director ofCentral Intelligence George J.
Tenetwith the Subject: Reaffimiation of theCentral Intelligence Agency'sInterrogation Program. Seealso Scott
Muller, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29July 2003; date: 5 August
2003(OG^^003-50078).1087 Memorandum for the Record; subject; Meeting with Deputy Chief,
Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
See sections of this summary andVolume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris; the
Identification and Arrests of Uzhairand SaifullahParacha; the Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri; tlie
Captureof Majid Khan; and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the captureof Ammaral-Baluchi).
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also informed the OIG that information from CIA
detainees "provided a wealth of information about Al-Qa'ida plots," including: a terrorist plot in
Saudi Arabiaagainst Israel; a plot against the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan; a plot against
Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf; a plot to derail trains; a plot against subways; a gas station
plot; a plot against the "tallestbuilding" in California; a plot against suspension bridges; and a
plot to poison water supplies.Much of this information was inaccurate.^^^^Ac^ding to
OIG records, "[o]n the question of whether actualplots had been thwarted, opined
that since the operatives involved ii^ian^f the above plots had been arrested, [CTC had], in
effect, thwarted the operation[s]." ||||H|||| pi'ovided alist to the OIG of teirorist^aptured and
tlie plots with which they were associated. None of the individuals listed by were
captured as a result of reporting from CIA detainees.
(TS/^
1089
//NF) During this same period in 2003, CIA officers were compiling
similar information for CIA leadership. On July 18, 2003, tlie chief of ALEC Station, HBl
wrote an email to ALEC Station officers requesting information on the "value and
impact" of CIA detainee information on behalf of the CIA Rendition^roup (RDG),^®^^ which
he stated was being compiled for senior CIA leadership.wrote that "[o]ne way to
assist now is to provide input to RDG on highlights of intel and ops reporting from the
detainees," in particular "reporting that helped reveal or stop plots, reporting that clinched the
identity of terrorist suspects, etc."'®^"^ The first portion o^h^sponse^ompiled by ALEC
Station, was drafted by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station who wrote that CIA
detainee reporting "plays a key role in our ability to identify and capture al-Qa'ida ten^ns^
including those who were planning to attack inside the United States." In an email, |||^||H
wrote that "[t]he ability of the detainees to identify many operatives previously unknown to us or
to the FBI resulted in the successful capture/detention of several terrorists," and that the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "key" to acquiring this information on these
operatives. As examples of operatives "previously unknown" to the CIA and the FBI and
identified by CIA detainees, PadiUa, BinyamMohammed, Majid Khan,
I, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, CounterteiTorist Center
ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
See sections of this summary and Volume 11 on the Thwartingof the Karachi Plots; the Thwarting of the
Heathrow Airport andCanary WharfPlotting; the Identification, Capture, and AiTest of lyman Paris; theCapture of
Majid Khan; the Thwarting of the SecondWave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group; and the KSM
detainee review in Volume El.
'05" imHI listed Majid Klian (gas station and poison plotting), lyman Paris (the suspension bridge plot, as well as
a possible shopping mall plot), Kliallad binAttash (theHeathrow plot), Masran bin Arshad (the"tallest building"
plot), and Ammai- al-Baluchi (theplot against theU.S. consulate in Karachi). See relevant sections of tliis summary
and Volume 11 for additional information.
As noted, the "Renditionsand Interrogations Group," is also refened to as the "RenditionsGroup," the
"Rendition, Detention^andlntenogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records.
Email from: to: DQ_CTC_ALEC Group Cliiefs; cc:
|; subject: value ofdetainees; date: July 18, 2003, at01:09 PM.
Email fiom: to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc:
; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM.
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I^mai^aris, and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.^®^^ These representations were inaccurate.
Iemail concluded:
"Simply put, detainee information has saved countless American lives inside
the US and abroad. We believe there is no doubt al-Qa'ida would have
succeeded in launching additional attacks in the US and that the information
obtainedfrom these detainees through the use of enhancedmeasures was key
to unlocking this information. It is our assessment that if CIA loses the ability
to interrogate and use enhanced measures in a responsible way, we will not be
able to effectively prosecute this war."^^^^
The information relayed from ALEC Station to RDG in July 2003
for CIA leadership also included information from a CIA assessmententitled "Significant
Detainee Reporting.That document included information that was largely congruent with
CIA records. It stated that KSM provided details on the Heathrow Airport Plot and the Karachi
Plots only after being confronted with the capture of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar al-
Baluchi;^®^^ diat with regard to plots inside the United States, KSM had only admitted to plots
that had been abandoned or already disrupted; that KSM fabricated information in order to tell
CIA interrogators "whathe thought they wanted to hear"; and that KSM generally only provided
information when "boxed in" by information already known to CIA debriefers.^'^^ This
information was not included in CIA representations to policymakers later that month.
(TS/y|||^ |p|^ H[|//NF) On July 29, 2003, as aresult of DCI Tenet's July 3, 2003, request
seeking reaffirmation of the CIA's detentionand interrogation policies and practices. Tenet and
CIA General Counsel ScottMuller conducted a briefing for a subset of theNational Security
Email from:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED],
t: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30:09 PM; email from:
DO_CTC_ALEC Chiefs Groups,
[REDACTED],
I;subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18,2003, at 3:57:45 PM.
See sections of this summary and Volume II on theThwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plotand the
Capture of Jose Padilla; theCapture of Majid Khan; the Identification, Capture, andArrest of lyman Paris; and the
Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha.
Italics added. Email from: to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs ,
I, [REDACTED],
2003, at 3:57:45 PM.
Email from:
[REDACTED], cc: subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18,2003, at 3:57:45
PM. See CIA document "Significant Detainee Reporting."
See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots, and the KSM detainee review
inVolume III.
Email from: to: DO_CTC_ALEC GroupChiefs,|
[REDACTED], cc: subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18,2003, at 3:57:45
PM. See also "Significant Detainee Reporting" and KSM detainee review in Volume III.
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Council principals.• According to a CIA memorandum, Muller represented that CIA
"detainees subject to the use of Enhanced Techniques of onekind or another had produced
significant intelligence information that had, in the view ofCIA professionals, saved lives."'
briefing provided the "results" of using the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques in briefing slides with the heading: "RESULTS: MAJOR
THREAT INFO." The slides represented that KSM provided information on "[a]ttack plans
against US Capitol, otherUS landmarks"; "[a]ttacks against Chicago, New York, Los Angeles;
against towers, subways, trains, reservoirs, Hebrew centers, Nuclear power plants"; and the
"Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plot." The slides also represented that KSM identified lyman
Paris, the "Majid Khan family," and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.^^^^ These representations were
largely inaccurate.
The CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was
obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee 'Abd al-
Rahim al-Nashiri regarding "US Navy Ships in the Straits of Hormuz." This representation was
inaccurate and omitted material facts.The CIA slides further indicated that "major threat"
information was obtained from the use of tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against
CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh—specifically that bin al-Shibh "[i]dentified Hawsawi" and
CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated
July 29, 2003, presented to seniorWhite House officials. Those attending the meeting included the directorof the
CIA, George Tenet; the CIAgeneral counsel, ScottMuller; Vice President Cheney; National Security Advisor Rice;
Wliite House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General Ashcroft; Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel,PatrickPhilbin;and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger.
CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated
July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
' CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Intenogation Progi:am on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated
July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
CIA records indicate diat the "attacks," "attack plans," and "targets" discussed by KSM were well known to the
Intelligence Community prior to any reporting fromCIA detainees, or were merely ideas for attacks that were
proposed, but never operationalized. TheCIAbriefing slides made no mention of KSM withholding or fabricating
information during andafter the useof the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. See relevant sections of this
summaiy and Volume 11, as well as the KSM detainee review in Volume HI.
CIA records indicate that al-Nashiri provideddetails on multiple terrorist plots—including plans to target ships
in the Strait of Hormuz—prior to his CIA detention and theuse of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
With regard to the targeting of ships in the Straitof Hormuz, tliis information was provided by al-Nashiri while he
was still in foreign government custody and was disseminatedin CIA intelligencereports prior to liis CIA detention.{See MM 36595MB; 36726^
disseminated intelligence,
|.) For other reporting from al-Nashiri while in foreign government custody
pTOSTO^^^^H^mfF^ disseminated intelligence,
See also detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nasliiri in Volume III.
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provided "major threat" informationon "[a]ttacks against Nuclear Power Plants, Hebrew
Centers," This representation was inaccurate and omitted material facts.
I" ^he context of "[mjajor threats [that] were countered and attacks
averted," the CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash on an "[ajttack
against U.S. Consulate in Karachi." This representation was inaccurate.The CIA slides
further represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah, resulting in the
"[ijdentification of [Jose] Padilla, Richard Reid," as well as information on "[a]ttacks on banks,
subways, petroleum and aircraft industries." These representations were inaccurate.
The briefing slides, which contained additional inaccuracies
detailed in Volume II of the Committee Study, were used, at least in part, for CIA briefings for
Al-Hawsawi was linkedto the September 11,2001, attacks and targeted by the CIA and otherintelligence
agencies prior to bin al-Shibh's capture. (See WASHINGTON ^Bf(232012Z MAY 02), CIA (032022Z
APR 02); 17743 (051408Z MAR 02); DIRECTOR(161821Z JUL 03X^A1-Hawsawi's arrest on March 1, 2003, was unrelated to any reporting from CIA
detainees. (See ALEC |i|H (16182IZ JUL 03).) With regard to the referenced "attacks," no operational plots
targeting the sites referenced were everidentified by theCIA. Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 2005
that the"mostsignificant" intelligence derived from Ramzi binal-Shibh was obtained prior to liis rendition to CIA
custodyand the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. According to a 2005CIA assessment, the
"most significant" reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh onfuti^attacks was background information related to al-
Qa'ida'splans to attack Heathrow Airport. (See ALEC (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided
the majority ofthis information in mid-0ctobe^002^vhil^ruh |^u^dy ofaforeign government and prior to
being transferred toCIA custody. (See CIA ||^| ) See also detainee review ofRamzi bin al-
Shibh in Volume III
See tlie section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots. CIA officers in BHI
wroteof the referenced reporting from bin Attash: "[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was
chilling-[CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either tlirough previous information or through
interviews ofal-Baluchi and Ba Attash priorto£ieir transfer out ofKarachi." This cable also stated, "[a]s noted in
severalprevious cables, in December 2002 became aware of die threat to Consulate officials." See
§••• 14510
For information on the "[ijdentification of [Jose] Padilla," see thesection of this summary andVolume IIon the
Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla. Richard Reid was arrested in
December 2001, priorto Abu Zubaydah's capture. See multiple open source reporting and Department of Justice
materials, including, UnitedStates v. RichardReidIndictment, U.S. DistrictCourt, Districtof Massachusetts,
January 16, 2002. Abu Zubaydah provided information onpotential places al-Qa'ida might target, including banks
and subways, shortly after his capture to FBI interrogators, months prior to the use of the CIA's "enhanced
interrogation techniques" in August 2002. See Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the
interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to die Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence by cover letterdated July20,2010(DTS #2010-2939). Seealso AbuZubaydah detainee review in
Volume UI.
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Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,as well as for Assistant
Attorney General Jack Goldsmith.
In subsequent interviews of CIA personnel, the OIG received
information that contradicted other CIA representations about the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program. The chief of the |||| Branch of the UBL Group at CTC described at
length how the arrests of MajidKhanand lymanParis were um-elated to reporting from CIA
detainees.^ The deputy director for law enforcement for the FBI's Counterterrorism Division
told the OIG how Uzhair Paracha and FBI operational activities were ultimately responsible for
the capture of Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.The chief of targeting and special requirem^Jts for
CTC's al-Qa'ida Department and former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force,fHIH
I, told the OIG that "the often-cited example ofZubaydah identifying Padilla is not
'[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah] not tell us whoquite accurate." According to
Padilla was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla." stated that the
Pakistanis had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and his partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing
any information on the pair, relaying, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky.
At the same time, however, CIA personnel provided inaccurate
examples of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the OIG. The
deputy chief of the Al-Qa'ida Department of CTC told the OIGthat "KSM gaveus Majid Khan
and Uzair Paracha."' Deputy DCI John McLaughlin told the OIG that information from KSM
"led to the capture" of Majid Khan, which in turn led to the capture of Hambali. McLaughlin
also represented that "the captureof Richard Reid was a result of modus operandi information
obtained from [Abu] Zubaydah."^These representations were inaccurate.
I" addition to these specific inaccurate examples, CIA leadership
made additional general claims to the OIG about the effectiveness of the CIA intenogation
Memorandum for the Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September27, 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50088).
Slides,CIA Intenogation Program, 16September 2003. The Memorandum for the Recorddrafted by John Bellinger
refers to a "detailedhandout" provided by tlieCIA. See John B. Bellinger, in, SeniorAssociate Counsel to the
President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council; Memorandum for the Record; subject: Briefing of
SecretariesPowell and RumsfeldregardingIntenogation of High-Value Detainees; date: September 30, 2003.
Scott W. Muller; Memorandumfor the Record; Interrogation briefingfor Jack Goldsmitli; date: 16 October 2003
(OGC-FO-2003-50097).
" Interview ofchief of the IIIH Branch ofthe UBL Group, hy Office ofthe
Inspector General^ul^0^003.
Interview of|B|||||BHIi' Office of the Inspecto^eneml^ugust 5, 2003.
August 19,2003,Memorandum for the Record, meeting with Officeof the Inspector
General.
August 19, 2003,Memorandum for the Record, meeting witli Officeof the Inspector
General. This infomiation was not included in the IG Special Review.
'•'5 HIHHH' Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center Al-
Qa'ida Department; date: 28 July 2003.
Interviewof John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,
September 5, 2003. This information was included in theCIA's July 2003 briefing slides. Richard Reid was
anested in December 2001, prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah.
See tlie section in this summaryand in Volume II on the Captureof MajidKhan; the Capture of Hambali; and
the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullali Paracha. See also the KSM detainee review in Volume in.
Richard Reid was arrested prior tothe captureofAbuZubaydal^^^^^^^^
ini' 'iM III III! mil I
Page 189 of 499
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Kii 11 III I
program that highlighted the "critical threat information" thatcouldonly be acquired by using
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees. Jose Rodriguez, then CTC
director, told the CIA OIG that "the use of EITs has saved lives and prevented terrorist
operations from occurring."Deputy DCI McLaughlin told the OIG that he "believes the use
of EITs has proven critical to CIA's efforts in the war on terrorism."^DDO Pavitt stated that
the program was "invaluable to U.S. national security," that "American lives have been saved as
a result of information received from detainees," and that the CIA "has been able to obtain
information that would not have been obtained without theuse of EITs."*^^° According to OIG
records, DCI Tenet stated he "firmly believes that the interrogation program, and specifically the
use of EITs, has saved many lives." Tenet added that the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques was "extremely valuable" in obtaining "enormous amounts of critical
threat information," and that he did not believe that the information could have been gained any
other way.^^^^
January 2, 2004, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson
provided a draft of the OIG Special Review, entitled "Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Program," to senior CIA officials for comment. The draft Special Review, which
was based on numerous interviews of CIA personnel, as well as additional research by the OIG,
described the origins of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the detention sites that
were operational at the time of the review, and the guidance that had been provided on both
interrogation and detention. Thedraftalso identified a number of unauthorized interrogation
techniques that had been used,^^"^ and conckided that, in a number ofcases, CIA interrogations
went "well beyond what was articulated in the written DOJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002."^^-^
Interview of Jose E. Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August
12, 2003.
"'9 Interview ofJohn E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,
September 5, 2003.
H20 Pavitt also stated that by "September, October and November" of2002, "they saw a clear benefit" to the use of
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah (Interview of James Pavitt,by
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003).
Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 8 September,
2003.1122 Pqj. example, the draft described interrogators placing pressure on adetainee's artery, conducting mock
executions, blowingcigaretteor cigar smoke intoa detainee's face, usingcold water to interrogate detainees, and
subjecting a detainee to a "hard takedown." In an interview conducted after Gul Rahman's death at DETENTION
SITE COBALT, Dr. DUNBAR described a "rough takedown." The interview report stated: "According to
[DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from therenditions team. Each onehada roleduring the
takedown and it was thoroughlyplanned and rehearsed. They opened tliedoor of [a detainee] cell and rushed in
screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with
Mylar tape. They covered hishead with a hood and ranhimup anddown a long corridor adjacent tohis cell. They
slapped himandpunched himseveral times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to
hit himas hard as theycould, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran himalong thecorridor, a
couple of times he fell and they draggedhim through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). [The detainee]
did acquirea numberof abrasions on his face, legs, and hands,but nothing that required medical attention."
DUNBAR stated that after "something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to 'give diem
something to think about.'" See Memorandum for Deputy Directorof Operations, from |
January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul Rahman, pp. 21-22, paragraph 34.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG),
January 2004.
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The draft report repeated the inaccurate examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques that had been conveyed by CIA officers to OIG personnel,but
nonetheless concluded:
"[w]ith the capture of some of the operatives for the above-mentioned plots,
it is not clear whether these plots have been thwarted or if they remain viable
or even if they were fabricated in the first place. This Review did not
uncover any evidence that these plots were imminent."
After reviewing the draft Special Review, including the OIG's
qualified conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques^he
CIA's CTC began preparing a highly critical response. In preparation for that response,|CTC Legal, requested additional information that could be used as
evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from CTC
personnel. sent an email seeking "a list of specific plots that have been thwarted by
the use of detainee reporting that we acquired following the use of enhanced techniques."
noted that he would compile the information, "emphasizing that hundreds or
thousands of innocent lives have been saved as a result of our use of those techniques... In
a separate email, emphasized that it was"critical" that the information"establish
direct links between the application of the enhanced interrogation techniques and the production
of intelligence that directly enabled the saving of innocentlives," that the intelligence obtained
after the use of die CIA's enlianced inten'ogation techniques be "significantly different in nature
from the intelligence acquired before the use of the enhanced techniques," and that the
information be "absolutely ironclad" and "demonstrablysupported by cable citations, analytical
pieces, or what have you."^^^^ further noted that "[w]e canexpect to need to
present these data to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney
General, and quite possibly to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely
verifiable." He concluded, "[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that the future of the program, and
the consequent saving of innocent lives, may depend substantially upon the input you
provide.""^^
The SpecialReview draft statedthat KSM"providedinformation thathelped lead to the arrests"of Sayf al-
Rahman Paracha, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-Marri, and Majid Khan, and that KSM's information "led to the
investigation and prosecution" of lyman Paris. The draft Special Review also stated that information from Abu
Zubaydah "helped lead to the identification" ofJose PadillaandBii^^ Muhammad. Finally, the draft included the
"plots" described by Deputy Chiefof ALEC Station during her July 16, 2003, interview. Most
of the inaccurate representations wouldremain in the final version of theSpecial Review completedin May2004.
See CIA InspectorGeneral,SpecialReview,Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-
IG), January 2004.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program(2003-7123-IG),
January 2004.
Email from: to: Scott Muller, John Rizzo,
and^^^^^H^fsubject: "For the response to the IG report"; date: February 4, 2004, at 1:04:03
PM.
'^ 2'' Email from: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date:
Februai-y 10,
Email from: m|||||m|||||^||||. [red/i^cTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date:
Februaiy 10, 2004. As described in this summaryan^n^^ Committee Study, the examples
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Responding to the request for information, Deputy Chief of ALEC
Station sent an email describing intelligence from KSM in which she wrote,
"let's be foward [sic] leaning."The content of |^H||^'s email would serve as atemplate
on which future justification^o^he CIA program and the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques were based.email stated that "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's
information alone has saved at least severalhundred, possibly thousands, of lives." She then
wrote that KSM "identified" lyman Paris, "who is now serving time in the US for his support to
al-Qa'ida," and "identified a photograph" of Saleh al-Marri, "whom the FBI suspected of some
involvement with al-Qa'ida, but against whom we had no concrete information," adding thatal-
Marri "is now being held on a material witness warrant." IH^H's email stated that KSM
"provided information" on Majid Khan, who "is now in custody," "identified a mechanism for
al-Qa'ida to smuggleexplosives into the US," and "identified"Jaffar al-Tayyar. '^^ ^
email also represented that "[a]fter the use of enhanced [interrogation techniques], [Abu
Zubaydah] grew into what is now our most cooperative detainee," and that Abu Zubaydah's
information "produced concrete results that helped saved lives."These representations were
almost entirely inaccurate.As she had in an interview with the OIG,
former chief of the Abu ZubaydahTask Force, refuted this view, writing in an email that Abu
Zubaydah "never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information," that Abu Zubaydah discussed
Jose Padilla prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that "he never
really gave us actionable intel to get them.""^"^ Separately, Deputy Chiefof ALEC Station
compiled were provided over the following years to the President, the Congress,die Department of Justice, and the
American public.
Email from: to: cc: [REDACTEDUR^ACTED],|; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. ^^|H's email
began: "here is my draft contribution... it's late,I'm tired, so it's not especially elegant... welcome any fact
correcting I got wrong, but let's be foward [sic] leaning." The inaccurate information included in the email was
used in the CIA's formal response to the OIG.
' email and the subsequent DD^espons^^he OIG wereusedastte template for talking points on
the program. See, for example, from: to: subject:
re EDITEDFinal - RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwardingcomments for responseto draft Inspector
Genera^evie^o^ape^o^ondoleezz^ic^n December 2004); date: December 6, 2004; email from:
to: HHHHi, HUHHIi' HHHUH' subject:
re EDITED Final - RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector
General review foMalkin^oints in November 2005); date: November 4, 2005.
In response to email, one CIA officer asked whether "re the jaffar al-tayyar stuff, didnt [sic] we
alread^ave email from: [REDACTED]; to:HIHI' subject: on
KSM/AZ and measures^ate^Fe^ary 10,2004, at 09:38 AM.
Email from: to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
|; subject: reAddition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004.
See relevant sections of tliissummary and Volume II on the eight primaryCIA effectiveness representations and
12 other prominen^I^epresenta^ns ofeffectiveness^^
Email from: to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez,[REDACTED], [REDACTEDlTll^H^^^l. subject: Re: Please Read ~ Re CTC Response to the Draft IG
Report^ate: February 10, 2004. As noted, in an August 19, 2003^Memor^dum for tlie Record detailing BIH
IBlHi's interview with the Office ofthe Inspector General, IHHI told the OIG that "the often-cited
exampleof Zubaydahidentifying Padillais notquiteaccurate,"and that "[n]ot only did [AbuZubaydah] not tell us
who Padilla was,his infonnation alone would never haveled us to Padilla." Noting thatthe Pakistani government
KM' 'ii (III i III! mil I




forwarded additional inaccurate information from CIA personnel in ALEC
Station to CTC Legal related to al-Nashiri,'^ ^^ and Hambali.^^^^
On February 27, 2004, DDO Pavitt submitted his formal response
to the OIG draft Special Review in the form of a memorandum to the inspector general. Pavitt
urged the CIA OIG not to "shy away from the conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks
and saved lives," and to "make it clear as well that the EITs (including the waterboard) have
beenindispensable to our successes."^Pavitt's memorandum included an attachment
describing the "Successes of CIA's CounterteirorismDetention and Interrogation Activities,"
and why the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary. The attachment stated:
"Information we received from detained terrorists as a result of the lawful use
of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly saved
countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence
points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our
had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and liis partner prior to AbuZubaydah providing any information on the pair,
jfHHmillstated, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky." Tliis infonnation was not included intlie draft orfinal OIG
Special Review.
The information forwarded by was related to tlie Heathrow Aiqiort plotting and stated that "[o]nly
after enhanced measures" did KSM "admit that the sketch of a beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in
fact an illustration that KSM the engineer drew himself to show another AQ operative tliat tlie beams in the Wharf-
like tliose in the World Trade Center - would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside." The email
also stated that KSM "identified the leading operatives involved in both the UK and Saudi cells that would support
the operation." These representations were inaccurate. Seethe section of this summaryand Volume 11 on the
Thwarting of the Heatlirow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting, and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.
'•36 Tlie information forwarded by stated that, "subsequent to the application of enhanced measures," the
CIA "learned more in-depthdetails" about operational planning, "to includeongoingoperations against botli the US
and Saudi interests in Saudi Arabia." This representationomitted key informationprovided by al-Nashiri in foreign
government custody and prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See the 'Abd al-Rahimal-
Nashiri detainee review in Volume lU^^^
The information forwarded by stated that, "after tlie use of enhanced measures [Hambali] provided
information that led to the wrap-up of an al-Qa'ida cell in Karachi, some of whose members were destined to be the
second wave attackpilots inside the US after 911.... [TJheu- identification and subsequentdetention saved hundreds
of lives." This representation was inaccurate. See the section of tliis summary and Volumellonth^ of
the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of theAl-Ghun^ {See email from: H^IHUlii'
multiple cc's; subject; EDITED—Re: Heathrow plot
insight from KSM; date: February 10, 2004, at 2:38:36 PM^^h^mainnclu^ th^oHowin^ext: "Here is
Heathrow." Below this text were forwarded emails from and |||||||||||||||||||||||||||. See email from:
to: ^^^^BB^B[^^B[^^^^^^B||subiect: Heatlirow plot insight
from KSM;date: February 10, 2004, at(H^MPMTemailft^nTlBjj^^^^BBB to:
BHU' subject: OGO^butta^^t 5andfind-Rejal^shiri; date: February 12, 2004, at 02:59 PM;
forwarding email from: to:
I; subject: Re: al-Nashiri; date: February 10, 2004, at 06:11 PM; email from: to:|; subject: **immediate—Hambali Reporting; date: February 10, 2004, at
11:43 AM.
Memorandumfor: Inspector General; fiom: James Pavitt, Deputy Directorfor Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG SpecialReview, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program"(2003-7123-IG);
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Countertenorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities.
1(11 'ill III I




allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not
thousands, of casualties."'
T^he attachment to Pavitt's memorandum repeated much of the
inaccurate information contained in Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
about KSM and Abu Zubaydah, as well as the additional information ALEC Station personnel
provided on KSM, al-Nashiri, and Hambali. In Pavitt's memorandum, every intelligence success
claim was preceded with some version of the phrase, "as a result of the lawful use of EITs."'''^^
Inaccurate information provided to the OIG during interviews and in the Pavitt memorandum
was included in the final version of the OIG's Special Review.^The relevant portion of the
Special Review, including much of the inaccurate information, has been declassified.'''^^
As ^^^HUcTC Legal anticipated
February 10, 2004, email, much of the information provided to the inspector general on the
"effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was later provided to
policymakers and the Department of Justice as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.
In late 2004, as the National Security Council was considering
"endgame" options for CIA detainees, the CIA proposed a public relations campaign that would
include disclosures about the "effectiveness" of the CIA program. CIA talking points prepared
in December 2004 for the DCI to use with National Security Council principals stated that "[ijf
done cleverly, selected disclosure of intelligence results could heighten the anxiety of terrorists at
large about the sophistication of USG methods and underscore the seriousness of American
commitment to prosecute aggressively the Waron Terrorism.""'^ The following month, the
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG);
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism
Detention and InteiTogation Activities.
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention iind Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG);
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities.
A review of CIA records found that almost all of the information in the Pavitt memorandum was inaccurate and
unsupported by CIA inten:ogation and intelligence records. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that CIA officers
"generally provided accurate information [to the Inspector General] on the operation and effectiveness of the
program," and that "with rare exceptions, [CIA officers] provided accurate assessments to the OIG."
The CIA Inspector General Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," was
declassified with redactions in May 2008. On August 24, 2009, some portions of the Review that were redacted in
May2008^were unredacted and declassified.
wrote in an email: "We can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel
at the IGand on the Hill, tothe Attorney General^andqi^^ to the President at some point, and they must
be absolutely verifiable." (See email from: |||||||||||||[||||I|B to: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ
and measures; date: February 10,2004.) As detailed in this Study, the CIA consistently used the same
"effectiveness" case studies. The eight most frequently cited "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists are examined
in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, as are 12 other prominent examples tliat the CIA
has cited in the context of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Talking Points for the DCI: DOD Proposals to Move Forward on Transfer of HVDs to Guantanamo, 16
December 2004.
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CIA proposed that the public information campaign include details on the "intelligence gained
and lives savedin HVD inten-ogations." '^'^ ^ There was no immediate decision by the National
Security Council about an "endgame" for CIA detainees or the proposed public information
campaign.
In early April 2005, chief of ALEC Station,
asked that information on the success of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program be
compiled in anticipation of interviews of CIA personnel by Tom Brokaw of NBC News. The
first draft included effectiveness claims relating to the "Second Wave" plotting, the Heathrow
Airport plotting, the Karachi plotting, and the identification of a second shoebomber.^A
subsequent draft sought to limit the information provided to what was already in the public
record and included assertions about Issa al-Hindi, lyman Paris, and Sajid Badat.^^"^^ That day.
Deputy Director of CTC Philip Mudd told that "we either get out and sell, or we get
hammered, which has implications beyond the media. [CJongress reads it, cuts our authorities,
messes up our budget."The following day, the draft was cleared for release to the media.
DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor, 12 January 2005; included in email
from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], cc: BMBBj^Bp^BjohnA^J^zzo,
subject:
Coord on NSC Talkings for 1/14; date: January 11, 2005, at 03:33 PM.
The draft stated tliat the "Second Wave" plotting "was uncovered during the initial debriefings of a senior al-
Qa'ida detainee," that the Heathrow plotting "was also discovered as a result of detainee debriefings," tliat the
Karachi plotting "was revealed during the initial debriefings of two senior al-Qa'ida detainees," and tliat the CIA
"learned form [sic] detainee debriefings of the second shoe bomber. {See email from: to:
[REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],j
,[REDACTEpTBi^^^Bj^DACTED], ••••. [REDACTED], [REDACTED; cc;
; subject: FOR IMMEDIATE COORDINATION: summary of impact of detainee
program; date: April 13,2005, at 5:21:37 PM.) These claims were inaccurate. See relevant sections of this
summary and Volume 11.
The draft discussed Issa al-Hindi, who had been referenced in the 9/11 Commission Report, stating that "[p]rior
to KSM's reporting, the U.S. Government was not aware of Issa's casing activity, nor did we know his true
identity." It added tliat "KSM's reporting was the impetus for an intense investigation, culminating in Issa's
identification and arrest." The draft also included two examples that had not been in official public documents, but
had been described in press stories. The first was that "KSM led U.S. investigators to an Ohio tnick driver named
lyman Paris." Tlie second was that "KSM's confessionswereals^nstrumental in determining the identity ofSaajid
Badat," the second shoe bomber. {See email from: ChiefofOperatio^, ALEC Station; to: m
••••, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],
subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13, 2005, at 6:46:59 PM.) As described elsewhere, tliese claims
were incongruent with CIA records. At least one earlier media account of KSM's purported role in tlie aiTest of
lyman Paris was provided in a book by an author who had extensive access to CIA officials. {See Ronald Kessler,
The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003.). The CIA's cooperation with the author is described
elsewhere in this summary, as well as in more detail in the full Committee Study.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and |^^^|BHHi< April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to
19:56:05.
; cc: [REDACTED], BBHI^H' [REDACTED], John
subject: Re: Brokaw interview: Take one;
Email fi-om:
A. Rizzo,
date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM.
TOP SECRET/.





On April 20, 2005, the same examples were circulated as part of an
anticipated official public campaign to promote the "effectiveness" of the still-classified CIA
program.^In response. |CTC Legal, |, expressed concern that
"the examples cited, while true, and perhaps as far as we can go, are not nearly the most striking
examples of lives saved." Referencing KSM's reporting on lyman Paris, noted that
"we risk making ourselves look silly if the best we can do is the Brooklyn Bridge - perhaps we
should omit specific examples rather than 'danm ourselves with faint praise.'"
who offered the Heathrow Airport plot as an example, made the following suggestion: "Can
[Office of Public Affairs] be more strongly declarative - 'while we can't provide details' (or
maybe we can) 'the program has produce^nteUigence that has directly saved lOO's/lOOO's of
American and other innocent lives'?" then attached claims originally compiled in
February 2004 for the purpose of responding to the draft OIG Special Review which, he wrote,
described "some of the actionable intelligence acquired as a result of the Program and the lawful
use of such techniques."^*''' The examples were inaccurate.*
On June 24, 2005, Dateline NBC aired a program, accompanied by
several online articles, which quoted CIA Director Goss and Deputy Director of CTC Mudd, as
well as anonymous "top American intelligence officials." Among other claims, NBC reported
that the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh "le[d] ultimately" to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin
Attash.^*^^ This information was inaccurate.
At the end of 2005, congressional concerns about the treatment of
detainees again spurred interest at the CIA for public disclosures on the "effectiveness" of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, congressional action on the Detainee
Treatment Act (the "McCain amendment") prompted a CIA attorney working at the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence to express concern that legislative support was needed for the
CIA to continue to use its enhanced interrogation techniques, and that a public information
campaign would be required to garner that support. The CIA attorney described the "striking"
similarities between the public debate surrounding the McCain amendment and the situation in
Israel in 1999, in which the Israeli Supreme Court had "ruled that several... techniques were
possibly permissible, but require some form of legislative sanction," and that the Israeli
""^0 See CIA document entitled, "INTERROGATION PROGRAM DRAFT PRESS BRIEFING," from April 2005.
from: to Rizzo; Re:
Interrogation Program-Going Public Draft Talking Points—CommentsDueto^B||iTie by COB TODAY Thanks;
date: April 20, 2005, at 5:10:10 PM.
See the sections of this summary and Volume El on the Capture of Khalid Shaykli Mohammad(KSM) and the
Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Khallad bin Attash).
"The frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June
24,2005. In 2003, Ronald Kessler published a book with which theCIAcooperated thatstated "intercepts and
information developed months earlier after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh... allowed the CIA to trace [KSM]." The
Kessler book also stated that the bin Attash capture was the "result" of interrogations of KSM. This information is
incongruent with CIA records. See Ronald Kessler, The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003. See also
John A. Rizzo; to cc: Scott W. Muller,
[REDACTED]; subject: Re: CIA at War; date: January 22, 2004, at 09:28 AM).
See the sections of this summary and Volume n on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) and the
Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding thecaptureofKhal^
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government "ultimately got limited legislative authority for a few specific techniques."^ The
CIA attorney then wrote:
"Once this became a political reality here, it became incumbent on the
Administration to publicly put forth some facts, if it wanted to preserve these
powers. Yet, to date, the Administration has refused to put forth any specific
examples of significant intelligence it adduced as a result of using any
technique that could not reasonably be construed as cruel, inhuman or
degrading. Not even any historical stuff from three or four years ago. What
conclusions are to be drawn from the utter failure to offer a specific
justification: That no such proof exists? That the Administration does not
recognize the legitimacy of the political process on this issue? Or, that need to
reserve the right to use these techniques really is not important enough to
justify the compromise ofeven historical intelligence?"^
described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the
Administration sought legislative support to continue the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program, and chose to do so by publicly disclosing the program in a 2006 speech by President
Bush. The speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA,
included numerous inaccurate representations about the CIA program and the effectiveness of
the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques. The CIA's vetting of the speech is detailed in CIA
"validation" documents, which include CIA concurrence and citations to records to support
specific passages of the speech. For example, the CIA "Validation of Remarks" document
includes the following:
'''...questioning the detainees in this program has given us information that
has saved innocent lives by helping us to stop new attacks - here in the United
States and across the world.'
CIA concurs with this assessment. Information from detainees prevented -
among others - the West Coast airliner plot, a plot to blow up an apartment
The CIA attorney also described the Israeli precedent with regard to the "necessity defense" that had been
invoked by CIA attorneys and the Department of Justice in 2001 and 2002. Tlie CIA attorney wrote that the Israeli
Supreme Court "also specificallyconsidered the 'ticking time bomb' scenarioand said tiiat enhanced techniques
could not be pre-approved for such situations, but that if worsecame to worse, an officer who engaged in such
activities could assert a common-law necessity defense, if he were ever prosecuted." {See email from:
[REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, \
[REDACTEDl^ubject: Re: IVlcCain^ate^Decei^er 19,2005, at 10:18:58 AlVI.) At the time, the CIA attorney and
the former |H^|CTC Legal, working in the Office of tlie Director of National
Intelligence. The OLC, in its July 20,2007, memorandum, included an analysis of the Israeli court case in the
context of concluding that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were "clearly authorized and justified by
legislative authority" as a result of the Military Commissions Act. See memorandum for Jolin A. Rizzo, Acting
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment
Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by tlie CIA in the
Intenogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], JohnA. Rizzo,||, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: McCain; date: December 19,2005, at 10:18:58 AM.




building in the United States, a plot to attack various targets in the United
Kingdom, and plots against targets in Karachi and the Arabian Gulf. These
attacks would undoubtedly have killed thousands."
(T8/^|||||||||||||||||^||B^^^ Multiple iterations ofthe CIA "validation" documents reflect
changes to the speech as it was being prepared. One week before the scheduled speech, a
passage in the draft speech made inaccurateclaims about the role played by Abu Zubaydah in the
capaire of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the role of Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the
capture of KSM, but did not explicitly connect these claims to the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques. In an August 31, 2006, email exchange, CIA officers proposed the
following language for the speech:
"That same year, information from Zubaydah led the CIA to the trail of one of
KSM's accomplices, Ramzi bin al Shibh. Information from Zubaydah together
with information from Shibh gave the CIA insight into al-Qa'ida's 9/11 attack
planning and th^mportanc^fKSM With the knowledge that KSM was the
'mastermind,' |||||||m|H||||||| Pakistani partners planned and mounted an
operation that resulted in his eventual capture and detention."
The August 31, 2006, email exchange included citations to CIA
cables to support the proposed passage; however, neither the cables, nor any other CIA records,
support the assertions.^
Emphasis in original. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy,Wednesday, 6 September2006, Draft
#15. As described in the relevant sections of this summary, and more extensively in Volume II, these claims were
inaccurate.
Email from: ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
; subject: Source list for our AZ paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM.
The cited cables describe Abu Zubaydah's June 2002 description of a meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh
(acquired prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah), and Abu
Zubaydah's August 200^eportin^i^ussing the same meeting (after the use ofthe techniques). (See CIA
(I01514Z JUN 02); August 2002).) Neither cable—or any other CIA record—indicates a
connectionbetween Abu Zubaydah's reporting on his meetingwith bin al-Shibhand bin al-Shibh's capture. The
cited cables also do not include information, which was available to the CIA prior to the captureof Abu Zubaydali,
highlighting KSM's "importance." The citedcabledescribes AbuZubaydah's April 2002 reporting, prior to the use
ofthe CIA's enhance^nteiToe^ techniques, identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the "mastermind" ofthe 9/11
attacks. (See H||||^^^H|^|(13 April 2002).) The citations did not include cables referencing infonnation
available to the CIA about KSM that was obtained prior to the captureof Abu Zubaydah, including information on
KSM's alias "Mukhtai'" and KSM's role in tlie September 11, 2001, attacks, as is detailed elsewhere in this
summary. The cables also did not support the claimthat information providedby Abu Zubaydahor Ramzibin al-
Shibh led to the capture of KSM. One cited cable related to the identification by Ramzi bin al-Shibh, while bin al-
Shibh waMi^oreigr^ov^ment custody, ofAli Abdul Aziz Ali as "Ammar^[The cable was cited as
20700 As determined later, the actual cable was 20790.] As described elsewhere in
this summary, KSMwas notcaptured as a result of information related to Ammar al-Baluchi. The email exchange
listedtwo cablesdirectly related to thecapture of KSM. The first cable,fromapproximately a week before KSM's
capture, described the CIA's operational use and value of the asset who led the CIA to KSM. The cable stated that
the relationshk^jetweeiUh^sse^n^CSM^s^^^B^^ the asset gained access to KSM, was "based
on The cabl^tate^hat Cl^Iea^u^irters
'continues to be impressed with the evidence of[the asset's] access to IHI^HiKSM HHlii associates, I
." (5ee DIRECTOR
TOP SECRET/
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Within a few days, the passage in the draft speech relating to the
captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM was modified to connect the use of the CIA's enhanced
inteiTogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The
updated draft now credited information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh with
"help[ing] in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed." The updated draft speech stated:
"Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] was questioned using these [interrogation]
procedures, and he soon began to provide information on key al-Qaida
operatives - including information that helped us find and capture more of
those responsible for the attacks of Nine-Eleven. For example, Zubaydah
[zoo-BAY-da] identified one of KSM's accomplices in the Nine-Eleven
attacks - a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh [SHEEB]. The information
Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh.
And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the
planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed."^
An updated CIA "validation" document concurring with the
proposed passage provided a modified list of CIA cables as "sources" to support the passage.
Cable citations to Abu Zubaydah's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques were removed.Like the previous version, the CIA's updated "validation"
document did not cite to any cables demonstrating that information from Abu Zubaydah "helped
lead to thecapture of [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh."^ Similarly, none of thecablescited to support
the passage indicated that information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was in
foreign government custody when he provided the information cited by the CIA) "helped in the
described KSM's capture, stating that it was "based on locational information" provided by the asset. {See
41351 ) Neither of the two cables cited to support the claim made any
reference to Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other detainee in CIA or foreign government custody. The
capture of KSM, including the role of tlie asset (referred to herein as "ASSET X") is detailed elsewhere in this
summaiy and in greater detail in the full ComniitteeStudy^^eeeinailfr to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; cc: HUHHHIII' HHHHHii' Source our AZ
paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM.
Pronunciation brackets in original draft. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6
September 2006, Draft #15.
Tlie document cited a cable on Abu Zubaydali's August 2002 description of his meeting witli Ramzi bin al-
Shibh, but not the previously cited June 2002 cable related toAbu Zubaydah's description of the same meeting^^
Zubaydah was subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. See
The information included in tlie cable describing Abu Zubaydah's August 200^^portin^rHii^2®® |^"
Ramzi bin al-Shibh was unrelated to tlie capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. {See )
The CIA document also citedasa |^sourc£^^^ the capture ofbin al-Shibh with no mention ofAbu
Zubaydah's reporting. {See HHHUHHHH-) Ihe details ofRamzi bin al-Shibh's capture are
described elsewhere in this summaiy and ingreaterdetaiUrHh^ul^om^
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planning and execution of the operation thatcaptured [KSM]." '^^ ^ As described elsewhere in
this summary, there are no CIA records to support these claims.
The CIA documents validating the president's speech addressed
other passages that were Hkewise unsupported by the CIA's cited cables. For example, the
speech included an inaccurate claim regarding KSM that had been part of the CIA's
representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques since 2003.
The speech stated:
"Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using these
procedures, and he soon provided information that helped us stop another
planned attack on the United States. During questioning, KSM told us about
another al Qaeda operative he knew was in CIA custody - a terrorist named
Majid Khan. KSM revealed that [Majid] Khan had been told to deliver
$50,000 to individuals working for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambah,
the leader of al Qaeda's Southeast Asian affiliate known as 'J-I.' CIA officers
confronted Khan with this information. Khan confirmed that the money had
been delivered to an operative named Zubair, and provided both a physical
description and contact number for this operative. Based on that information,
Zubair was captured in June of 2003, and he soon provided information that
helped lead to the capture of Hambali."' ^^^
support for this passage, the CIA cited a June 2003 cable
describing a CIA interrogation of Majid Khan in which Majid Khan discussed Zubair.^The
CIA "validation" document did not include cable citations from March 2003 that would have
revealed that Majid Khan provided this inforaiation while in foreign government custody, prior
to the reporting from KSM. '^^ "^
The CIA document included a previousl^itec^^le relatin^^hecapture^ KSM that made no mention of
reporting from CIA detainees. (^See 41351 ri^HIH|||||Hi ) '^ he CIA document also
included the previously cited cable describing bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar." As described in the section
of this summary, as well as in Volume II, on the Capture of KSM, KSM was not captured as a result of information
relate^o Ammar al-Baluchi. (The document cited the cable as 20700, as noted, the actual cite was
20790.) The CIA cable also cited an analytical product whose relevance was limited to the connection
between KSM and al-Aziz (Ammar al-Baluchi). (See DI SerialFlierCTC2002-30086CH: CIA analytic report,
"Threat Threads: Recent Advances in Understanding 11 September.") Finally, the document included a cable that
was unrelated to the content of the speech.
See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid
Shaykh Mohammad (KSM).1165 Presidential Speech onSeptember 6,2006, based onCIA information and vetted byCIA personnel.
CIA Validation ofRemarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15; |
^^^^8 (070724Z MAR 03), disseminated as Further, the June 2003 cable,
DIRECTOR idBI (122120Z JUN 03), cited by the CIA as validation, makes no reference to reporting from KSM.
Khan was captured on March 5, 2003 and was in foreign government detention until being transferred to CIA
custody on May 2003. See details on the detention and interrogation of Majid Khan in Volume III.
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On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered the speech based
on the CIA-vetted information.On September 8, 2006, the chief of the
Department in CTC, participated in the CIA's validation of the
speech, distributed the "final validation document" for possible updates or changes. In an email,
mmurged the recipients to "[pjlease look very carefully, as this is going to be a very
important document."
On September 11, 2006, a CIA officer responded, questioning the
passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM, as well as the relevance of the CIA cables
cited in the validation document to support the passage. The CIA officer questioned whether a
CIA cable describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar" supported the claim that
bin al-Shibh's reporting helped lead to the capture of KSM. The officer wrote:
"I presume the information in this cable that supports the statement is Ramzi's
admission regarding Ammar?? Did that actually help lead us to KSM?? not
sure who did this section, but we may want to double-check this and provide
additional cables on how this actually 'assisted us'. This also seems to be a
point critics in the press seem to be picking on, I will do some digging on my
own as well."^'^^
There are no CIA records to indicate that the CIA officer's
comments about the inadequate sourcing were further addressed. As described in this summary,
and in more detail in Volume H, there are no CIA records to support the passage in the speech
related to the capture of KSM.
After the speech, press accounts challenging aspects of the speech
became the subject of internal discussion amon^om^I^officers. On September 7, 2006, the
chief of the KIIHH Department in CTC, email stating: 'The
NY Times has posted a story predictably poking holes in the President's speech." Defending the
passage in the specch asserting that, after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
On April 29, 2009, Marc Thiessen, the speechwriter responsiblefor President Bush's September 6, 2006,
speech, wrote: "This was the most carefully vetted speech in presidential history - reviewed by all the key players
from the individuals who ran the program all the way up to the director of national intelligence, who personally
attested to the accuracy of the speech in a memo to tlie president. And just last week on Fox News, former CIA
Director Michael Hayden said he went back and checked with the agency as to the accuracy of that speech and
reported: *We stand by our story.'" See Maic Thiessen, "The West Coast Plot: An 'Inconvenient Truth,"' The
/?ev/evv^pri^5^009.
from: to:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^|H|n^HHl^H> [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
subject: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!! Please verify the
attached; date: September 8, 2006, at 06:28 PM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: cc: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]7^^Hli^^^^H H
I; subject: Re: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!!
Please verify the Attached; date: September 11, 2006, at 9:16:15 AM; attachment Nl: CIA Validation of Remarks
on Detainee Policy Final (Draft #15). The email also identified as unrelated one cable that had been cited as a
source and conected a transposed number ofthecabledescribin^aii^ identification of"Ammar."
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Abu Zubaydahprovidedinformation "tJiat helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh,'
explained:
"...we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured;
however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that—when added
into other information—helped us trackhim. Again, on this point, we were
very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh."^
statement, that Abu Zubaydah provided "information
on [bin al-Shibh's] recent activities" that "helped [CIA] track him," was no^uppor^ by the
cables cited in the CIA's "validation" document, orany other CIA record. |||||||B||||||||'s email
did not address the other representation in the president's speech—that Abu Zubaydah
"identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh.^
The New York Times article also challenged the representation in
the speech that Abu Zubaydah "disclosed" that KSM was the "mastermind behind the 9/11
attacks and used the alias 'Mukhtar,'" and that "[t]his was a vital picce of the puzzle that helped
our intelligence community pursue KSM." As the New York Times article noted, the 9/11
Commissior^iad pointed to acable from August 2001 that identified KSM as "Mukhtar." In her
email, acknowledged the August2001 report identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and
provided additional information on the drafting of the speech:
"[0]n28 August, 2001, in fact, [CIA's] HHHI [database] does show areport
from [a source] stating that Mohammad Rahim's brother Zadran told him that
KSM was now being called 'Mukhtar.' Moreover, we were suspicious that
KSM might have been behind 9/11 as early as 12 Sept 2001, and we had some
reporting indicating he was the mastermind. We explained this latter fact to
the White House, although the 28 August report escaped our notice."
Email from; HHHHI'
Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydali's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7,
2006. A September 7, 2006, article (published September 8, 2006) in theNew York Times, by Mark Mazzetti,
entitled, "Questions Raised About Bush's Primary Claims of Secret Detention System" included comments by CTA
officials defending the assertions in the President's speech. The article stated: "Mr. Bush described the
interrogation techniquesused on the C.I.A.prisoners as having been 'safe, lawful and effective,' and he asserted that
torturehad not been used. .. .Mr. Bushalso said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identifiedMr. bin al-
Shibh as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh's role in the
attacks months before Mr. Zubaydah's capture."
Thereare noCIArecords to support these claims. See thesection of this summary on thecapture of Ramzi bin
al-Shibh, as well as a more detailed account in Volume II.
from: jjjjBHUHH' to
Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTEDL^^BBf^BHHinREDACT^,
[REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7,
2006. There are no CIA records indicating what was "explained" to the White House. The CIA validation
document provided officially concurred with the passage in the speech. See CIA Vahdation of Remarks on Detainee
Policy, Wednesday, 6September2006, Draft#^
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In her email, HIHii stated that "[t]he fact that the 9/11
commission, with 20-20 hindsight, thinks we should have known this in August 2001 does not
alter the fact that we didn't."'
(TS/4l||H^HIIi^B'/NF) In addition to the New York Times article, the CIA was concerned
about an article by Ron Suskind in Time Magazine that also challenged the assertions in the
speech about thecapturc^f Ramzi bin al-Shibh an^^CSNl^^^^r^September 11, 2006, email,
the chief ofdie |||||HIHili Department in CTC, wrote; *'[w]e are not
claiming [Abu Zubaydah] providedexact locational information, merely that he provided us with
information that helped in our targeting efforts." |HH|'s email did not address the
representations in the president's speech that Abu Zubaydah "identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh and
that the information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the capture" of bin al-Shibh. With
regard to the capture of KSM, email acknowledged that Suskind's assertion that
"the key was a cooperative source" was "correctas far as it goes, but the priority with which we
pursued KSM changed once AZ conclusively identified him as the mastermind of9/11."^^^^j^^HH's email did not address the representation in the president's speech that Abu
Zubaydah, along witii Ramzi bin al-Shibh, "helped in tii^lanning and execution of the
operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." statements about the captures
of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM are not supported by CIA records.
The president's September 6, 2006, speech, which was based on
CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, was the first detailed, formal public
representation about tiie effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.The
Email from: to |
Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTEDLl^^|||^^^^^H[i, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Questions aboutAbuZubaydali's identification of KSMas "Muklitar"; date: September 7,
2006.
The Unofficial Story of the al-Qaeda 14; Tlieir torture by the CIA was wrong - in more ways than you might
think, Ron Suskind, Time, 18 September 2006.
Email from: to: [REDACTED], ^•••1, [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: URGENT: FOR YOUR COMMENT: DCIA Questions on
the Suskind Article; date: September 11, 2006, at 08:23 PM.
See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Captiue of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid
Shaykh Mohammad (KSM). In 2007, CIAofficers alsoquestioned thepassage in the President's September 6,
2006, speech concerning tliedisruption of plotting against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. See the section of this
summaryand VolumeII on the Thwarting of tlieCamp Lemonier Plotting for additional infomiation.
1178 President Bush made other public statements that reliedon inaccurateinformation provided by the CIA. For
example, as described elsewhere in this summary, on March 8, 2008,President Bush vetoed legislation that would
have limited intenogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. The President's veto message to
the Houseof Representatives stated that "[t]heCIA's ability to conduct a separate and specialized inteirogation
program for terrorists whopossess the most critical information in the waron terrorhas helped the United States
prevent a number of attacks, including plotsto fly passenger airplanes intothe Library Tower in Los Angeles and
into Heatlirow Airport or buildings in downtown London." {See message to the Houseof Representatives, President
GeorgeW. Bush,March 8, 2008). TliePresident also explained his veto in his weekly radio address, in whichhe
referenced tlie "Library Tower," also known as the "SecondWave"plot, and the Heathrowplot, while representing
that the CIAprogram "helpedus stopa plot to strikea U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti, a planned attackon the U.S.
consulate in Karachi..." {SeePresident's Radio Address, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed
in this summary, and described more fully ir^olum^I^I^representation^j^ the role ofthe CIA's
im IM III I
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inaccurate representations in the speech have been repeated in numerous articles, books, and
broadcasts. The speech was also relied upon by the OLC in its July 20, 2007, memorandum on
the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically to support the premise
that the use of the techniques was effective in "producing substantialquantities of otherwise
unavailable intelligence."'
D. CIA Representations About theEffectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
Against Specific CIA Detainees
While the CIA made numerous general representations about the
effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA representations on specific detainees
focused almost exclusively on two CIA detainees, Abu Zubaydah, detained on March 28, 2002,
and KSM, detained on March 1, 2003.''^®
I. Abu Zubaydah
As described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA
provided significant information to policymakers and the Department of Justice on the CIA's
decision to use the newly developed CIA '^enhanced interrogation techniques" on Abu Zubaydcih
and the effects of doing so. These representations were provided by the CIA to the CIA OIG,''^'
enhancedintenogation techniques withregard to the SecondWave,Heathrow, Djibouti and Karachi plots were
inaccurate.
The OLC memorandum, alongwithotherOLC memoranda relying on inaccurate CIArepresentations, has been
declassified, as has the May2004OIGSpecial Review containing inaccurate information provided by CIAofficers.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal DeputyAssistantAttorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20,2007, Re: Application of the War
Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, andCommon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al QaedaDetainees (DTS#2009-1810, Tab 14).
See Volume II for additional information on CIA representations.
Amongother documents,see Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Directorfor
Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to DraftIGSpecial Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTogation
Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of
CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Intenjogadoi^ctivitie^^^^^^^^^
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the White House,the Department of Justice,Congress,and the American public.
The representations include that: (1) Abu Zubaydah told the CIA he believed "the general US
population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary";^
(2) Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with U.S. government personnel using traditional
interrogation techniques;(3) Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in critical information on teiTorist
operatives and plotting;^^^^ and (4) the use of CIA'senhanced interrogation techniques on Abu
Zubaydali was effective in eliciting critical intelligence from Abu Zubaydah. These
representations are not supported by internal CIA records.
The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah "expressed [his] belief
that the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what
was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals" is not supported by CIA
Amongotlier documents, see Memorandum for the Record: "Reviewof Intenogation Programon 29 July
2003." Memorandum preparedby CIA GeneralCounsel ScottMuiler,dated August5, 2003, and briefing slides
entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003,presented to seniorWhite House officials; and Briefing
for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and InteiTogation Program,CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled,
"Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program.'
Among otlierdocuments, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for SteveBradbury from|
Legal Group, DCICounterterrorist Centerre: Effectiveness of the CIACountertenorist Interrogation Techniques.
Amongother documents, see CIA classifiedstatement for the record. SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence,
provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying
Senate Select Committee on Intelligencehearing tianscript for April 12,2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central
Intelligence AgencyDetention and Interrogation Program." DirectorHayden stated: "Now in June [2002],after
about four mondis of intenogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point wherehe refused to cooperate and he shut down.
He would not talk at all to the FBI intenogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant
progress was being made in learning anything of intelligence value."
1185 pqj. example,see CIA "Questionsand ProposedAnswers" 9/2/2006, Tab 2 of CIA Validation of Remarkson
Detainee Policy, September 6, 2006.
See, for example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from HH Legal
Group, DCICounterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of theCIA Countertenorist Intenogation Techniques."
See, for example,ODNI September2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial inteiTOgation, Abu
Zubaydahgave some information tliathe probably viewed as nominal. Some was important,however, including
that KlialidShaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This
identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to tliis
teiTorist plotter—leads that eventuallyresulted in his capture. It wasclear to his inteiTogators that Abu Zubaydah
possessed a great deal of infonnation about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stoppedall cooperation. Over the ensuing
months, the CIA designed a new interrogationprogram tliat would be safe, effective, and legal." See also
Presidential Speech on September6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel.
As detailed in DIRECTOR llli (031357Z AUG 02). See also Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum for
John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, dated August 1, 2002, and entitled
"Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative," which states: "TlieinteiTogation team is certain [Abu Zubaydah] has
additional information that he refuses to divulge. Specifically, he is witWiolding information regaiding tenorist
networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the
United States or against our interests overseas."
Amongother documents, see Officeof the Directorof National Intelligence, "Summary of the High Value
Terrorist Detainee Progiam," September 6, 2006; and CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of
Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from HIHiiHH' H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject
"Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist Intenocatior^echnique^^^^^^
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records.'^ ^^ On August 30, 2006, a CIA officer from the CIA's al-Qa'ida Plans and Organization
Group wrote: "we have no records that 'he declared that America was weak, and lacking in
resilience and that our society did not have the will to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the
terrorists from succeeding in theirgoals.In a CIA Sametime communication that same day,
a CIA ALEC Station officer wrote, "I can find no reference to AZ being deifant [sic] and
declaring America weak... in fact everything I have read indicated he used a non deifiant [sic]
resistan^strategy." In response, the chief of the Department in CTC,
wrote: "I've certainly heard that said of AZ for years, but don't know why...." The
CI^ALE^Station officeo^plied^robably a combo of[deputy chief ofALEC Station,
^nd ••• I'll at that." The chief of the
Department completed the exchange, writing"yes, beheve so... and agree, we shall pass over in
silence."^^^2
(^^S/^|||^|||||H||||||||[|//NF) The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating
with debriefers using traditional interrogation techniques is also not supported by CIA
records.In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators recommended that Abu Zubaydah
spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members traveled |m|| "as a
means ofkeeping [Abu Zubaydal^off-balance and to allow the team needed time offfor a break
and to atten^^^onal matters as well as to discuss "the endgame" for Abu
Zubaydah jjjjjjjjjjj^^ with officers from CIA Headquarters.As aresult, Abu Zubaydah spent
much of June 2002, and all of July 2002,47 days in total, in isolation. When CIA officers next
interrogated Abu Zubaydah, they immediately used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,
including the waterboard.^^^^ Prior to this isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information
on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its
leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics.
Abu Zubaydah provided the same type of information prior to, during, and after the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information
See, for example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from mH Legal
Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."
from: to: and
"Suggested language change forAZ^^jdatejAugust30, 2006, at06:32 PM.
Sametime communication, HHHlHH' 30/Aug/06 13:15:23 to 19:31:47.
See ODNI September2006Unclassified Public Release: "During initial interrogation, AbuZubaydah gave some
information that he probablyviewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh
Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to
comb previouslycollected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that
eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of
information aboutal-Qa'ida;however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Overtheensuing montlis, theCIA designed
a newinterrogation program thatwould be safe, effective, and legal." Seealso Presidential Speechon September 6,
2006, basedon CIA information and vetted by CIApersonnel, that states: "We knew that Zubaydah had more
information that could save innocent lives. But he stopped talking... And so, the CIA used an alternative set of
procedures."
10424 (070814Z JUN 02)
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume IE, to include CIA email [REDACTED] dated March 28, 2007,
04:42 PM, with the subjectline, "Subjectdetainee allegation - per our telcon of today."
See reportingcharts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated
March 2005. The sameinformation was included in an "AbuZubaydah Bio"document "Prepared on 9 August
2006."
See reporting charts in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
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on the next attack in the United States—and operatives in the United States—provided the basis
for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's
determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques to become "compliant" and reveal the information that CIA Headquarters believed he
was withholding. The CIA further stated that Abu Zubaydah could stop the application of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, like the waterboard, by providing the names of
operatives in theUnited States or information to stop the next attack.^At no point during or
after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type
of information.
representation that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team
believed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in new information
on operatives in the United States and teiTorist plotting is also incongruent with CIA records.
While Abu Zubaydah was in isolation in July 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the Department
of Justice and White House officials that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed Abu
Zubaydah possessed information on terrorist threats to, and al-Qa'ida operatives in, the United
States.The CIA officials further represented that the interrogation team had concluded that
the use of more aggressive methods "is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the
critical information needed to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women, and
children within the United States and abroad," and warned "countless more Americans may die
unless wecan persuade AZto tell us what he knows."^-®^ However, according to CIA cables, the
interrogation team at the detention site had not determined that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques were required for Abu Zubaydah to provide such threat information. Rather, the
interrogation team wrote "[o]ur assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high
degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning
threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided."^^^^
The CIA representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah was effective in producing critical threat information
See 10586 (041559Z AUG 02), which states: "In trutli, [Zubaydah] can halt the proceedings at any
time by providing truthful revelations on the threat which may save countless lives."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
'200 As detailed in DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02). The CIA further represented: (1) that the enhanced
interrogation phase of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation would likely last "no more than several days but could last up
to thirty days," (2) "that tlie use of the [enhanced interrogation techniques] would be on an as-needed basis and that
not all of these techniques will necessaiily be used," (3) tliat the CIA expected"these techniques to be used in some
sort of escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard, though not necessarilyending with this technique," (4)
"that although some of these techniques may be used more tiian once, that repetition will not be substantial because
the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions," and (5) "that steps will be taken to ensure
tliat [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these methods." See the Abu Zubaydah
detainee review for detailed information for how these statements proved almost entirely inaccurate. See also
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Inten ogation of al Qaeda Operative.
'20' DIRECTOR•• (031357Z AUG 02)
'202 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
and •^••1; subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: July 23, 2002, at07:56:49 PM;
[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02). Additional assessments by the interrogation team that Abu Zubaydah was
not witliholding information aie described inth^bi^ubaydal^e^^ in Volume III.
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on terrorists and terrorist plotting against the United States is also not supported by CIA records.
Abu Zubaydah did not provide the information for which theCIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques werejustifiedand approved—information on the next attackand operatives in the
United States.According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida
activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership
structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics."'^ ®"^ This type
of information was provided by Abu Zubaydah prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydahprovide information on al-Qa'ida cells in the United
States or operational plans for terrorist attacks against the United States.Further, a
quantitative review of Abu Zubaydah's intelligence reporting indicates that more intelligence
reports were disseminated from Abu Zubaydah's first two months of interrogation, before the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and whenFBI special agents were directly
participating, than werederived during the next two-month phase of interrogations, which
included the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 24 hours a day for 17
days.'^ ^^ Nonetheless, on August 30, 2002, the CIA informed the National Security Council that
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Vohniie III. Participants in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydali alsowrote
that Abu Zubaydah"probably reached the pointof cooperation even prior to the August institution of 'enhanced'
measures-a development missed because of the narrowfocus of die questioning. In any event there was no
evidence that the waterboard produced time-perishable information which otherwise would have been
unobtainable." See CIA Summary and Reflections ofm^^|Medical Services on OMS participation in the RDI
program.
CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated March 2005. See also "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared
on 9 August 2006."
See Abu Zubaydahdetainee review in Volume III, and CIA paperentitled,"Abu Zubaydah," dated March2005;
as well as "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document"Prepared on 9 August 2006."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
Abu Zubaydah was taken intoCIAcustody on March 2002, and was shortly thereafter hospitalized until
April 15, 2002. Abu Zubaydah returned to DETENTION SITEGREEN on April 15,2002. During the months of
April and May 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on lifesupport andunable tospeak
(Abu Zubaydah communicated primarily withFBI special agents in writing), Abu Zubaydah's interrogations
resulted in 95 intelligence reports. In February 2008, theCIAidentified the"keyintelligence andreporting derived"
from Abu Zubaydah. The three items identified bytheCIA were all acquired in April andMay of 2002 by FBI
interrogators. Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation from June 18, 2002, to August 4, 2002, without being asked
any questions. After 47 days in isolation, the CIA reinstituted contact widi Abu Zubaydah at approximately 11:50
AMon August 4,2002, when CIApersonnel entered thecell, shackled andhooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his
towel, leaving Abu Zubaydali naked. Without asking any questions, CIA personnel made a collar around his neck
with a towel and used thecollar "toslam him against a concrete wall." Multiple enhanced inteiTogation techniques
were used non-stop until 6:30PM, when Abu Zubaydah wasstrapped to the waterboard and subjected to the
waterboard technique "numerous times" between 6:45 PM and 8:52 PM. The"aggressive phase of interrogation"
using theCIA'senhanced interrogation techniques continued for20days. {See Abu Zubaydah treatment cluonology
in Volume III.) During the months of August and September 2002, Abu Zubaydah's reporting resulted in 91
intelligence reports, fourfewer than thefirst twomonths of his CIAdetention. {See Abu Zubaydah detainee review
in VolumeIII.) Specifically, for infonnation on AbuZubaydah's initialwalling, see CIA email dated March28,
2007, at 04:42 PM, withthe subject line, "Subject detainee allegation - perour telcon of today," which states that
Abu Zubaydah claims "a collar was used to slam him against a concrete wall." The CIA officer wrote, "While we
do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at thesite at thetime confinned that this did indeed happen.
For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at tlie site after the walling on the concretewall."
Regarding theCIA's assessment of the "key intelligence" from Abu Zubaydah, seeCIA briefing documents for
Leon Panetta entitled, "Tab9: DCIA Briefing onRDI ftogram- I8FEB.2009" andgraphic attachment, "Key
Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abj^ubaydaj^n^aiali^hay^ (KSM)" (includes "DCIA
Kii' 'iM III' I I kII mil I
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the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and "producing meaningful
results."'^ ^^ Shortly thereafter, however, in October 2002, CIArecords indicate that President
Bush was informed in a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) that "Abu Zubaydah resisted providing
useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of
improving his living conditions." The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.Subsequently, the CIArepresented to other senior policymakers
and the Departmentof Justice that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were
successfully used to elicit critical information from Abu Zubaydah.For example, in a March
2, 2005, CIA memorandum to the Department of Justice, the CIA represented that information
obtained from Abu Zubaydah on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and Jose Padilla was acquired only
''after applying [enhanced] inteiTogation techniques."This CIA representation was repeated
in numerous CIA communications with policymakers and the Department of Justice.The
information provided by the CIA was inaccurate. On the evening of April 20, 2002, prior to the
Briefing on RDIProgram" agenda, CIAdocument "ElTs andEffectiveness," withassociated documents, "Key
Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZand KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart:
Attachment," and "supporting references," to includeJ|Backgroun Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")-
On August 30, 2002, Legal, IHIHHiHl' Legal Adviser John Bellinger
to discuss Abu Zubaydali's interrogation. {See email from; John Rizzo^o^ohn Moseman; subject: Meeting with
NSC Legal Adviser, 30 August 2002; date: September 3, 2002; ALEC |m^|, 052227Z SEP 02.) According to
I's email documenting themeeting, he"noted that we had employed thewalling techniques,
confinement box, waterboard, along with some of the other methods which also had been approved by the Attorney
General,"and "reportedthat while the expertsat the site andat Headquarters werestill assessing the product of the
recent sessions, it did appeal" that the currentphase was producing meaningful results." {See email from: John
Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser, 30 August 2002;date: September3, 2002.)
The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described to Bellinger with respect to either the use of
the techniques or the"results" of the interrogation. It is unclear from CIArecords whether the CIA ever informed
the NSC legal adviseror anyoneelse at the NSC or the Department of Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide
information about future attacks against the UnitedStatesor operatives taskedto commit attacks in the U.S., during
or after tlie use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
ALEC ilil (181439Z OCT 02)
These representations were eventually included in the President's September 6, 2006, speech, in which the
President stated: "We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped
talking... so tlieCIA used an alternative set of procedures... Zubaydah wasquestioned using these procedures, and
soon he beganto provideinformation on key al Qaedaoperatives, including information that helpedus find and
capture more of those responsible for tlie attacks onSeptember the 11"'." Tliese representations were also made to
the Committee. On September6, 2006, DirectorHaydentestified that, "faced with the techniquesand with the
prospects of whathe did notknow wascoming, Abu Zubaydah decided thathe had earned tlieburden as far as
Allali had requiredhim to cairy it and that he couldput the burden downandcooperate withhis interrogators." {See
transcript of briefing, September 6, 2006 (DTS#2007-1336).) Director Hayden's Statementfor the Recordfor an
April 12, 2007, hearingstated that: "[ajfter the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah becameone of our most
important sources of intelligence on al-Qa'ida." Seestatement for the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence from
CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563).
Italics in original document. CIAMemorandim Bradbury at Office of LegalCounsel,Dep<u-tment of
Justice, dated March 2,2005, fi-om HI Legal Group, DCI Counterteriorist Center, subject
"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Inten-ogation Techniques."
Among otherdocuments, see Department of JusticeOffice of LegalCounsel Memoranda dated May 30, 2005,
and July 20,2007. The July 20, 2007, memorandum - now declassified - states (inaccurately) that: "InteiTogations
of Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques wereemployed—revealed two al Qaedaoperatives already in the
United States and planningto destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonatea radiologicalbomb in
Washington, D.C." See VolumeII, specifically the sectionon the "Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/TallBuildings
Plot" and tlie capture of Jose Padilla, for additional details concerning the inaccuracies of this statement.
nil I ( nil
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use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided this information to
FBI officers who were using rapport building interrogation techniques.
2. Khalicl Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)
As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA
provided significant inaccurateinformation to policymakers on the effectivenessof the CIA's
enhancedinterrogation techniques in the interrogation of KSM. These representations were
10091 (210959Z APR 02). Despite requests by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the
CIA has never conected the record on this assertion. On September8, 2008, the Committee submitted Questions for
the Record(QFRs) to the CIA from a hearing on the legalopinions issuedby the Department of Justice's Officeof
Legal Counsel on theCIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Because of time constraints, theCIAagreed "to
take backseveral questions from Members that [the CIA was] unable to answer at thehearing." On the topic of the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, theCommittee asked"Why was this information
[related to Padilla], which was not obtained through the use of EITs, included in the 'Effectiveness Memo?"' CIA
records provided for thi^jevi^ contain coinplete^respoi^s to tliese Questions for the Record. Tlie CIA's answer
to this question was: Legal simply inadvertently reporte^iis wrong. Abu
Zubaydah provided information on Jose Padilla while being interrogated by the FBI (HIHl 10091)." The
Committee never received this response, despite numerous requests. Instead, the CIA responded with a letter dated
October 17,2008, stating that the "CIAhas responded to numerous written requests for information from SSCIon
this topic [theCIA's Detention andInterrogation Program]," and that"[w]eare available to provide additional
briefings on this issue to Members as necessary." In a letterto CIA Director Michael Hayden, Chairman
Rockefeller wrote, "[tjhe CIA's refusal to respond to hearing Questions for the Record is unprecedented and is
simply unacceptable." Senator Feinstein wrote a separate letter toCIA Director Michael Hayden stating, "I want
you to know that I found the October 17,2008 reply...appalling." The CIA did not respond. (See: (1) Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Questions for theRecord submitted toCIADirector Michael Hayden on September 8,
2008, with a request for a response byOctober 10,2008 (DTS #2008-3522); (2) CIA document prepared in
response to "Questions for theRecord" submitted by theSenate Select Committee on Intelligence on September 8,
2008; (3) letter from Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence ChairmanJohn D. RockefellerIV, dated October29,
2008, toCIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217); (4)letter from Senate Select Committee onIntelligence
ChainnanJohn D. Rockefeller IV,dated October 29,2008, to CIADirector Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217);
and (5) letter from Senate Select Committeeon IntelligenceCommittee member, Dianne Feinstein, dated October
30, 2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS#2008-4235).) In February 2004, a seniorCIA officer wrote: "AZ
never really gave 'this is theplot' type of information. He claimed every plot/operation he hadknowledge of and/or
wasworking on wasonlypreliminary. (Padilla and thedirtybomb plot was prior to enhanced andhe never really
gave actionable to get them)." See email from: llli^^H|^^H||||htoJH|||^^H^m, cc:[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^BHIilHjohn^Mu^^[REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTEDlHIHBIH; subject: Please
Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004)
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provided by the CIA to the the White House/^^^ the Department ofJustice,the
Congress,and the American public.The representations include that: (1) KSM provided
little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques(2) the CIA overcame KSM's resistance through the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques;^-^® (3) the CIA'swaterboard interrogation technique
was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM;'^ '^ (4) KSM "recanted little of the
information" he had provided, and KSM's information was "generally accurate" and
"consistent";'-^^ (5) KSM made a statement to CIA personnel—"soon, you will know"—
indicating an attack was imminent upon his aiTest; and (6) KSM believed "the general US
'2''' Among otlierdocuments, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: JamesPavitt, DeputyDirectorfor
Operations; subject: re (S)Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation
Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of
CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Inten'ogation Activities.
'2'-'' Among otlierdocuments, see Memorandum for the Record: "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July
2003,"Memorandum prepaied by CIAGeneral Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003,and briefing slides
entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003,presented to seniorWhite House officials; Briefing for
Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. CIAdocument dated March4, 2005, entitled,
"Briefingfor Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program," and "DCIA TalkingPoints:
Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov.
6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."
Among otlier documents, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from ||^|
Legal Group, DCICounterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of theCIACounterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.
Among otherdocuments, see CIA classifiedStatement for the Record, SenateSelectCommitteeon Intelligence,
provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Cential Intelligence Agency, 12April 2007; andaccompanying
Senate SelectCommitteeon Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12,2007,entitled, "Hearing on Central
Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program."
See, for example, CIA "Questions and Proposed Answers" (related to the President's speech)9/2/2006; Tab 2 of
CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, September6, 2006; and speech by President Bush on September 6,
2006.
CIA memorandum to"National Security Advisor," from "Director ofCentral Intelligence,'^ubje^
"Effectiveness oftlie CIA Counterterrorist Inte^ogatioirrechni^ included in email from: to:
and subject: on value
techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. CIAdocument datedMarch4, 2005, entitled,"Briefingfor
Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIATalkingPointsentitled, "TalkingPoints
for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectivenessof the High-ValueDetaineeIntenogation (HVDI) Techniques."
CIA briefingdocumentdated May 2,2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FORCHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT2
May 2006 Briefingfor Chiefof Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIARendition, Detention and Intenogation
Programs." March2, 2005,Memorandum for Steve Bradbuiy from Legal Group, DCI
CounterteiTorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation Techniques.
CIA memorandum to"National Security Advisor," from "Director ofCentral Intelligence,''Subie^
"Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist InterrogatiornTechi^ included in email from: to:
subject: on value
techniques"; date: December6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM; CIAdocument dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for
Vice PresidentCheney:CIA Detention and Intenogation Program." CIA briefingdocumentdated May 2, 2006,
entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the
President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Intenogation Programs."
See, for example, transcript. Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence, April 12,2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
"Klialid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," authoredby [REDACTED],
CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB; CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and
Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy-Briefing on RDI Program09 Jan. 2009," referenced
materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect
Banack [sic] Obama National Security Teanrruesday^^anuar^009^3^- 11:30 a.m."
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population was 'weak,' lackedresilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary."'"'^
These representations are not supported by internal CIA records.
While the CIA represented to multiple parties that KSM provided
little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, CIA records indicate that KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques within"a few minutes" of first being questioned by CIA
interrogators.This material fact was omitted from CIA representations.
The CIA represented that the CIA overcame KSM's resistance to
interrogation by using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.CIA records do not
support this statement. To the contrary, there are multiple CIA records describing the
ineffectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in gaining KSM's cooperation.
On March 26, 2003, the day after the CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on
KSM, KSM was described as likely lying and engaged in an effort "to renew a possible
resistance stance.On April 2, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism
(IICT) produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded by
a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding information or
lying about terroristplots and operatives targeting the UnitedStates.'--^ During and after the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA repeatedly expressed concern that KSM
was lying and withholding informationin the context of CBRN (Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear) programs,plotting against U.S. interests in Karachi, Pakistan,
plotting against Heathrow Airport,^^^^ Abu Issa al-Britani,^^ '^ as well as the "Second Wave"
plotting against the "tallest building in California," which prompted the CIA's ALEC Station to
note in a cable dated April 22, 2003, that it "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression
towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US
interests, especially inside CONUS."^^^^
1223 2,2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from jj^H Legal Group, DCI
Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIACounterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.
34491 (051400Z MAR 03)
CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject:
'|Effectivenes^ni^CI/^Coun^^ Interrogation Techniques," included in email from;
subject; on value
techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM. CIA document datedMarch 4, 2005,entitled, "Briefing for
Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA briefingdocumentdated May 2, 2006,
entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the
President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition,Detentionand Interrogation Programs."
^••11026 (271034Z MAR 03)1227 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded bya Bodyguard of Lies,"
Interagency IntelligentCommittee on Terrorism (IICT), April 3,2003.
'228 DIRECTOrJ^H (121550Z JUN 03)
'229 alec ^^B(022012Z MAY 03)
1230 Memorandum for:
Action detainee branch; date: 12 June 2003.
'23' ALEC (210159Z OCT 03); email from:
subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16,2003, at 5:25:13 PM.
'232 alec (222153Z APR 03)
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repeatedly represented that the CIA's waterboard
interrogation technique was particularly effective ineliciting information from KSMJ~^^ This
representation is not supported by CIA records. Numerous CIA personnel, including members
of KSM's interrogation team, expressed their belief that the waterboard interrogation technique
was ineffective on KSM. The on-site medical officer told the inspector general that after three or
four days it became apparent that the waterboard was ineffective and that KSM "hatedi^ut
knewhe could manage."^-^"^ KSM debriefer and Deputy Chiefof ALEC Station
BHH inspector general that KSM "figured out a way to deal with [the
waterboard],and she relayed in a 2005 Sametime communication that "we broke KSM...
using the Majid Khan stuff... and theemails |^Mri other words b^onfi^JJJjjJ^^SM with
information from other sources. ^B^^^|CTC Legal, iHHBHIIH, told the
inspector general that the waterboard "was of limited use on KSM."^^^^ A KSM interrogator told
the inspector general that KSM had "beat the system,and assessed that KSM responded to
"creature comforts and sense of importance" and not to "confrontational" approaches.The
interrogator later wrote in a Sametime communication that KSM and Abu Zubaydah "held back"
despite the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, adding "I'm ostracized whenever
I suggest those two did not tell us everything. How dare I think KSM was holding back."'-'^ ® In
April 2003, ^^^^^|OMS told the inspector general that the waterboard had "not been very
effective on KSM." He also "questioned how the repeated use of the waterboard was
categorically different from 'beating the bottom of my feet,' orfrom torture in general."^ '^^ ^
The CIA repeatedly represented that KSM had "recanted little of
the information" he had provided, and that KSM's information was "generally accurate" and
"consistent."^ '^^ ^ This assertion is not supported by CIA records. Thi*oughout the period during
See, for example, SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central IntelligenceAgency
Detention and Intenogatioi^rogri^^ 12, 2007 (SSCI #2007-3158).
'23'' Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May
15,2003.
'-3-'' Interview of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3,
2003.
Sametime Communication, and [REDACTED], 02/May/05, 14:51:48 to 15:17:39. The
"Majid Klian stuff refers to confronting KSM with the reporting of Majid Klian, then in foreign government
custody.
'237 Interview of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector
General, August 20^2003^^^^
'238 Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October
22, 2003.
'239 11715 (201047Z MAY 03)
^2'*') Sametime Communication, and^H^^^H^5/Aug/06, 10:28:38 to 10:58:00. The
Sametime also includes die following statement from "I thinlc it's a dangerous message to say we
could do almost the same without measures. Begs the question- then why did you use them before?"
'2^" Interview of•••••, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General, April 11
and 13,2003.
'2''2 "KlialidShaykhMuhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," was authored by [REDACTED],
CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and
InteiTogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDGCopy- Briefing onRDI Program 09 Jan. 2009,"referenced
materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect
Barrack [sic] Obama National Security TeaiT^uesday^^anuar^009^^3^- 11:30 a.m."
TOP




which KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided
inaccurate information, much of which he would later acknowledge was fabricated and recant.
Specifically, KSM's fabrications andrecantations covered his activities immediately before his
capture,the identity of an individual whom he described as the protector of his children,^-"^
plotting against a U.S. aircraft carrier, a meeting with Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the location of
Hassan Ghul.^^"^^ KSM fabricated significant information, which he would later recant, related to
Jaffar al-Tayyar, stating thatal-Tayyar andJosePadilla were plotting together,linking al-
Tayyar toHeathrow Airport plotting'^ "^^ and toMajid Khan's plotting,and producing what
CIA officials described as an "elaborate tale" linking al-Tayyar to an assassination plot against
former President Jimmy Carter.KSM later explained that "he had been forced to lie" about
al-Tayyar due to the pressure from CIA interrogators.KSM recanted other information about
the Heathrow Airport plotting, including information regarding the targeting,additional
operatives, and the tasking of prospective pilots to study at flight schools.KSM provided
significant information on Abu Issa al-Britani (Dhiren Barot) that he would later recant,
including linking Abu Issaal-Britani to Jaffaral-Tayyar and to the Heathrow Airport plot.'^ ''^
Under direct threat of additional waterboarding,'^ ^"^ KSM told CIA interrogators that he had sent
Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts.In June 2003,
KSM stated he fabricated the story because he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he made
these claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear."^-^^ KSM
also stated that he tasked Majid Khan with recruiting Muslims in the United States,which he
; ALEC
describin
34513 (052246Z MAR 03); 139 (051956Z APR 03)
[34569 (061722Z MAR 03); 1281 (130801Z JUN 04); |
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[REDACTED]; subject: plannedrelease of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detaineeSyedHabib; date:
10751 (102258Z MAR 03)JHH| 10762 (112020Z MAR 03), disseminated iis 1
23796 (121932Z AUG 04); §^>20873 (08163IZ MAR 04); B|||20873 (081631Z MAR 04);
DIRECTOR•• (101847Z MAY 04); DIRECTOR jjj^HaOlS^^M^04)
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03);j\LECMBi (120134Z MAR 03)
10883 (182127^1A^3), disseminated as 11717 (201722Z MAY
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would later recant.^-^^ On May 3, 2003, CIA officers recommended revisiting the information
KSM had provided "during earlier stages of his interrogation process," noting that "he has told us
that he said some things during this phase to get the enhanced measures to stop, therefore some
of this information may be suspect."
The CIA also repeatedly referred to a comment made by KSM
while he was still in Pakistani custody as indicating that KSM had information on an imminent
attack. Inreports to the inspector general,the national security advisor,^and the
Department of Justice,^^^^ among others, theCIA represented that:
"When asked about future attacks planned against the United States, he coldly
replied 'Soon, you will know.' In fact, soon we did know - after we initiated
enhanced measures."^-^^
Contrary to CIA representations, CIA records indicate that KSM's comment was interpreted by
CIA officers with KSM at the time as meaning that KSM was seeking to use his future
cooperation as a "bargaining chip" with more senior CIA officers.
Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM, along with Abu Zubaydah, the
statement that "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to
'do what was necessary' to prevent the teiTorists from succeeding in their goals."^-^-^ There are
no CIA operational or interrogation records to support the representation that KSM or Abu
Zubaydah made these statements.
1258 12558 (041938Z AUG 03); |
disseminated as|
1259 11437 (031551Z MAY 03). As detailed in Volumes II and III, KSM's claims tliat he fabricated
information appeared credible to CIA officers. Other intelligence collection supported these claims.
Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG SpecialReview, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program"(2003-7123-IG);
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004,Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism
Detention and Intenogation Activities.
'2'"' CIA memorandumto "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject:
"Effectiveness ofthe CIA Countertenorist Intermgatioi^ech^ included in email from:
and iiiiigliiiiiiiiiiiggiii^ subject; on value
techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM.
March 2, 2005, Memorandumfor Steve Bradbury from Legal Group, DCI
Countertenorist Center re: Effectiveness of tlie CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.
Email from: to: cc: ••••, [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
BHI^^Hi^H^ubject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. Memorandum for:
Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Duectorfor Operations; subject: re (S)Comments to Draft IG
Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: Febmary 27, 2004;
attachment: February24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's CounterteiTorism Detention and Intenogation
Activities.
41592 (051050ZMAR03);(^••^•41627(0^29Z^R03)1265 March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradburyft^mJJ(HBBBi» iiH Legal Group, DCI
Countertenorist Center re: Effectiveness onh^CI^Countertenjorisnntm Techniques.
111! I (III I I III! I III 11
Page 215 of 499
|31148(171919Z DEC 05); I 31147 (171919Z DEC 05),
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Kii I (III I
E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence"
The CIA represented that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques resulted in the collection of "a high volume of critical intelligence'-^^ on al-
Qa'ida."'^ ^^ The Committee evaluated the "high volume" ofintelligence collected by compiling
the total number of sole source and multi-source disseminated intelligence reports from the 119
known CIA detainees.
The CIA informed the Committee that its interrogation program
was successful in developing intelligence and suggested that all CIA detainees produced
disseminated intelligence reporting. For example, in September 2006, CIA Director Michael
Hayden provided the following testimony to the Committee:
Senator Bayh: "I was impressed by your statement about how effective the
[CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in eliciting important
information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information
about al-Qa'ida. I think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?"
Director Hayden: "Over 8000, sir."
Senator Bayh: "And yet this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals."
The"critical" description in thisCIA representation is addressed in the section of this summary concerning the
reportedacquisition of actionable intelligence afterthe use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the
CIA representedas enabling the CIA to thwart terrorist plots and capture specific terrorists. See VolumeII for
additional information.
Among other documents, see CIA Memorandum for the National Security Advisor (Rice) entitled,
"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," December 2004; CIA Memorandum to the
Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of theCIACountertenorist Interrogation Techniques," March 2,
2005; CIA briefing notes entitled, "Briefing forVice President Cheney: CIA Detention andInterrogation Program,"
March 4, 2005; CIA talking points for the National Security Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005
DCI MeetingPC: Effectiveness of the High-Value DetaineeInterrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March4,
2005; CIA briefing notes entitled, "Briefingfor Chief of Staff to the PresidentJosh Bolten: CIA Rendition,
Detention, andInterrogation Programs," dated May 2, 2006; CIA briefing document, entitled, "DCIA Talking
Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, witli the notation the document was "sent to
DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." Also included in additional briefingdocumentsreferencedand
described in this summary.1268 \Yi^i|e multi-source intelligence reports are included in the Committee Study, the quantitative analysis in
this summary is basedon sole-source intelligence reporting, as thesereports best reflectreporting from CIA
detainees. Multi-source intelligencereports are reports that contain data from multiple detainees. As described
above, a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA
detainees at a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees were or were not able
to identify or provide informationon the individual. As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS
(202255Z JUN 06), which states that from January 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hambali was "used
in thedissemination of three intelligence reports, two of which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay
detainees," wliile the third "detailed [Hambali's] statement thathe knew of no threats or plots to attack any world
sporting events." Sole-source reports, bycontrast, are based on specific information provided by oneCIAdetainee.




Director Hayden: "No, sir, 96, all96."''^ ^
(^F8yvm^m^H^NF) In April 2007, CIA Director Hayden testified that the CIA's
interrogation program existed "for one purpose - intelligence," and that it is "the most successful
program being conducted by American intelligence today" for "preventing attacks, disabling al-
Qa'ida."^^^*^ At this hearing DirectorHayden again suggested that the CIA interrogation program
was successful in obtaining intelligence from all CIA detainees.^^^^ A transcript of thatheaiing
included the following exchange:
Senator Snowe; "General Hayden. Of the 8000 intelligence reports that were
provided, as you said, by 30 of the detainees."
Director Hayden: "Byall97, ma'am."'^ ^^
suggestion that all CIA detainees provided information that
resulted in intelligence reporting is not supported by CIA records. CIA records reveal that 34
percent of the 119 known CIA detainees produced no intelligencereports, and nearly 70 percent
produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA
records, subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, nearly 20 percent produced
no intelligence reports, while 40 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. While the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program did produce significant amounts of disseminated
intelligencereporting (5,874 sole-source intelligence reports), this reporting was overwhelmingly
derived from a small subset of CIA detainees. For example, of the 119 CIA detainees identified
in the Study, 89 percent of all disseminated intelligence reporting was derived from 25 CIA
detainees. Five CIA detainees produced more than 40 percent of all intelligence reporting from
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA records indicate that two of the five
detainees were not subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques.
F. The Eight Primaiy CIA Effectiveness Representations—the Use of the CIA's Enhanced
InteiTOgation Techniques "Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" and "Capture
Additional Terrorists"
From 2003 through 2009,'^ ^"^ the CIA consistently and repeatedly
represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and necessary to produce
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing by the Director,Central Intelligence Agency, on the Central
Intelligence AgencyDetention, Intenogation and Rendition Program, September 6, 2006 (SSCl #2007-1336). At
the time this statement was made tliere had been at least 118 CIA detainees.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and
Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and
Intenogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and
Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
See detainee intelligence reporting data in Volume 11.
'2 '^' The CIA represented in 2002 that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques were necessary and effective.
The Committee analysis focuses on CIA representation^etweei^OO^n^O^, during which time the CIA
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critical intelligence that "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists,
and collect a high-volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." The CIA further stated that the
information acquired as a result of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques could
not have been acquired by the U.S. governmentin any other way ("otherwise unavailable").
provided specific examples of counterterrorism "successes" tlie CIA attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.
See list of 20 CIArepresentations included in this summary. From2003through 2009, the CIA's
representations regarding theeffectiveness of theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques included a specific setof
examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terroristscaptured that the CIA attributed to informationobtained from
theuse of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA representations further asserted thatthe intelligence obtained
from the useof the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, andresulted in
"savedlives." Among otherCIA representations, sec. (1) CIArepresentations in theDepartment of Justice Office
of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, which relied ona series of highly specific CIA representations
on the typeof intelligence acquired from theuseof theCIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques to assess their
legality. TheCIA representations referenced bythe OLC include that the use of theCIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," "vital," and"otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" thatwas
"essential" for the U.S. government to "detect and dismpt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states
that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for
preventing a subsequent attack within theUnited States." {See Memorandum for John A.Rizzo, Senior Deputy
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 30,2005, Re: Application of United StatesObligations Under Article 16of
theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques thatMay Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al
Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIArepresentations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum
dated July20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from theuseof
theCIA's enhanced interrogation tecliniques. Citing CIA documents andthePresident's September 6, 2006, speech
describing the CIA's interrogation program (which was basedon CIA-provided information), the OLC
memorandum states: "The CIAintenogation program—and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation
techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] byproducing substantial quantities
of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As thePresident explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us
information about terroristplanswe couldnotget anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives.'" {See
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War
Crimes Act, theDetainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions toCertain Techniques
that May BeUsed by theCIA in theInterrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for
membersof the National Security Council in July and September2003 representedthat "the use of Enhanced
Techniques of one kind or another had producedsignificant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA
professionals, saved lives,"andwarned policymakers that "[t]ermination of this program will result in lossof life,
possibly extensive." {See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record fromScott Muller, Subject: Review of
Interrogation Program on 29July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29,2003; September 4,
2003,CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the
Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4)TheCIA's response to theOffice of Inspector
General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: "Information [the CIA] received... as a result of
the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly saved countless American lives
inside theUnited States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to thefact that without theuseof such techniques,
we and our allies would [have] sufferedmajorterrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties."
{See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG SpecialReview, "Counterterrorism Dietention and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG;
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism
Detention andInteiTogation Activities.) (5)CIA briefing documents forCIA Director Leon Panetta in February
2009, which statethat the"CIA assesses that theRDI program worked andthe [enhanced interrogation] techniques
were effective in producing foreign intelligence," andthat"[m]ost, if notall,of the timely intelligence acquired
from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means." {See CIA briefing
documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tal^^CI^Briefin^nRDIProOTan^ 18FEB.2009" and graphic
Kii I ( III I




The CIA also represented tliat the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques was examples of specific terrorist plots"thwarted" and specific
terrorists captured as a result of the use of the CIA's techniques.
For example, in a December 2004 CIA memorandum prepared for
the national security advisor, the CIA wrote that there was "no way to conduct" an
"independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation
techniques," but stated, "[t]he CentralIntelligence Agency can advise you that this program
works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence." To illustrate the
effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques, the CIA provided 11 examples of "[k]ey
intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying inten'ogation techniques," nine of
which referenced specific ten'orist plots or the captureof specific terrorists.Similarly, under
the heading, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," a CIA briefing prepared for President Bush
in November 2007 states, "reporting statistics alone will not provide a fair and accurate measure
of the effectiveness of EITs." Instead, the CIA provided eight "examples of key intelligence
collected from CIA detainee inteiTogations after applying the waterboard along with other
interrogation techniques," seven of which referenced specific terrorist plots or the capture of
specific ten-orists.^^^^
The Committee selected 20 CIA documents that include CIA
representations about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from
2003 through 2009. The 20 CIA documents, which were consistent with a broaderset of CIA
representations made during this period, include materials the CIA preparedfor the White
attaclunent, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah andKlialid Shaykli Muhaminad (KSM),"
including "DCIA Briefing on RDIProgiam" agenda, CIA document "EITs andEffectiveness," with associated
documents, "KeyIntelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZand KSM)," "Background on KeyIntelligence
Impacts Chart: Attachment," and"supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures andPlots
Disrupted.") (6)CIAdocument faxed to theSenate Select Committee onIntelligence on March 18, 2009, entitled,
"[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committeedatabases at DTS#2009-1258, which provides a list of
"some of the key capturesand dismptedplots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced
intenogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if notall, of tlie timely intelligence acquired from
detainees in this program would not havebeendiscovered or reported by anyotiier means." See Volume II for
additional CIArepresentations asserting that tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain
unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
Italics in original document. SeeCIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Directorof Central
Intelligence," Subject: "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterron^nterro^^ included in email
from: iHUHIi' ||||||||||||^gm||||||m^ |||||||||m||||||||||||m_ subject: on
value of interrogation techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The emailreferences the attached
"information paperto Dr. Rice explaining the value of tiie interrogation techniques." The document includes the
following: Tlie "Karachi Plot," "TheHeatlirow Plot," Tlie "Second Wave," "TheGuraba Cell," "Issaal-Hindi,"
"Abu Talha al-Pakistani," "Hambali's Capture,""Jafaaral-Tayyar," "DirtyBombPlot," "Shoe Bomber,"and
"Shkai, Pakistan."
See CIA documententitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboaid 06 November 2007," dated November6, 2007,
with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." The document
states, under theheading, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," that "reporting statistics alone will notprovide a
fair and accurate measureof the effectiveness of EITs," and then provides a list of "examples of key intelligence
collected from CIA detainee inteiTOgations after applying the waterboard along with other intenogation
techniques...The 'Second Wave'...Hambali's Capture...The Guraba Cell...Shoe Bomber...Issa al-Hindi...Jafaar
al-Tayyar... The Karachi Plot...TheHeathro^
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House, the Department of Justice, the Congress, the CIA Office of Inspector General, as well as
incoming members of PresidentObama's national security team, and the public. The Committee
selected the following 20 CIA documents:
1. July and September 2003: CIA Briefing Documents Seeking Policy Reaffirmation of the
CIA InteiTogation Program from White House Officials, "Review of Interrogation
Program."i278
2. Febmary 2004: The CIA's Response to the Draft Inspector General Special Review, CIA
"Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation
Program,'" and attachment, "Successes of CIA's CounterteiTorism Detention and
Interrogation Activities."^^^^
3. July 2004: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent
Source on Al-Qa'ida."'-^"
4. December 2004: CIA Memorandum for the President's National Security Advisor,
"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.
5. March 2005: CIA Memorandum for the Office of Legal Counsel, "Effectiveness of the
CIA CounterteiTorist Interrogation Techniques."
6. March 2005: CIA "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation
Program.
CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July2003,"prepared byCIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slidesentitled, "CM Interrogation Program,'''' dated
July 29, 2003, presentedto seniorWhite Houseofficials. Additional briefings aredetailed in September 4, 2003,
CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: MemberBriefing; and September26, 2003, Memorandum for the
Record from Scott Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.
CIA memorandum to the CIAInspector General from JamesPavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations,
dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Activities," dated February 24,2004.
CIA Directorate ofIntelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad^reeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13,
2004; fax to the Department of Justice, April 22,2005, entitled, Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah.|H "
This report was widely disseminated in theIntelligence Community, and a copyof this report was provided to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence onJuly15,2004. On March 31,2009, former Vice President Cheney
requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released witli redactions on
August 24,2009.
CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject:
"Effectivenes^^l^CI^Coun^ Inte^ogationTech^ included in email from: to:
HmHI' subject: on value
techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "information paper to Dr.
Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques."
CI^Memorandi^ fo^teve Bradbury at Office ofLegal Counsel, Department ofJustice, dated March 2, 2005,
from HILcgtil Group, DCI Countertenorist Center, subject: "Effectiveness ofthe CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."
CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing forVice President Cheney:
CIA Detention and Interrogation Program."




7. March 2005: CIA Talking Points for the National Security Council, "Effectiveness of the
High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques."'^ ^"^
8. April 2005: CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" provided to the
Department of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.
9. April 2005: CIA "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah" and additional CIA documents
provided to the Department of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
10. June 2005: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War
Against Al-Qa'ida."''^ "^
11. December 2005: CIA Document entitled, "Future of CIA's Counterten'orist Detention
and Interrogation Program," with the attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee
Program to CT Operations and Analysis," from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen
Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances Townsend,
Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John
Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence.
12. May 2006: CIA Briefing for the President's Chief of Staff, "CIA Rendition, Detention
and Interrogation Programs," on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.
'284 CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-
Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques."
CIA "Briefing Noteson tlieValueof DetaineeReporting" faxed from the CIA to the Departmentof Justice on
April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM.
CIA fax to DOJ Command Center, dated Apri^2,2005, for Office of Legal Coui^l, U.S.
Depaitment ofJustice, from HHHHI' Legal Group, DCI Counteilerrorist Center, re: H|, Materials
of KSM and Abu Zubaydah, included CIA Intelligence Assessment "Khalid Shaykli Muhammad: Preeminent
Source on Al-Qa'ida," and CIA document, "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah."
CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which
CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. The Intelligence Assessment at the
SECRET//NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On Maich 31, 2009,
former Vice PresidentCheney requestedthe declassification of this Intelligence Assessment,which was publicly
released with redactions on August 24, 2009.
CIA memorandum entitled, "Future of CIA's Counterterrorist Detention and Intenogation Program," dated
December 23, 2005, from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President/National
Security Advisor, Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, Ambassador John
D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, Attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to
CT Operations and Analysis."
CIA briefingdocumentdated May 2, 2006,entitled, "BRIEFING FORCHIEF OF STAFF TO THE
PRESIDENT 2 May2006 Briefingfor Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detentionand
Interrogation Programs."
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13. July 2006: CIA Memorandum for the Director of National Intelligence, "Detainee
Intelligence Value Update."
14. September 2006: CIA documents supporting the President's September 6, 2006, speech,
includingrepresentations on theeffectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program,
including: "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist
Interrogations Program," "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," and
"Summary of the High Value Terrorist DetaineeProgram." ^^^^
15. April 2007: CIA Director Michael Hayden's Testimony to the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence describing the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program.
16. October 2007: CIA Talking Points for the Senate Appropriations Committee, addressing
the effectiveness of theCIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, entitled, "Talking
Points Appeal ofthe SHI Million Reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention
Program.'"-^^
17. November 2007: CIA Director Talking Points for the President, entitled, "Waterboard 06
November 2007," on the effectiveness of the CIA's waterboard interrogation
technique.
18. January 2009: CIA Briefingfor President-elect Obama's National Security Transition
Team on the value of the CIA's "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)."^"^^
19. February 2009: CIA Briefing for CIA Director Leon Panetta on the effectiveness of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB.2009," "Key Intelhgence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," "EITs and Effectiveness," "Key Intelligence Impacts
Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart:
CIA briefing documententitled, "DetaineeIntelligence Value Update,"dated 11 July 2006, internaldocument
saved within CIA records as, "DNI Memo Intel Value July 11 2006...TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING."
CIA documentdated July 16,2006, entitled, "DRAFTPotential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist
Interrogations Program," and"CIAValidation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6,
2006,speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the
High Value Terrorist Detainee Program."
CIA classifiedStatementfor the Record, Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael
V. Hayden, Director, Central IntelligenceAgency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence heating transcript for April 12,2007, entitled,"Hearingon Central Intelligence Agency Detention and
Interrogation Program."
CIA fax from CIA employee[REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committeeon Appropriations, Subcommittee on
Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "T^ng points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed
entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of tlie Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program."
1294 "dcia Talking Points: Waterboard06 November2007," dated November 6, 2007 with tlie notation the
document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."
CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including
"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RD^rogran^^an^OOQ/^repared "13 January 2009."
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Attachment," and "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted," among other CIA
documents.
20. March 2009: CIA Memorandum for the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, including representations on the "Key Captures and Disrupted Plots Gained
from HVDs in the RDI Program."^^^^
From the 20 CIA documents, the Conmiittee identified the CIA's
eight most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists that the CIA
attributed to information acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques:
Eight MostFrequently CitedExamples ofPlots*'Thwarted*^
and Terrorists Captured Providedbythe CIA as Evidencefor
the Effectiveness ofthe CWs Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques
Referenced X Nutnber
ofTimes in the 20 CIA
Documents
1
The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and
the Capture of Jose Padilla
17/20
2 The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots 17/20
3
The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery
of the al-Ghuraba Group
18/20
4
The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot
and die Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi
17/20
5 The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris 7/20
6 The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat 17/20
7
The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf
Plotting
20/20
8 The Capture of Hambali 18/20
The Confmiittee sought to confirm that the CIA's representations
about the most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists were
consistent with the more than six million pages of CIA detention and inteiTogation records
provided to the Committee. Specifically, the Committee assessed whether the CIA's
representations that its enhanced interrogation techniques produced unique, otherwise
unavailable intelligence^ that led to the capture of specific ten'orists and the "thwarting" of
CIA briefingdocuments for Leon Panetta,entitled, "Tab 9: DCIABriefing on RDl Program- 18FEB.2009" and
graphicattachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and KhalidShaykhMuhammad
(KSM)," Includes "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "ElTs and Effectiveness," with
associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key
Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references,"to include "Background on Key Captures and
Plots Disrupted."
CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Mai'ch 18, 2009, at 3:46 PM, entitled,
"[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," which includes "Key Captures and Disrupted Plots Gained From HVDs in the RDI
Program" (DTS #2009-1258).
1298 piom 2003 tlirough 2009, the CIA's representations regarding tlieeffectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examplesof teiTorist plots "disrupted" and tenorists captured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained fronUh^is^nt^nhance^nte^og^ation techniques. CIA
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representations further asserted that the intelhgence obtainedfrom the useof the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations,see:
(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which relied on a series of highly specificCIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. Tlie CIA representations referenced by the
OLC include tliat the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critic^,"
"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionableintelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect
and disnipt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United
States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquiredfrom the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Citing CIA documents and the President's September6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program
(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandumstates: "The CIA interrogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As tlie President
explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhereelse,
the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by tlieCIA in the Intenogation of High Value
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefingsfor members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003
represented that "the use of EnhancedTechniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence
informationthat had, in the viewof CIA professionals, saved lives," and warnedpolicymakers that "[t]ermination of
this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from
Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Inteirogation
Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and
September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Recordfrom Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) Tlie
CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts:
"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced inteirogation techniques ('ElTs') has
almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to
the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the
[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and tliat "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other
means." (See CIA briefing documentsfor Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart:Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background
on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIAdocument faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligenceon
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258,
which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence
acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See
Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the
CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
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specific plots were accurate.The Committee found the CIA's representations to be
inaccurate and unsupported by CIA records.
Below are the summaries of the CIA's eight most frequendy cited
examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists, as well as a description of the CIA's claims
and an explanation for why the CIA representations were inaccurate and unsupported by CIA
records.
1. The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture ofJose Padilla
Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced inten'ogation
techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence,
which enabled the CIA to disaipt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period
of years, the CIA provided the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated with, and the capture of,
Jose Padilla, as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
These CIA representations were inaccurate. The CIA first received reporting on the terrorist
threat posed by Jose Padilla from a foreign government. Eight days later, Abu Zubaydah
provided information on the terrorist plotting of two individuals, whom he did not identify by
ti-ue name, to FBI special agents. Abu Zubaydah provided this information in April 2002, prior
to the commencement of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002. The plots
associated with Jose Padilla were assessed by the Intelligence Community to be infeasible.
'299 xlye dy\ has representedthat it has provided the SenateSelectCommittee on Intelligencewith all CIA records
related to tlie CIA'sDetention and Intenogalion Program. This document production phase lasted more than three
years and was completed in July 2012. The records produced include more than six million pages of material,
including records detailing the interrogation of detainees, as well as the disseminated intelligence derived from the
interrogation of CIA detainees. The CIA did not provide—nor was it requested to provide—intelligence records that
were unrelated to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. In other words, this Study was completed without
direct access to reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign liaison assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee
debriefings, law enforcement derived information, and otlier methods of intelligence collection. Insomuch as this
material is included in the analysis herein, it was provided by the CIA witliin the context of documents directly
related to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. For example, a requirements cable from CIA Headquarters
to CIA interrogators at a CIA detention site could cite SIGNALS intelligence collected by NSA, or include a CIA
HUMINT source report on a particulai- subject, with a request to question tlie CIA detainee about the reporting.
While direct access to the NSA report, or the CIA HUMINT report, may not have been provided, it may still be
included in this Study because it appeared in the CIA Headquarters requirements cable relating to the questioning of
a CIA detainee. As such, there is likely significant intelligence related to die terrorist plots, terrorists captured, and
other intelligence matters examined in diis report, that is unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
and within the databases of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but which has not been identified or reviewed by the
Select Committee on Intelligence for this Study. As is detailed in the near 6800-page Committee Study, the
Committee found that there was significant intelligence in CIA databases to enable the capture of the terrorists cited,
and "disrupt" the terrorist plots represented as "tliwarted," without intelligence from the CIA intenogation program.
Had tlie Committee been provided with access to all intelligence available in CIA and Intelligence Community
databases, it is likely this finding would be strengthened further. Finally, as of March 2014, the White House had
not yet provided approximately 9,400 documents related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program—
equivalent to less than .2 percent of CIA detention and interrogation records—pending an Executive Privilege
determination. Tlie Committee requested access to tliese documents in tluee letters dated January 3, 2013, May 22,
2013, and December 19, 2013. The White House did not respond to tlie requests.
See Volume II for additional informationandanalysi^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Further Details: The Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings plotting refers to
terrorist plotting involving U.S. citizen Jose Padilla. Padilla and his associate, Binyam
Mohammed, conceived the "Dirty Bomb Plot" after locating information, derived from what the
CIA described as "a satirical internet article" entitled "How to Make an H-bomb," on a computer
at a Pakistani safe house in early 2002.^^®^ The article instructed would-be bomb makers to
enrich uranium by placing it "in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and swinging it around
your head as fast as possible for 45 minutes.Padilla and Mohammed approached Abu
Zubaydah in early 2002, and later KSM, with their idea to build and use this device in the United
States.Neither Abu Zubaydah nor KSM believed the planwas viable,'^ '^^ but KSM provided
funding for, and tasked Padilla to conduct, an operation using natural gas to create explosions in
tall buildings in the United States,^^^^ later known as the"TallBuildings Plot."'^ ®^
1301 10090 (210703Z APR 02) and CIA Document, Subject: "CIA Statement Summarizing Significant
Infonnation About Jose Padilla (21:10 hrs.- 8 June 02}." For more information on the Internet article that
recommended enriching uranium by "putting it into a bucket and twisting it around one's head to enrich it," see
2Jow to Make an H-Bomb" and [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04). See also email from: [REDACTED],
I^^BoTA/CTWG/CBRN Group; to: [REDACTED] and multiple ccs, including subject: "Re:
[REDACTED]: Re: KSM homework on AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA's
CBRN group's position on Padilla and Mohammed's plotting. According to the email: "Padilla and
Binyam/Zouaoui had pulled an article off a satirical web site called 'How to make an H-bomb' which is based on a
1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results article. The article was intended to be humorous and included instructions
such as enriching uranium by placing liquiduranium hexaflouride in a bucket,attaching it to a six foot rope,and
swinging it around your head as fast as possible for 45 minutes. While it appears that Padilla and Zouaoui took the
article seriously, Zubaydah recommended that they take their (cockamamie) ideas to (I believe) KSM in Karachi. It
was at that point that KSM told them to focus on bringing down apartment buildings with explosives, (in other
words: keep your day iobs)." U.K. courts noted "that
Email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; subject: "Note to Briefers Updating Zubaydah 'Uranium
Device' Information"; date: April 23,2002, at 08:25:40 PM. The email states, "CIA and Lawrence Livermore
National Lab have assessed that the article is filled with countless technical inaccuracies which would likely result in
the deatli of anyone attempting to follow the instructions, and would definitely not result in a nuclear explosive
device." See also [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04).
'303 10090 (210703Z APR 02)
'30^ CIA^^^B (290925Z APR 02); 11086 (261140Z APR 02). See also Padilla statement noting Abu
Zubaydah "chuckled at the idea," but sent Padilla and Muhammad to Karachi to present the idea to KSM. See fax
from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice NationalSecurity Division, to [REDACTED],at CTC Legal, on August 15,
2007, with subject line: "Jose Padilla."
DIRECTOR•• (041637Z). See also CIA•• (290925Z APR 02); |||^Bi| 10091 (210959Z APR
02); [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04); and DIRECTOR (J01725Z MAR 04).
For additional background on the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plotting, see fax from Pat Rowan, Departmentof
Justice National Security Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: "Jose
Padilla." The document states: "Jose Padilla is a United States citizen who has been designatedas an enemy
combatant by the President and has been detainedby the military since June 9, 2002. Padilla is commonly known as
\e 'dirty bomber' because early intelligence from a senior al Qaeda detainee [Abu Zubaydah] and Padilla's
intended accomplice [Binyam Muhammad] indicated that he had proposed to senior al Qaeda leaders the use of a
radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty bomb,' against United States targets, or interests, and he was detained by the
military partly on that basis. Based on later and more complete intelligence, including Padilla's own statements
/ during military detention, it now appears that Padilla re-entered the United States after he accepted a mission from al
Qaeda leaders, specifically from Klialid SheikhMohammad ('KSM'), the emir of the attacks of September11, to
destroy one or more high-rise apartment buildings in the United States tlirough the use of natural gas explosions
triggered by timing devices, and had received training, equipment and money for that mission." See also other
records that describe the plotting as targeting tall apartment buildings, without reference to a radiological or "dirty"
bomb. For example, aJuly 15, 2004, CIA intelligenc^eporUitle^ Muhammad: Preeminent
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The capture of, and the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated
with Jose Padilla, is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as
evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of
years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials,
and the Department of Justice represent the identification and/or the capture of Jose Padilla,
and/or the disruption of the "Dirty Bomb," and/or the "Tall Buildings" plotting, as examples of
how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD inteiTogations after applying interrogation
techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capaire additional terrorists."
The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives,
Source on Al-Qa'ida," noted: "From late 2001 until early 2003, KSM also conceived several low-level plots,
including an early 2002 plan to send al-Qa'ida operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise
apartment buildings in an unspecified majorUS city." Similarly, an Intelligence Community report titled,"Klialid
Shaykli Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, SuiTounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," noted: "Binyam
Muhammad stated during his debriefmgs that his and Padilla's objective was to topple a high-rise building with a
gas explosion in Chicago." (See Community CounterteiTorism Board, IntelligenceCommunity Terrorist Tlireat
Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of
Lies," Report Number IICT-2003-14, April 3, 2003.) The unclassified ODNI "Summary of the High Value
TeiToristDetainee Program," released September 6, 2006, states that, "[wjorking with information from detainees,
the US dismpted a plot to blow up tall buildings in the United States. KSM later described how he had directed
operatives to ensure the buildings were high enough to prevent the people trapped above from escaping out of the
windows, thus ensuring their deaths from smoke inhalation."
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Tecliniques," from March 2, 2005. See also CIA talking points for National Security
Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of tlie High-Value Detainee
Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005, as well as multiple otlier CIA briefing records and
memoranda described in Volume II.
1308 Prom 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
intenogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see:
(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which relied on a series of liighly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of
the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by tlie
OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical,"
"vital," and "othei*wiseunavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect
and disrupt" tenorist threats. The OLC memorandum furtlierstates that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within tlie United
States." {SeeMemorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandumdated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelhgence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program
(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhanced intenogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President
explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about tenorist plans we could not get anywhere else,
the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
loi 'iM III I
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Por example, a document prepared for Vice President Cheney in
advance of a March 8, 2005, National Security Council principals meeting states, under a section
entitled "INTERROGATION RESULTS," that:
"Use of DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a
comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist
plots...
.. .Dirty Bomb Plot: Operatives Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed planned
to build and detonate a 'dirty bomb' in the Washington DC area. Plot
disrupted. Source: Abu Zubaydah."^^^^
IntelligenceAgency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy AssistantAttorney General, Officeof Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of the GenevaConventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Usedby the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003
represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or anotherhad producedsignificant intelligence
information that had, in the viewof CIA professionals, saved lives," and warnedpolicymakers that "[t]ermination of
this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." {SeeAugust 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from
Scott Muller, Subject: Reviewof Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefingslides, CIA Interrogation
Program,July 29, 2003; September4, 2003,CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: MemberBriefing; and
September26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject:CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The
CIA's response to the Office of InspectorGeneral draft Special Reviewof the CIA program, which asserts:
"Information [tlieCIA] received... as a resultof the lawfuluse of enhancedinterrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidencepoints cleariy to
the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terroristattacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." {See Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention
and Intenogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefingdocuments for CIA
Director Leon Panetta in Febmary2009,which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI programworked and the
[enhanced intenogation] techniques wereeffective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in thisprogram would nothave beendiscovered or reported byother
means." {See CIA briefingdocuments for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefingon RDI Program-
18FEB.2009" and graphicattachment, "KeyIntelligence and Reporting Derived from AbuZubaydah and Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including"DCIA Briefingon RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on KeyIntelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background
on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIAdocument faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258,
which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence
acquired from detainees in this program would nothave been discovered or reported by any other means." See
VolumeII for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the
CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and
Interrogation Program." Tlie briefing document further represented that: (1) "Prior to the use of enhanced measures
against skilled resistors [sic] like KSM and Abu Zubaydah- the two most prolific intelligence producers in our
control- we acquired little threat information or significant actionable intelligence"; and (2) "[CIA] would not have
succeeded in overcoming the resistance of KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and other equally resistant HVDs without the
application of EITs." \
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Likewise, the July 20, 2007, Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) memorandum on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used CIA-
provided information on Jose Padilla to describe the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and the success of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to date. The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum
states:
"The CIA interrogation program—and, in particular, its use of enhanced
interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities ofotherwise unavailable
intelligence. The CIA believes that this program 'has been a key reason why
al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11
September 2001'... We understand that use of enhanced techniques has
produced significant intelligence that the Government has used to keep the
Nation safe. As the President explained [in his September 6, 2006 speech], 'by
giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the
program has saved innocent lives'.. .For example, we understand that enhanced
interrogation techniques proved particularly crucial in the interrogations of
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Zubaydah... Interrogations of
Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two
al-Qaeda operatives alreadyin the United States^^ '^^ andplanning to destroy a
high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in
Washington,
On April 21, 2009, a CIA spokesperson confirmed the accuracy of the information in the OLC
memorandum in response to the partial declassification of this and other memoranda.
The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the
thwarting of the Dirty Bomb plotting, the thwarting of the Tall Buildings plotting, and/or the
capture of Jose Padilla in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department
of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.^^^^
Italics added. CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided information on "two operatives already
in the United States." While neither Binyam Muhammad nor Jose Padilla was "already in the United States," the
OLC description appears to be a reference to Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammad, as the OLC then makes
reference to the "Dirty Bomb" and "Tall Buildings" plotting.
Italics added. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re:
Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the InteiTogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
See "Waterboarding Saved L.A.," Washington Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts
that it "took [the CIA] until 2007 to consistently stop referring to [Padilla's] 'Dirty Bomb' plot—a plan [the CIA]
concluded early on was never operationally viable." As noted, the CIA continued to refer to the "Dirty Bomb"
plotting through 2007 and confimied tlie information publicly in 2009.
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 tlirough 2009 with representations on the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in
Volume II.
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^ review of CIA operational cables and other CIA records found
that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of
"Jose Padilla" or the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb or Tall Buildings plotting. CIA records
indicate that: (1) there was significant intelligence in CIA databases acquired prior to—and
independently of—the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to fully identify Jose Padilla
as a terrorist threat and to disrupt any terrorist plotting associated with him;^^^"^ (2) Abu
Zubaydah provided information on the terroristplotting of two individuals who proposedan idea
to conduct a "Dirty Bomb" attack, but did not identify their true names; (3) Abu Zubaydah
provided this information to FBI specialagents who were using rapport-building techniques,
in April 2002, more than three months prior to the CIA's "use of DOJ-approved enhanced
See. for example, CIA documententitled, "CIA StatementSummarizing
Sign^ant Information About Jose Padilla {21:10 hrs.- 8June 02}"; 10972 (12031Z APR 02); ALEC
•IH (231837Z APR 02); and 10976 (120948Z APR 02); among other records.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidah" and provide^^h^en^e Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS#
2010-2939). Seealso 10092 (211031Z APR02). WhileAbuZubaydah wassubjected to sleep
deprivation and nudity prior to this date by the CIA,he had been allowedto sleep shortly prior to beingquestioned
on this matterby the FBI special agents, who were exclusively usingrapport-building interrogation techniques when
the information was acquiredfrom Abu Zubaydah (who was covered with a towel). The sleep deprivation and
nudity as implementedduring thisperiod differedfrom how sleep deprivation and nuditywere implemented after
the CIA developed, and the Department of Justiceapproved, the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques"in
August2002. Rather than beingplacedin a stress position during sleepdeprivation, Abu Zubaydahwas kept awake
by being questioned nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI interrogators. Recordsfurther indicate that during breaks in
the interrogations, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly sleep. See also I^HHI 10116 (25073IZ APR 02),
whichdescribes this sleepdeprivation as a period of "no sustainedsleep" with"cat napsbetween interrogators."
The cable further states: "Like many medical students, the subject appears to handle 76 plus hours of limitedsleep
with few problems" (italicsadded). The useof nudity during thisperiodalso differedfrom future uses of nudity, as
Abu Zubaydahwas covered when interrogated by tlie FBI. See also SSCI Staff interview of FBI Special Agent Ali
Soufan, April 28, 2008, at 1:20 PM, Hart Senate Office Building (transcript at DTS #2008-2411). Ali Soufan
described events prior to Abu Zubaydah's provision of information related to the "Dirty Bomb," stating: "He was
injured,badly injured. He was dehydrated. I remember we were puttingice on his lips. And he didn't have any
bowel control, so we were cleaninghim. And the reasonI'm telling you some of these disgusting things is because
it helped build rapport with the guy in this short period of time." Later, Ali Soufan described the provision of
information related to the Dirty Bomb plotting, statingjJ'When I was going in, he was totally naked. I refused to go
and interview him naked. So I took atowel. And H I and [REDACTED], every time we went in he had to
be covered or I [wouldn't] go. It's as simple as that." See also section of transcript stating, "So we went back. And
we start talking to him. We took someCoke, tea, and we start talkingabout different things. We flipped him about
differentthings, and I and [REDACTED]. Andthen he came back to his senses and he startedcooperating
again. And this is when he gave us Padilla." (AbuZubaydahprovidedinformation concerningthe Dirty Bomb
plotting and Jose Padilla's kimya, but did not provide the name "Jose Padilla." As described in this summary, Jose
Padilla's name had already been provided to the CIA by a foreign government that identified Padilla as a U.S.
citizen suspected of being engaged in possible terrorist activity.) See also Abu Zubaydah detainee review in
Volume III.
III! I 1 III I
Page 230 of 499
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
interrogation techniques";^and (4) the Intelligence Community internally assessed that the
"Dirty Bomb"^^^^ and "TallBuildings"'^ ^^ plots were infeasible as envisioned.
Ti;ie Department of Justice finalized its approval of theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including
walling, facial slaps, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the waterboard, as well as other
techniques, on August 1, 2002. See VolumeI and Volume HI for additional details. Beginningon August 4, 2002,
and extending through August 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was subjectedto the non-stop concurrent use of the CIA's
enhanced intenogation techniques, including at least 83 applications of the waterboard. CIA records indicate that
tlie use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques ceased on August 30, 2002, when Abu Zubaydah received
clothing.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II, to include: (1) email from: [REDACTED]^^^^
^BBOTA/CTWG/CBRN Group; to: [REDACTED] and multiple ccs, including subject: "Re:
[REDACTED]: Re: KSM homework on AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA's
CBRN group's positionon Padillaand Mohammed'splotting; "Padillaand Binyam/Zouaoui had pulled an article
off a satirical web site called 'How to make an H-bomb' which is based on a 1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results
article. Tlie article was intended to be humorous..."; (2) email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; subject:
"Note to Briefers Updating Zubaydah 'Uranium Device' Information"; date: April 23, 2003, at 08:25:40 PM; and
(3) U.K. court records relaying that "[Binyam Mohammed] at the outset said tliere was no Dirty Bomb plot (a
position he has consistently maintained to his defense lawyers)" (UKJudgment, at 39). According to U.K. legal
records, "[Binyam Mohammed] said ... that he had seen a file on a computer in Lahore and decided it was a joke -
part of the instruction included adding bleach to uranium 238 in a bucket and rotating it around one's head for 45
minutes." (UK Judgment, at 11). On June 10, 2002, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced, "We have
captured a known terrorist who was exploring a plan to build and explode a radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty
bomb,' in the United States." The statement continued: "In apprehending A1 Muhajii* as he sought entry into the
United States, we have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States by exploding a radioactive
'dirty bomb.' Now, a radioactive 'dirty bomb' involves exploding a conventional bomb that not only kills victims in
tlie immediate vicinity, but also spreads radioactive material that is highly toxic to humans and can cause mass death
and injury. From information available to the United States government, we know tliat Abdullah A1 Muhajir is an
A1 Qaeda operative and was exploring a plan to build and explode a radioactive dirty bomb. Let me be clear: We
know from multiple independent and coiToborating sources that Abdullah A1 Muhajir was closely associated with A1
Qaeda and that as an A1 Qaeda operative he was involved in planning future terrorist attacks on innocent American
civilians in the United States. .. .1 commend the FBI, the CIA and other agencies involved in capturing Abdullah A1
Muhajir before he could act on his deadly plan." See Transcript of the Attomey General John Ashcroft Regarding
the Transfer of Abdullah A1 Muhajir (Bom Jose Padilla) to the Department of Defense as an Enemy Combatant, on
June 10, 2002.
See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to
terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditionsd explosives and VBIEDs.
See also U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report entitled, "Use of
Natural Gas as a Terrorist Weapon in Apartment Buildings," dated August 4, 2008.
The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA "concluded early on" that the "dirty bomb" plot was
"never operationally viable." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "it took [the CIA] until 2007" to stop citing
the "dirty bomb" plot in its representations about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Tliis is incoirect. The CIA refened to tlie disruption of this plotting in a representation to die Department of Justice
in July 2007, in representations to Congress in late October2007, and confirmed this information to tlie press in
April 2009. See CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM.
Document faxed entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of the Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and
Detention Program." See also the July 20, 2007, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum, which states that
"interrogations of Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two al-Qaeda operatives
already in the United States and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological
bomb in Washington, D.C." (italics added). As described elsewhere in this summary and in the full Committee
Study, on April 21, 2009, in response to the partial declassification of OLC memoranda that month, a CIA
spokesperson confirmed the CIA stoodby the "factual assertions" in die OLC memoranda. See "Waterboaiding
Saved L.A.," Washington Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA's June 2013 Response further states "[d]espite the
imprecision of our language, we continue toasses^^va^^oo^xampl^^he importance of intelligence derived
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Prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah on March 28, 2002, the CIA
was alerted to the threat posed by Jose Padilla. In early 2001, U.S. government records indicated
that a Jose Padilla came to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report a lost passport. These records
indicated that Jose Padilla provided a "sketchy" story about overstaying his Pakistani visa and
that he was "allegedly studying Islamic law in Egypt." A search of the State Department's
Consular Lookout and Support System was conducted at the time, which resulted in "multiple"
hits for "Jose Padilla."^^^® State Department records confirmed that Jose Padilla had sought a
new passport at the U.S. Consulate in Karachi in February 2001, and was subsequently provided
with a replacement on March 21, 2001.^-^^^
On December 15, 2001, the CIA provided the FBI with documents
obtained in Afghanistan from a purported al-Qa'ida-related safe house. Included in the binder
were 180 terrorist training camp application forms entitled, "Mujahideen Identification Form /
New Applicant Form." An application form for a then 33-year-old individual with the alias
"Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir" from "America" was among the forms. "Al-Muhajir's" form—dated
July 24, 2000—listed other identifying information, to include a "10/18/70" date of birth;
language skills to include English, Spanish, and Arabic; travels to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Yemen; and the individual's marital status.
from the detainee program." As described in this summary and throughout the full Committee Study, in its efforts to
obtain legal authorization and policy approval for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented
that the intelligence referenced was obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques (not the
"detainee program"), and that the information obtained was unique and otherwise unavailable.
The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is used by State Department passport agencies, post, and
border inspection agencies to perfonn name checks on visa and passport applicants to identify individuals who are,
ineligible for issuance or require other special action. Source: www.state.gov
A February 16, 2001, email entitled, "Lost passport case- Jose Padilla," states that a "Jose Padilla," with a date
of birth of October 18, 1970, came to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report a lost passport. The email notes that
"his story is really-sketchy-been traveling here long enough to overstay his Pakistani visa, but speaks no Urdu, and
is allegedly studying Islamic law in Egypt." A March 5, 2001, email in CIA records, entitled, "The continuing Jose
Padilla saga!" states tliat there are "multiple CLASS hits" (Consular Lookout and Support System) for a Jose
Padilla. The author writes "[REDACTED] and 1both agree there is something sketchy about the guy." On March
21, 2001, State Department records indicate that Jose Padilla was provided with a replacement passport. See
documents included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including
email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]: cc: [REDACTED]; subject: "Lost passport case- Jose Padilla"; date:
February 16, 2001, at 4:46 AM, included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence; second email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: "The continuing
Jose Padilla saga!"; date: March 5, 2001, at 10:09AM; U.S. State Department travel records identified by the
Departmentof Justice; letter from Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Departmentof Defense, to James Comey, U.S. Department
of Justice, dated May 28, 2004.
Italics added. Jose Padilla's fingerprints would later be found on tlie forms. See Jose Padilla U.S. court
documents, which include the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form. See also FBI Washington 101514Z
10AP^07V|Summar^hronolog^f Intelligence on Jose Padilla," and email from: [REDACTED]; to:
subject: "Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with FBI SA in Pakistan at the
time"; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of "Padilla's Muj pledge form." See
also numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to
be Padilla's," New York Times,dated May 16, 2007; "Key Padilla evidence got to CIA in Afghan pickup,"
Associated Press, March 28, 2007; and "Terror Suspect's Path from Streets to Brig," New York Times, dated April
24, 2004. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA could not locate information on this forni in CIA
databases. According to testimony of a CIA officer at Jose Padilla's federal trial, the binder and other material were




On April 10, 2002, the CIA disseminated a cable with intelligence
derived from the exploitation of documents obtained during the raids in which Abu Zubaydah
was captured. Included in the CIA cable is a translation of a letter from mid-March 2002 that
references a 33-yeai'-old English-speaking individual. The cable states that the CIA believed this
individual might be involved in "a martyrdom operation." The translation disseminated states:
"There is a brother from Argentina, he speaks Spanish, English and Arabic, he is 33 years old, he
is maiTied and has two little children. He is a great brother. He knows business and studies
English language. He trains [in] selfdefense, he is a good looking man."^^^-^
April 11, 2002, the CIA was provided with
information from Pakistani officials on a 33-year-old U.S. citizen named "Jose Padilla," with a
date of birth of October 18, 1970, who was briefly detained by Pakistani officials on April 4,
2002. The Pakistani government provided a copy of Jose PadiUa's U.S. passport and relayed that
Jose Padilla had overstayed his travel visa, and that there were inconsistencies with Jose
Padilla's appearance and accent. The CIA's wrote that they would provide the
information on "Jose Padilla" to the State Department's Regional Security Officer, and "would
follow-up with [Pakistani officials] on this matter." The date of birth and travel information
included with Jose PadiUa's passport matched information on the "Mujahideen Identification
Form" (33-year-old "American" referenced as "Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir") the CIA had
provided to the FBI on December 15, 2001.^^^^
^002, Pakistani officials provided additional
information to the CIA's specifically that they had detained a U.S. passport holder
named Jose Padilla and a British passport holder named "Fouad Zouaoui" (later identified as
Binyam Muhammad), who had suspiciously attempted to depart Pakistan. According to the CIA
cable, Pakistani authorities provided the information on the pair "due to concerns about possible
terrorist activity."^The cable noted that Pakistani authorities had to release Padilla,but tliat
PadiUa's associate remained in detention.(When questioned further, the Pakistani authorities
provided by a CIA source to CIA officers in Kandaliar, Afghanistan. The CIA officer testified at Jose PadiUa's trial
that, after he sorted tluough the material, the blue binder was placed in a sealed box and provided to tlie FBI in
Islamabad, Pakistan. See referenced open source reporting.
'32' ALECJHM (102327Z APR 02)
'32'* m^|^972 (12031Z APR 02). As noted, the State Department already possessed information of concern
related to Jose Padilla.
'325 See Jose Padilla U.S. court documents, which include the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form. See
also FBI Washington 101514ZQ0AP^^7V|SumiTiM^hr^^ ofIntelligence on Jose Padilla," and email
from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: "Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with
FBI SA in Pakistan at the time"; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of
"PadiUa's Muj pledge form"; and numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given
Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to be PadiUa's," New York Times, dated May 16, 2007.
10976 (120948Z APR 02). The official cable st^s that the Pakistani official and his office "has not
received the full details, and he is passing this onto [the CIA] HII due to concerns about possible terrorist activity."
The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the reporting from the Pakistani government that a Pakistan-based U.S.
citizen named Jose Padilla was engaged in possiMe terrorist activity was "unremarkable at the time," and that the
CIA viewed the report as a "routine 'illegal traveler'" report.
10972 (12031Z APR 02);I— 10976 ( 120948Z APR 02)





stated that they suspected Jose Padilla of being "an al-Qa'ida member.")The information
identifyin^os^Milla and "Fouad Zouaoui" as potential terrorists had been provided by the
CIA's to CIA Headquarters, several CIA Stations, and the State Department's
Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Karachi by April 12, 2002.'^ ^^ Using the identifyini
in^mationin Jose Padilla's passport, provided by the Pakistani government, the CIA'
requested that CIA Headquarters and the CIA's Station conduct "
database search) using ^^e other identifying information
provided.The CIA's thatCIAHeadquarters and the CIA's
Station do the same for Padilla's associate, Fouad Zouaoui. As a result, by April 12, 2002,
the CIA was already alerted that a named U.S. citizen, "Jose Padilla," had spent significant time
in Pakistan and was engaged in "possible terrorist activity."^^^^
Eight days after the CIA was informed that U.S. citizen Jose
Padilla was engaged in "possible terrorist activity," on the evening of April 20, 2002, Abu
Zubaydah told FBI special agents about two men who approached him with a plan to detonate a
uranium-based explosive device in the United States (the "dirty bomb"). Abu Zubaydah stated
he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the true names of the two individuals,
butdid provide physical descripdons of the pair.^^^^ This information was acquired after Abu
Zubaydah was confronted with emails that indicated Abu Zubaydah had sent two individuals to
KSM. The FBI special agents who acquired this information from Abu Zubaydah believed it
was provided as a result of rapport-building interrogation techniques.Abu Zubaydah would
See DIRECTOR (162003Z FEB 03), which details a follow-up exchange between
personnel andPakistani officials.
10972 (12031Z APR 02); BHI10976 (120948Z APR 02)
There were no records identified to indicate that the CIA informed tlie FBI at this time that U.S. citizen "Jose
Padilla" was engaged in "possible terrorist activity." As described in Volume 11, once alerted, the FBI identified
links between Jose Padilla and FBIcounterterrorism subjects, including an individual who reportedly paid for Jose
Padilla's travel to Pakistan to attend a terrorist training camp.
10972 (12031Z APR 02); ••• 10976 (120948Z APR 02)
10976 (120948Z APR 02). See additional reporting in the Volume II intelligence chronolo^
Abu Zubaydah provided the names of the individuals asTaiha al-Kini and Abdallah al-Muhajir (|
10090 (210703Z APR 02^^




See FBIcommunications to FBI Headquarters in April 2002,as well as May 13,2009, SenateJudiciary
Committee testimony of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan on the interrogationof Abu Zubaydah. In the CIA's June
2013 Response, die CIA states the CIA's representation that Abu Zubaydah provided the information after the "use
of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques"was accurate because, "Abu Zubaydah revealed this
information after having been subjected to sleep deprivation, which would be categorized as an enhanced
interrogation technique once theprogram wasofficially underway." Asdescribed in detail in the AbuZubaydah
detainee review inVolume III, when Abu Zubaydah was discharged from a hospital in Country |, the CIA sought to
deprive Abu Zubaydah of sleep and to cease AbuZubaydah's interaction with the FBI special agents who had been
interviewing Abu Zubaydah and acquiring information from him at the hospital. Days later, after this new CIA
approach was implemented, the CIA reversed this decision and the FBI was allowed to question Abu Zubaydah
again. Further, the use of sleep deprivation during this period differed from future uses of sleep deprivation and had
ceased by the time of the referencedFBI interview,as the CIA had determined diat Abu Zubaydah's ability to focus
on questions and provide coherent answers appeared compromised. (See 10071 (190827Z APR 02) and
10116 (250731Z APR 02).) Ali Soufan testified that Abu Zubaydali provided information about the
"Dirty Bomb" plot only after he (Soufan) re-initiated a more traditionalinterrogation approachwith Abu Zubaydah,
stating, "We then returned to using the InformedInterrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydahagain
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not be subjected to the "use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques" until August
2002, more than three months later. '^^ ^^
two hours of the dissemination of this information, CIA
officei^^llllj^^^BHIIII^I cables to CIA Headquarters and select CIA Stations
calling attention to the similarities between Abu Zubaydah's reporting and their request from
April 12, 2002, for information on Jose Padilla and Fouad Zouaoui, which had not yet been acted
upon by the receiving offices.A travel alert was then initiated for Jose Padilla based on the
previous information provided by the Pakistani government. Padilla was located and
unknowingly escorted back to the United States by an FBI special agent on May 8, 2002.^^^^
Upon his arrival in the United States Padilla was found to be carrying $10,526 in U.S. currency,
an amount he failed to report.^^^^ Padilla was interviewed and takeninto FBI custody on a
started talking and gave us important actionable intelligence. This included the details of Jose Padilla, the so-called
'dirty bomber.'" {SeeSenate Judiciary Testimony, transcript at;
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=38428wit_id=7906.) Tlie assertion in the CIA's June 2013
Response is incongruent with additional CIA records. See senior CIA analystcomments on the draft CIA Inspector
General Special Review from February 10, 2004, stating: "Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and
he never really gave us actionable intel to get them"; CIA draft response to Committee Questions for the Record
concerning an OLC memorandum suggesting that information on Jose Padilla was acquire^rom Abu Zubaydali
after enhanced interrogation techniques, with the CIA response stating that the CIA's BBIICTC Legal
simply inadvertently reported tliis wrong. Abu Zubaydahprovided infonnation on Jose Padilla while
being intenogated by the FBI (|||B|BI 10091)"; CIA testimony from CIA Director Hayden on April 12,2007,
stating, "In August 2002, CIA began using these few and lawful interrogation techniques in the interrogation of Abu
Zubaydah"; and tlie CIA-vetted speech by President Bush on September6, 2006. See also SSCI Staff interview of
FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008, at 1:20 PM, Hart Senate Office Building (Ah Soufan: "So we went
back. And we start talking to him. We took some Coke, tea, and we start talking about different tilings. We flipped
him about different things, |B| and I and [REDACTED]. And then he came back tohis senses and hestarted
cooperating again. And this is when he gave us Padilla.") (DTS #2008-2411).
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III that details how, after Department of Justice approval in
August 2002, tlie CIA began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah on August 4,
2002^ncludin^i^vaterboard. See also^^j/Zf/h 10644 (201235Z AUG 02); and email from: [REDACTED];
to: and [REDACTED]; subject: "Re: So i^egins"; date; August 4, 2002, at09:45 AM.
11036 (220348Z APR 02). See also ALEC •• (220238Z APR 02); 11041 (220802Z
APR 02); and U042 (220921Z APR 02).
1338 A^i^iong other documents, see letter from the CIA addressedto SSCI Staff Duector A1 Cumming, dated June 24,
2002, and entitled, "Anest of Jose Padilla." After being detained in Pakistan, Binyam Mohammad was rendered by
the CIA July |, 2002, where he was hel^^^^^HHIII government^n Januat
2004, Binyam Mohammad was transferred to CIA custody |^^^|^^^|30586
••••l 630
1339 pjjjj Rowan, Department of Justice NationalSecurity Division to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on
August 15, 2007 with subject line; "Jose Padilla," includes a Departmentof Justice memorandum that is based
primarilyon 29 URsof the joint FBI-military interrogations of Padilladisseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9,
2003, a FBI document "Jose Padilla Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and
Binyam Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); aCIA Statement Summanzin^igmficant
Information about Jose Padilla of 8 June 02 ['CIA Summary']; a DIA Info Memo from 1/13/03); and
an FBI LHM "Jose Padilla Debrief Status" (11/11/03). See also SSCI Transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated
June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603).




material witness warrant.The exploitation of Jose Padilla's pocket litter^^"^^ and phone
revealed significant connections to known terrorists, including subjects of FBI terrorism
investigations in the United States.
In separate debriefings, PadiUa and his associate, Binyam
Mohammed, maintained they had no intention of engaging in terrorist plotting, but proposed the
"Dirty Bomb" plot in order to depart Pakistan, avoid combat in Afghanistan, and return
home.
Over several years CIA officers identified errors in the CIA's
representations concerning the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in
relation to the Abu Zubaydah reporting pertaining to Jose Padilla and Padilla's alleged plotting.
Inrcsponse to one such representation, the chief ofthe Abu Zubaydah Task Force wrote to |
IIIIIIIICTC Legal in 2002 that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find [Jose
Padilla and Binyam Mohammed]."In 2004, she sought to correct inaccurate CIA
representations again, telling colleagues:
'3''® CIA Notification, "Arrest ofJose Padilla," dated June 24, 2002 (DTS #2002-2866); WHDC •• (242226Z
MAR 03). Discusses information obtained by FBI officials on March 20, 2003, and SSCI Transcript "Staff Briefing
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the Detention of Jose Padilla," dated June 11, 2002 (DTS #2002-2598).
Pocket litter refers to material acquired on a person upon a search and may include notes, identification cards,
tickets, phone numbers, computer files, photographs, or any other material in the person's possession.
See CIA Document, Subject "CIA StatementSummarizingSm Information About Jose Padilla {21:10
hrs.- 8 June 02}," email from [REDACTED] to on August 2, 2002, at 3:54:17 PM, with the
subject line; "Re: Padilla's travel history," and fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security
Division to [REDACTED], at CIA CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: "Jose Padilla." The fax
includes a Department of Justice memorandumthat is based primarily on 29 IIRs of the joint FBI-military
intenogations of Padilla disseminated from May 5,2003, to July 9, 2003, a FBI document "Jose Padilla Debrief
Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on
Padilla (5/14/02); aCIA Statement Summarizi^ Significant Information about Jose Padilla of8June 02 ['CIA
Summary']; aDIA Info Memo from |||||||||||m|[ (11/13/03); and an FBI LHM "Jose Padilla Debrief Status"
(11/11/03). See also SSCI transcript "Detention ofJose Padilla," dated Jun^2^002 (DTS #2002-2603), in which
the CIA informs the SSCI that, based on his address book confiscated in Padilla "did have connections
to Islamic extremists, both within the United States and outside the U.S."
See Department of Justice memorandum referenced in chronology in Volume II that is based primarily on 29
IIRs of the joint FBI-military interrogationsof Padilla disseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9, 2003; a FBI
document "Jose Padilla Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam
Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); a CIA Statement Summarizing Significant Information about
Jose Padilla of8June 02 ['CIA Summary']; aDIA Info Memo frommm(11/13/03); and an FBI LHM "Jose
Padilla Debrief Status" (11/11/03)^^^^^^^ —
See CIA memorandum from: to: subject: "AZ information"; date:
Jul^0^002, at 01:18:50 PM. See also February 10, 2004, iH
HHllll' [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], ACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED],Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: Please
Read ~ Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report;date: February 10, 2004. In a SSCI transcript dated June 12,
2002, entitled, "Detention of Jose Padilla" (DTS #2002-2603), the CIA acknowledged it had information on Jose
Padillaprior to reporting from AbuZubaydah. ACIA officer stated: "the Pakistaniliaison felt it was important to
bring [Padilla] to our attention, given the recent raids...there was enough information indicating that his travel was
suspicious, to put us on alert. This suspicion was enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which
occurred on 21 April." This is the only known CIA representation that did not fully attribute information on Jose
Padilla to CIA interrogations.




"AZ never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information. He claimed every
plot/operation he had knowledge of and/or was working on was only
preliminary. (Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and he
never really gave us actionable intel to get them)."^ '^^ ^
In October 2005, the chief of CTC's CBRN (Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) Group wrote, under the heading, "Don't Put All Your
Uranium in One Bucket":
"Jose Padilla: we'll never be able to successfully expunge Padilla and the
'dirty bomb' plot from the lore of disruption, but once again I'd like to go on
the record that Padilla admitted that the only reason he came up with so-called
'dirty bomb' was that he wanted to get out of Afghanistan and figured that if
he came up with something spectacular, they'd finance him. Even KSM says
Padilla had a screw loose. He's a petty criminal who is well-versed in US
criminal justice (he's got a rap sheet as long as my arm). Anyone who believes
you can build an IND or RDD by 'putting uranium in buckets and spinning
them clockwise over your head to separate the uranium' is not going to
advance al-Qa'ida's nuclear capabilities."'^ "^^
other U.S. government assessments also called into
question the "Tall Buildings" plotting, which was loosely based on attacks that were conducted
in Moscow in September 1999 using conventional explosives. The "Tall Buildings" plotting did
notenvision the use of conventional explosives.^^"^^ Instead, the plotting envisioned using
natural gas to destroy high-rise residential buildings. As planned, the Intelligence Community
assessed the plotting was not viable.^^"^^ An August 4, 2008, U.S. government assessment stated:
"On the surface, the idea is simplistic, if not amateurish... the probability of an efficient fuel air
explosion is low."^ '^^ ^
Jose Padilla was detained on a material witness warrant from May
8, 2002, to June 9, 2002, when he was tiansferred to U.S. military custody and designated an
"enemy combatant." On January 3, 2006, Jose Padilla was transferred to U.S. law enforcement
Email from:to; cc; [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez,
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]7BHHHB^Bi' subject: Please Read --Re CTC Response to the Draft IG
Report; date: February 10, 2004.
See email from: [REDACTED] C/CTC/OTA/CBRNG/RNTB; to: multiple recipients; subject: "Re: Urgent:
Unclassified Fact Sheet for David Shedd"; date: October 6,2005, at 04:35 PM.
See additional details in Volume 11.
See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to
terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs.
See Intelligence Community review of tlie Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to
terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using tiaditional explosives and VBIEDs.
See also U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report entitled, "Use of
Natural Gas as a Terrorist Weapon in Apartment Buildings," dated August 4,2008. The latter document states that:
"If the idea of the plot is to cause death and destiuction on the same scale as had occurred in Russia, then Padilla's
methodology comes into question. The probability of causing this magnitude of death and destruction using natural
gas [versus conventional explosives] would be considerably lower."
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custody and tried in federal court. On August 16, 2007, Jose Padilla and two co-defendants,
Adham Hassoun and Kifah Jayyousi, were found guilty of three criminal offenses relating to
terrorist support activities from October 1993 to November 1, 2001.^^^° The case against Jose
Padilla centered on his attendance at a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan in the fall of
2000—specifically, the terrorist training camp application form acquired by the CIA and
provided to the FBI in December2001. The form was found to have Jose Padilla's fingerprints,
as well as identifying data to include his date of birth, languages spoken, and travels.On
January 22, 2008, Jose Padilla was sentenced to 17 years in prison. On September 19, 2011, the
U.S. 11'^ Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the sentence was too lenient inpartbecause it did not
take in account Jose Padilla's prior criminal offenses.
After beingdetained in Pakistan, Jose Padilla's associate Binyam
Mohammad was rendered by the CIaMB^^IJuly B 2002, where he was held by the
government. On January 2004, Binyam Mohammad was rendered to CIA
custody.On May |, 2004, Binyam Mohammad was transferred to the custody ofthe U.S.
military in Bagram, Afghanistan.On September 21, 2004, he was transferred to Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.^^^^ Binyam Mohammad was then transferred from U.S. military custody to the
United Kingdom on February 23, 2009.
Lawyers representing Binyam Mohammad sued the government
of the United Kingdom to compel the release of documents relating to his whereabouts and
treatment after his initial detention in April 2002.'-^^^ In Februaiy 2010, a British court
compelled the release "of a summary of the torture" to which Binyam Mohammed was subjected
'350 ALEC ^^•(Mayl7^02), with references to FBI WASH 150315Z, and CIA reporting
from Upon Jose Padilla's arrest, Padilla was found to be in possession of the phone
number of Adham Hassoun,
|; and providing material support to terrorists. U.S. prosecutors focused onmore
than 70 intercepted phone calls between the defendants during the 1990s, but provided no information at the trial
related to plotting in the United States. See U.S. District Criminal Court Docket, Florida Southern, for defendants,
including Jose Padilla, as well as open source news reports, including "Without a plot, is Padilla guilty?," Christian
Science Monitor, dated July 19, 2007; and "The others on trial in Padilla case," Christian Science Monitor, dated
May 29, 2007.
An Assistant U.S. Attorney involved in the prosecution stated, "The narrative is fairly clem* that Padilla was
recruited to go overseas to participate in jihad." See U.S. District Criminal Court Docket, Florida Southern, for
defendants, including Jose Padilla, as well as open source news reports, including "Without a plot, is Padilla
guilty?," Christian Science Monitor, dated July 19, 2007; and "The others on trial in Padilla case," Christian Science
Monitor, dated May 29, 2007.
See open sources, to include press articles such as, "Court Says Padilla Prison Sentence Too Lenient," Reuters,
dated September 19, 2011.
^^^^^^^^•12520 (281655Z SEP 04)
1356 Terrorism Watch, March 10,2009, Guantanamo Detainee's Torture Claims Could Impact Bilateral Relationship
with UK.
'3-^7 [REDACTED] 3174 (311725Z JUL 08)
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during his detention. In the fall of 2010, the British government awarded Binyam Mohammed a
reported £1 million in compensation.^^^^
2. The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots
Summary: The CIA represented tliat its enhanced interrogation
techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence,
which enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture teiTorists, and save lives. Over a period
of years, the CIA provided the thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) as evidence for the effectiveness
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These CIA representations were inaccurate.
The Karachi Plot(s) was dismpted with the confiscation of explosives and the airests of Ammar
al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in April 2003. The operation and arrests were conducted
unilaterally by Pakistani authorities and were unrelated to any reporting from the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program.
Fi^rther Details: The Karachi Plot(s) refers to terrorist plotting that
targeted a variety of U.S. and Western interests in the Karachi area, to include the U.S.
Consulate, named hotels near the airport and beach, U.S. vehicles traveling between the
Consulate and the airport, U.S. diplomatic housing, U.S. personnel subject to potential sniper
attacks, as well as Pakistan's Faisal Army Base.'^ ^^ CIA records indicate the CIA became aware
of the initial plotting as eaily as September 2002, and that it was disrupted in April 2003, when
the remaining plot leaders were arrested in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities.
While the plot leaders were captured in the process of procuring explosives, they maintained that
they were stiU in the process of locating vehicles, a safe house, and suicide operatives at the time
of their an-est.^^^^
The thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) is one of the eight most
frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques,Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and
provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent
the Karachi Plot(s) as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations
after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and capture
Among other open sources, see "Compensation to Guantanamo detainees 'was necessary,'" BBC News UK,
November 16, 2010.
See intelligence chronology in Volume IIand HHHI11454 (3017102Z APR 03).
33804 (190956Z SEP 02); [REDACTED] 34513 (052246Z MAR 03);
•••••; DIRECTOR
intellige^ chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR
••I MAY
Tlie Karachi terrorist plots encompassed a variety of potential targets in the Karachi area associated with U.S.
and Western interests. Although the plotting involved multiple targets, the plotting is most often referred to as the
"Karachi Plot."
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additional terrorists.The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the
CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives.
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA
CounterteiTorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005. Seealso CIAtalking points for National Security
Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10March 2005 DCIMeeting PC: Effectiveness of theHigh-Value Detainee
InteiTogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005.1364 Prom 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific setofexamples of terrorist plots "disrupted" andterrorists captured that
theCIA attributed to information obtained from theuseof itsenhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted thatthe intelligence obtained fromthe useof the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among otherCIArepresentations, see:
(1) CIA representations in tlie Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which reliedon a seriesof highly specific CIArepresentations on the typeof intelligence acquired from theuse of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. TTie CIArepresentations referenced by the
OLC include that the use of theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary"to obtain "critical,"
"vital," and "otherwiseunavailable actionable intelligence" that was"essential"for the U.S. government to "detect
and dismpt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandumfurdier states that "[the CIA] ha[sj informed [the OLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largelyresponsible for preventinga subsequent attack within the United
States." {See Memorandumfor John A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputyGeneralCounsel,Central IntelligenceAgency, from
StevenG. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United StatesObligations Under Article 16of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Valueal Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the useof the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques.
Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing theCIA's interrogation progiam
(which was basedon CIA-provided information), the OLCmemorandum states: "The CIAinterrogation program—
and, in pai'ticular, its useof enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve thisparamount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwiseunavailable intelligence. .. .As the President
explained [on September6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else,
the progiam has saved innocentlives.'" (SeeMemorandum for John A. Rizzo, ActingGeneralCounsel,Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of the GenevaConventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by theCIA in the Interrogation of High Value
al QaedaDetainees.) (3) CIAbriefings for members of the National Security Council inJuly andSeptember 2003
represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or anotherhad producedsignificant intelligence
information tliathad, in the viewof CIAprofessionals, saved hves," and warned policymjikers that "[t]ermination of
this program will result in loss of life, possiblyextensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandumfor the Record from
Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July2003; Briefing slides,CIAInterrogation
Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIAMemorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and
September 26, 2003,Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4)The
CIA's responseto the Officeof Inspector General draft SpecialReview of the CIA program, whichasserts:
"Information [theCIA] received... as a result of the lawful useof enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly savedcountless American lives inside the United States andabroad. The evidence points clearly to
the fact that without tlieuse of such techniques, weandour allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "CounterterrorismDetention
and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004;attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
DirectorLeon Panettain February 2009,whichstatethat the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the
[enhanced interrogation] techniqueswere effectivein producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timelyintelligence acquired from detainees in this program wouldnot have been discovered or reportedby other
means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta,entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefingon RDI Program-
18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derivedfrom AbuZubaydah and Khalid
Shaykli Muhammad (KSM)," including "E)CI^Briefin^r^DJ^rogram|^ g^ CIA document "EITs and
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example, in November 2007, the CIA prepared and provided a
set of talking points to the CIA director for an "upcoming meeting with the President regarding
the Waterboard Enhanced Interrogation Technique."^^^^ Thedocument includes a section
entitled, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," which states "reporting statistics alone will not
provide a fair and accurate measure of the effectiveness of EITs." The document then provides a
list of "Key Intelligence Derived through use of EITs," stating:
"CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a
comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist
plots... The following are examples of key intelligence collected from CIA
detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along with other
interrogation techniques: ...The Karachi Plot: This plan to conduct attacks
against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan was uncovered
during the initial interrogations ofKhallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi
and later confirmed by
Likewise, a CIA-prepared briefing for Vice President Cheney on
tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in March 2005, under a section of the briefing
called, "INTERROGATION RESULTS," asserts:
"Use of DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a
comprehensive inteiTogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots,
capture additional terrorists.. .The Karachi Plot: Plan to conduct attacks
against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan. Plot disrupted.
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chait: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supportingreferences," to include "Background
on KeyCapturesand Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to tlieSenateSelect Committeeon Intelligenceon
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERTJ and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258,
which providesa list of "some of tliekey capturesand disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence
acquiredfrom detainees in this programwouldnot have beendiscovered or reported by any other means." See
Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the
CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
On September 17, 2007, President Bush nominated Judge Michael Mukasey to be Attorney General of the
United States. In October 2007, at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mukasey
declined to say whether he believed waterboardingas an interrogation techniquewas unlawful. On October 30,
2007, Mukaseyresponded to written questions from tlie Senate Judiciary Committee on the issue of waterboarding,
stating: "As described in your letter, these techniques seem over the line or, on a personal basis, repugnant to me,
and would probably seem the same to many Americans. But hypotheticals are different from real life, and in any
legal opinion the actual facts and circumstances are critical." {See October30, 2007, Letter from Michael B.
Mukasey, to Senators Patrick J. Leahy, Edwaid M. Kennedy, Joseph R. Biden,Jr., Herb Kohl, Dianne Feinstein,
Russell D. Feingold,Charles E. Schumer, Richard J. Durbin, Benjamin L. Cardin, and Sheldon Whitehouse.) On
November6, 2007,days prior to a Senate vote to confirmMukasey, the CIA provided a set of talking points to the
CIA director for use with the President in a meeting about the CIA's use of the waterboard intenogation technique.
See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the
notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."
Italics added. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November
6, 2007, with the notation the document wasJ^senU^DCI^Nov^i^repar^n for POTUS meeting."
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Sources: Khallad Bin Attash, Ammar al-Baluchi. KSM also provided info on
the plot after we showed him capture photos of Ammar and Khallad.
The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the
thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the
Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.^^^^
A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found
that the CIA*s enhanced interrogation techniques—to include the waterboard—played no role in
the disruption of the Karachi Plot(s). CIA records indicate that the Karachi Plot(s) was thwarted
by the arrest of operatives and the interdiction of explosives by Pakistani authorities, specifically
The CIA had information regarding the Karachi terrorist plotting as
early as September 11, 2002.^^^" On thatday, a raid conducted b]
Pakistani authonties^^^^^^^^|^^m^^^^^^^^^|^^|, of an al-Qaida safe house
in Karachi, Pakistan, uncovered the "perfume letter," named as such because the term
"perfumes" is used as a code word. The letter, written in May 2002, was from KSM to Hamza
al-Zubayr, a known al-Qa'ida member who was killed in the raids.KSM's letter to al-Zubayr
states, "Dear Brother, we have the green light for the hotels," and suggests "making it three
instead of one."^^^^ By early October 2002, theCIA had completed a search of the names
identified in the "perfume letter" in its databases and found many of the individuals who "had
assigned roles in support of the operation" were arrested by Pakistani authorities during the
Italics added. CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice
President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program."
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the





Response concedes that the CIA "mischaracterized the impact of tlie reporting [the CIA] acquired from detainees on
the Karachi plots," and acknowledges that the Karachi plotting was "thwartedby the arrest of the operatives and the
interdiction of explosives by [Pakistani authorities]." TTie CIA does not dispute that Pakistani authorities arrested
Ammar al-Baluchi and Kliallad bin Attash independently, and that information from the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program played no role in tlie arrests. The CIA's June 2013 Response states, however, that CIA
detainee reporting "revealed ongoing attack plotting against the USofficial presence in Karachi that prompted the
Consulate to take further steps to protect its officers." This statement is incongruent with CIA records. In response
to the reporting cited by the CIA, CIA personnel in Karachi wrote: "[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin
Attash] was chilling- [CIA officers]had become awareof most of this reporting either through previous infonnation
or through interviews of al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior to their transfer out of Karachi." The CIA
personnel in Karachi further reassured addressees that, in December 2002, the U.S. Consulate in Karachi took
increased steps to protect U.S. Consulate personnel. See Volume II for additional information.
1370 pqj. detailed information, see Volume II.
ALEC•• (032142Z OCT 02)
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raids At least one person in the letter, Khallad bin Attash, a known al-Qa'ida operative,
remained at large.^^^"^
What remained of the Karachi plotting was disrupted unilaterally
by Pakistani authorities as a result ofa criminal lead. On April H, 2003, Pakistani authorities,
speciflcally received a repoit that explosives and weapons were to
be transported in a pickup truck to a specific location in Karachi Pakistani authorities made
arrangements to intercede, and, on April 29, 2003, they intercepted the vehicle and confiscated
explosives, detonators, and ammunition. The driver of the vehicle provided the location where
the explosives were being delivered, leading to the capture of several operatives, including
Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, as well as to the discovery of another explosives
cache. A third captured individual stated that the explosives had belonged to Hamza al-Zubayr,
the known and now deceased al-Qa'ida operative, as well as others residing in the home raided
on September 11, 2002, where the "perfume letter" was discovered.
While being arrested, Ammar al-6aluchi was asked by a Pakistani
officer about his intentions regarding the seized explosives. Al-Baluchi responded that he was
planning to attack the U.S. Consulate in Karachi.In foreign government custody—and prior
to being rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques—Ammai* al-Baluchi continued to provide information about the Karachi plotting to a
foreign government officer who was using rapport-building interrogation techniques.The
information provided by Ammar al-Baluchi on the plotting included the surveillance conducted,
the envisioned targets, and the exact method of attack that was considered for the U.S. Consulate
in Karachi and other hard targets. Ammar al-Baluchi discussed the use of a motorcycle with a
bomb to breach the perimeter wall of the consulate and then how the operatives would seek to
exploit that breach with a vehicle filled with explosives.Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin
'373 alec•• (0302054Z OCT 02). See also CIA paper dated January 11, 2002, entitled, "Threat Tlireads:
Most 11 Septem^r Plotters Still Under the Radar."
'37"^ ALEC (0302054Z OCT 02). See also CIA paper dated January 11, 2002, entitled, "Threat Threads:
Mos^^Septeml^- Plotter^til^nder the Radar."
'37-'< ||||||||||m||45028 ^I^ records indicate the interdiction was the result ofcriminal leads and was
unrelated to any reporting from CIA detainees.
1377
I DIRECTOR ^lA's June 2013
Response maintains that KSM's reporting on die thwarted "perfume letter" plotting was separate from the "plots
disrupted with the anest and interrogation of Ammar and Khallad." Because CIA records did not make this
distinction, and the fact that the operations, to at least some extent, shared targets, operatives, and the same set of
explosives, the operations are linked in diis Study.
^5028 ; DIRECTOR
1378 the threat to U.S. interests,CIA officers sought to participate in the intenogations. A May 2, 2003, CIA
cable (See states that, because of Ammar al-Baluclii's "strong reticence towards the U.S.," CIA
officers were observing the foreign government interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi via video feed. The cable notes
that a foreign government officer who had developed rapport with Ammai* al-Baluchi was conducting all the
questioning and obtaining intelligence from Ammar al-Baluchi on the plotting against U.S. interests in Pakistan, as
well as other matters.
'37^ Tlie CIA's June 2013 Responseclaims that "Ammar and Kliallad provided new information on odier attack
plans in Kaiachi after entering CIA custody and undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques," and that "[djuring
his fust inteiTogation in CIA custody and after enhanced techniques commenced, [Ammar] revealed tliat the plan




Attash remained in foreign government custody for approximately H weeks, with Ammar al-
Baluchi—and to a lesser extent bin Attash—responding to questions on a variety of matters,
including the Karachi plotting.
On May 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were
rendered to CIA custodyand immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. The next day, the CIA disseminated two intelligence reports on the Karachi
Plot(s) from the interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash. The reporting
relayed that: (1) al-Qa'ida was targeting Western interests in Karachi, including the U.S.
Consulate and Western housing in a specific neighborhood of Karachi; and (2) the attack could
have occurred as early as "late May/early June 2003," but the plotters were still in the process of
finding vehicles, a safe house, and the suicide operatives at the time of their arrest.^^^ These
disseminated intelligence reports were used to support CIA representations in finished
intelligence products,talking points, briefing documents, and President Bush's September 6,
was to use a motorcyclebomb and a car bombin a single,coordinatedattack at the end of Mayor early June, and he
pointed to the location on the Consulate's perimeter wall where the attack would occur." The information in the
CIA's June2013Response is inaccurate. Ammar al-Baluchi provided the referenced information while in foreign
government custody, prior to entering CIA custody and being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. Give^h^hre^to U.S. interests, CIA officers sought to participate in the interrogations. AMay 2,
2003, CIA cable (||||||||||H 14291) states that, because ofAmmar al-Baluchi's "strong reticence towards the
U.S.," CIA officers were observing the foreign government interrogationsof Ammar al-Baluchi via video feed. The
cable notes that a foreign government officer who haddeveloped rapport withAmmar al-Baluchi wasconducting all
the questioning and obtaining intelligence from Ammar al-Baluchi. This included information about the
motorcycle-car bomb plottingagainst the U.S. Consulate, as well as information on plans to potentially target
Westerners in a specific housing areain Karachi. According to the information obtained, surveillance by the plotters
"had confirmed a U.S. presence significant enough to warrant such an attack." Ammar al-Baluchi further stated that
he had consideredcaijacking a U.S.Consulate vehicleand loadingit widiexplosives to target the Consulate, and
elaborated on tlie initial idea to attack the U.S. Consulate with a helicopter, stating that he did not follow through
witli this idea because he believed it would take too long to train an operative for that type of attack {see |[||^^^|
14291, May2, 2003). Later, theforeign govemment officerdescribed Ammar al-Baluchi as "morechatty" than
Khallad bin Attash, anddetailed how,while in foreign government custody Ammar al-Baluchi "acknowledged plans
to attack U.S. Consulate officials at the airport, the Consul General's Residence and the Consulate itself" The
foreign government officer explained tliat "boththe Consulate and the CG's residence" required a "tiered attackof
successive car bombs which would breach the perimeter"of the targets. The foreign governmentofficer also stated
that, based on Ammar al-Baluchi's comments on his casing efforts, it was inferred that Ammar al-Baluchi had
sought totarget Americans attheir residences in specific areas of Karachi. See 19647 ^^^^|APR
04).
Records indicate that Khallad bin Attash was less cooperative (Ammar
al-Baluchi wasdescribed as "more chatty"), but nonetheless provided information in foreign government custody on
the surveillance heconducte^caimt United States government vehicles in Karachi, among other information.
45028 (JHHaPR 03); DIRECTOR ^^•••IaPR 03); BIHI14291 (May 2,2003)7^^^^^! 19647 (|^^^|aPR04). CIA records indicate that Ammar al-Baluchi was providing
significant information to theforeign government officer conducting thequestioning who haddeveloped rapport
with Ammar al-Baluchi.
[REDACTED] 38325 ; [REDACTED] 38389
'^ 83 director (^^•mAY^; DIRECTOR•• (^^•mAY^
'3'' DIRECTOR (^^1 MAY 03); DIRECTORi^| MAY 03). DIRECTOR•• noted
that Khallad bin Attash indicated that they had identified one suicide operative so far.
See CIA speech validation effortsfor the President'sSeptember 6,2006, speech acknowledging the CIA's
Detention andInterrogation Program. In thespeech. President Bushstated that"Terrorists heldin CIAcustody...
helped stop aplanned attack on the U.S. consulat^r^arachMisin^a^oi^^ motorcycle bombs." See also,
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2006, speech that the Karachi Plot(s) was "thwarted," "disrupted," or "uncovered" as a result of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. However, within 24 hours of the dissemination of
these intelligence reports, CIA personnel in Karachi responded in an official cable that the
information acquired from the CIA detainees and disseminated was already known to the CIA
and U.S. Consulate officials. The cable stated:
"[w]hlle reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was chilling- [CIA
officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous
information or through interviews of al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior
to their transfer out of Karachi.
(T8/^^^|^^^^H^^TheCIApersonnel in Karachi reassured addressees that, in
December20027^^lmil^^^AH the U.S. Consulate in Karachi took increased steps to
protect U.S. Consulate personnel based on similar terrorist threat reporting. According to the
cable, Americans in the referenced housing area had akeady been vacated from die "area for
several months," the potential for "attacks targeting Americans at the airport" had been
"recognized several months ago," and new procedures and security measures had been put in
place to minimize the risks associated with the potential terrorist attacks.
As noted, in November 2007, the CIA prepared and provided a set
of talking points to the CIA director for an "upcoming meeting with the President regarding the
Waterboard Enhanced Interrogation Technique." Under a secdon endtled, "Plots Discovered as
a Result of EITs," the document lists the "Karachi Plot," stating the disruption was the result of
"key intelligence collected from CIA detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along
with other interrogation techniques," and that the plotting was ''uncovered during the initial
interrogations ofKhallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi and later confirmed by KSM."^^^^
While Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, there are no CIA records to indicate that either was ever subjected to
the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. KSM did provide information on the plotting, but
was assessed by CIA personnel to be withholding information on the plotting, more than a month
after the CIA stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM. In late April
2003, CIA inten-ogators confronted KSM with photographs demonstrating tiiat Ammar al-
among other documents, the June 2005 CIA Intelhgence Assessment entitled, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the
War Against Al-QaMda." CIA records indicate this document was provided to Wliite House officials on June 1,
2005. A slightly modified version of this Intelligence Assessment was broadlydisseminated witliin the Intelligence
Community on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, former Vice PresidentCheney requested the declassification of
this Intelligence Assessment, wliich was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. The assessment
represents that "detainee reporting"resultedin the "[rjevealingof the Karachi Plots," stating: "When confronted
with information provided by Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad admittedduring debriefings that al-Qa'ida was planning
to attack the US Consulate in Karachi, Westerners at the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas." The footnote
for this claim cites the May 2003, disseminated intelligence report detailin^h^dmissioiMnade by Khallad bin
Attash while being subjectedtotheCIA/^nhanced inteirogation techniques source.
1386 14510 This cable also stated, "As noted in several previous cables, in
December 2002 j^BConsulate became aware of the thieat to Consulate officials."
14510•••••
Italics added. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points; Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November
6, 2007, with the notation the document wa |^senn^DCI^Nov^Mi^repara^n for POTUS meeting."
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Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash had been captured. When the CIA interrogators asked what
Ammaral-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were"up to" in Karachi, KSM provided information
regarding potential targets in Karachi.KSM's belated reporting prompted the CIA's ALEC
Station to write a cable stating:
"We were disappointed to see that KSM only made these new admissions of
planned attacks in Pakistanafter seeing the capture photographs of Ammar al-
Baluchi and Khallad. We consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this]
information to be a serious concern, especiallyas this omission may well have
cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been diligent in following up
on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash, and
other probable operatives involved in the attack plans... Simply put, KSM has
had every opportunity to come clean on this threat and, from our optic, he
deliberately withheld the information until he was confronted with evidence
that we already knew about it, or soon would know about it from Ammar and
Khallad... KSM's provision of the Pakistan threat reporting - only after he
was made aware of the capture of the attack planners - is viewed as a clear
illustration of continued and deliberate withholding of threat information
which he believed had not yet been compromised."
Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, and KSM remained in CIA
custodyuntil their transfer to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in September
2006.'^ ^^ All three remain in U.S. military custody.
3. The Thwarting of theSecond Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group
Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation
techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence,
which enabled the CIA to disrupt tenorist plots, capture terrorists, andsave lives. Overa period
of years, the CIA provided the "discovery" and/or "thwarting" of the Second Wave plotting and
the "discovery" of the al-Ghuraba group as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
inten-ogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. The Second Wave plotting was
disrupted with the arrest and identification of key individuals. The arrests and identifications
1389
SEP 06).
11448 (301141Z APR 03); 11454 (301710Z APR 03). As described in detail in the
intelligence chronology in Volume II, KSM was rendered to CIA custody onMarch 2003, and was immediately
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On March 5, 2003, he was "confronted" with the
"perfume letter," at which point hediscussed theletter and its recipient, Hamza al-Zubayr. KSM hadnotyet been
subjected to thewaterboard. As described, Hamza al-Zubayr was killed ina September 2002 raid against al-Qa'ida-
related safehouses. KSM stated that Khallad bin Attash hadbeen responsible forobtaining operatives for the
Hamza al-Zubayr operation. At the time KSM provided this information, a separate cablestatedthat KSM
"continued to denyUi^e has any [knowledge ofj ongoing operations." See [REDACTED] 34513 (052246Z MAR
03); DIRECTOR W^M (062312Z MAR 02); [REDACTED] 34575 (061929Z MAR 03)
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were unrelated to any reporting acquired during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against CIAdetainees. Likewise, theal-Ghuraba group was identified
by a detainee who was not in CIA custody. CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided significant fabricated information on both the Second Wave
plotting and the al-Ghuraba group.
Further Details: Al-Qa'ida's "Second Wave" plotting refers to
twoefforts by KSMto strike the WestCoastof the United States with airplanes using non-Arab
passport holders. While intelligence reporting often conflated the"Second Wave" plotting, KSM
viewed the plottingas two separate efforts. Neither of the twoefforts was assessed to be
imminent, as KSM was still engaged in the process of identifying suicide operatives and
obtaining pilot trainingfor potentialparticipants when eacheffort was disrupted through the
arrest or identification of the suspected operatives and operational planners.
The al-Ghuraba student group was established in late 1999 by
JemaahIslamiyah (JI) leadersprimarily to educate the sonsof jailed JI leaders and to groomthe
students for potential leadership and operational roles in JI. Some members of tJie al-Ghuraba
group reportedly completed militanttraining in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at
Islamic universities in Karachi. Despite CIA representations to the contrary, intelligence and
See Second Wave / Al-Ghuraba Group intelligence chronology in Volume11, including, among other
documents, DIRECTOR |||||i (2021IZ JUN 03) and cable note on "Draft Intel^CSN^^ails his Thinking on
and Efforts to Taiget California," included as an attachment to an email from |||[^^^B|||| to adistribution list
for CIA OTA in the Directorate of Intelligence, dated June 30, 2003, at 06:25 PM.
Seeintelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed information. See also statements by UnitedStates
government officials, such as a February 9, 2006, White House briefing on"theWestCoastTerrorist Plotby
Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to tlie President for Homeland Security andCounterterrorism." At this briefing
the White Houseemphasized hov '^ "collaboration withour international partners" had "disrupted teiTorist networks
around the worid and serious al-Qaeda plots." Using the "West Coast" plot as an example, Townsend stated that:
"KlialidShaykhMohammed was the individual who led thiseffort. .. .The cell leader was arrested in Febmary of
2002, and as we begin—at that point, the other members of the cell believedthat the West Coast plot had been
cancelled [and] was not going forward... the lead guy is anested, which disrupts it in Februaryof '02." When asked
about whether this plotting couldbe accurately described as a disruption giventhe belief by some that "it never got
far enough to be disrupted," Townsend stated, "there is noquestion in my mind that this is a dismption." Seealso
May 23,2007, Wliite House Press Release, entitled, "Fact Sheet: Keeping America SafeFrom Attack," wliich states,
"We AlsoBrokeUp OtherPost-9/11 Aviation Plots. In 2002, we broke up a plot by KSM to hijack an airplane and
fly it intothe tallest building on theWest Coast." As described in theStudy, KSM was not detained until March 1,
2003. Tlie CIA's June 2013 Responseacknowledges that"[t]he Studyconectly points out that we erred when we
represented thatwe 'learned' of theSecond Wave plotting from KSM and 'learned' of tlie operational cell
comprised of students from Hambali." The CIA's June 2013 Response describes the inaccurate representation as
"imprecision" by the CIA,but nonetheless states that the CIA "continue(s) to assess this was a good example of tlie
importance of intelligence derived from thedetainee program"; andcontends—for the first time—that Hambali's
capture "wasa critical factor in thedisruption of al-Qa'ida's plan to conduct a 'Second Wave' attack." Asdescribed
throughout the Committee Study, in its effortsto obtain legal authorization and policy approval for the CIA's
enhancedinterrogation techniques, the CIArepresented that the intelligence referenced was obtained "as a result" of
the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques (not the "detainee program"), and that the information obtained was
unique andotherwise unavailable. Asdetailed in this summary andin Volume II, the capture of Hambali was
unrelated to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques.
Reporting indicates tliat the al-Ghuraba group wassimilar to tliePan Islamic Party of Malaysia(PAS)'s
Masapakindo, aka Pakindo, organization. Masran binArshad wasconnected to Pakindo, and wliile in foreign
government custody, explained that "in 1991JPA^PaiUslami^art^ established asecret Malaysian
KM' 'ii (III I
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open source reporting indicate the group was not "tasked with," witting, or involved in any
aspect of KSM's Second Wave plotting.
The "discovery" and disruption of the "Second Wave Plot" (also
known as the "WestCoast Plot"and the"TallestBuilding Plot"),^^^^ along with the associated
identification, discovery, and capture ofthe al-Ghuraba "cell," is one of theeight most frequently
cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided
to seniorpolicymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the
thwarting anddiscovery of the "Second Wave" plotting and the identification, discovery, or
arrest of the al-Ghuraba group members as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from
HVD interrogations afterapplying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt
Student Association known as 'Masapakindo' tohelp facilitate a steady pipeline of PAS religious and military
trainees traveling from Malaysia to Pakistan, sometimes continuing on to Afghanistan, butultimately returning to
Malaysia. This student association forchildren ofPAS members also was intended to serve as a general support
structure for PAS students who were undergoing Islamic religious training in Pakistan andIndia. Masapakindo's
headquarters was based in Karachi, Pakistan." See also February 27,2004, Memorandum forCIA Inspector
General from James L. Pavitt, CIA Deputy Director for Operations, entitled "Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," which contains a February 24, 2004, attachment entitled,
"Successes of CIA'sCounterterrorism Detention and Intenogation Activities." See alsoCIA Intelligence Product
entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scmtiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," dated April 18,
2008. Although this report makes numerous references to the al-Ghuraba group, itdoes not reference the group's
potential engagement in KSM's Second Wave attack. As described in thissummary, andin greater detail in
Volume II, contrary to CIA representations, a wide bodyof intelligence reporting indicates that the al-Ghuraba
group was not"discovered" asa result of KSM's reporting, norwas theal-Ghuraba group "tasked" with, or witting
of, any aspect of KSM's "Second Wave" plotting. Seealso KSM andHambali reporting from October 2003, and
the intelligence chronology in Volume II, to include [REDACTED] 45915 (141431Z SEP 03).
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Generiil Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re; Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16of the Convention Against Torture toCertain Techniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees. The memorandum states: "Use of enhanced
techniques, however, led to critical, actionable intelligence suchas the discovery of the GurabaCell, which was
taskedwith executing KSM's planned Second WaveattacksagainstLos Angeles."
'396 References to the "Second Wave" attacks appeared in public news reports shortly after September 11, 2001,
sometimes in reference to Zacarias Moussaoui. See, for example. The Washington Post, "Suspected Planner of 9/11
Attacks Captured in Pakistan afterGunfight" (09/14/2002) ("Someinvestigators have theorized that Moussaoui,
whose laptopcomputer contained information about cropdusting, may havebeen partof a second wave of terror
attacks or a back-up plan instead."); The New York Post, "2"^ PlotTied to Moussaoui" (09/06/2002) ("French
officials reportedly are claiming that Zacarias Moussaoui was never meant tobethe '20'^ hijacker' but was tobepart
of a 'second wave' of terror."); The Los Angeles Times, "Officials Skeptical as Detainees Say Sept. 11 was First in a
Trio" (10/01/2002) ("Tlie Sept. 11 attacks may have been planned as the first of three terrorist strikes in the United
States, eachprogressively bigger and more devastating than thelast, U.S. officials saidMonday, citing recent
interviews with captured A1 Qaeda operatives.... Since days after Sept. 11, authorities have said tliey were
concerned about a possible 'second wave' of attacks."). Similarly, on May 6, 2006, an affidavit filed by Moussaoui
stated, "I was part of another al-Qaedaplot whichwas to occur after September 11, 2001."
A November 21, 2005, Newsweek article entitled, "The Debate Over Torture," referenced a member of the
Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence stating that "enhanced interrogation techniques" worked with KSM to
thwart an al-Qa'idaterrorist plot, which themagazine indicated was the"Second Wave" plot. The article included
thefollowing: "A career CIA official involved with interrogation policy cautioned Newsweek not to put toomuch
credence in such claims. 'Whatever briefing theygot was probably not truthful,' said the official, who did not wish
tobeidentified discussing sensitive matters/]
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terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists."The CIA further represented that the
intelligenceacquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise
unavailable" and "saved lives."'
Italics in original. March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from |||||mi|^^H' IHII Legal Group,
DCI CounterteiTorist Center, document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation
Techniques."
1399 Prom2003 tlirough 2009,theCIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific setof examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured tliat
the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations furtlier asserted thatthe intelligence obtained from theuse of theCIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, andresulted in "saved lives." Among otherCIArepresentations, see\
(1) CIArepresentations in theDepartment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30,2005,
which relied on a seriesof highly specific CIArepresentations on the typeof intelligence acquired fromthe use of
the CIA's enhancedintenogation techniques to assess their legality. Hie CIArepresentations referenced by the
OLC include that the use of tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessaiy" to obtain "critical,"
"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect
anddisrupt" terrorist threats. TheOLC memorandum further states that "[tlie CIA] ha[s] infomied [theOLC] that
theCIA believes that thisprogram is largely responsible forpreventing a subsequent attack within tlie United
States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
StevenG. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof LegalCounsel,May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Usedin the Interrogation of HighValue al Qaeda Detainees.) (2)CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20,2007, which alsorelied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the useof theCIA'senhanced interrogation techniques.
Citing CIAdocuments and thePresident's September 6,2006, speech describing the CIA's inteiTogation program
(which wasbased on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "TheCIAinterrogation program—
and, in particular', itsuse of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve thisparamount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President
explained [on September 6,2006], 'by giving us information about teirorist plans wecouldnotget anywhere else,
theprogram has saved innocent lives.'" {See Memorandum forJohn A.Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, fromSteven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the WarCrimes Act, theDetainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value
al QaedaDetainees.) (3) CIAbriefings for members of tlie National Security Council in July and September 2003
represented that "the useof Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another hadproduced significant intelligence
information that had, in the viewof CIA professionals, savedlives,"and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of
tliis program willresult in lossof life, possibly extensive." {See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from
Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003;Briefing slides,CIA Intenogation
Program, July 29,2003; September 4, 2003, CIAMemorandum for theRecord, Subject: Member Briefing; and
September 26, 2003,Memorandum for the Record fromMuller, Subject: CIAIntenogation Program.) (4) The
CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draftSpecial Review of theCIA program, which asserts:
"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced intenogation techniques ('EITs') has
almostcertainly savedcountless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidencepointscleady to
the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allieswould [have] suffered major tenorist attacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." {See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "CounterteiTorism Detention
and InteiTogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: Febmary 24, 2004,Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
DirectorLeon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI programworked and the
[enhanced intenogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would nothavebeendiscovered or reported by other
means." {See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Prograni-
18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Keylntelligencean^ep^^ from Abu Zubaydah and Klialid
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(^E^^^^4ll|||||imil||||^ ^^^) For example, in November 2007, the CIA prepared abriefing for
President Bush. Under a section entitled, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," the CIA
represented that the CIA"'learned' about the "Second Wave" plotting and the al-Ghuraba group
only "after applying the waterboard along with other interrogation techniques.
Likewise,on March 2, 2005, the CIA provided the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) with a document entided, "Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." The CIA memorandum stated that the "Central
Intelligence Agency can advise you that this program works and the techniques are effective in
producing foreign intelligence."The CIA stated that "enhanced interrogation techniques...
[have] enabled CIA to disrupt plots" and "capture additional teiTorists." The document then
listed 11 examples of "key inteUigence collected from HVD interrogations after applying
interrogation techniques,"including:
"The 'Second Wave': This was a KSM plot to use East Asian operatives to
crash a hijacked airliner into the tallest building on the US West Coast (Los
Angeles) as a follow-on to 9/11. We learned this during the initial
interrogation ofKSMand later confirmed it through the interrogation of
Hambali and Khallad.
.. .The Guraba Cell: We learned of this 17-memberJemaah Islamiyah cell
from Hambali, who confirmed that some of the cell's operatives were
identified as candidates to train as pilots as part of KSM's 'second wave'
attack against the US..
Shaykli Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and
Effectiveness," with associateddocuments, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and"supporting references," to include "Background
on Key Captures and Plots Dismpted.") (6)CIA document faxed to theSenate Select Committee on Intelligence on
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS#2009-1258,
which provides a list of "some of the key capturesand disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the
CIA'senhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if notall,of thetimely intelligence
acquired from detainees in this program would not have beendiscovered or reported by anyothermeans." See
Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that theCIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques enabled the
CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
Italics added. "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the
notation the document was "sent to DCIANov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." CIA records indicatethat
Hambali was not subjected to the CIA's waterboard technique.
March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury firom^^^HfH^, Legal Group, DCI
Counterterrorist Center, document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."
Under a section entitled, "Results," theCIA "Effectiveness Memo" states that the"CIA's useof DOJ-approved
enhanced interrogation techniques, aspart ofa comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt
terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, andcollect a high volume of critical intelligenceon al-Qa'ida. We
believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason whyal-Qa'idahas failed to launch
a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001."
Italics in original.
Italics added. March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from HH Legal Group,
DCICounterterrorist Center, document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIACounterterrorist Interrogation
Techniques." The same representation can b^oun^rwrniltipledocu^^ "Briefing for Chief of Staff to
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'The ensuing May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, now declassified
and publicly available, states:
"[The CIA has] informed us that the inteiTOgation of KSM—once [enhanced]
interrogation techniques were employed—led to the discoveryof a KSM plot,
the 'Second Wave'.. .and the discovery of the Ghuraba Cell, a 17-member
Jemaah Islamiyah cell tasked with executing the 'Second
provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the
"discovery" and thwarting of the Second Wave plotting and/or the "discovery" of the al-Ghuraba
Group in 18 of the 20 documents provided to senior policymakers and the Department of Justice
between July 2003 and March 2009.^"^^^
A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found
that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the "discovery" or thwarting
of either "Second Wave" plot. Likewise, records indicate that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques played no role in the "discovery" of a 17-member "cell tasked with executing the
'Second Wave.'"'^®^
Intelligence Community records indicate that the initial "Second
Wave" effort began in parallel with the planning for the September 11, 2001, attacks and
included two operatives who were tasked with seeking pilot ti'aining. The thwarting of this
plotting was unrelated to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The two
operatives, Zacarias Moussaoui and Faruq al-Tunisi (aka AbderraoufJdey), were known to be
engaged in teiTorist activityprior to any reporting from CIAdetainees.On August 16, 2001,
the President Josh Bolten; CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs," dated May 2, 2006; as well as
"TalkingPointsfor 10 March2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Interrogation (HVDI)
Techniques," dated March 2, 2005.
Italics added. Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency,
from StevenG. Bradbury, PrincipalDeputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United StatesObligations Under Article 16 of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May be Usedin the InteiTOgation of HighValue Al Qaeda Detainees. The memorandum states: "It is this
paramount interest [thesecurity of the nation] that the Government seeks to vindicate through the interrogation
program. Indeed, the program, which the CIA believes 'has beena key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launcha
spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001,' directly furthers that interest, producing substantial
quantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence. Asdetailed above, ordinary interrogation techniques had
little effect on eitlier KSM or Zubaydah. Use of enhanced techniques, however, led to critical, actionable
intelligence such as the discovery of the GurabaCell, which wastasked withexecutingKSM's plannedSecond
Wave attacks against Los Angeles."
Seelistof CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 withrepresentations on the
effectiveness of the CIA's enlianced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in
Volume II.
1406 Memorandumfor John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy GeneralCounsel,Central Intelligence Agency, fi-om Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
UnitedStates Obligations UnderArticle 16 of the Convention Against Torture to CertainTechniques diat May be
Used in the Intenogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.
See detailed reporting in the Second Wave / Al-Ghuraba Group intelligence clironologv in Volume II of the
including
TOP




Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen, was arrested on immigration charges by the FBI in
Minnesota. At the time of his an"est, the FBI informed the CIA that the FBI considered
Moussaoui to be a "suspected airline suicide attacker."On January 17, 2002, the FBI
publicly released a statement identifying Faruq al-Tunisi, aka Abderraouf Jdey, a Canadian
citizen, as an al-Qa'ida operative possibly "prepared to commit future suicide terrorist
attacks.Intelligence indicates that al-Tunisi, who remains at large, withdrew from
participating in al-Qa'ida operations.His whereabouts remain unknown.
The subsequent"Second Wave" effort began with KSM's tasking
of several Malaysian nationals—led by Masran bin Arshad—in late 2001 to attack the "tallest
building in California" using shoe-bomb explosive devices to gain access to a plane's cockpit.
The thwartingof this plotting was alsounrelated to the use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation
techniques. This plot was disrupted withthe arrest of Masranbin Arshad in January 2002. This
arrest was unrelated to CIA detainee reporting.Bin Arshad claimed the effort had "not
advanced beyond the initial planning stages" when KSM "shelve[d] the plan" in December 2001
when Richard Reid exposed the "shoe bomb" explosive method.Beginning in July 2002,
while in the custody of a foreign government, and after the extensive use of rapport-building
interrogation techniques,^^^^ bin Arshad provided detailed information on this "Second Wave"
1408 /\ugust 18, 2001, FBI Minneapolis Field Officer Memorandum referenced inReport of the Joint Inquiry into the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11,2001, by the House Permanent SelectCommittee on Intelligence and the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence. Zacarias Moussaoui was later convicted of terrorism-related offenses, and
sentenced to life in prison. SeeDepartment of Justice, Officeof the InspectorGeneral, "A Review of the FBI's
Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks," dated November 2004, and released
publicly in June 2006, amongother sources. Seealso other open source records,including November20, 2007,
Associated Press article entitled, "Judge in 9/11 Conspirator Moussaoui's Case Questions Government Evidence in
TeiTorism Trials." The articlestates: Judge"Brinkema said she no longer feels confident relyingon those
government briefs, particularly since prosecutors admitted last week that similar representations made in the
Moussaoui case were false. In a letter made public Nov 13, [2007], prosecutors in the Moussaoui case admitted to
Brinkema that the CIAhad wrongly assured her thatno videotapes or audiotapes existed of interrogations of certain-
high profile terrorism detainees. In fact, two such videotapes andone audio tape existed."
i-ifw August 25, 2001, CIA Headquarters cable referenced by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the SenateSelectCommittee on Intelligence investigations, as well as theTwelfth Public Hearing on tlie
"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," June 16, 2004.
January 17, 2002, Federal Bureau of Investigation public release.
Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested on August 16,2001. Intelligence indicates Faruq al-Tunisi withdrew from al-
Qa'ida operations. Faruq al-Tunisi remains
ALEC (151618Z OCT 03);
Although the operation wasdisrupted with hisarrest, bin Arshad claimed to officers of a foreign government
that the operation was halted priortohis detention, specifically, when Richard Reid's shoe-bomb explosive
concealment method was uncovered in December2001. See DIRECTOR (270238Z FEB 03).
See intelligence clironology in Volume 11.
CIA ••• 65902
DIRECTOR
After binArshad was rendered from [Country 1]to [Country 2] forquestioning, |
^ountr^ officials^quired a"negligible amount ofintelligent' from bin Arshad, and he was eventually
tomH [Country 3]. The cable stated, [Countr^^^thorities] indicate[d] that [Masran
bin Arshad] wasthe toughest subject they hadeverinterrogated, including terrorists." In anticipation of the
release o^i^ugus^^002, CIA intelligence report describing new information Masran bin Arshad was providing,
the CIA in [Country 3] sen^^abl^oCI^Ieadquaitei^j^ stated: "In light of the attention
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plotting, the Malaysian operatives (details on Affifi, Lillie, and "Tawfiq"), and the proposed
method of attackThis information would later be corroborated by other intelligence
collection, including, to a limited extent, reporting from CIA detainees in the spring of 2003.
Another Malaysian national associated with Masran bin Arshad, Zaini Zakaria, was identified by
a foreign government as a potential operative seeking pilot training as early as July 2002.^^^^^
Zakaria was tasked with obtaining such training by al-Qa'ida, but failed to follow through with
the tasking.Zakaria turned himself in to Malaysian authorities on December 18, 2002.
Malaysian authorities releasedZakariain February 2009.In 2006, in a White House briefing
on the "West Coast Terrorist Plot," the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
CounterteiTorism announced that the plot had been disrupted with the arrest of the cell leader,
Masran bin Arshad.
that this report is likely to generateamongconsumersj^roba that the interrogation methods
beingused with Masran [by the somewhat
unconventional...Tliishas entailedhaving several [Country 3 officers] spendan enonnous amount of time with
Masran praying with him, eating with him, earning his trust, listenin^^um^n^liciting fromhiiiL^iis^proach
has yielded a significant amount of valuable intelligence." (See 659^
65903nH^H^|; 65902
BBI^^^^^B^IoCIAsuspicions that "Tawfiq" may be identifiable with Mohd Farik bin Amin, aka Zaid, aka
Zubair, are found in ALEC (192004Z JUN 03).
See Second Wave/al-GhurabaGroupbte^^ chronology in Volume IT, including DIRECTOR jjjj^^l
(082328Z JUL 03) and
See SecondWave/al-Gliuraba Group intelligence chronology in Volume II, including CIA (22I647Z
JUL 02).
Among othe^i^orts, see DIRECTOR HII (082328Z JUL 03), CIA HH| (221647Z
JUL 02), and 45325 (051614Z SEP 03). According to KSM, an individual named "Mussa," which the CIA
assessed was KSM's namefor Zaini Zakaria,disappeared after receiving money that was intended for pilot training.
Reporting indicates thatZakaria—a Malaysian—was to be thepilotfor the group of Malaysian individuals that
Masranbin Arshad sought to use in the SecondWave plotting. As noted in the text, Zakaria turned himself into
Malaysian authorities on December 18,2002. Hambali—who wasassociated with theseMalaysians—stated he "did
not know whythe operation wascancelled," but surmised it mightbe because of the September11, 2001, attacks, or
becauseZaini Zakaria "got cold feet." Hambalireportedin September 2003 that the head of the operation was
Masran bin Arshad and tliat Zaini Zakaria was the pilot selected to fly the airplane. Hambali coiToborated Masran
bin Arshad's reportingthat the other members of the group were MohdFarikbin Amin (aka Zubair), Abd Al-
Rahman bin Mustapha Afifi, and Bashirbin Lap Nazri (akaLillie). By the timeof Hambali's capture, all three were
in custody. See DIRECTOR (042340Z SEP 03)^
mm 10044 (260718Z AUG 04). See also DIRECTOR (181840Z MAY 07) and "Malaysia Frees
Suspected A1 Qaeda Pilot-Report,"Reuters, dated February 14, 2009.
As described, on Febraary 9, 2006, in a White House briefingon "the West Coast Tenorist Plot by Frances
Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security andCounterterrorism," the WhiteHouse
emphasized how "collaboration with our international partners" had "disrupted terrorist networks aroundthe world
and seriousal-Qaeda plots." Using the "WestCoast" plot as an example, Townsend relayed that: "Klialid Shaykh
Mohammed was the individual who led this effort. .. .The cell leader was anested in February of 2002, and as we
begin—at that point, the othermembers of the cell believed that the WestCoastplot had been cancelled[and] was
not goingforward...the leadguy is arrested, which disrupts it in February of '02." When asked about whether this
plottingcould be creditedas a dismption given the beliefby somethat "it nevergot far enough to be disrupted,"
Townsendstated, "tiiere is no questionin my mind that tliisis a disruption." See also May 23, 2007, White House
Press Release, entitled, "Fact Sheet: Keeping AmericaSafe From Attack," which states "We Also Broke Up Other
Post-9/11 Aviation Plots. In 2002, we broke up a plot by KSM to hijack an airplane and fly it into the tallest
buildingon the West Coast." The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that operatives involved in the "Second
Wave" plot were arrested in 2002. The CIA's June 2013 Response nonetheless contends that "Hambali remained
capable of directing the plotat tlietimeof his arrest," andthat, therefore, the arrest of Hambali "was a critical factor
in the disruption of al-Qa'ida's plan." Tliei^^ioCl^^coi^^ndicatin^h^Hambali took any action in
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Contrary to CIA representations, the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against KSM did not result in the "discovery" of KSM's "Second
Wave" plotting. On March 1, 2003, KSM was captured. He was rendered to CIA custody on
March |, 2003, and was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and in the weeks
afterwards, KSM did not discuss the "Second Wave" plotting.On April 19, 2003—24days
after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had ceased—interrogators
questioned KSM about Masran bin Arshad and his role in developing a cell for the "Second
Wave" attacks. After being told that Masran bin Arshad had been arrested, KSM told his
interrogators, "I have forgotten about him, he is not in my mind at all." KSM also denied that
"he knew anything about a plot to take out the 'tallest building' in California." '^^ '^^ KSM's
reporting prompted ALEC Station to write in a cable that "we remain concerned that KSM's
progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to
threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS."'"^^^
According to a CIA cable, on May 5, 2003, KSM "evenmally
admitted to tasking Masran bin Arshad to target the tallest building in California." '^^ -^ KSM
continued, however, to deny aspects of the plotting—such as denying the use of shoe-bombs in
the operation, only to confirm the planned use of shoe-bombs in later interrogations.On June
23, 2003, an ALEC Station officer wrote that "[gjiven that KSM only admitted knowledge of
this operation upon learning of Masran's detention, we assess he is not telling all he knows, but
rather is providing information he believes we already possess."KSM was asked about
detained Malaysian national Zaini Zakaria for the first time on July 3, 2003. During the
interrogation, the CIA debriefer stated that there was information suggesting that Zakaria was
funded by al-Qa'ida to take flight lessons in September 2001.'"^-^ KSM denied knowing the
name Zaini Zakaria, but later described "Mussa." The CIA suspected this was an alias for
Zakaria. CIA officers at the detention site where KSM was being interrogated then wrote in a
cable, "[t]he core problem, once again, is the appearance that KSM gave up this critical
information only after being presented with the idea that we might already know something
about it."^430
furtherance of the plotting. Further, a November 2003 cable states that CIA interrogators believed Hambali's role in
al-Qa'ida terrorist activity was more limited than the CIA had assessed prior to his capture and that al-Qa'ida
members did not consider Hambali "capable of leading an effort to plan, orchestrate and execute complicated
operations on his ov^^n." {See Hii^HII 1113(111252Z NOV 03).) The claim in the CIA's June 2013 Response
that the capture of Hambali "resulted in large part from information obtained from" KSM is inaccurate. Details on
the capture of Hambali are described elsewhere in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II.
See 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); 10972 (241122Z MAR 03); and the KSM detainee review
in Volume HI.
^•^•11319 (191445Z APR 03), disseminated as ]
Alic^H (222153Z APR 03)
11513 (051120Z MAY 03)
12068 (201407Z JUN 03); 12167 (301747Z JUN 03), disseminated as |
'^ 2®Em^from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED],^
mfll, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Highlight for Coord: KSM and Los Angeles Tlireat Reporting;
date: June 23. 2003, at 02:21 PM.1429 ^•••112208 (05I545Z JUL 03), disseminated as |
12208 (051545Z JUL 03), disseminated
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With regard to the al-Ghuraba group, contrary to CIA
representations, a wide body of intelligence reporting indicates that the al-Ghuraba group was
not "discovered" as a result of reporting from KSM or Hambali, nor was the al-Ghuraba group
"tasked" with, or witting of, any aspect of KSM's "Second Wave" plotting Rather, while in
foreign government custody, Hambali's brother, Gun Gun Ruswan Gunawan, identified "a group
of Malaysian and Indonesian students in Karachi" witting of Gunawan's affiliation with Jemaah
Islamiyah.^"^-^^ CIArecords indicate that Gunawan stated that the students were in Karachi "at
the request of Hambali."^"^^^ In a cableconveying this information, CIA officers recalled
intelligence reporting indicating KSM planned to use Malaysians in the "next wave of attacks,"
and stated Gunawan had just identified "a group of 16 individuals, most all of whom are
Malaysians."^"^^"^ The cableclosedby stating, "we need to question Hambali if this collection is
pai't of his 'next wave' cell." (From July through December 2002, foreign government
reporting described KSM's use of Malaysians in the "next wave attacks." The reporting
March 2,2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from 11Legal Group, DCl
Countertenorist Center, document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counteiterrorist InteiTogation Techniques."
Tlie same representation can be found in multiple documents, including "Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President
Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention, and Intenogation Programs" dated May 2, 2006, as v^ell as "Talking Points
for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC; Effectiveness of tlie High-Value Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated
March 2, 2005. As noted earlier, the CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA's representations on
how the CIA first learned of the group were inaccurate. See intelligence clironology in Volume II for detailed
information on this matter.
15359 IIIIHIIillHH- detailed in Volume II, while still inforeign government custody,
Hambali stated he had a brotlier named "Ruswan Gunawan" who attended Abu Bakr University in Karachi and lived
in a donnitory on or near the campus. According to Hambali, his brother served as his "primary conduit for
communications" with KSM and al-Qa'ida. The information that Hambali provided regarding the true name of his
brother was relayed to CIA Headquarters and to CIA personnel in Pakistan and elsewhere on August 15,2003. The
cable stated that, while Hambali was in foreign government custody, the CIA "learned that" Hambali had a 25-year-
old-brother at Abu Bakr UniversityinK^chi named "Rusman Gunawan." According to Hambali, the brothe^^d
in adormitory near campus^^^^ |^^ |^respo^ed tliat tliis was "actionable intelligence that may help"
locate Gunawan and that would check records of the students at Abu Bakr University for
matches to Gunawan. Previous checks for names provided by KSM and other CIA detainees for Hambali's brother
("Abdul Hadi") did not result in matches or locational information. Tlie Director of the CIA Counterterrorism
Center subsequently authorized tlie capture and detention of Hambali's brother based on the infonnation Hambali
had provided in foreign government custody. Thereafter, CIA personnel in began working to facilitate tlie
capture of Gunawan by Pakistani authorities. Days later, a CIA cable referenced information on the probable
location ofRuswan Gunawan and described ^
Seeintelligence
chronology in Volume II for details, including 87551 (15073IZ AUG 03); ^B^^ri|||87552(150738Z AUG 03);••••^108 (161148Z AUG 03); ALECM® (18171IZ AUG^sTMHB 15173(251117ZAI^ 03); ^^^••(0n729Z SEP 03); and ••••1^43 (020259Z SEP 03).
1433 15359 cable closes by stating that Gunawan suggested the interrogators ask
Hambali about the 17-member group, "now that we can confront him with [Gunawan] having unmasked the group."
Tlie cable added that the Pakistani government would not allow the members of the student group to depart Pakistan
and that "confronting Hambah with [tlie information on the 17-member group] should also be interesting."1434 15359 lllllll^milllllH. Records indicate that it was this initial analysis that led the CIA to
consider the group part of KSM's "Second Wave" "cell." It is unknown if these CIA officers were aware of Masran
bin Arshad's reporting on his team of Malaysian nationals initially tasked with conducting an attack against the
'tallest building in California" using shoe-bomb explosive devices to gain access to a plane's cockpit. See
DIRECTOR (270238Z FEB 03).
15359
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included Masran bin Arshad's information, provided while he was in foreign government
custody, on his four-person Malaysian cell tasked by to be part of an operation targeting
the West Coast of the United States, as wellas July 2002 reporting on Malaysian national Zaini
Zakaria seeking pilot training.
Contrary to CIA representations, the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against Hambali did not result in the "discovery" of "the Guraba Cell"
that was "tasked with executing the 'Second Wave'" plotting. As noted, in foreign government
custody, Hambali's brother, Gun Gun Ruswan Gunawan, identified "a group of Malaysian and
Indonesian students in Karachi" witting of Gunawan's affiliation with Jemaah Islamiyah. '^^ '^^
The cable conveying this information recommended "confronting Hambali" with this
information.While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Hambali
was questioned about the al-Ghurabagroup and KSM's effort to use airplanes to attack the
United States. Hambali told his CIA interrogators "that some of the members of [the al-Ghuraba
group] were destined to work for al-Qa'ida if everything had gone according to plan," that one
member of the group had "ambitions to become a pilot," that he (Hambali) was going to send
three individuals to KSM in response to KSM's "tasking to find pilot candidates, but never got
around to asking these people," and that "KSM told him to provide as many pilots as he
could.Months later, on November 30, 2003, after three weeks of being questioned by a
In October2003, KSM infomied theCIAthat "he did notyet view the [al-GhurabaJ groupas an operational pool
from which to draft operatives,"and notedeventhose who had receivedmilitary training were not ready to be
considered for "ongoing planning." See |HHiiHl0223 (221317Z QCT 03) and j
^e^ntellig^ic^hr^oiogWr^olume^^ CIAJ
65903 andl^lHHBV ^59021
eel 1were not members of the al-Ghuraba group.
15359
15359 As described, the cable closes by stating that Gunawan suggested the
interrogators ask Hambali about the 17-member group, "nowthat we can confront him with [Gunawan] having
unmasked the group." The cable added that the Pakistani government would not allow the members of the student
gioup to depart Pakistan and that"confronting Hambali with [the information on the 17-member group] shouldalso
be interesting."
'''"o See [REDACTED] 45953 (151241Z SEP03) and[REDACTED] 1323 (161749Z SEP03). CIA cables describe
howHambali was repeatedly questioned on this issue wliile being subjected to theCIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. A CIA cable states: "With the gradual ramp-up of intensity of the session and the use of the enhanced
measures, [Hambali] finally stepped over the line and provided the information." Months later Hambali admitted to
fabricating the information provided. A cable explained that Hambali "gave answers tliat were similar to what was
being asked and what he inferred the interrogator or debrieferwanted, and when the pressure subsidedor he was
told that the information he gave was okay^Hamb^ knew that he had provided the answer that was being sought."
{See•• 1142 (November 30, 2003), 1144 (010823Z DEC 03).) The CIA represented in the
February 2004 Pavitt memo to the CIA InspectorGeneral, among other documents, that "as a result of the lawful use
of ElTs, Hambali provided infonnation [onthe al-Ghuraba group]... someof whom had beendesignated as the
pilots" for the Second Wave attacks. The CIA's June 2013 Response indicates that the CIA continues to assess that
multiple al-Ghuraba members had an "interest in aircraft and aviation." CIA records do not support this assertion.
While one member of the al-Ghuraba group was interested in airplanes, [a specific al-
Ghuraba group member. Person 1], intelligence indicate^iat the interest was unrelated to terrorist activity. {See
intelligei^e chronology in Volume II, including 15608 (^H^H^^Ii), describing
[Person's] interview while in foreign government custody.) ACIA cable states "after several heart-to-
heart chats, millH [Person 1] cried and pledged his full cooperation." Under questioning, HjjjH [Person 1]
stated that Gunawan encouraged ||||[|||||||||| [Person 1] to pursue his interest in au-craft and "attempted in late 2001
and early 2002 to recruit him for pilot training/^eMhecablej^^^^B[Per^ 1] deflected these requests from
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The four members of the Malaysian
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
debriefer "almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia," Hambali admitted to fabricating a number of
statements during the period he was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, including information on efforts to locate pilots for KSM, Specifically, Hambali
stated "he lied about the pilot because he was constantly asked about it and under stress, and so
decided to fabricate." According to a cable, Hambali said he fabricated these claims "in an
attempt to reduce the pressure on himself," and "to give an account that was consistent with what
[Hambali] assessed thequestioners wanted to hear." '^^ ^ TheNovember 30, 2003, cable noted
that CIA personnel "assesse[d] [Hambali]'s admission of previous fabrication to be credible.
Hambali then consistently described "the al-Ghuraba organization" as a "development camp for
potential future J1 operatives and leadership, vice a JI cell or an orchestrated attempt by JI to
Gunawan. Asked about his interest in aviation, |||||||[| [Person 1] stated that "he was the only member ofthe
Ghurabastudy group witlian interest in aviation,"and that "since he was aboutfour years old he has 'been a big
maniacfor airplanes.'" [Person 1] told his interrogators thathe purchasedand read multiple magazines
about aircraft from various book stores. ACIA officer wrote, "asked toprovidede^ls ontlie Boeing 747, [Person
1] rattled off an impressive array of facts about the various series of 747s." [Person I's] claims were
consistent with other intelligence in CIA databases. See intelligencechronology in Volume II for additional
information.
*^12^11^11142 (301101Z NOV 03). This cable appears to have been retransmitted the following day as
•^^•1144 (010823Z DEC 03).
The CIA detention site wrote, "[Hambali]'s admission came after three weeks of daily debriefing sessions with
[the case officer] canied out almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia. [Hambali] has consistently wanned to [the case
officer's] discussions with him, and has provided to [the case officer] additional information that he had avoided in
the past... More tellingly, [Hambali] has opened up considerably to [the case officer] about his fears and
motivations, and has taken to trusting [the case officer] at his word. [Hambali] looks to [the case officer] as his sole
confidant and the one person who has [Hambali]'s interest in mind.... Given this. Base notes [Hambali]'s account
of how, tlirough statements read to him and constant repetition of questions, he was made aware of what type of
answers his questioners wanted. [Hambali] said he merely gave answers that were similar to what was being asked
and what he inferred the interrogator or debriefer wanted, and when the pressure subsided or he was told that the
information he gave was okay, [Hainbali] knew tliat he had provided the answer that was being sought." (See
intelligence clironology inVolume II, including Hljl 1142 (November 30, 2003).) Tlie CIA's June 2013
Response states tliat "[w]e continue to assess [Hambali's] original revelation was correct, however, based on KSM's
claim that he tasked Hambali to identify and train pilots, Hambali's verificationof this claim in multiple instances,
and the students' interest in aircraft and aviation." The CIA's June 2013 Response is incongnient with the
assessment of CIA inten ogators at the time—that the claim of fabrication was "credible"—as well as with a wide
body of subsequent reporting. CIA records indicate that CIA officers confused intelligence reporting on the
Malaysians involved in the "Second Wave" plotting—an apparent referenceto Masran bin Arshad, Zaini Zakaria,
and three other Malaysians—with the al-Ghuraba Malaysian student grout
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initiate JI operations outside of Southeast Asia." '^^ '^ ^ This description was con^oborative of other
intelligence reporting
An October 27, 2006, CIA cable states that "all of the members of
the JI al-Ghuraba cell have been released,"^^^ while an April 18, 2008, CIA intelligence report
focusing on the Jemaah Islamiyah and referencing the al-Ghurabagroup makes no reference to
the group serving as potential operatives for KSM's "Second Wave" plotting.
4. The Thwarting of the UnitedKingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture ofDhiren
Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi
Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation
techniques were effective and necessaiy to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence,
which enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period
of years, the CIA provided the capture ofDhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, and the diwarting of
Barot's United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. The operation that
resulted in the identification of a U.K.-based "Issa," the identification of "Issa" as Dhiren Barot,
Dhiren Barot's arrest, and the thwarting of his plotting, resulted from the investigative activities
of U.K. government authorities. Contrary to CIA representations, KSM did not provide the first
reporting on a U.K.-based "Issa," nor are there records to support the CIA representation that
reporting from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted
in Dhiren Barot's arrest. After the arrest of Dhiren Barot, CIA officers prepared a document for
U.K. authorities which stated: "while KSM tasked al-Hindi to go to the US to surveil targets, he
was not aware of the extent to which Barot's planning had progressed, who Issa's co-
conspirators were, or that Issa's planning had come to focus on the UK." The plotting associated
Hainbali elaborated that the al-Ghuraba group was similar to the Pan Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS)'s
Masapakindo, aka Pakindo,organization. Masran bin Arshad was connectedto Pakindo,and, while in foreign
government custody, explained that "in 1991, PAS [Pan Islamic Party of Malaysia] established a secret Malaysian
Student Association known as 'Masapakindo' tohelp facilitate a steadypipelineof PAS religious and military
traineestravelingfrom Malaysia to Pakistan, sometimes continuing on to Afghanistan, but ultimately returning to
Malaysia. This student association for children of PAS members also was intended to serve as a general support
structure for PAS students who were undergoing Islamic religious training in Pakistan and India. Masapakindo's
headquarters was based in Karachi, Pakistan." See intelligence clironology in Volume II for additional information,
including [REDACTED] 45915 (141431Z SEP03) andCIA (160621Z DEC02). See also February 27,
2004, Memorandum for CIA Inspector General from James L. Pavitt,CIA DeputyDirectorfor Operations, entitled
"Comments to Draft IG Special Review," "Counterteirorism Detention and Interrogation Program," which contains
a February 24, 2004, attachment entitled, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation
Activities." Seealso CIA Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting
Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," dated April 18, 2008. See also KSM and Hambali reporting from October 2003.
See intelligence clironology in Volume II. Although NSA signalsintelligence was not provided for this Study,
an April 2008 CIA intelligence reporton theJemaahIslamiyanoted that the al-Ghuraba group "consistedof the sons
of JI leaders, many of whom completed basic militant training in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at Islamic
universities in Karachi," and that this assessment was basedon "signals intelligence and other reporting." SeeCIA
Intelligence Productentitled, "JemaahIslamiya: Counterterrorism ScrutinyLimitingExtremist Agendain Pakistan,"
dated April 18, 2008.
WASHINGTON DC (272113Z OCT 06)1446 Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in
Pakistan," dated April 18, 2008.




with Dhiren Barot was assessed by experts to be "amateurish," "defective," and unlikely to
succeed.
Further Details: Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi,^'^^met with al-
Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan in early 2004 to discuss potential terrorist attacks against targets in the
United Kingdom.^"^®^ Intelligence reporting indicates thatBarotspentFebruary and March 2004
Dhiren Barot was referred to as "Issa," "Abu Issa," "Abu Issa al-Pakistani," and "Issa al-Britani." CIA records
indicate that Dhiren Barot's most common alias, "Issa al-Hindi" (variant "Esa al-Hindi") - the name used to author
the book, "Tlie Armyof Madinah in Kashmir" - was uncovered in May 2003 from FBI interviewsof an individual
in FBI custody, James Ujaama, aka Bilal Ahmed. Intelligencereporting indicated that Dliiren Barot's, aka Esa al-
Hindi's, "Tlie Army of Madinah in Kashmk" was a well-known book among the U.K. extremist community.
Informationon the book was prominently available online in 2002, on, amongotlier internet sites, the website of the
book store associated with Moazzem Begg, a U.K. extremist who was arrested and transferred toU.S. ii^ary
custody atGuantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2002. Tlie cover ofthe book lists "Esa Al-Hindi" as the author (jfjH
•••••••280438Z (280746Z MAY 03)).
Note on CIA records related to U.K.-based "Issas": Two United Kingdom-based al-Qa'ida associates, Dhiren
Barot and Sajid Badat,were known by the same commonaliases, Issa, Abu Issa, Abu Issa al-Britani ("[of] Britain")
and/or Issa al-Pakistani. Both individuals were British Indians who had been independently in contact with senior
al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan. Reporting indicated that the Issa(s) were located in the U.K. and engaged in terrorist
targeting of the U.K. The investigation into their true identitieswas a U.K.-led operation. As a result, the CIA
sometimes had limited insight into U.K.-based activities to identify and locate tlie Issas. Senior CIA personnel
expressedfmstration that the U.K. was not sharing all known information on its investigations, writing in August
2003 that "[tlie FBI is] clearly working closely with the [U.K. service] on these matters and [the CIA is] at the
mercy" of what it is told. Until the arrest of one of the Issas, Sajid Badat, on November 27, 2003, the U.S.
Intelligence Community and U.K. authorities often confused the two al-Qa'ida associates. As a result, the quality
and clarity ofdetainee reporting on the Issas (including reporting from detainee^iUh^ustod^^e CIA, U.S.
military, Depailment of Justice, and foreign services) varied. CIA personnel reported in
September 2003 that there were "two (or three) Abu Issas" in intelligence reporting and fliat, because of their
similarities, it was often "unclear which Issa the detainees [were] referring to at different stages." Once detained in
the United Kingdom in November 2003, Sajid Badat (one of the Issas) cooperated with U.K. autliorities and
provided information about tlie other "Issa." Badat stated that "people often asked [Badat] about [the other] Issa, as
they were both British Indians." According to Sajid Badat, "anyone who had been involved with jiliad in Britain
since the mid-90s" would know Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot), to include Babar Alimed, Moazzem Begg, Richard
Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, and KSM. Dhiren Barot (the other Issa), anested on August 3, 2004, was found to have
been especially well-known among the U.K. extremist community, having written a popular book in 1999
expounding the virtues of jihad in Kashmir under the alias, "Esa al-Hindi." CIA records include a reference to the
book and a description of its author ("a brother from England who was a Hindu and became a Muslim.. .[who] got
training in Afghanistan j^/^a^arly as December 1999. {See information disseminated by the CIA on 12/31/99 in|.) [A foreign partner] would later report that Dhiren Barot "frequently" appeared "in
reporting of terrorist training" and "involvement in Jihad in occupied Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Malaysia,
throughout the 1990s." As described, the Committee Study is based on more tiian six million pages of material
related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program provided by the CIA. Access was not provided to
intelligence databases of the CIA, or any other U.S. or foreign intelligence or law enforcement agency. Insomuch as
intelligence from these sources is included, it was, unless noted otherwise, found within tlie CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program material produced for this Study. It is likely that significant intelligence unrelated to the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program on Sajid Badat and Dhiren Barot exists in U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement records and databases. {See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including: ALEC^^^|(112157Z
JUN 03); 19907 (231744Z APR 04); 99093 (020931Z SEP 03); ALEC l^B(212n7^
AUG 03); CIA WASHINGTON DC ••} (162127Z JUN 03); and a series ofemails between]
and (with multiple ccs) on August 22,2003, at 9:24:43 AM.) In the context of the
Captiu-e/Identification of Sajid Badat, the CIA's June 2013 Response states that "KSM's reporting also cleai'ly
distinguished between, and diereby focused investigations of, two al-Qa'ida operatives known as Issa al-Britani."
As detailed in the KSM detainee review in Volume III, KSM did discuss the two operatives, but he did not identify
111! I (III I




in Pakistan with senior al-Qa'ida explosives expert 'Abd al-Rahmanal-Muhajir, likely refining
plans to use vehicle-based bombs against U.K. targets. In July 2004, casingreports
associated with "Issa" were recovered in a raid in Pakistan associated with the capture of Abu
Talha al-Pakistani.'"^^® During questioning in foreign government custody, "Abu Talha stated the
U.S. casing reports were from Abu Issa."^"^^^ Furtherdebriefings of Abu Talha revealed that
Issa, aka Dhiren Barot, was the "operational manager" for al-Qa'ida in the United Kingdom.
Additional information about Dhiren Baiot's U.K. plotting was recovered from the hard drives
confiscated during the raid that resulted in the arrest of Dhiren Barot. A document describing the
plotting was divided into two parts. The first part included "the Gas Limos project," which
envisioned parking explosives-laden courier vans or limousines in underground garages. The
second part, the "radiation (dirty bomb) project," proposed using 10,000 smoke detectors as part
of an explosive device to spread a radioactive element contained in the detectors. Dhiren Barot's
plotting was referred to as the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot.'"^^^ The U.K. Urban Targets
either by name (or, in the case of Dhiren Barot, by his more common kiinya, Issa al-Hindi) and provided no
actionable intelligence that contributed to the eventual identification and location of either "Issa."
See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED] at the Office of Director of National Intelligence; subject:
"URGENT: Unclassified Fact Sheet for [REDACTED]"; date: October 6, 2005, at 2:39 PM.
3924 CIA WASHINGTON DC•||| •BIHiH- ^lA has
represented that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in the identification and arrest of
"Abu Talha al-Pakistani." Tlie CIA's June 2013 Response states that Abu Talha's arrest and debriefing was
"invaluable to our overall understanding of Issa's activities and the threat he posed," and claims that Abu Talha's
arrest "would not have happenedif not for reporting from CIA-held detainees." CIA records do not support this
statement. CIA records indicate that Abu Talha was identified and located independent of information from CIA
detainees. Abu Talh^MP^stani, a Pakistani with links to U.K. extremists, was identified through information
derived from British m||| [intelligence collection] and the U.K. investigation ofU.K.-based extremist Baber
Ahmed and his associates. These individuals were already under investigation by the B|| [foreign partner].
Further, Baber Ahmed was known to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement authorities prior to any CIA
detainee reporting. Foreigngovernment authorities, relying on information providedby die United Kingdom and, to
an extent, U.S. signals intelligence, ultimately located and arrested Abu Talha al-Piikistani. Because of the central
role of U.K. authorities, CIA records do not include a comprehensive accounting of the investigation and operations
that led to Abu Talha al-Pakistani's detention. CIA records indicate, however, that Abu Talha al-Pakistani was
identified by two detainees in foreign governmentcustody, shortly after their capture. (Both detainees would later
be transferred to CIA custody and subjected to theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.) The first of these two
detainees was Majid Khan, who on March 6, 2003, discussed Ammar al-Baluchi's Karachi-based assistant, "Talha."
Majid Khan provided a phone numberfor Talha, and used that number at the request of his captors in an effort to
locate and capture Ammar al-Baluchi through Talha. Tliis reporting, which Majid Khan provided while he was in
foreign government custody,preceded any reporting from CIA detainees. The other detaineewho reportedon Abu
Talha was Ammar al-Baluchi, who describedhim as "Suliman" and stated that he had been dispatched to the United
Kingdom to recruit operatives suitable for hijacking and suicideoperations. Ammar al-Baluchi was also in foreign
government custody at the time of this disclosure. KSM's failure to mention Abu Talha/"Suliman," more than a
month after the CIA had ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against him, prompted one of KSM's
debriefers to state that "KSM could be in trouble very soon." KSM also fabricated that he had shown a sketch
related to the Heathrow Airport plot to Ammar al-Baluchi, rather than to Abu Talha, until confronted with Ammar
al-Baluchi's denials, more than threemonths afterthe use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques against
KSM hadceased^5eeVolumeII and the KSM detainee review in Volume El foradditional information.
Email from: to: JamesPavittand others; subject: "Laptop docex from recent raid may yield
pre-electionthre^inforniatioirjdat^^ 2004, at7:35 AM.
392^^H|^ |^^ m7disseminated as
See DIRECTOR |||fl|f^32140Z AUG 04). See also intelligence chronology in Volume II, as well as email
from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], at the Officeof Director of National Intelligence; subject: "URGENT:
Unclassified Fact Sheet for [REDACTED]"; date: October 6,2005, at 02:39 PM. The email includes a CIA-
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Plot was disrupted when Dhiren Barot and his U.K.-based associates were detained in the United
Kingdom in early August 2004. '^^ '^^ On August 24, 2004, U.K. authorities informed the CIA that
the criminal charges against Barot and his co-conspirators "were mainly possible owing to the
recovery of terrorist-related materials during searches of associated properties and vehicles
following their arrests."''^ ^^ In September 2004, an Intelligence Community assessment stated
that Dhiren Barot was "in an early phase of operational planning at the time of his capture," and
that there was no evidence to indicate that Barot had acquired the envisioned materials for the
attacks.In December 2005, an FBI assessment stated, "the main plot presented in the Gas
Limos Project is unlikely to be as successful as described," concluding, "we assess that the Gas
Limos Project, while ambitious and creative, is far-fetched.On November 7, 2006, Dhiren
Barot was sentenced to life in prison. On May 16, 2007, Barot's sentence was reduced from life
in prison to 30 years after a British Court of Appeal found that expert assessments describing the
plot as "amateurish," "defective," and unlikely to succeed were not provided to the sentencing
judge.
thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the
identification and/or capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, is one of the eight most
frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and
provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent
the identification and/or arrest of Dhiren Barot, and/or the disruption of his U.K. plotting, as an
example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying
interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional
terrorists."^"^^^ In at least one documentprepared for the president, the CIA specifically
coordinated fact sheet and states the following regarding Dhiren Barot and his U.K. attack planning: "Issa al-
Hindi—who previously traveled to and cased a number of financial targets in the US—met with al-Qa'ida leaders in
Pakistan in etirly2004 to discuss attack planning against targets in the UK. Issa spent February and March 2004 in
Shkai, Pakistan, witli senior al-Qa'ida explosives expert 'Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir, probably refining plans to use
vehicle bombs against UK targets. Issa's reports, which were recovered in a raid in mid-2004, discussed ramming a
fuel tanker into a target and parking explosives-laden courier vans or limousines in undergiound garages.
Disruption: Issa and members of his cell were detained in the UK in early August 2004—soon after the arrest of key
Hamza Rabi'a subordinate Abu Talha al-Pakistani in HBj Pakistan."
CIA internal assessments concur with tliis analysis. See "disruption" text in an email from: [REDACTED]; to:
[REDACTED], at the Office of Director of National Intelligence; subject: "URGENT: Unclassified Fact Sheet for
[REDACTED]"; date: October 6, 2005, at 02:39 PM.
CIA•• (242144Z AUG 04)
1456 Disseminatedintelligence product by the nCT, entitled, "Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa'ida's "Election
Threat," dated September 10, 2004.
'"<57 pgi Intelligence Assessment, "The Gas Limos Project: An al-Qa'ida Urban Attack Plan Assessment," dated
December 14, 2004.
See Royal Courts of Justice Appeal, Barot v R [2007], EWCA Crim 1119 (16 May 2007). Tlie expert
assessmentsdetermined that tlie plotting involved "a professional-looking attempt from amateurs who did not really
know what they were doing." See also June 15, 2007, Bloomberg news article entitled, "Terrorist Gang Jailed for
Helping London and New York Bomb Plot."
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005. See also CIA talking points for National Security
Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectivenessof the High-Value Detainee
Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005, as well as multipleother CIA briefing records and
memoranda.
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highlighted the waterboard technique in enabling the "disruption of [Dhiren Barot's] sleeper
cell "J460 fLirther represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives.
See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with
the notation the documentwas"sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."
From 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific setofexamples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained fromthe use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique,otherwise unavailable, andresulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see:
(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Officeof LegalCounsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which relied on a series of highly specificCIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the
OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogationtechniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical,"
"vital," and "otherwise unavailableactionable inteUigence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect
and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [tlie OLC] that
the CIA believes that tliis program is largely responsiblefor preventing a subsequent attack within the United
States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo,Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,Office of LegalCounsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of UnitedStatesObligations Under Article 16of the Convention AgainstTorture to CertainTechniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Citing CIA documentsand the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation progiam
(which was based on CIA-provided information), die OLC memorandum states: "The CIA intenogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve tliisparamount interest[security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantitiesof otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President
explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us informationabout terrorist plans we could not get anywhereelse,
the program has saved innocent lives.'" (SeeMemorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from StevenG. Bradbury, Principal DeputyAssistantAttorneyGeneral, Office of Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of die National SecurityCouncil in July and September2003
represented that "the use of EnhancedTechniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence
information that had, in the viewof CIA professionals, saved lives," and wiirned policymakers that "[t]erminationof
this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from
Scott Muller, Subject: Reviewof Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefingslides, CIA Interrogation
Program, July 29, 2003; September4, 2003, CIA Memorandumfor the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and
September26, 2003, Memorandum for tlie Record from Muller, Subject:CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The
CIA's response to the Office of Inspector Generaldraft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts:
"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almostcertainlysaved countless American hves inside the United Statesand abroad. Tlieevidencepoints cleariyto
the fact that without die use of such techniques, we and our allies would [liave] suffered major terrorist attacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: Febmary 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's CounterterrorismDetention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the
[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timely intelligence acquiredfromdetainees in this program would not have been discoveredor reportedby other
means." (See CIA briefing documentsfor Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and ReportingDerivedfrom Abu Zubaydah and Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCI^Briefin^t^D^roemnrage^ CIA document "EITs and
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example, documents prepared in February 2009 for CIA
Director Leon Panetta on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques state
that the "CIA assesses...tlie techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and
that "most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would
not have been discovered or reported by other means." The document provides examples of
"some of the key captures, disrupted plots, and intelligence" attributed to CIA interrogations.
The document includes the following:
"Key Captures from HVD Inten*ogations: .. .arrest ofDhiren Barot (aka Issa
al-Hindi) in the United Kingdom
The materials for Director Panetta also include a chart entitled, "Key Intelligence and Reporting
Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad," that identifies two pieces of "key
intelligence" acquired from KSM, one related toMajid Khan''^ ^^ and the other to Dhiren Barot:
"KSM reports on an unidentified UK-based operative, Issa al-Hindi, which
touches off an intensive CIA, FBI and [United Kingdom] manhunt."
Likewise, a December 2004 CIA memorandum prepared for
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice responded to a request "for an independent study of
the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation techniques." The CIA
responded, "[t]here is no way to conduct such a study," but stated that the "CIA's use of DOJ-
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on Key IntelligenceImpacts Chart: Attachjnent," and "supportingreferences," to include "Background
on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases (DTS #2009-1258),
wliichprovides a list of "some of the key captures and disruptedplots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence
acquired from detainees in this progiam would not have beendiscoveredor reported by any other means." See
Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the
CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
Italics added. CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)." The documents include "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document
"EITs and Effectiveness," witli associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and
KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include
"Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted."
The reference in the document to KSM's reporting related to Majid Khan is inaccurate. The document asserts:
"When confronted with KSM's information, Majid admits he delivered the money to Zubair...." As described in
this summaiy, and more extensively in Volume11, Majid Klian providedinformationon tlie referenced money
transfer while in foreign governmentcustody, to an intenogator using rapport-building techniques, prior to any
infonnation from KSM.
1464 briefing documents for Leon Panetta entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefingon RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and
graphic attachment, "Key Intelligenceand ReportingDerivedfrom Abu Zubaydah and KlialidShaykli Muhammad
(KSM)." Includes "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with
associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment(AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key
Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and
Plots Disrupted."




approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach,
has enabled CIA to disrupt terroristplots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume
of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida," The document then provides examples of "[kjey
intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques,"^"^^^
including:
"Issaal-Hindi: KSM first^"^^^ identified Issa al-Hindi as an operative he sent to
the US prior to 9/11 to case potential tamet^i^Y^n^/ashington. When
shown surveillance photos provided by [foreignpartner
authorities], HVDs confirmed al-Hindi's identity. Al-Hindi's capture by the
British resulted in the disruption of a sleeper cell and led to the arrest of other
»'1467
operatives.
(T8//||||||||||||mi|||^^Hf^^^) Similaiiy, CIA Director Michael Hayden represented to the
Committee on April 12, 2007, that "KSM also provided the first lead to an operative known as
'Issa al-Hindi,' with other detainees giving additional identifying information."
The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the
thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the identification and/or arrest of
Dhiren Barot, aka Abu Issa al-Hindi, in 17of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and
the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009."^^
^ review of CIA operational cables and other documents found
that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not result in the unique intelligence that the
Italics in original.
1466 -pjjg CIA's June 2013 Response states that the "CIA accurately represented that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
(KSM) provided the initial lead to a UK-based al-Qa'ida operative named Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, whom
KSM had tasked to case US targets. Tliat information [from KSM] allowedus to identify this Issa as Barot and
ultimately led British authorities to arresthim." As is described in this summary, and in greaterdetail in Volume II,
this CIA representation is not supported by internal CIA records.
CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director ofCentral Intelligence," Subject:
"Effectivenes^^l^CI^Coun^^ Interrogatioi^echi^ues,'' included in email from: to:
and subject: on value
techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. Theemail references theattached "infomiation paperto Dr.
Riceexplaining the value of the interrogation techniques." The document includes references to thefollowing: The
Karachi Plot, the Heathrow Plot, the "Second Wave" plots, the Guraba Cell, Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani,
Hambali's Capture, Jafaar al-Tayyar, the Dirty Bomb Plot, Sajid Badat, and Shkai, Pakistan. The document also
asserts that "[pjrior to the use of enhanced measures" the CIA "acquiredlittle threat information or significant
actionable intelligence" from KSM, As detailedin the summary,KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques immediatelyupon entering CIA custody.
CIA classified statement for therecord, Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael
V. Hayden, Director,Central Intelligence Agency, 12April 2007; and accompanying SenateSelectCommittee on
Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12,2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and
Interrogation Program" (DTS #2007-1563).
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in thissummary anddescribed in detail in
Volume II.
Kll il ( III I (lil|i|




CIA represented led to the arrest of Dhiren Barot or the thwarting of his plotting.The review
found that the intelligence that alerted security officials to: (1) the potential terrorist threat posed
by one or more U.K.-based operatives with the alias "Issa"; (2) Issa's more common alias, "Issa
al-Hindi"; (3) Issa al-Hindi's location; (4) Issa al-Hindi's ti-ue name, Dhiren Barot; and (5)
information on Dhiren Barot's U.K. plotting, all came from intelligence sources unrelated to the
CIA's Detention andInterrogation Program.^"^^^ Contrary to CIA representations, reporting from
CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not lead to the arrest
of Dhiren Barot or the thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot, nor did KSM
provide the first reporting on a U.K.-based "Issa." Rather, the disruption of the United Kingdom
Urban Targets Plot and the identification and anestofDhirenBaro^^ al-Hindi) was
attributable to the effoits of U.K. law enforcement^^^^^^^H||^ ^H||, as well as
mm [a review of computer hard drives], l^^^^^^^^mi^llected
communications], and reporting from detainees in the custody of the U.S. Department of Justice,
the U.S. military, and a foreign government. While records indicate KSM did provide the initial
information on "Issa's" tasking to conduct casings in the United States prior to the September 11,
2001, attacks,'"^^- as well as information on an emailaddress related to Issa,^"^^^^ this information
was provided within a larger body of fabricated reporting KSM provided on Issa. The CIA was
unable to distinguish between the accurate and inaccurate reporting, and KSM's varied reporting
led CIA officers to conclude thatKSM was "protecting" Issa '^^ '^^ and"obstructing [the CIA's]
ability to acquire good information" on the U.K.-based operative well after the CIA ceased using
enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM.^"^^^
CIA records indicate that CIA detainees largely provided corroborative reporting on Abu Issa, aka Dhiren Barot,
and that CIA representations that "most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program
would not have been discovered or reported by otlier means," is not supportedby CIA records. See intelligence
clironology in Volume 11 for additional details.
Dhiren Barot's anest by U.K. authorities was also unrelatedto reporting from the CIA's Detention and
InteiTogation Program. See information in this summary, as well as tlie intelligence chronology in Volume II.
When Issa's U.S. casing reports were found on Abu Talha al-Pakistani's computer, KSM stated that he did not
know ofany al-Qa'ida plans, by Abu Talha oranyone else, totarget th^Citigroup/Citibanl^uilding^n^^
Group building, or the United Nations building in New York. {See 1477 )
Nonetheless, KSM's reportingon Issa's travel to the U.S.was later corroborated by FBI reporting and individuals
detained by foreign governments. See FBI IIR (26 AUG2004) and TTIC Special AnalysisReport
2004-28H, entitled, "Homeland: Threat Assessment for IMFAVorld Bank Annual Meeting, 2-3 October 2004,"
dated September 28, 2004; and DIRECTOR•• See also reissue, DIRECTOR
10948 (222101ZMAR 03)
A CIA officer's comment on talking points prepared for "ADCI Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards" on Issa al-
Hindi states that "KSM didn't decode tlie [phone] numbers for us (he just provided info on how he may have
encoded the numbers—which when used didn't result in valid numbers) [an] address with the number didn't exist; it
was a dead end, and it appears KSM was protecting [Issa] al-Hindi." See email from: [REDACTED]; to:
[REDACTED],with multiple ccs; subject: "IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of
Kerry/Edwards"; date: August 30, 2004, at 02:51 PM, which contains comments on previous drafts of talking points.
Email from: ^ |, [REDACTED]; subject: KSM and Kliallad Issues;
date; October 16,2003^at5^25^13PM^ 5eefl/^oem^^ to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Some things to
ping Mukie on-cable coming; date: April U^003^^^00^ |^^ ^n^ALECjHH (222153Z APR 03).
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According to information provided to the CIA by the United
Kingdom, Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, appeared in ||||||||[||||||||^^H reporting related to
"terrorist training" and participation "in jihad in occupied Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Malaysia throughout the IQQOs."^"^^^ Information concerning aboo^writtei^yDhiren Barot
(under the alias "Esa al-Hindi") on jihad in Kashmir appeared in and CIA
intelligence records as early as December 1999. '^^ '^' At that time U.K. authorities had a number
of U.K.-based extremists under investigation, including Moazzem Begg.'"^^^ Begg's Maktabah
al-Ansarbookstore was describe^i |^aknownjihadistga^^ place."According to
intelligence reports, in 1999, 'Abu Issa' stayed with Moazzem
Begg^"^^^ at the Maktabah al-Ansar bookstore inBirmingham, U.K.," and that this "Issa" was in
contact with other U.K. extremists.According to reporting, Begg was associated with two
"al-Qa'ida operatives" arrested in 1999 for their involvement in terrorist plotting and later
released.A report from August 1, 2000, stated that U.K. authorities raided Begg's bookstore
and found an invoice for 5000 copies of a book entitled, "The Army of Madina in Kashmir."
A search of computers associated with the two aforementioned "al-Qa'ida operatives" described
the book as their "project" written by "a brother from England who was a Hindu and became a
Muslim." According to the reporting, the U.K.-based author of the book "got training in
Afghanistan" before fighting jihad in Kashmir. (The book advocates for "worldwide jihad"
and the authoris listedon the cover of the bookas "Esa al-Hindi."^"^^^) Additional reporting on
(242144Z AUG 04)
A June 25, 2004, CIA Serial Flyer entitled, "Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg's Links to Active
Operatives," states that, after beingcaptured in Febniary 2002 and beingheld in U.S. military custody,"Begghas
beencooperative in debriefings and has provided background information and descriptions of a numberof his past
associates that have helped shed lighton the extentof the Islamicextremist network in the United Kingdom and its
ties to al-Qa'ida." According to the CIA report, in June 2004, Begg's "description and resulting sketch of UK
contact Issa al-Hindi"—whose true identity was tlien unknown—"was compared to a still shot of an unidentified
man taken from a surveillance video of UK extremists." The comparison "revealed that the man in the video
probably [was] the elusive Issa al-Hindi." Begg co-owned the MaJctabah al-Ansar bookshop in Birmingham, United
Kingdom, that would later be found to have published a book written by "Esa al-Hindi" that was well known among
U.K. extremists, "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir."
See [REDACTED] 72330 "Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg's Links to Active
Operatives,"June 2004 for intelligence referencing earlier reporting. See also open source reporting on U.K. raids
of the bookstore in the year 2000, as well as subsequentraids, including. "Bookshop linked to Bin Laden's
'General," The Telegraph^^^ February 1, 2007.
On April 2004,relayed information acquired from Sajid Badat, the other U.K. "Issa." Badat stated
that "anyone who had been involved with jihad inBritainsince the mid-90s" would know the other Issa, naming
among other individuals, Moazzem Begg. See ||||^m| 19907 (231744Z APR 04).
CI |^||^ ^J^62213Z SEP 03) (cable referencing information collected in 1999)
49612 (281213Z JUL03)
[REDACTED] 72330 (t^able discusseshistorical reporting). See also "Bookshop linkedto
Bin Laden's 'General," The Telegraph, dated Februaiy 1, 2007.
The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the"Study highlights and mischaracterizes" this intelligencebecause
the authorof "The Armyof Madinah in Kashmir," is not identified in the intelligence report. The CIA Response
states that the report "identifies the author only as 'an Afghanistan-trainedBritish convert writing about Hindu
atrocities in Kashmir.'" Notwithstanding the CIA's Response, the Committee found the intelligence report
references the book, "The Armyof Madinah in Kashmir," and describes the author as "a brotherfrom Englandwho
was a Hindu and becamea Muslim aboutsix years ago" and who "got trainingin Afghanistan then went to fight in
Kashmir." According to open sources, the 1999bookadvocated "worldwide jihad" in order to bring nations "to
111! I ( III I




"Issa" appeared in CIA records again in July 2001. At that time the FBI reported that Ahmed
Ressam, who was in a U.S. federal prison (arrested by U.S. border patrol with explosives in his
vehicle in December 1999), reported that a U.K. national named "Issa" attended a terrorist
training camp associated with al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan.
In February 2002, Moazzem Begg was arrested at an al-Qa'ida safe
house in Islamabad, Pakistan, and subsequently transferred to U.S. military custody at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.^"^^^ While still in Pakistani custody, Begg provided reporting on U.K.-
based extremists in the context of terrorist training camps, including information on an individual
who would play a key role in "Issa's" identification and capture, "Sulayman" (variant
Sulyman).^"^^^ In May 2002, the CIA was seeking to learn more about "Sulyman."^"^^^ WM
[foreign partner] authorities informed the CIA that Sulyman was a person of interest to U.K.
authorities for his connections to U.K. extremists and his suspected travel to Kashmir multiple
times for terrorist activity. The [foreign partner] further reported that Sulyman may have
been involved same
report |iiiii iili il li i |liiii ij ii |i iilin i j mi liiili il 'iiil i in ui hi i 11 true name, Nisar Jilal, as
well as his date of birth and place of employment.
Beginning in mid-2002, there was increasing intelligence reporting
on one or more U.K.-based individuals referred to as "Issa" who were connected to KSM and
possibly planning attacks in the United Kingdom.This reporting resulted in efforts by U.K.
autho^es to identify and locate this "Issa." '^^ ^^ In August 2002,and again in October 2002,
[foreign partner] informed the CIA that it was seeking to identify a U.K.-based "Abu
Issa" who was reportedly "an English speaker and trusted [terrorist] operative." '^^ '^^
In September 2002, an email address ("Lazylozy") was recovered
during raids related to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh that would later be found to be in
their knees." An Internet archive search for the title of tlie book, "The Amiy of Madinah in Kaslunir," found the
book prominently advertised among the "Recommended Products" in 2002 on the website for the Maktabah al-
Ansar bookstore (www.maktabah.net/books/images/kashmir.jpg: internet archive 2002). The website archive from
2002 states that the author "Esa al-Hindi" converted "to Islam at the age of 20" and recalls his "personal experience
in occupied Kashmir fighting the Indian forces." The bookstore's websiteand related jihadi websites list the author
of the book as "Esa Al-Hindi." CIA cables suggest it was not until June 2003 that the CIA conducted an internet
search for "The Army of Madinali in Kashmir." When the search was conducted, the CIA found^^^one of the
recommended reads featured" on the website of the Maktabah al-Ansar bookstore. See ALEC (052206Z
JUN 03). As noted, the same information on the book was prominently listed on the same website more than a year
earlier.
DIRECTOR (23JUL01); DIRECTOR jHl(20JUL01)
June 25,2004, CIA Serial Flyer entitled, "Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg's Links to Active
Operatives.'
14083 DIRECTOR I ; DIRECTOR|
DIRECTOR DIRECTOR |1490 imillll 77599,
See 2002 reporting detailed in tlie Volume II intelligence cluonology. At this point it was still unknown how
many Issas the reporting was referencing. In Septembe^003, however, aCIA officer assessed tliere were "two (or
three) Abu Issas" in intelligence reporting. See 99093 (02093IZ SEP 03).[REDACTED] 80508 f
'-'^ 3 [REDACTED] 80508[REDACTED] 839171
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contact with 'Issa." Information on the email address was disseminated in intelligence
'• 1495 ®reporting. - The same email address was found on March 1, 2003, during the raids that led to
the captiu'e otKSM. CIA records indicate that sought coverage for the email
account.Within days, the Intelligence Community was collecting information from the
account and had reported that the user of the accountwas in contact with other coveredaccounts
and that the message content was in English.
KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. On March |, 2003, KSM
was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques including at least 183 applications ofthe waterboard interrogation technique—^imtil
March 25, 2003.^"^^^ During the month of March 2003, KSM provided information on avariety
ofmatters, including on aU.K.-based Abu Issa al-Britani. The information provided by KSM on
"Issa" included both accurate and inaccurate information. At the time, the CIA was unable to
discern between the two. During interrogation sessions in March 2003, KSM first discussed an
"Issa al-Britani" among alist ofindividuals who were connected to KSM's Heathrow Airport
plotting.'^ ^^ On March 17, 2003, KSM stated that, prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, he
tasked Issa to travel to the United States to "collect information on economic targets." On March
21, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm interrogators' suspicions that KSM
sought to recruit individuals from among the African American Muslim community. KSM then
stated that he had talked with Issa about contacting African American Muslim groups prior to
September 11, 2001 The next day KSM was waterboarded for failing to provide more
information on the recruitment of African American Muslims. One hour after the waterboarding
session, KSM stated that he tasked Issa"to make contact withblack U.S. citizenconverts to
Islam in Montana," and that he instructed Issa to use his ties to Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri, a
U.K.-based Imam, to facilitate his recruitment efforts.KSM later stated that Issa's mission
in the United States was to surveil forests to potentially ignite forest fires.^^®^ During this period,
KSM was confronted with aseries of emailsthati^ the aforementioned "Lazylozy" email'
accountand another email account KSM confirmed that the emails were
established for communication between Issa al-Britani and Ammaral-Baluchi and stated that
1503Issa used the "Lazylozy" account, and that al-Baluchi used the account.
month later the CIA reported that Issa did not use the "Lazylozy" email address, but the other
email address.) Over the next six months, KSM retracted or provided conflicting reporting on
Issa. On June 22, 2003, CIA interrogators reported that "[KSM] nervously explained to
1495
(102238Z MAR 03)1497 Update onEjnail Activityl
Messages Derivedfrom |HCoverage, CIA
See KSM detainee review in Volume III for additional details.
"^^There are no other records indicating that Dhiren Barot, aka Issa, was connected to KSM's Heathrow Plotting.
10828 (151310Z MAR 03);H^^|j^l3 (141819Z MAR 03); 10871 (172037ZMAR 03)
10932 (212132Z MAR 10921 (211046Z MAR 03)
10942 (221610Z MAR 03). According to KSM, Shaykh abuHamza al-Masri hadcontacts in
Montana.
DIRECTOR (3122^^jlA^^; 10942 (22152IZ MAR 03); HIHB 11070 (302115Z
MAR 03), disseminated as
1503
alec
10948 (222101ZMAR03)|(182330Z APR 03)
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debriefer that he was under 'enhanced measures' when he made these claims" about terrorist
recruitment in Montana, and "simply told his interrogators what he thought tliey wanted to
hear."'^ ^^ A CIA Headquarters response cable stated that the CIA'sALEC Station believed
KSM's fabrication claims were "another resistance/manipulation ploy" and characterized KSM's
contention that he "felt 'forced' to make admissions"under enhanced interrogation techniques as
"convenient excuses." As a result, ALEC Station urged CIA officers at tiie detention site to get
KSM to reveal "who is the key contact person in Montana?"^^®^ By June 30, 2005, ALEC
Station had concluded that KSM's reporting about African American Muslims in Montanawas
"an ouUight fabrication."
On April 4, 2003, the CIA provided reporting to the U.K. on
"Issa," stating that "we realize that Abu Issa isa target ofinterest to your service." The
information compiled by the CIA included anAugust 2002 report (um'elated to the CIA s
Detention and Inten*ogation Program) that stated that a U.K. national "Abu Issa Al-Pakistani"
was slated by al-Qa'ida for "terrorist operations against foreign targets."^^®^ On April 18, 2003,
a^Bcablet^he U.K. relayed that the correct email for Abu Issa al-Britan^
It further noted that "the Abu Issa account" is "under coverage, and
The same cable notes that KSM had changed his reporting on Issa's
background"^^ording to the cable, KSM originally stated Issa was of Pakistani origin, but now
claimed that Issa was of Indian origin. The CIAwrote that KSM's reporting:
"tracks widi reporting from anotiier detainee. As you are aware, Feroz Abbasi
and other detainees at Guantanmo [sic] Bay have described an Abu Issa that
worked for the al-Qa'ida media Committee run by KSM...Abassi [at] one time
related that Abu Issa described himselfas Indian."'^ ®^
(qpg//|^^^|^^^//Ni^OnMayn, 2003, cable noted that the email address
associated with Abu Issa tracked to a specific address in
Wembley, a suburb of London.
On May 28, 2003, a CIA cable documented intelligence obtained
by the FBI from interviews ofJames Ujaama (aka Bilal Ahmed), who was in FBI custody.
Ujaama, who had spent time in the U.K. extremist community, reported on an "Issa" in the U.K.
who was known as "Issa al-Hindi" and was "goodfriends with a Pakistani male named







12095 (222049Z JUN 03)
'50^ ALEC (260043Z JUN 03). No individuals related toKSM's reporting were ever identified inMontana.
KSM also retracted his statement connecting Issa to theHeatlirow Airport plotting. There are noCIA records to
indicate that either U.K.-based Issas (Sajid Badat orDhiren Barot) was ever involved in the Headirow Airport
plotting. See intelligence chionology in Volume II and information on the Heatlirow plotting in this summary for
additional information.
(302258Z JUN 03)
(182330Z APR 03). The Committee did not have access toU.S. militaiy detainee reporting.
052^6Z JUN 03). See also ALEC and HHB93759 (160919Z MAY 03).
280438Z (28a746ZMAY03^^^^^^^
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likely Nisar Jalal, based on reportingfrom U.S military detainee Moazzem BeggJ^^" Ujaama
provided the FBI with the name of the U.K. law office where Sulyman (aka Nisar Jalal) worked,
which matched reporting provided to the CIA by H [foreign partner] authorities in
2002.^^^^
On June 2, 2003, KSM was shown a sketch of Issa al-Hindi
provided to the CIA by the FBI and based on reporting by James Ujaama. KSM stated that the
sketch did not look like anyone he knew.^^^"^
A June 5, 2003, cable states that the FBI had "gleaned new clues
about Issa in recent days from detainees, including [from Moazzem] Begg," who was in U.S.
military custody. According to the cable, Begg told FBI special agents "that Issa is likely from
Wembley, Alperton, or Sudbury." AHMI noted that
[technical collection indicated that Issa was located in
Wembley].U.K. officials highlighted that Issa's reported "good friend," Nisar Jilal (aka
Sulyman), also had an address in Wembley.
On September 13, 2003, KSM explained a coding system for
telephone numbers for Issa that produced no results.On October 16, 2003, KSM identified a
picture of an individual known as "Nakuda," as Abu Issa al-Britani.'^ ^^ CIA relayed this
information to U.K. officials, who responded that this identification was "extremely
unlikely."''*'^ CIA detainee Khallad bin Attash was shown the same photograph and stated that
the photo "definitely" was not Issa.^^^® CIA officers wrote that KSM "is obstructing ourability
to acquire good information" on Issa and noting that KSM has "misidentified photos when he
knows we are fishing" and "misleadsus on telephone numbers."'^ ^^ A cable from the CIA's
ALEC Station stated that "KSM appears to have knowingly led us astray on this potentially
77599 2002
280438Z|280746Z MAY 03), ••• 77599, ^^•||2002| Ujaama provided
detailed information on Issa al-Hindi, including a description, biographical data, and information on Issa al-Hindi's
contacts, which could be used to locate and identify Issa al-Hindi.
l^^Hm09 (022030Z JUN 03)
ALEC^^B (052206ZJUN 03)
[REDACTED] 94931 U.K. also reported that, in June of 1999, an individual assessed
to be IssaprovidedMoazz^^ Begg vyith telephone numbers for a lawyer known as Sulyman. See [REDACTED]
95463 alec r
12825 (131747Z^ 03); ALEC (141942Z SEP 03); ALEC (210I59Z OCT 03)
Email from: to:
[REDACTED]; cc:




[REDACTED]; subject: KSM and Khallad Issues;
date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM. See ri/50email from: to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; cc: ••••••, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Some things to
ping Mukieon-cable coming; date: April n^003^ |^00^^M^n^ALECBHB(222153Z APR 03).
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important, albeit historical, lead [the phone numbers] to one of our most hotly pursued
targets."'^ ^^
(TS// In October 2003, CIA officers wrote:
"even with all we have learned from our on-going partnership with [the United
Kingdom] and various detainees, we have not been able to obtain accurate
locational information, including confirmed phone numbers and timely
information on email addresses. Our latest information, based on [foreign
partner reporting] and a detainee's assessment [Moazzem Begg in U.S.
military custody], is that Issa is believed to currently be located in Wembley, a
suburb of London."
In Januaiy 2004, urged [foreign partner] officials to
|interview Nisar Jilal (aka Sulyman) "in light of Ujaama's reporting" from the FBI
confinning a relationship between Issa al-Hindi and Nisar Jilal.In"tnii 111 ni 1,1 11
)artner] officials began planning an operation
1525
One individual personally
saw Issa al-Hindi on June|, 2003, in the Wembley areaof South London. Based on the FBI
reporting and the email coverage, U.K. authorities continuously surveilled Nisar Jilal (aka
a man) and photographed his associates. Aspecific series of photographs was passed by
[foreign partner] officials to CIA officials depicting an individual whom CIA
officials wrote "bears a striking resemblance" to the Issa al-Hindi sketch provided by Moazzem
Begg, the detainee in U.S. military custody.The CIA would later write that Moazzem Begg's
"description and resulting sketch of U.K. contact Issa al-Hindi" was "compared to a still shot of
an unidentified man taken from a surveillance video of UK extremists," and the comparison
"revealed that the manin the video probably [was] the elusive Issa al-Hindi."'^ ^^
UN¥) With the suspicion that the photo was Issa al-Hindi, the CIA's
requested the photo be "shown to detainees" and requested "immediate
feedback."According to a CIA cable dated June 17, 2004, the suspected Issa al-Hindi
'522 aLECHB(210159ZOCT03)
'523 Draft cable included in an email from: [REDACTED]; to; |||||BHiiHH subject:
"Abu Issa al-Hindi Tai:geting Study"; date: October 22, 2003, at 6:49:41 PM.
'52" ALEC
'525aLEC^H
22246 See also [REDACTED] email
and others; subject: "For Immed. Coord: Al-Hindi ID Highlight"; date; June 17, 2004, at
3:06:29 PM.
'527 [REDACTED] 22406 (04 9023184 I17/JUN/2004)
'528 A June 25, 2004, CIA Serial Flyer entitled, "GuantanamoBay DetaineeMoazzem Begg's Links to Active
Operatives."
'529 [REDACTED] 22406 (04 9023184 I17/JUN/2004)
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photograph was shown to KSM, who "confirmed that the unidentified photo depicts al-
Hindi.'"^^^
//NF) By July 2, 2004, [foreign partner] authorities had informed
the CIA that they felt "confident" that Issa's true name was "Dhiren Barot." According to
reporting^vhil^nde^i^^ was observed talking for an extended period of timeU
in the vicinity where James Ujaama (in FBI custody) had
I'l II Iil I I ' " I'll |i >iliii 11 authorities observed that Issa drovemm to a
residence in Wembley. A record search of the address in Wembley by U.K. authorities identified
a passport application with a photograph that matched the Issa under surveillance. The name on
the passport application was Issa's true name, Dhiren Barot.
Once identified, Dhiren Barot remained under U.K. surveillance as
the U.K. collected additional information on Dhiren Barot and his activities. On July 2004,
an al-Qa'ida associate named Abu Talha al-Pakistani was arrested and detained by Pakistani
offi^ls.^ '^^ ^ CIA records indicate that the arrest occurred after
^^H^identified when and where Abu Talha al-Pakistani wouldbeat^^^H^^^IT^ On
Julylj, 2004, after Abu Talha's capture, Pakistani authorities conducted a series ofraids and
seized a laptop computer that was shared with the U.S. government.The computer was
suspected of belonging to senior al-Qa'ida member, Hamza Rabi'a,^^^^ and contained a series of
undated, Enghsh-language casing reports. In all, the computer contained over 500 photographs,
maps, sketches, and scanned documents associated with apparent casings.
On July 31, 2004, KSM was questioned about the casing reports.
KSM stated that he did notknow of any al-Qa'ida plansby Abu Talha or anyoneelse to target
the Citigroup/Citibankbuilding. Prudential Group building, or the United Nations building in
CIA records indicate that other detainees also identified this individual asIssa al-Hindi.
See 280438Z (280746Z MAY 03) and •||||||H 77599 Ujaama
provideddetailed information on Issa al-Hindi, including a description, biographical data, and information on Issa
al-Hindi's contacts, which could be used to locate and identifyIssa al-Hindi. There are no specific CIA recordsof
James Ujaama providing exact location data forIssaal-Hindi. As noted, however, senior CIApersonnel expressed
frustration tliat the U.K. was not sharing all known information on their investigations, writing in August 2003 that
•"[the FBI is] clearly working closely withthe [U.K. service] on these matters and [theCIAis] at die mercy" of what
it is told. As described in this summary, James Ujaama was in FBI custody.
••• 232261






[REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED];subject: Laptop docex from
recent raid may yield pre-election threat infonnationTdateTjulyB^2004, at 07:35 AM.
See Terrorist Threat Integration Center, Terrorist Threats to US Interests Worldwide. See also [
1; and I
I; emailfrom; [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DRAFT DCI SPECIAL ITEM -
14Jul04; date: July 14, 2004, at 03:48 PM. This information was obtained from sources unrelated to the CIA's
Detention and Intenogation Program.
3924 38891
I; to: James Pavitt, [REDACTED], Rodriguez, John
TOP SECRET/ /NOFORN




New York described in the documents.On the same day, Abu Talha, who was in the custody
ofa foreign government, stated the "U.S. casing reports were from Abu Issa."'^ ^^ Issa, aka
Dhiren Barot, was stillundersurveillance by U.K. authorities at this time.^^"^^
August 1, 2004, Abu Talha was shown a photograph of Dhiren
Barot and "immediately identified him as Issa." Abu Talha—who was cooperating with foreign
government authorities—described Issa's visit to Pakistan from February to April 2004, during
which he stated "Issa" (aka Dhiren Barot) met with Hamza al-Rabi'a on multiple occasions to
"discuss operations in the United Kingdom and targets already cased in the United States." Abu
Talha stated that Issa believed his activities and identity were not known to the authorities. '^''^ '
An August 3, 2004, cable stated that "analysis of information on
[the] hard drive" of the computer seized "revealed a document... that is a detailed study on the
methodologies to affect a terrorist attack." According to the cable, "the study describes the
operational and logistics environment in the UK." The document is divided into two main parts.
The first part includes seven chapters on the topic entitled "rough presentation for gas limo
project." The second part is entitled "rough presentationfor radiation (dirty bomb) project."
The "gas limo project" section concludes that the most feasible option would be to use a
limousine to deliver explosives, while the "dirty bomb" project section states that smoke
detectors could be used to deliver the radioactive substance americium-147. The document
proposes to use 10,000 smoke detectors as part of an explosive device to spread this radioactive
element. In addition, the document discusses the vulnerabilities of trains and the possibilities of
hijacking and utilizing gasoline tankers to conduct a terrorist attack.
analysis was disseminated, August 3, 2004,
U.K. authorities arrested Dhiren Barot and 12 other individuals, and seized "over 100 hard-
dnves."'^ '^ ^ On August 7, 2004, the U.K. shared associated with Dhiren
Barot with the U.S. government. The [information provided] included copies of casing
reports related to the United States and the United Kingdom.'^ "^ On August 17, 2004, U.K.
authorities charged nine individuals in relation to the Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi,
investigation.U.K. authorities informed the CIA that "[d]espite intelligence about the




HiilHI, [REDACTED], cc; [REDACTED]; subject: Laptop docex from
recent raid may yield pre-election tlireat iiiliiiiii ilimi il ili liil i J 'IHII il <1' I i ill
Email from: to: James Pavitt [REDACTED], Rodriguez, John P. Mudd,
[REDACTED],
[REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Laptop docex from recent raid may
yield pre-election tlireat information; 11 i(i liil i J IN11 at07:35 AM.
DIRECTOR See also reissue, DIRECTOR
director (032140Z AUG 04)
CIA•• (261529Z AUG 04) / [REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04)
CIA Operational Developments Against A1 Qa'ida Worldwide,09 August 2004, 1700 Hours.
1545I
; to; James Pavitt, [REDACTED],
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were mainly possible owing to the recovery of terrorist-related materials during searches of
associated properties and vehicles following their arrests.
On August 23, 2004, the CIA received an update from H
[foreign partner] authorities that noted the "research conducted by the [Barot] networkinto
central London hotels and railway stations [is] likel^o be exploratory rather than representing a
detailed operational plan."^ '^^ ^ Areport from the [foreign partner] stated:
"material that is emerging from [the United Kingdom] investigation, combined
with detainee reporting from senior al-Qa'ida members [an appai-ent reference
to Abu Tatha al-Pal^istani's reporting on U.K. targeting in Pakistani custody],
strongly suggests that Barot's cell was planning a terrorist attack in the U.K.,
what is not yet clear is how close the cell was to mounting an attack or what, if
any, targets had been finalized."
August 30, 2004, talking points on the Dhiren Barot case were
prepared by CIA officers. A CIA officer wrote that KSM's reporting on contact numbers for
Issa was "a dead end" and "that it appears KSM was protecting al-Hindi."^ '^^ '-^ The talking points
highlighted the cyber capabilities enabled by the USAPATRIOT Act in the investigation of
Dhiren Barot, stating:
"Probably the most important intelligence tool we used in breaking this
[Dhiren Barot] case was our cyber capability enabled by the USA Patriot Act.
From beginning to end cyber played a role, but it was not the only tool that was
used. HUMINT and SIGINT threads were followed and contributed to our
[REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04). See also CIA (242144Z AUG 04). Internal CIA
communications related to August 30, 2004, CIA talking points concerning Dhiren Barot state that a sketch of Issa
al-Hindi, by U.S. military detainee Moazzem Begg, ultimately played a central role, as a surveillance photo of a
suspected Issa al-Hindi "looked so much like thesketch." The CIA talking points identify [technical
collection] capabihties as the CIA's primary contributioiU^h^nve^ation, stating: "Probably tlie most important
intelligence tool we used in brecikin^h^case was our^^H|B^V[t^^*hnical collection] enabled by the USA
Patriot Act. From beginning to endfB [technical collection] played arole, but it was not the only tool that was
used. HUMINT and SIGINTthreads werefollowed and contributed to our understanding of the
[technical collection] and also in finding new [technical collection] leads. Exploitation of computers andother
information obtained in raids before andduring thecasealsocontributed significantly, as did surveillance. However,
none of these tools arestand-alones. Good oldfashioned hard targeting andanalysis of these maddeningly vague
anddisparate andincomplete threads of information was the gluethatput it all together." See"Capture of Al-Qa'ida
Operative Abu Issaal-Hindi (aka Dhiien Barot, aka Abu Issa al-Britani)," multiple iterations of talking points,
including the revised version cited, found inan email from: [REDACTED]; to; [REDACTED], with multiple ccs;
subject: "IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPsfor ADCI Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards"; date: August 30,2004, at
02:51 PM.
[REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04)
[REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04)
In an email, a CIA officercommented on talking points prepared for "ADCITuesdayBriefingof
Kerry/Edwards" on Issa al-Hindi, stating that "KSM didn't decodethe numbers for us (he just provided infoon how
he may have encoded the numbers—which when used didn't result in valid numbers) and address with the number
didn't exist; it was a dead end, and it appears KSM was protectingal-Hindi." See email from: [REDACTED]; to:
[REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: "IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of
Kerry/Edwards"; date: August 30,2004, at02:51 PM, which contains comments on previous drafts of talking points.
111! 111 III iiBB^^B||^^^Bmiiiiiiii(iiiii|
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understanding of the cyber messages and also in finding new cyber leads.
Exploitation of computers and other information obtained in raids before and
during the case also contributed significantly, as did surveillance. However,
none of these tools are stand-alones. Good old fashioned hard targeting and
analysis of these maddeningly vague and disparate and incomplete threads of
information was the glue that put it all together.
On September 10, 2004, the Interagency Intelligence Committee
on Terrorism (IICT) disseminated a report entitled, "Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa'ida's
Election Threat," which states:
"We do not know the projected timeframe for any attacks Issa was planning to
execute in the UK, but it is unlikely he would have been ready to strike in the
near term. Upon returning to the UK in mid-2004, Issa attempted to gather
materials to build explosives for future attacks in the UK... lU.K.] authorities
have been unable to locate any explosives precursors, and it is possible he had
not yet acquired the necessary materials at the time of his detention. The
detainee [Abu Talha al-Pakistani] also noted that some of Issa's operatives
required further training—most likely in explosives—and that [Issa] intended
to send an associate to Pakistan for thiee months to receive instruction from
senior al-Qa'ida explosives experts."
The assessment adds, "Issa appears to have been in an early phase of operational planning at the
time of his capture."^^^^
In November 2004, H authorities informed the CIA that "it was
largely tiii'ough the investigation of Nisar Jalal's associates that [the U.K.] was able to identify
Dhiren Barot as being [identifiable] with Issa al-Hindi."^^^^
A December 14, 2004, FBI Intelligence Assessment entitled, "The
Gas Limos Project: An al-Qa'ida Urban Attack Plan Assessment," evaluated "the feasibility and
lethality of this plot" based on "documents captured during raids" against "al-Qa'ida operatives
in Pakistan and the United Kingdom in July and August 2004, and on custodial interviews
conducted in the weeks following these raids." The FBI concluded that "the main plot presented
in the Gas Limos Project is unlikely to be as successful as described." The report continued:
"We assess that the Gas Limos Project, while ambitious and creative, is far-fetched."^^^"^
1550 "Capture of Al-Qa'idaOperative AbuIssa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot, akaAbuIssa al-Britani)" multiple
iterationsof talking points, includingthe revised version cited, found in an email from: [REDACTED]; to:
[REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: "IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCITuesdayBriefingof
Keny/Edwards"; date: August 30, 2004, at 02:51 PM.
Disseminated intelligence productby the IICT entitled, "Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa'ida's "Election
Threat," dated September 10, 2004.
1552 Disseminated intelligence productby the IICT entitled, "Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa'ida's "Election
Tlireat," dated September 10, 2004.
'"3 [REDACTED] 297591
1554 pgj Intelligence Assessment, "The Gas Limos Project; An al-Qa'ida Urban AttackPlan Assessment," dated
December 14,2004.
Id! MUM iiBg|^^^^JB[B||^Bii|i'l'l(ll'(lll|i|




On December 12, 2005, the CIA assessed that "while KSM tasked
al-Hindi to go to the US to surveil targets, he was not aware of the extent to which Barot's
planning had progressed, who Issa's co-conspirators were, or that Issa's planning had come to
focus on the
On November 7, 2006, Dhiren Barot was sentenced to life
imprisonment in the United Kingdom. On May 16, 2007, Dhiren Barot's sentence was reduced
to 30 years after a British Courtof Appeal found thatexpert assessments describing the plotas
"amateurish," "defective," and unlikely to succeed were not provided to the sentencingjudge.
5. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Faris
Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation
techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which
thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the "identification,"
"arrest," "capture," "investigation," and "prosecution" of lyman Faris as evidence for the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were
inaccurate. lyman Faris was identified, investigated, and linked directly to al-Qa'ida prior to any
mention of lyman Faris by KSM or any other CIA detainee. When approachedby law
enforcement, lyman Faris voluntarily provided informationand made self-incriminating
statements. On May 1, 2003, lyman Faiis pled guilty to terrorism-related charges and admitted
"to casing a New York City bridge for al Qaeda, and reseai'ching and providing information to al
Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possibleattacks on U.S. targets."
Further Details: lyman Faris was an Ohio-based truck driver
tasked by KSM with procuring "tools and devices needed to collapse suspensionbridges," as
well as tools that could be used to derail trains.Faris had met KSM through his self-
described "best friend," Maqsood Khan,'^ ^^ who was a Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida facilitator and
Majid Khan's uncle.
The identification and arrest of lyman Faris is one of the eight most
frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and
provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent
the identification, capture, and/orarrestof lyman Faris as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED] andothers;subject: "Re: needanswer: request for any info
deemed operationally sensitive be passed to brits concerning Dhiren Barot (aka Issa al-Hindi)"; date: December 12,
2005, at 6:08:01 PM,in preparation of a document entitled, "Addendum in Respect of Disclosure - Al Hindi.pdf."
See RoyalCourtsof JusticeAppeal, Barotv R [2007], EWCA Crim 1119(16 May 2007). The expert
assessments determinedthat the plotting involved "a professional-looking attemptfrom amateurs whodid not really
know what they were doing." Seealso June 15,2007, Bloomberg newsarticleentitled,"TerroristGang Jailed for
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collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to
disiTipt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists."'-^^" The CIA further represented that
the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise
unavailable" and "saved lives.
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of tlie CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005.
i56> From 2003 tluough 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of tenorist plots "disrupted" and tenorists captured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations furtherasserted that the intelligence obtained fromthe use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique,otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "savedlives." Among other CIA representations, see:
(1) CIArepresentations in the Department of JusticeOffice of Legal Counsel Memorandum, datedMay30, 2005,
which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of
the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques to assess their legality. Tlie CIA representations referenced by the
OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical,"
"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect
and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum furtlier states that"[dieCIA] ha[s] informed[the OLCJ that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within die United
States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, PrincipalDeputyAssistantAttorney General,Officeof Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of UnitedStatesObligations UnderArticle 16of the Convention Against Torture to CertainTechniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Valueal Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal CounselMemorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquired from theuse of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques.
Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6,2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program
(which was basedon CIA-provided information), the OLCmemorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhancedinterrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramountinterest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailableintelligence. ...As the President
explained[onSeptember6, 2006], 'by giving us information aboutteiTorist plans we could not get anywhere else,
tlieprogramhas saved innocentlives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, ActingGeneralCounsel,Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal DeputyAssistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of tlieWar CrimesAct, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003
represented that "the use of EnhancedTechniques of one kind or anotherhad producedsignificant intelligence
information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of
this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Recordfrom
Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Intenogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Intenogation
Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandumfor the Record,Subject: Member Briefing; and
September 26, 2003, Memorandumfor the Record from Muller, Subject:CIA Intenogation Program.) (4) The
CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft SpecialReviewof the CIA program, wliich asserts:
"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly saved countless Americanlives inside the UnitedStates and abroad. The evidence points clearly to
the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major teiToristattacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: JamesPavitt,
DeputyDirectorfor Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to DraftIG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assessesthat the RDI program worked and the
[enhanced interrogation] techniqueswereeffective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timelyintelligenceacquiredfrom detainees in this program would not have been discoveredor reported by other
means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Keylntelligenc^n^Reportin from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid
TOP




(^I^^i^^^HIIIIIHHIIIIHIi^^^^) Por example, in a July 2003 CIA briefing for White House officials
on the CIA interrogation program, the CIA represented that "[m]ajor threats were countered and
attacks averted," and that "[tjermination of this [CIA] program will result in loss of life, possibly
extensive." The CIA further represented that "the use of the [CIA's enhanced interrogation]
techniques has produced significant results" and "savedlives."^^^- Underthe heading,
"RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO," a briefing slides states:
"KSM: Al-Qa'ida Chief of Operations... - Identification of lyman Faris" '^'^ -^
Similarly, on Febmary 27, 2004, DDO James Pavitt responded to
the CIA Inspector General's draft Special Review and included a representation related to lyman
Faris. Pavitt stated that the Inspector General's Special Review should have come to the
"conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," and that "EITs (including the
water board) have been indispensable to our successes.Pavitt provided materials to the OIG
that stated:
"Specifically, as a result of the lawful use of EITs, KSM identified a truck
driver who is now sewing time in the United States for his support to al-
Qa'ida."'^ ^-^
The final CIA Inspector General Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation
Program," published in May 2004, states:
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefmg on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on KeyIntelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include"Background
on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIAdocument faxed to the SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence on
March 18, 2009, entitled, "SWIGERT and DUNBAR," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which
provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of tlie CIA's
enhancedinterrogation techniques, and stating: "CIAassesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence
acquiredfrom detainees in this program wouldnothave been discoveredor reported by any other means." See
Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabledthe
CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review ofInteiTogation Program on 29 July 2003,"prepared by CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefmg slidesentitled, "CM Interrogation Program. " dated
July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
Italics added. CIAmemorandum for theRecord, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29July2003," prepared
by CIA GeneralCounsel Scott Muller, datedAugust 5, 2003; briefmg slidesentitled,"CM InterrogationProgram,"
dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated
February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and
Intenogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004.
1565 Memorandum to theInspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated
February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004.




"Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's information also led to the investigation and
prosecution oflyman Paris, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in
Ohio."^-'^ ®^
This passage in the CIA Inspector General Special Review was declassified and publicly
released on August 24, 2009.^^^^
Likewise, information prepared by the CIA for CIA Director Leon
Panetta in February 2009 on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced inten"ogation techniques
states that the "CIA assesses... the techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence,"
and that "most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program
would not have been discovered or reported by other means." The document provides examples
of "some of the key captures, disrupted plots, and intelligence gained from HVDs interrogated,"
including the ''arrest of lyman Faris."^^^^ In March 2009, the CIA provided a three-page
document to the chairman of the Committee stating, "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the
timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or
reported by any other means," before listing "lyman Faris" as one of the "key captures" resulting
from the CIA interrogation program.
provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the
identification and capture of lyman Faris in nine of the 20 documents and briefings provided to
policymakers and the Department ofJustice between July 2003 and March 2009.^^^^
Italics added. CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review- CounterteiTorism Detention and Interrogation
Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
The relevant sections of the Special Review were also cited in the OLC's May 30, 2005, memorandum, which
stated that "we understand tliat inteiTogations have led to specific, actionable intelligence," and that "[w]e
understand that the use of enhanced techniques in the interrogations of KSM, Zubaydali and others... has yielded
critical infoimation." {see memorandum for Jolin A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence
Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attoniey General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30,
2005, Re: Application of UnitedStates Obligations UnderArticle 16 of tire Convention Against Torture to Certain
Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogationof High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees, p. 9 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab
11), citing Special Review at 86, 90-91). Like tlie Special Review, the OLC memorandumhas been declassified
with redactions.
1568 jtjjiics added. CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment,"Key Intelligence and ReportingDerived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)." Tliedocuments include "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document
"EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and
KSM)," "Background on KeyIntelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and"supporting references," to include
"Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted."
CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Maich 18, 2009, at 3:46 PM, entitled,
"[SWIGERT and DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258).
See list of CIA preparedbriefings and memoranda from2003 tluough 2009 with representations on the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referencedin tliis summary and described in detail in
Volume II.
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^ review of CIA operational cables and other records found that
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
played no role in the identification and captureof lyman Faris.'^ ^^
CIA records indicate that lyman Paris was known to the U.S.
Intelligence Community prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. On March 2001, the FBI
opened an international terrorism investigation targeting lyman Faris.^^^^ According to CIA
records, the "predication of the [FBI] Faris investigation was information provided by [foreign]
authorities that [revealed] Faris' telephone number had been called by Islamic extremists
operating in France, Belgium, Turkey and Canada," including "millennium bomber" Ahmad
Ressam.^^^^ Ressam, currently serving a 65-year U.S. prison term, was arrested on December
14, 1999, en route to Los Angeles International Airport with explosives in the trunk of his car.
According to CIA records, as "a result of a post 9/11 lead," the FBI interviewed lyman Faris
shortly after die attacks of September 11,2001.'^ '^^ On November 2001, the FBI closed its
invesrigation of lyman Faris for unknown reasons.
Ori March 5, 2003, Majid Khan was taken into Pakistani
custody.That sam^ay^IS^co^age of Majid Khan's residence in Maryland indicated
that Majid Khan's made a suspicious phone call to an individual at a
residence associated with lyman Faris.The call included discussion of Majid Khan's
possible arrest and potential FBI surveillance of^^^Hj^H, who asked the individual in Ohio
if he had been approached and questioned.^^^^^^^Bwarned the Ohio-based individual
not to contact anyone using his phone. Thatsameday7^^^B||HB informed FBI special
agents that the other party to the intercepted conversation was lyman Faris.By March 6,
2003, the FBI had officially reopened its international terrorism investigation of lyman Faris.
The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that "we incorrectly stated or implied that KSM's information
led to the investigation of Faris." Elsewhere, the CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[CIA] imprecisely
characterizedKSM's information as having 'led' to the investigation of lyman Faris, rather than moreaccurately
characterizing it as a key contribution to the investigation." As described in more detail in Volume II, the CIA and
FBI had significant information on lyman Faris priorto any reporting from KSM. The CIA's June 2013 Response
also states that tlie CIA's inaccurate statements that KSM's reporting"led" to the investigation of lyraan Fariswere
only made "[i]n a few cases," and "[ijn a small number of., representations." As described in the full Committee
Study, the CIA repeatedly represented that KSM's reporting "led" to the investigation of lyman Faris, and was
responsible for the "identification" and "capture" of lyman Faris.
'•"2 Inforaiation provided by the FBI to the Committee onNovember, 30, 2010. Records donot provide an
explanation for the closing of the investigation.
'"3 WHDC^M (102129Z MAR 03). See also ALEC•• (180200Z MAR 03).
ALEC (261725Z MAR 03)
Information provided to the Committee by the FBI on November, 30, 2010.







(060353Z MAR 03)1580 pgj information relayed in ALEC P
1581 pgj information confirmed for the Committeeon November, 30. 2010.
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While U.S. law enforcement investigations of lyman Paris moved
forward, Majid Khan, in foreign government custody, was being questioned by foreign
government interrogators. According to CIA records, the inteiTogators were using rapport-
building techniques, confronting Khan with inconsistencies in his story and obtaining
information on Majid Khan's al-Qa'ida connections.On March 11, 2003, Majid Khan
identified a photo of lyman Paris.Majid Khan stated that he knew Paris as "Abdul Raof,"
and claimed Paris was a 35-year-old truck driver of Pakistani origin who was a "business partner
of his father." In addition to describing business deals lyman Paris was involved in witli
Khan's family, Majid Khan stated that Paris spoke Urdu and excellent English and had a
"colorful personality.The next day, while still in foreign government custody, Majid Khan
stated that lyman Paris was "an Islamic extremist."^According to CIA cables, on March 14,
2003, Majid Khan provided "more damning information" on lyman Paris, specifically that Paris
was a "mujahudden during the Afghan/Soviet period" and was a close associate of his uncle,
Maqsood Khan. Maqsood was a known al-Qa'ida associate whom Majid Khan had already
admitted was in contact with senior al-Qa'ida members. Majid Khan told foreign government
interrogators that it was Maqsood who provided the money for Majid Khan's al-Qa'ida-related
travels.Majid Khan further stated that "after the KSM arrest became public knowledge,"
lyman Paris contacted Majid Khan's family and requested the family pass a message to Maqsood
IGian regarding the status of KSM.'^ ^^ This information on lyman Paris was acquired prior to—
and independently of—any reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
On March 10, 2003, in response to a requirements cable from CIA
Headquarters reporting that al-Qa'ida was targeting U.S. suspension bridges,^KSM stated that
any such plans were "theoretical" and only "on paper." He also stated that no one was currently
pursuing such a plot.^^^^ KSM repeated this assertion on March 16, 2003,'^ ^^ noting that, while
UBL officially endorsed attacks against suspension bridges in the United States, he "had no
planned targets in the US which were pending attack and that after 9/11 the US had become too
hard a target."^^^^ On neither occasion did KSM reference lyman Paris.
1582 13678 (070724Z MAR 03). The cable states: "a [foreign government officer] talked quietly to
[Majid Khan] alone for about ten minutes before the interview began and was able to establish an excellent level of
rapport. The first hour and [a] half of the interview was a review of bio-dataand information previously [reported].
When [foreign government interrogators] started putting pressure on [Majid Klian] by pulling apart his story about
his 'honeymoon' in Bangkok and his attempt to rent an apartment, safehouse, for his cousin [Mansoor Maqsood, aka
Iqbal, aka Talha, aka Moeen, aka Habib], at 1400, [Majid Klian] slumped in his chair and said he would reveal
everythingtoofficers.
IS8313758 information later relayed in ALEC






1589 Pqj. additional information, see intelligence chronology in Volume 11.
'590 ALEC (071757Z MAR 03)
10752 (102320Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR (122101Z MAR 03). See also
10858 (170747Z MAR 03)
10858 (170747Z MAR 03)




//NF) On March 15, 2003, deputy chief of ALEC Station,
|, who was reading the intelligence from the foreign government interrogations of Majid
Khan, requested a photograph of Majid Khan and additional information to use with KSM.^^^"^
In response, CIA Headquarters sent the detention site photographs of Majid Khan's family and
associates, including lyman Paris.
(¥S/4|||||^mi|||||^^^) On March 17, 2003, eleven days after the FBI officially reopened
its investigation of lyman Faris, KSM was shown photographs of both lyman Faris and Majid
Khan.'^ ^^ According to CIA cables, KSM was also asked detailed questions based on email
communications, which a cable stated served as "an effective means to convey to [KSM] the
impression that the USG already possessed considerable information and that the information
would be used to check the accuracy of his statements."In this context, KSM identified the
photograph of lyman Faris as a "tmck driver" and a relative of Majid Khan. KSM claimed that
he could not remember the truck driver's name. KSM described the "tmck driver" as a "colorful
character who liked to drink and have girlfriends and was very interested in business.The
next day, March 18, 2003, KSM stated that in February 2002 he tasked the "truck driver" to
procure specialized machine tools that would be useful to al-Qa'ida to loosen the nuts and bolts
of suspension bridges in the United States. According to KSM, in March 2002, the "truck
driver" asked Mansour Khan [sonof Maqsood Khan]^^^^ to inform KSM that he (the "truck
driver") could not find such tools. KSM stated that he made no further requests of the "truck
driver."^^®®
According to a CIA cable, on the evening of March 20, 2003, the
FBI informed the CIA that "Ohio police had been following [lyman] Faris for 'some time,' and
had stopped him and questioned him about his relationship to Shoukat Ali Khan [Majid Khan's
Memorandum for: [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED],OFFICE: ^^H^[DETENTION
SITE BLUE]; subiect^altimo^boy and KSM; date: 15 March 2003, at 07:08:32 PM.
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Baltimore boy and KSM;
date: March 15, 2003, at 2:32 PM; ALEC 152212Z MAR 03).
1596 Having readreporting from the interrogations of Majid Khan, oneof KSM'sdebriefers at theCIA's
DETENTION SITE BLUE, deputy chief of ALE^StationJ|^^^|^BiHi requested the photographs to "use
witl^^ [sic] et al." {See Memorandum for •••^^•jREDACTED]; from [REDACTED],OFFICE:
^^^H|/[DETENTI0Nsite BLUE]; subject: Baltimore boy and KSM; date: 15 March 2003, at 07:08:32 PM.)
The photographs were sent to DETENTION SITE BLUE shortly thereafter. See ALEC HH (1522I2Z MAR
03).1597 ^^^^^h0865 (171648Z MAR 03), disseminated as jHHHHI' 10866 (171832Z MAR
03);^^^Ml0870 (172017ZMAR03)1598 10866 (171832Z MAR 03). KSM explained tliat Majid Khan was married to Maqsood Khan's
niece, and that "another Maqsood Khan relative was a truck driver in Ohio." KSM stated that he had met him "on at
least one occasion" atthe home ofMaosoo^^an inKarachi in approximatelyl999or2000^his information was
also sent on March 18, 2003, in ALEC]|HH (180200Z MAR 03). See also
'5^9 alEC^^P(261745ZMAR03)
1600 0886 (182219Z MAR 03); ALEC•• (180200Z MAR 03). In assessing the session for CIA
Headquarters, personnel at DETENTIONSITE BLUE wrote that "KSM will selectively lie, provide partial truths,
and misdirectwhen he believes he will not be found out and held accountable." On the other hand, they wrote that
"KSM appears more inclined to make accurate disclosures when he believes people, emails, or other source material
are available to the USG for checking his response^^ee^^^^B^0884(^140Z MAR 03).
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father] of Baltimore."'^ ^^ According to a CIA officer, "[w]hen the FBI approached Paris he
talked voluntarily Records indicate that Paris "initially claimed to know Shoukat All Khan
though the gas station business" and agreed to take a polygraph examination. According to PBI
records, prior to the polygraph, Paris admitted to being associated with KSM and provided
details on his relationships with al-Qa'ida members in Pakistan.Specifically, lyman Paris
told PBI and Ohio police that he had met KSM twice and had been "tasked with procuring
items." Paris detailed how KSM had a plan "to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn
Bridge to cause its collapse using gas cutters."^^®'^ Paris maintained thathe "thought that the task
to take down the bridge was impossible"and did not take further action.
See WHDC (242226ZMAR 03), which discusses information obtained by FBI officials on March 20,
2003; and FBI case file
CIA Officeoflnspector General interview of Chief ofthe H| Branch of the UBL Group at
CTC, by of the Inspector General, July 30, 2003. Tlie intei-view report states; "CIA initiated
tlie lead (not from detainees) to an individual believed to live in Baltimore - Majid Klian. He was believed to be in
contact with a nephew of [KSM]. Tlie FBI initiated trash coverage (using their special authorities to tap e-mail) on
the Baltimore residence where Khan had lived and faiTiily members still lived. Meanwhile, using
FISA coverage the Agency, with tlie help of [a foreign government], located
[Majid] Khan. The Baltimore house placed a call to Ohio (to lyman Fai ls) which became another FBI lead. When
the FBI approached Faris he talked voluntaiily."
See FBI case file WHDC (211522Z MAR 03) and WHDC (242226Z MAR 03).
Faris described Maqsood Khan as "the 'right foot' of Usama bin Ladin (UBL)."
"50^ See WHDC •• (242226Z MAR 03); and WHDC•• (211522Z MAR 03) (discusses infonnation obtained
by FBI official^ March 20, 2003).
ALEC m (261745Z MAR 03). Asenior CIA counterteiTorism official, who had previously served as chief
of the Bin Ladin Unit, commented on the intelligence obtained from lyman Fai'ison tlie Brooklyn Bridge plotting,
stating: "i guess we have to take these guys at their word, but if these are the types of attacks ksm was planning,
[KSM] was more of a nuisnace [sic] than a threat and you have to wonder how he ever thought of anything as
imaginative as the 11 sept attacks, i wonder if he had two tracks going: ops like 11 sept and a whole other series
half-baked, secular palestinian-style ops like those majid khan, faris, and the other yahoos are talking about, perhaps
he believe [sic] if we caught tlie yahoos, we would relax a bit and they would be better able to hit us witli an
effective attack? the other alternative, is tliat ksm liimself is a yahoo, strange stuff" (See email from:
•1^1; to: [REDACTED];
subject: attacks in conus; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:19:18 AM, referencing cable WHDCmr(242226Z MAR
03), with the subject line, "EYES ONLY: Majid Khan: Imminent al-Qa'ida Plots to Attack NYC and WDC Targets
Aborted by KSM Capture.") In a separate email, the senior official wrote: "again, odd. ksm wants to get 'machine
tools' to loosen the bolts on bridges so they collapse? did he think no one would see or hear these yahoos trying to
unscrew the bridge? that everyone would drive by and just ignore the effort to unbolt a roadway? and what about
opsec: 'yup, we were just going to recruit a few of the neighbors to help knock down the brooklyn bridge.'" See
email from:
^^1; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:35:18 AM.
1606 alec (261745Z MAR 03). During this period, the CIA was receiving updates from the FBI debriefings
of lyman Faris. See TRRS-03-03-0610, referenced in 10984 (242351Z MAR 03). On March 20, 2003,
KSM confu*med tliat he had tasked "the tiuck diiver...to procure machine tools that would be useful to al-Qa'ida in
its plan to loosen the nuts and bolts of suspension bridges," but stated he had "never divulged specific targeting
information to the truck driver." (See 10910 (202108Z MAR 03).) A CIA cable from March 24,
2003, noted that KSM's CIA interrogators were "reviewing latest imreadout on Majid Klian debriefs [who was
in foreign government custody] and FBI [intelligence reports] from debriefings of the truck driver Faiis lyman
[sic]," and tiiat the CIA team was therefore "focused entiiely on sorting out the information on Majid's claim.. .as
well as truck driver details on the tlireat." (See 10984 (242351Z MAR 03).) According to another cable,
KSM indicated that while the original plan was tosever the cables, he determined that it would beeasieM^cqmre
machine tools tliat would allow the operatives to"loosen the large nuts and bolts ofthe bridges." (See HHH
10985 (24235IZ MAR 03).) The disseminatedUntelligenc^^pornroiTUh^^ added that KSM stated his
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(4^8/^||||||||||H||H//NF) Over several weeks lyraan Paris continued to voluntarily cooperate
with law enforcement officials and engaged in efforts to assist in the capture of Maqsood
Khan.^^^^ Paris provided additional details on his activities related to the Khan family, KSM, his
meeting with UBL, and two extremists in the United States who had discussed wanting "to kill
Americans in a Columbus area shopping mall with a Kalashnikov automatic rifle."On April
22, 2003, "Paris had accepted a plea agreement"and continued to cooperate, includingby
sending email messages to al-Qa'ida members in Pakistan for the purposes of intelligence
collection.On May 1, 2003, Paris was transported from Quantico, Virginia, where he was
voluntarily residing and working with the PBI, to a federal court in Alexandria, Virginia, where
he pled guilty to material support to terrorism charges.He was subsequently sentenced to 20
years in prison.
On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terrorism (IICT) assessed that the use of tools to loosen the bolts of suspension bridges were
"methods that appear to be unrealistic."^ '^^
6. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest ofSajid Badat
Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced inteiTOgation
techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which
thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the identification,
discovery, capture, and arrest of Sajid Badat as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. U.K. domestic
investigative efforts, reporting from foreign intelligence services, international law enforcement
efforts, and U.S. military reporting resulted in the identification and arrest of Sajid Badat.
last communication witli lyman Faiis was shortlybefore his capture on March 1, 2003, and tliat he (KSM) was
"severely disappointed to leariUha^man had not yet been successful in his mission to purchase the necessary
materials." {See DIRECTOR |H|f(2511IZ MAR 03).) Later, on April 10, 2003, aCIA cable stated that KSM
told CIA interrogators that d-Qa'ida members had "cased" the Brooklyn Bridge and that KSM had discussed
attacking suspension bridges with other senior al-Qa'ida operatives. See HEADQUARTERS (100928Z APR
03).
See FBI case file ALEC (261725Z MAR 03), and Department of Justice release dated
October28, 2003, entitled, "lyman ParisSentenced for ProvidingMaterial Support to A1 Qaeda." During these
interviews lyman Paris provided detailed information on a variety of matters, including his ongoing relationship
with Maqsood Klian; the aliaseshe used in Pakistan ("MohmedRauf and "Gura"); how he became acquainted with
KSM and al-Qa'ida; as well as his interaction with the Majid Khan family. lyman Paris further provided
information on his initialmeeting with UBLandhow he helped Maqsood Khan obtain supplies "for usage by
Usama Bin Lad^' when he was inPakistan.
"^08 ALEC^M (022304Z APR 03); ALEC H||H^128Z APR 03); ALEC |^H(0^04Z APR 03);
WHDC^M^SSTZ APR03). also ALECHHB (261725Z MAR 03); ALEclfcl (010200Z APR
03); ALECB||P(261933Z MAR 03).1609 WHDC HHr(232240Z APR 03)
See Department of Justice comments in "The Triple Life of a Qaeda Man," TimeMagazine, June 22, 2003.
See PBI case file
See Department of Justice releasedated October28, 2003, entitled, "lyman Paris Sentenced for Providing
Material Support to A1 Qaeda."
1613 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded bya Bodyguard of Lies," nCT,
April 3, 2003.
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Further Details: Sajid was selected by al-Qa'ida leaders,
including Abu Hafs al-Masri and Sayf al-'Adl, to can-y out an attack against a Western airliner
with Richard Reid using a shoe bomb explosive device in December 2001.^ '^^ Sajid Badat
returned to the United Kingdom in late 2001 and sent a message to his al-Qa'ida handler, Ammar
al-Baluchi, stating that he was withdrawing from the operation.^^^^ On December 22, 2001,
Note on CIA records related to U.K.-based "Issas": Two United Kingdom-based al-Qa'ida associates, Dhiren
Barot and Sajid Badat, were known by the same common aliases, Issa, Abu Issa, Abu Issa al-Britani ("[of] Britain")
and/or Issa al-Pakistanl. Botli individuals were British Indians who had been independently in contact witli senior
al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan. Reporting indicated that the Issas were located in the United Kingdom and engaged in
terrorist targeting of the U.K. The investigation into their true identities was a U.K.-led operation. As a result, the
CIA sometimes had limited insight into U.K.-based activities to identify and locate tlie Issas. Senior CIA personnel
expressed frustration that the U.K. was not sharing all knowninformationon its investigations, writing in August
2003 that "[the FBI is] clearly working closely with the [U.K. service] on diese matters and [the CIA is] at the
mercy" of what it is told. In June 2003, the CIA informed the FBI that tlieCIA had "no electronic record of
receiving any transcripts or summaries from your agency's interviews with [Richard] Reid, and would appreciate
dissemination of summaries of questioning for the purposes of [CIA] analysis." Until the arrest of one of the Issas,
Sajid Badat, on November 27, 2003, die U.S. Intelligence Community and U.K. authorities often confused the two
al-Qa'ida associates. As a result, the quality and clarity of detainee reporting on the Issas (including reporting from
detainees inthecustodyoft^^ U.S. militai-y, Department ofJustice, and foreign services) varied. CIA
personnel HIHHHIIHH reported in September 2003 that there were "two (or three) Abu Issas" in
intelligence reporting and that because of their similarities, it was often "unclear wliich Issa the detainees [were]
referring to at different stages." Once detained in the United Kingdom in November 2003, Sajid Badat (one of the
Issas) cooperated with U.K. authorities and provided information about die other "Issa." Badat stated that "people
often asked [Badat] about [the other] Issa, as they were both British Indians." According to Sajid Badat, "anyone
who had been involved witli jihad in Britain since the mid-90s" would know Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot), to
include Babar Ahmed, Moazzem Begg, Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, and KSM. The other Issa, Dhiren Barot,
arrested on August 3, 2004, was found to have been especially well-known among the U.K.-based extremist
community, having written a popular book in 1999 expounding the virtues of jihad in Kashmir under the alias, "Esa
al-Hindi." CIA records include a reference to the book and a description of its author ("a brother from England who
was aHindu and became aMuslim...[who^oUrainin^i^^hanistai^^^^^ail^s December 1999
(disseminated by the CIA on 12/31/99 in [foreign pailner] would later
report tliat Dhiren Barot "frequently" appeared "in reporting of terrorist training" and had "involvement in Jihad in
occupied Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Malaysia, tliroughout the 1990s." The Committee Study is based on
more than six million pages of material related to the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program provided by the
CIA. Access was not provided to intelligence databases of tlie CIA or any other U.S. or foreign intelligence or law
enforcement agency. Insomuch as intelligence from these sources is included, it was, unless noted othei-wise, found
within the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program material produced for this Study. It is likely that significant
intelligence unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program on Sajid Badat and Dhiren Barot exists in
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement records and databases. See intelligence clironology in Volume II, including:
ALEC •||||H (112157Z JUN 03); ••• 19907 (231744Z APR 04); 99093 (020931Z SEP 03);
ALEC ^^l^miTZ^G 03)jCIAWASHI^TON DC (162127Z JUN 03); and aseries of emails
between^^llllllllHIH and (with multiple ccs)onAi^st 22, 2003, at 9:24:43 AM.
Among other documents, .ygg^^Bl9760(l51532Z JUN 02); 80508 (081717Z AUG 02); CIA
•• (311736Z OCT02), 99093
03). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "KSM's reporting also clearly distinguished between, and thereby
focused investigations of, two al-Qa'ida operatives known as Issa al-Britani." As detailed in the KSM detainee
review in Volume HI, KSM did discuss the two operatives, but he did not identify either by name (or, in the case of
Dhiren Barot, by his more common kimya, Issa al-Hindi), and provided no actionable intelligence that contributed to
the eventual identification of, or locational information for, either individual.
Among other documents, see CIA Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM," dated, "14 January 2002 1630 Hours"; CIA
Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI




Richard Reid attempted to detonate ashoe bomb on aflight from Paris, France, to Miami,
Florida. The plane was diverted to Boston, Massachusetts, and Reid was taken into ciisto'dy.^^^^
The discovery, identification, capture, and arrest ofSajid Badat,
"the shoe bomber," is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as
evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over aperiod of
years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials,
and the Department of Justice represent the discovery, identification, capture, and/or arrest of
Sajid Badat as an example of how "[kjey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after
applying interroption techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt teiTorist plots" and "capture
addidonal ten-orists."^ '^^ In at least one CIA document prepared for the president, the CIA
specifically highlighted the waterboard interrogation technique in enabling the CIA to learn "that
Sajid Badat was the operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard
Reid in 2001."'^ ^^ The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives."
January 2002 1630 Hours"; ALEC (142334Z MAY 03); and
See intelligence chronology in Volume II and multiple open source reports, as well as Department of Justice
materials, includmg United States v. Richard Reid IndxcXm^ni, U.S. District Court, District ofMassachusetts
January 16, 2002. According to aCIA operational update, in early December 2001, aunilateral CIA source reported
that aknown extremist "indicated there would be an attack on either an American or British airliner, originating in
France, Germany, or Britain, with the use of explosives concealed in shoes." According to CIA records, an
unclassified notice distnbuted to airlines concerning information from the CIA source in early December 2001 "is
credited with having alerted flight crew personnel and theii* having reacted so swiftly to Reid's actions" aboard
Flight 63. See intelligence chronology in Volume 11, including CIA Headquarters document, entitled
"OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM "dated "9 Anril
2002 1630 Hours." ' ' ^
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office ofLegal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness ofthe CIA
Countertenorist Interrogation Tecluiiques," from March 2, 2005.
See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with
the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6in preparation for POTUS meeting."
From 2003 through 2009, tlie CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness ofthe CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided aspecific set of examples of ten'orist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see:(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which relied on aseries of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of
the CU senhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the
OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical,"
"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for tlie U.S. government to "detect
and disrupt'^ terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing asubsequent attack within the United
States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department ofJustice Office ofLegal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced inteirogation techniques
OUng CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program—
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As anexample, on October 26,2007, the CIA faxed a document to
the Senate Appropriations Committee appealing aproposed elimination offunding for the CIA's
Rendition and Detention Program. The CIA appeal states that "[m]ost, if not all, of the
intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this program would likely not have been
discovered or reported in any other way." Representing the success ofthe CIA interrogation
program, the document states:
"Detainees have... permitted discovery ofterrorist cells, key individuals
and the interdiction of numerous plots, including... thediscovery of an
and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otlierwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President
explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else,
the program has saved innocent lives.'" {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Actmg General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, July 20,2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
ofthe Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003
represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence
information that had, in the view ofCIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of
this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from
Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation
Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and
September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The
CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: ^
"Inforaiation [tlie CIA] received... as aresult ofthe lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to
the fact that without the use ofsuch techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major teiTorist attacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention
and Inten-ogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: Februai-y 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes ofCIA's Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
Director Leon Panetta in Febmary 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the[enhanced intenogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that [m]ost, ifnot all, of
the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other
means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB 2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Klialid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),
"Backgiound on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background
on Key Captures and Plots Dismpted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on
March 18,2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258,
which provides alist of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of tlie
CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, ifnot all, of the timely intelligence
acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See
Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the
CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailabl^ntelligenc^ha^sa\^^^^^^^^
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operative who was preparing another attack^^^^ like that attempted by
'shoe bomber' Richard Reid."^^^^
Similarly, in early March 2005, the CIA compiled talking points on
the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for use in a meeting with the
NationalSecurity Council. The document states,"[t]he Central Intelligence Agency can advise
you that this program works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence."
The document states that ''after applying interrogation techniques," the CIA "learned from KSM
and Ammar that Sajid Badat was the operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack
with Richard Reid in December 2001."^^^^ A month later, on April 15, 2005, the CIA faxed an
eight-page document to the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel entitled, "Briefing
Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" which contained similar information.The Office
of Legal Counsel used the information to support its May 30, 2005, legal opinion on whether
certain "enhanced interrogation techniques" were consistent with United States obligations under
Article 16 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.The CIA-provided document states:
"Identifying the 'other' shoe bomber. Leads provided by KSM in November
2003 led directly to the arrest of shoe bomber Richard Reid's one-time partner
Sajid Badat in the UK. KSM had volunteered the existence of Badat—whom
As detailed in the intelligence chionology in Volume H, there is no evidenceto support the CIA assertion in
October 2007 that Sajid Badatwas "preparing anotherattack like that attemptedby 'shoe bomber' Richard Reid." A
body of intelligencecollected after the December 22, 2001, attemptedshoe bomb attackby Richard Reid indicated
that the proposed partner"backed outof theoperation." This information wascorroborated by signals intelligence.
Once detained on November 27, 2003, Sajid Badat cooperated with U.K. authorities and described how he withdrew
from the operation. See, among other CIA records, CIA Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM," dated"14 January2002 1630
Hours."
Italics added. CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. SenateCommittee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "^king points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM;
document faxed entitled, "Talking Points Appeal ofthe $|m Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and
Detention Program." As detailed in the intelligence chronology in Volume II, there is no evidence that Sajid Badat
was "preparing another attack like that attempted by 'shoe bomber' RichardReid." All intelligencecollectedafter
the December 22, 2001, attempted shoebomb attack by Richard Reidindicated thathis proposed partner "backed
out of the operation." See, for example, CIA Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM," dated,"14 January2002 1630
Hours."
Italics in original. CIA Talking Points entitled, "TalkingPoints for 10 March2005 DCI Meeting PC:
Effectiveness of the High-Value DetaineeInterrogation (HVDI) Techniques."
CIA "BriefingNoteson the Valueof Detainee Reporting" faxed fromthe CIA to the Department of Justiceon
April 15,2005, at 10:47AM. See also a CIAdocument dated December 20,2005, andentitled, "Examples of
Detainee Reporting Used by Our CT Partners to Thwart Terrorists, 2003-2005," which includes four columns:
"Detainees," "WhatThey Told Us," "Actions Taken By OurCTPartners," and"Results." Under theheading of
KSM and Ammar al-Baluchi, the document states: "What They Told Us..." "Provided lead information to Issa al-
Britani, a.k.a. Sajid Badat in the UnitedKingdom, November2003. KSM said Badat was an operativeslated to
launch a shoe-bomb attacksimultaneously with Richard Reidin December 2001. Ammar al-Baluchi provided
additional information on Badat...Results...Disrupted a shoe-bomb attack."
1625 Pqj. additional infonnation, see Volume I and Volume II.
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he knew as 'Issa al-Pakistani'—as the operative who was slated to launch a
simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001."'^^^
The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the
purported role of KSM and Ammar al-Baluchi^^^^ in the discovery, identification, capture, and
arrest of Sajid Badat in 16 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of
Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.However, in an additional case, a March 4,
2005, CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, the CIA credited Abu Zubaydah with identifying
Sajid Badat,despite a lack ofany reporting on Sajid Badat from Abu Zubaydah.^^^^
1626 xhere are no recordsof KSMidentifying Sajid Badat as "Issa al-Pakistani." CIA records indicate tliat KSM
stated he did not know Richard Reid's paitner's tme name, but referred to him only as "Abu Issa al-Britani"
(described in CIA cables as "Abu Issa the Britain" [sic]), or as "Issa Richaid." See intelligence chronology in
Volume II, including ALEC |B||||| (112157Z JUN 03).
CIA "BriefingNoteson the Valueof DetaineeReporting" faxedfromthe CIA to tlie Department of Justiceon
April 15,2005,at 10:47AM. Asdetailed in Volume II, therearenoCIArecords of KSM providing any reporting in
November 2003 contributing to Sajid Badat's aixest.
CIA Briefingfor Obama National Security Team-"Renditions, Detentions, and Intenogations (RDI)," including
"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefingon RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009": "...[L]eads provided by KSM and Ammar
al-Baluchi in November2003 led directly to the anest in the United Kingdom of Sajid Badat tlie operative who was
slated to launch a simultaneous shoe-bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001." Ammar al-Baluchi, while
still in foreign government custody, and prior to being transfen*ed to CIA custodyand subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, stated that hehad contacted "Abu Issa" on behalfofKSM^unl^CI^^elieved
tliat Ammar al-Baluchi was providing inaccurate information. (See ALEC 206234|||Bm^^^HII|). iH
[foreign partner] authorities laterindi^ted that the^elieve^ha^mmar al-Baluchi was providing accurate
reporting on Abu Issa. (See 10054 l-^ter, in CIAcustody, Ammaral-Baluchi
described Issa's connection to the Richard Reid plot. "^leCIAcreditedco^^ Ammar al-Baluchi with emails
as "key in gainingAmmar's admissions." (SeeALEC ) As detailed in VolumeII,
Ammar al-Baluchi, like KSM, was unable, or unwilling, to identify Sajid Badat by name.
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memorandafrom 2003 tlirough2009 with representations on tlie
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in
Volume II.
1630 briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney:
CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." The briefing document states: "Shoe Bomber: Sajid Badat, an
operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoebombattackwithRichard Reid in December2001, identified and
captured. Source: Abu Zubaydah." Thereareno CIA records to support this statement. On August 17,2003, Abu
Zubaydah was shown a pictureof Sajid Badatthat a CIA officerstated "looksan awful lot like the sketches"from a
detainee in foreign government custody. Abu Zubaydahstatedhe did not recognize the person in the photo. On
August 22, 2003, sketches ofBadat wereshowiUc^b^iibaydah, who did not recognize the individual depict^
See email from: (multiple ccs)^ubie^"Re: Meeting with
date: August 17, 2003, at 1:04 PM; H|^ Hi2679(181124Z AUG 03); ••• 12713 (231932Z AUG 03).
xhe CIA also credited Abu Zubaydali, who was captured in March 2002, wltli identifying Richard Reid, who
was aiTested in December 2001. Tills inaccurate infoi*matlon was presented to select National Security Council
principals. Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Assistant Attorney General Jack
Goldsmith. See CIA briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior
Wliite House officials (Memorandum for the Record; subject: CIA Intenogation Program; September 27, 2003
(OGC-FO-2003-50088); Slides, CIA Interrogation Program, 16 September 2003). The Memorandum for the Record
drafted by John Bellingerrefers to a "detailed handout" provided by the CIA. See John B. BelUnger III, Senior
Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council; Memorandum for the Record;
subject: Briefing of Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld regtu-ding Intenogation of High-Value Detainees; date:
September 30, 2003. Seealso ScottW. Muller; Memorandum for the Record; Interrogation briefingfor Jack
Goldsmitli; date: 16 October 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50097).
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Contrary to CIA representations, a review of CIA operational
cables and other documents found that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not
result in otherwise unavailable intelligence leading to the discovery, identification, capture, or
arrest of Sajid Badat. According to CIA records and the U.K.'s own investigative summary,
the investigation of Sajid Badat was a United Kingdom-led operation, and the intelligence that
alerted security officials to: (1) a U.K.-based "Issa" (aka, Sajid Badat); (2) a potential second
"shoe bomber" related to Richard Reid;'^ ^^ (3) a suspected U.K. terrorist named "Sajid
Badat";(4) Sajid Badat's connectionto Richard Reid; (5) Sajid Badat's physical description;
(6) Sajid Badat's location; and (7) the initial identification of a U.K. surveillance photo of Sajid
Badat, the "shoe bomber,was unrelated to information acquired from CIA detainees during
or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA records indicate that the
information that led to Sajid Badat's arrest and U.K. criminal prosecution was also not derived
from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
Prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, and as early as January
14, 2002, the FBI informed the CIA that Richard Reid "had an unidentified partner who
allegedly backed out of the operation at the last minute."This information was later
"''^^•113165
The CIA's June 2013 Response maintains that "KSM was the first to tell [the CIA] there was a second shoe
bomber and that he remained at large." The Committee found this statement to be incongruent with CIA records.
There were multiple reports that Richard Reid had an unidentified partner prior to the provision of any information
from KSM (captured on March 1, 2003). The CIA's June 2013 Response addresses only one of two documented
efforts by the FBI in January 2002 to inform the CIA that Richard Reid had "an unidentified partner who allegedly
backed out of the operation at the last minute." The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that this FBI
infomiation was provided to senior CIA leadership in writing, but states that, on one of the two days the information
was provided, "the Reid investigation came on page 10 of 15 pages of updates that day," and that the information
did not "exist in any searchable CIA data repositories." The CIA's June 2013 Response also does not address the
CIA's own source reporting on "another operative" who existed alongside Richard Reid. In April 2002, a reliable
CIA source—who had warned of the Richard Reid shoe-bomb attack weeks before it occurred—reportedthat, in
addition to Richard Reid, "another operativeexisted." The source stated that, instead of an airliner departing from
Paris, as had Richard Reid's flight, "this attack would occur against an airliner originating from Heathrow
International Airport in London." Oncecaptured, Sajid Badat wouldconfirm this reporting. Despiteacknowledging
evidence to the contrary, and without further explanation, the CIA stated in meetings with the Committee in 2013
that the CIA stands by its representations that "KSM was the first to tell [the CIA] there was a second shoe bomber
and that he remainedat large."
See Volume II, including FBI WASHINGTON DC (160429Z JUL 02). The CIA's June 2013
Response acknowledges that there was intelligence reporting that Sajid Badat was involved in terrorist activities and
"targeting American interests," but defends its past assertions highlighting the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
inteiTOgation techniques in obtaining otherwise unavailable intelligence by asserting that, at the time of this
reporting, there "was nothing at the time on Badat to lead [the CIA] to prioritize him over others."jj-,e CIA's June 2013 Response states: "KSMwas the first person to provide—in March2003, after having
undergone enhanced inteiTogation techniques in CIA custody—a detailed and authoritative narrative of al-Qa'ida
development of and plans to use shoe bombs operationally." The CIA's June 2013 Response does not acknowledge
intelligence acquired by the Intelligence Community on these matters prior to any reporting from KSM and does not
address the significant amount of fabricated reporting KSM provided. See Volume n for additional information.
See Volume 11 for additional information.
The FBI infonnation was provided to the CIA. See CIA Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM," dated, "14 January 2002 1630
Hours." The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges the existence of this CIA document and that the information
in the document was "compiled... for counterterrorism seniors at CIA." The CIA's June 2013 Response nonedieless
states that "[t]here is no reference to this possibilityjo^^ossibl^econdop^ inofficial communications
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corroborated by a credible CIA source prior to any reporting from the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation ProgramIn July 2002, a foreign government reported that pre-paid phone
cards recovered by the FBI from Richard Reid upon his arrest were used by an individual named
Sajid Badat to call a known terrorist, Nizar Trabelsi.^^^^ FBI interviews of Trabelsi—officially
relayed to the CIA in July 2002—reported that "L. Badad Sajid" was "involved in operations
targeting American interests."^^"^® The CIA highlighted in a July 2002 cable that this information
matched previous reporting from a European government that identified a "Saajid Badat," of
Gloucester, United Kingdom, with a date of birth of March 28, 1979, as a person suspected of
being involved in terrorist activityAdditional analysis of the phone card connecting Badat
and Reid—as well as other intelligence—placed Sajid Badat and Richard Reid together in
Belgium in September 2001.^^"^^
According to Sajid Badat was linked to other
well-known extremists in the United Kingdom who were already under investigation.
Specifically, Badat was known to as^ member ofBabar Ahmad's group,"
and was a "particularly close associate of Mirza Beg." reporting also determined that Badat
had attended a jihad training camp in Afghanistan,
(TS^^^^m|[|[||//NF) Concun^ent with the emergence ofinformation linking Sajid Badat
to Richard Reid, there was an ongoing international effort to identify one or more U.K.-based al-
Qa'ida operatives known as "Issa."^^ As early as June2002, CIArecords indicate that an
between FBI and CIA, nor did it exist in any searchable CIA data repositories prior to KSM's reporting." The CIA
expressed concern that the FBI was not shaiing information from the debriefings of Richard Reid. Additional FBI
information about Sajid Badat, including anyinfoniiation obtained from Richard Reid, was not available to the
Committee. See CIA WASHINGTON DC (162127Z JUN 03).
See intelligence chronology in Volume 11, including U.S. military detainee reporting detailed in CIA
Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI
EXTREMIST TERRORISM," dated, "9 April 2002 1630 Hours." This CIA document included reporting from a
CIA source who stated that, in addition to Richard Reid, "another operative existed" who was planning an attack
"against an airliner originating from Heathrow International Airport in London." Tlie same source had provided
reporting on an "attack... against an airliner originating in France, Germany, or Britain, with the use of explosives
concealed in shoes" just prior to Richard Reid's attempted use of explosives concealed in shoes on December 21,
2001. Despite corroborated intelligence reporting acquired prior to the provision of information from CIA
detainees, the CIA represented, as late as October 2007, that "[m]ost, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from
high-value detainees in [the CIA] program would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way,"
crediting CIA detainees with "the discovery of an operative who was preparing another attack like that attempted by
'shoe bomber' Richard Reid." See CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talkingpoints," sent on October 26,
2007, at5:39:48 PM. Document faxed entitled, "Talking Points Appeal ofthe $|H Million reduction in
CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program."
1639 pBi WASHINGTON DC (130706Z JUL 02)
FBI WASHINGTON DC (160429Z JUL 02)
CIA IHIHi^H^IRECTOR1642 PBI WASHINCTO^C^^ta (I30706Z JUL 02); FBI WASHINGTON |
13165
See^^ [foreign partner] summary ofthe Sajid Badat investigation and
[foreign partner] authorities relayed to the CIA that there were "two (or three) Abu Issas" in
tenorist threat reporting who were described as from die U.K. and engaged in suspected al-Qa'ida teiTorist
operations. CIA Headquarters informed ^^^H|B|hi^ugus^OO^ha |^there are (at least) two/two important






individual in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha'iii, repeatedly referenced an
"Abu Issa al-Pakistani" as a British-born Pakistani associated with Richard Reid and engaged in
plotting in the United Kingdom at the behest of This information was corroborative of
other intelligence reporting.In May 2003, this detainee met with CIA officers to produce
several sketches that were described ashaving "achieved a 95% likeness" of this individual^
Oi^ugust 17, 2003, CIA officers noted that aphotograph ofSajid Badat provided by
foreign partner] looked "an awful lot like the sketches" of the Richard Reid
associate made with the assistance of the detainee in foreign government custody.
CIA Headquarters requested that the photograph be shown to CIA
detainees. According to CIA records, on August 18, 2003, "KSM viewed the picture for a while,
but said he did not recognize the person in the photo." When KSM was asked if Issa's name
could be Sajid Badat, "KSM shrugged and said that the Badat name was not the name he
recalled." Pressed further, KSM stated, "he was confident that the name Sajid Badat was not
Issa's name."'^ "^^ On August 22, 2003, emails among CIA officers stated that "CTC believes that
Abu Issa's true name is Sajid Badat... KSM says that Badat is not Abu Issa—but he might be
lying."On August 23, 2003, the detailed sketches derived from interviews of the detainee in
fugitives known as Issa and carrying UK passports (those both are known at times as Issa al-Britani), and both have
strong links to KSM." See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details^
Amongotherdocument^ 19712|Bimi|^^^|;||||||j||H 19744^^H|||m|Hii; and
19780 April 4, 2003, cable from the CIA ^
providing information on a U.K. "Issa" in which the CIA acknowledges Hlh investigation
already underway, writing "we realize that Abu Issa is [a subject of interest] of interest [yourgovernment]." Abu
Zubair al-Ha'ili is also known by the variant, Abu Zubayral-Ha'ili. Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili was never in CIA custody.
See intelligence clironology in Volume II.
1648 from: ||i||^^^|^^^|ito; (multiple ccs); subject: "Re: Meeting with
date: August 17, 2003, at 1:04PM. TlieCIA's June 2013 Responsestates that "[t]he fact that the [foreign partner]
as late as August 2003 was only able to locate a poor quality photo of Sajid Badat belies the notion that Badat was
well on his way to being identifiedas important and disrapted in advance of KSM's reporting. However, the
Committe^oi^ when CIA officers received what they described as a "crummy" photo ofSajid Badat from the
they nonetheless wrote, "it sure looks to me like Sajid is the shoe bomber Issa," noting the body of
intelligence compiled to date and the fact that "the photo [of Sajid Badat] looks an awful lot like the sketches of
'Issa al-Britani/Pakistani'" the CIAhad obtained fromthe detainee in foreign government custody,AbuZubairal-
Ha'ili. Of note to CIA officers was that al-Ha'ili "was asked, 'what is Abu Issa's most striking feature or
features?'" Abu Zubair repUed, "his eyes, thick frame eye glasses, and Pakistani hat." Abu Zubair stated that Issa
always wore a unique, inegulady shaped checkered hat thathas the frontcentercut out of it and is only worn in
Pakistan. In a discussion of thephotoof SajidBadat, a CIA officer wrote: "Sajid appears to have the samegoofy
hat on thatZubairwentto lengths todescribe." See email from: to: [REDACTED] (multiple
ccs); subject: "Re: photo of Sajid badat, suspectedas iden with Issa al-Hindi: some possible confusion"; date:
AugusU5^03,at 7:20:40 PM.
12679(181124ZAUG03). Khallad bin Attashand Abu Zubaydah were also shown the pictureof
Sajid Badat. Both detainees stated they did not recognize tlie person in the photo.
Series of emails, including email from: ^UMlHIiiiH (multiple ccs); August 22,
2003, at 9:24:43 AM. The CIA's June 2013 Responsestates, "no one had suggested Badat could be a candidate for
this Issa until KSM's reporting." CIA records indicate that KSM never identified Sajid Badat by name. Moreover,
on March 20, 2003, while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM inaccurately
identifie^icha^Reid's U.K. associate as "Talha." (See |[|mm 10912 (2021 lOZ MAR 03), disseminated as||||||mi||||||||^|^|.) On May 11, 2003, amonth and ahalf after the CIA ceased using its enhanced interrogation
techniques against KSM, KSM stated that Talh^a^ctudl^|Issa/^ndt^^ had provided the name Talha under
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foreign custody, Abu Zubak al-Ha'ili—the sketches CIA officers stated so closely resembled the
llll [foreign partner]-provided photos ofSajid Badat—were shown to KSM. KSM stated he
did not recognize the individual in the sketches.
Meanwhile, on August 21, 2003, aCIA cable no^ that the Bi
[foreign partner] had informed the CIA that joint interviews by the FBI and [H [foreign
partner] authorities of an individual in FBI custody, James Ujaama, led investigators in the U.K.
to ahome "formerly occupied by both Mirza [Beg] and Sajid [Badat]."^ '^'^ The Bi [foreign
partner] authorities relayed to the CIA that "at least one of these men was known by the alias
Issa," and that the sublets were related to a separate ongoing terrorism investigation. On
September 2, 2003, [foreign partner] authorities informed the CIA that "secret and
reliable" reporting indicated that Sajid Badat is the Richard Reid associate and shoe bomber.
According to the [forei
linked Badat to a larger]
larger aforementioned
artner] report, [foreign partner information]
network in the United Kingdom, which was part of the
[foreign partner] investigation.
On September 9, 2003, a detainee in U.S. military custody at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, identified a photograph of Sajid Badat to a visiting U.K. official as Abu
Issa the "shoe bomber."^^^^ The next day, KSM identified a photograph of Sajid Badat as "Issa
al-Britani, aka Issa Richard"—the associate of Richaid Reid. Other detainees in U.S. military
custody subsequently identified the same photograph of Sajid Badat as "Abu Issa" the
"shoebomber."^^^^
pressure and had now remembered tlie right name - Issa - after he had time to think about the question. See|HiHn^84 (111753Z MAY 03); DIRECTOR (121729Z MAY 03).
(231932Z AUG 03)
1652 ujjiama had pled guilty to terrorism-related charges on April 14,2003,and had agreed to continuecooperating
with FBI officials on teiTorism investigations. Earnest James Ujaama entered a guilty plea to a charge of conspiracy
to providegoods and services to the Talibanon April 14,2003. SeeU.S. Department of Justice press releasedated
April 14,2003, and entitled,"EarnestJames Ujaama Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to SupplyGoods and Services to
the Taliban, Agrees to Cooperate with Terrorism Investigations."
ALEC H(|H(212117Z AUG 03). CIA records state that soiwetim^moM^Au^^ 2003, the FBI had
enteredSaii^adat, with the conect identifying information, into databases.1654 99093j||||||^^^H)
DIRECTOR•••H|EeP03)/|^^^^^^H. [REDACTED]. See also CIA\
DEC 03), which includes a "Comment" that "during a 9 September 2003 interview of [Feroze Ali] Abassi at
Guantanamo Bay, Abbasl identified Badat as a participant in the 'informationgathering course' at al-Faruq" terrorist
training camp, about which Abassi had previouslyprovidedde^iled information.
'6''® See Hllli 12806 (I019I0Z SEP 03) and 54986 (300927Z OCT 03). The CIA's June 2013
Response acknowledges that a U.S. military detaineefirst identified SajidBadat, but argues that CIA representations
on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in producing otherwise unavailable intelligence
in tliis case were nonetheless accurate. The CIA's June 2013 R^onse states that KSM "did provide unique
intelligence," and that "KSM's identification of Badat [in the photo] was more important than others who also
recognized the photograph—including one who identifiedthe photo a day before KSM did—because only KSM at
the time had characterized tliis Issa as a partner to Reid and as a would-be shoe bomber." As detailed in this
summary and in greater detail in Volume II, the CIA's 2013 Response is incongruent with intema^I^ecords^^
After the anest of Sajid Badat, U.K. authorities described their investigatiot^^aii^adat|^ ^B^B||H||^ H[
The United BCingdom highlighted information from a [specific U.K. intelligence
collection on Sajid Badat] not further identified in CIA records. The U.K. record of investigation makes no
referenceto KSM's photo identification, but rather states: "reportingon 9 September2003 confirmed tliat a U.S.
military detainee had positively identified Saaii^ada^^binssa^^sse^hat Sajid Badat is identical with both
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After conducting extensive surveillance of Sajid Badat, U.K.
authorities arrestedBadaton November 27, 2003.^^^^ Badat immediately cooperated with U.K.
investigators and confirmed he withdrew from a shoe bomb operation with Richard Reid in
December 2001.^^^^ OnNovember 28, 2003, the United Kingdom provided a detailed account to
the CIA on how investigative efforts in the United Kingdom led to the identification of Sajid
Badat, noting that "key aspects" ofreportin^cquirc^ron^IA^.S. military, and foreign
government detainees matched thoseofajH^H^^HUm" [specific U.K. intelligence
collection on Sajid Badat]. The intelligence collection
on Sajid Badat] was not previously referenced in U.K. investigative updates to the CIA.^^^^
After pleading guilty in aU.K. court on Februar^8^005^^^^
terrorism-related charges, Sajid Badat was sentenced to 13 years in prison.
Sajid "Badat was voluntarily cooperative throughout much of his pre-sentencing
incarceration."On November 13, 2009, Sajid Badat's 13-yeai- prison sentence was reduced
to 11 years. In March 2010, approximately five years after his sentencing, Sajid Badat was
released under an agreement whereby Badat became a cooperating witness for U.S. and U.K.
authorities.The legal agreement came to light when Sajid Badat testified against Adis
Medunjanin, a U.S. terrorism suspect on trial in New York, via a video-link from the United
Kingdom in April 2012.^^^^
7. The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary WharfPlotting




1659 13165 03). The [foreign partner] report liighlights how the"[a named foreign
government] reported that on the 13 September 2001 Nizar [Trabelsi] was arrested for his alleged involvement in
planning a terrorist attack against the American Embassy in Paris" and how Trabelsi was connected to a phone card
"recovered from Richard Colvin Reid" but found to have been used by Sajid Badat. The report references a larger
U.K. investigation, stating that Badat was found to be "a member of Babcir Ahmad's group" and to have "attended a
jihad training camp in Afghanistan." The m [foreign partner] report closes by stating: "Further reporting on 9
September 2003 confirmed that a U.S. military detainee had positively identified Saajid Badat as Abu Issa. We
assess that Sajid Badatisidentical with both Sajid and Abu Issa the shoebomber."1660 Entail from: H^HH||||[; to: [REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: "Re: Profile on Saajid Badat for
coord by 6pm, 19 October 2005; date: October 19, 2005, at 3:14:29 PM.
See open source reporting, including "Secret Life of Shoe Bomb Saajid Badat Funded By The Taxpayer," U.K.
Telegraph, dated April 23, 2012; "US court hears Bin Ladin testimony from UK bomb plotter," BBCNews,dated
April 24, 2012; "Operative Details A1 QaedaPlans to Hit Planes in Wake of 9/11," CNN, dated April 25, 2012;and
"'Convention' of Convicted Terrorists at NY Trial," NPR News, dated April 24, 2012.
See open source reporting, including"Secret Life of Shoe Bomb Saajid Badat Funded By The Taxpayer," U.K.
Telegraph, dated April 23, 2012; "US court hears Bin Ladin testimony from UK bomb plotter," BBC News,dated
April 24, 2012; "Operative Details A1 QaedaPlans to Hit Planes in Wake of 9/11," CNN, dated April 25, 2012;
"'Convention' of Convicted Terrorists at NY Trial," NPR News, dated April 24, 2012; and "Man Convicted of a
Terrorist Plot to Bomb Subways Is Sent to Prison for Life," New York Times, dated November 16, 2012.
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EC 03). See also the intelligence chronology in
UNCLASSIFIED
Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation
techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which
thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the identification and
thwarting of the Heathrow Airport Plot as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. A review of records indicates
that the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting had not progressed beyond the initial
planning stages when the operation was fully disrupted with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-
Shibh, KSM, Ammar-al-Baluchi, and Khallad bin Attash. None of these individuals were
captured as a result of reporting obtained during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against CIA detainees.
Further Details: After the September 11, 2001, attacks against the
United States, KSM sought to target the United Kingdom using hijacked aircraft and surmised
that Heathrow Airport and a building in Canary Wharf, a major business district in London, were
powerful economic symbols.^^^^ The initial planwas for al-Qa'ida operatives to hijackmultiple
airplanes departing Heathrow Airport, turn them around, and crash them into the airport itself.
Security was assessed to be too tight at Heathrow Airport and the plan was altered to focus on
aircrafts departing from mainly Eastern European airports to conduct attacks against Heathrow
Airport. Al-Qa'ida was unable to locate pilots to conduct these attacks.Once KSM was
detained in Pakistan on March 1, 2003, responsibility for the planning was passed to Ammar al-
Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, who were at the time focused on caiTying out attacks against
Western interests in Karachi, Pakistan.
The thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting
is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the
effectiveness of the CIA's enlianced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA
documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the
Department of Justice represent the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting as an example
of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation
techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional ten'orists."^^^^
The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives."^^^^
1663 \Yhile the CIA refers to "Canary Wharf' as a potential target of KSM's plotting, intelligence records suggest the
actual taiget was likely "One Canada Square," the tallest building in the United Kingdom at the time of the plotting,
which is located in Canary Whaif, a major business district in London.
See detailed intelligence clironology in Volume II.
See the Karachi Plots section in this summary, as well as additional details in Volume U.
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA
CounterteiTorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005.
1667 pjoni 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectivenessof the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see\
(1) CIA representations in tlie Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of
tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the
OLC include that the use ofthe CIA's enhancedintenjogatior^echni^^ to obtain "critical,"




Poi" example, on December 23, 2005, CIA Director Porter Goss
explained in a letter to NationalSecurity Advisor Stephen Hadley, Homeland Security Advisor
Frances Townsend, and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte, that he was
"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. governmentto "detect
and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLCJ that
the CIA believes that this program is laigely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United
States." (SeeMemorandum for John A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputy GeneralCounsel,Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal DeputyAssistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United States Obligations UnderArticle 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used in the Intenogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligenceacquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Citing CIA documents and the President's September6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program
(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandumstates: "The CIA interrogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security
of the nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President explained
[on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about tenorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program
has saved innocent lives.'" (SeeMemorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence
Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury,Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20,
2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions to Certain Techniques tliat May Be Usedby the CIA in the Interrogationof High Value al Qaeda
Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003
represented that "the use of EnhancedTechniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence
information that had, in the viewof CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]erminationof
this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from
Scott Muller, Subject: Reviewof Interrogation Programon 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Intenogation
Program, July 29, 2003; September4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and
September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The
CIA's response to the Office of Inspector Generaldraft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts:
"Information [the CIAl received... as a result of tlie lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points cleariy to
the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands,of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG;date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the
[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and tliat "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timely intelligence acquiredfromdetainees in this program would not have been discoveredor reported by other
means." (See CIA briefing documentsfor Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB.2009"and grapliic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derivedfrom Abu Zubaydahand Khalid
Shaykh Muliammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background
on Key Capturesand Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIAdocument faxed to the SenateSelectCommittee on Intelligence on
March 18, 2009, entitled, "SWIGERT and DUNBAR," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which
provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence
acquired from detainees in this programwould nothave been discovered or reported by any other means." See
VolumeII for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabledthe
CIA toobtain unique, otherwise unavailableintelligencethatj|savedl^^
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suspending the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques because of the passage of the
Detainee Treatment Act (the "McCain amendment"). The letter stated:
"...only 29 [CIA detainees] have undergone an inteiTogation that used one or
more of the 13 [CIA enhanced interrogation] techniques.These
inten-ogations produced intelligence that allowed the U.S., and its partners, to
disrupt attacks such as 911-style attacks planned for the U.S. West Coast and
for Heathrow airport. I can inform you with confidence that this program has
allowed the U.S. to save hundreds, ifnot thousands, of lives
Similarly, the CIA infoiTned the CIA inspector general on
February 27, 2004, that:
"As a result of the lawful use of EITs, KSM also provided information on an
al-Qa'ida plotfor suicide airplane attacks outside of the United States that
would have killed thousands ofpeople in the United Kingdom. .. .Of note, even
after KSM reported that al-Qa'ida was planning to target Heathrow, he at first
repeatedly denied there was any other target than the airport. Only after the
repeated lawful use ofEITs did he stop lying and admit that the sketch ofa
beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was infact an illustration that
KSM the engineer drew himself in order to show another AQ operative that the
beams in the Wharf- like those in the World Trade Center would likely melt
and collapse the building, killing all inside.... We are still debriefing detainees
and following up on leads to destroy this cell, but at a minimum the lawful use
ofBIT's on KSMprovided us with critical information that alerted us to these
threats....
provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the
Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plotting in 20 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and
the Department ofJustice between July 2003 and March 2009.^^ '^
a review of CIA operational cables and other documents found
tliat contrary to CIA representations, information acquired during or after the use of the CIA's
1668 -piyg infonnation was incoiTect. CIA records indicate that by December 23, 2005, at least 38 CIA detainees had
been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Italics added. "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations and Analysis," prepared to support
a letter from CIA Director Goss to Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances
F. Townsend, Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John D. Negroponte, dated
December 23, 2005.
Italics added. CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for
Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
'Counteitenorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's
Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTOgation Activities," dated February 24, 2004.
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 flirough 2009 with representations on the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in
Volume II.
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enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in "alert[ing]" the CIA to the threat to-
"disrupt[ing]" the plotting against—Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf.^^^^
-or
to the detention and interrogation of the CIA detainees
credited by the CIA with providing information on the plot, the CIA and other intelligence
agencies were already "alerted" to al-Qa'ida's efforts to target Heathrow Airport. Specifically,
the CIA knew that: (1) KSM and al-Qa'ida were targeting "a national symbol in the United
Kingdom" and that this symbol was the "Heathrowairport";(2) the attack plan called for
hijacking commercial aircraft and crashing them directly into Heathrow airport;'^ ^"^ (3) no pilots
had been identified by al-Qa'ida and the planned attack was not imminent;^^^^ (4) KSM, Ammar
As described in this Study, the CIA consistently represented from 2003 tlirough 2009 that the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in "disruptedplots," listed the "Heathrow Plot" as disrupted "as a result
of the EITs," and informed policymakers that the information acquired to disrupt the plotting could not have been
obtained from other intelligence sources or methods available to the U.S. government. In at least one CIA
representation to White House officials that highlighted the Heathrow plotting, the CIA represented that "the use of
the [CIA's enhanced interrogation] tecliniques has produced significant results," and warned policymakers that
"[tjermination of this [CIA] program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA's June 2013 Response
states: "CIA disagrees with the Study's assessment that [the CIA] inconectly represented that information derived
from interrogating detainees helped disrupt al-Qa'ida's targeting of Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf in London,
including in PresidentBush's 2006speech on theProgram. Detainee reporting, including some whichwas acquired
after enhanced interrogationtechniques were applied, played a critical role in uncovering the plot, understanding it,
detaining many of the key players,and ultimately allowing us to conclude it had been disrupted. It is a complex
story, however, and we should have been clearer in delineating the roles played by different partners." As described
in this summaiy, past CIA representations concerning the HeathrowAirportplotting and intelligenceacquired "as a
result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were inaccurate. (See,amongother records, the September
6, 2006, speech by President Bush, based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, which describes the CIA's use
of "an alternative set" of interrogation procedures and stating: "These are some of the plots that have been stopped
becauseof the informationof this vital program. Terrorists held in CIA custody...have helped stop a plot to hijack
passenger planes and fly tliem into Heathrow or Canaty Whaif in London.") Contrary to the CIA's June 2013
assertion,CIA records indicate that information related to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
played no role in "detaining manyof the key players" and played no role in "uncoveringtlie [Heathrow] plot." CIA
records indicate the Heathrow Airportplotting had not progressed beyond the initial planning stages when the
operation was fully disrapted with the detention of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (detained on September 11, 2002), KSM
(detained on March 1, 2003), Ammar-al-Baluchi (detained on April 29, 2003), and Khallad bin Attash (detained on
April 29, 2003). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[b]y all accounts, KSM's anest was the action that
mostdisrupted the [Heathrow] plot." As detailed in this summaryand in greater detail in Volume II, the capture of
these detainees—including KSM—was unrelated to any reporting from CIA detainees. CIA records further indicate
that details on al-Qa'ida's targeting of HeathrowAirport were acquired prior to any reporting from CIA detainees.
For example, prior to receiving any informationfrom CIA detainees, the CIA acquired detailed information about
al-Qa'ida's targeting of Heathrow Airport, to include, but not limited to, the al-Qa'ida senior leaders involved, the
methodof the planned attack, the statusof the operation, and the kiinyas of two potentialunwittingoperatives in the
United Kingdom. Finally, the CIA's June 2013 Response claims tliat its past CIA representations were accurate and
that CIA "detainee reporting, including some which was acquiredafter enhanced interrogation techniques were
applied, played a critical role" in providing information, "ultimately allowing [CIA] to conclude it had been
disrupted." Prior to June 2013, the CIAhad never represented that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques producedinformation "allowing [CIA] to conclude [the Heathrow Plot]had been disrupted." Rather, as
detailed in this summary and morefully in Volume II, the CIA represented that the information acquired "as a result
of EITs" produced unique, otherwise unavailable "actionableintelligence"that "saved lives" and disrupted the
plotting itself. Asdet^ed, these representations were inaccurate.
DIRECTOR (I72I32Z OCT 02)
DIRECTOR (172132Z OCT 02)
DIRECTORIH(I72132Z OCT 02)
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al-Baluchi, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh were involved in or knowledgeable about the plotting;
(5) al-Qa'ida was seeking to recruit numerous operatives, but potentially already had two
operatives in place in the United Kingdom named "Abu Yusif' and "Abu Adel," although the
two operatives were unwitting of the plot;^^^^ and (6) KSM was seeking Saudi and British
passport holders over the age of 30 for the attack,
A review of records indicates that the Heathrow Airpoit plotting
had not progressed beyond the initial planning stages when die operation was fully disrupted
with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (detained on September 11, 2002),^^^^ KSM (detained
on March 1, 2003),^^^° Ammar-al-Baluchi (detained on April 29, 2003), and Khallad bin Attash
(detained on April 29, 2003,).^^^^ There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the
individuals were captured as a result of CIA detainee reporting. A draft National Terrorism
Bulletin from March 2006 states: "the [Heathrow Airport] operation was disrupted mid-cycle,
around the spring of2003, when several of the key plotters, including KSM, were detained."'^ ^"
Foreign government intelligence analysis came to the same conclusion.
While each of these four detainees provided information on the
plotting during their detentions, none of this information played any role in the disruption of the
plot. A wide body of intelligence reporting indicated that no operatives were informed of the
[REDACTED] 20901 (301117Z SEP 02). See also CIA
CIA m In October 2002, months prior toKSM's capture, Ramzi bin al-Shibh (RBS),
who had not yet been rendered to CIA custody and therefore not yet subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, identified Abu Yusef and Abu Adil as potential U.K.-basedHeatlirow operatives. RBS described how
the two English-speaking "al-Qa'ida suicide operatives" were dispatched to the United Kingdoii^^^M^RBS
provided a detailed description of the two potential operatives, as well as their travel. {SeeCIA
^BHI) was captured on March 1, 2003. Tlie CIA's June 2013 Response nonetheless asserts tliat "KSM
also was responsible for helping us identify two potential operatives—known only as Abu Yusef and Abu Adil—
whom al-Qa'ida had deployed to the United Kingdom by early 2002 and whom KSM wanted to tap for a role in a
future Heathrow operation." U.K. investigative efforts led to the identification of Abu Yusef, who then identified
Abu Adil—who was ab eady an investigative target of the U.K. government. In Febru^ 2004, the CIA reported
that no CIA detainee was able to identify a photograph of Abu Yusif. See ALEC (262236Z FEB 04).
DIRECTOR•• (172132Z OCT 02)
See section of this summary and Volume II on the "Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh." The CIA's June 2013
Response states that "the information provided by Abu Zubaydah played a key role in the capture of Ramzi Bin al-
Sliibh." As described in the "Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II,
Ramzi bin al-Shibh was not captured as a result of information acquired during or after the use of the CIA's
enhanced intenogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
See section of tliis summary and Volume II on the Capture of Klialid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM). The CIA's
June 2013 Response acknowledges that "[b]y all accounts, KSM's anest was the action that most disrupted tlie
[Heatlirow] plot." The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts, however, that "[Abu] Zubaydah's reporting also
contributed to KSM's airest." As described in the "Capture of KSM" in this summai-y and in more detail in Volume
II, the capture of KSM was not attributable to any information obtained from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program.
As described in the section of this summary related to the "Karaclii Plot(s)" and in more detail in Volume IT,
information from CIA detainees played no role in the arrests of Ammar al-Baluchi or Khallad bin Attash.
See series of emails dated March 22, 2006, with the subject Une, "RE:Abu Adel NTB Coord: Please Respond by
14:00 Today (3/22). See also series of emails dated Maich 22, 2006, with the subject line, "RE: Abu Adel NTB
Coord: Please Respond by 14:00 Today (3/22).
"^83 director
TOP SECREIW^^^^^B^B //NOFORN




plot, no pilots were ever identified by al-Qa'ida for the attacks, and only schedules of potential
flights were collected for review.
CIA detainee records indicate that reporting from CIA detainees on
aspects of the Heathrow plotting was often unreliable and not believed by CIA officers. For
example, KSM retracted information he provided while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, including information linking Jaffar al-Tayyarto the Heathrow Plot.'^ ^^
On May 20, 2003, nearly two months after the CIA ceased using its enhanced interrogation
techniques against KSM, a CIA analyst wrote that KSM had provided tiiree different stories
related to the Heathrow plotting, writing to CIA colleagues: "Bottom Line: KSM knows more
about this plot than he's letting on."^^^^ By late June 2004, KSM had retracted muchof the
varied reporting he had provided on the Heathrow plotting, most importantly the information
KSM provided on tasking potential operatives to obtain flight training. KSM stated that
during March 2003—when he was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques—"he may have given false information," and that, in many cases, the information he
provided was "just speculation.The value of other CIA detainee reporting was also
questioned by CIA officers.In July 2003, a cable from the CIA's ALEC Station stated that
"HQS/ALEC remains concerned with what we believe to be paltry information coming from
detainees about operations in the U.K."^^^®
In addition, KSM withheld information Hnking Abu Taiha al-
Pakistani to the Heathrow plotting. According to CIA interrogation records, KSM discussed
Canary Wharf the first time he was shown his notebook, in which the words "Canary Wharf'
were written.KSM stated, however, that he had drawn the sketch for Ammar al-Baluchi. In
Among other documents, see DIRECTOR (172132Z OCT 02)
See CIA WASHINGTON_DCj|||^ H(122310Z MAR 03);
10828 (151310Z MAR 03); ^^Mll717 (201722Z MAY 03); |
See from: [REDACTED]; to; cc: subject:
KSM on Heatlirow"; date: May 20, 2003, at 03:44 PM.
22939 (031541ZJUL04)
22939 (031541ZJUL04)
In March 2003, after Ramzi bin al-Shibh had been rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, CIA officers wrote that they did ''no^dieve[Rarazi]^^ was "being completely
honest" about potential Heathrow operatives. {See ALEC ^m|H^|^mi||||||^|.) AJune 2003 CIA cable
states that "KSM, Ammar, and Kliallad remain loathe to reveal details of the Heathrow plot," and that the CIA
believedthe detainees were withholding information that could lead to the capture of AbuTalha al-P£ikistani, noting
specifically that the CIA detainees had "so far clung to such information" and "deflectedquestions." By tliis time
KSM, Ammaral-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attashhad all been rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. See ALEC j^H (I72242Z JUN 03) and Volume III for additional
information.
'^ ^0 A^C^Mj (161821Z JUL 03)
m||||^fl^87 (130716Z MAR 03). As described, the CIA represented that KSM "first repeatedly denied
there was any other target than the airport," and "[o]nlyafter the repeatedlawfuluse of EITsdid [KSM] stop lying
and admit that the sketch of a beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in fact an illustration that KSM the
engineer drew himself in order to show another AQ operative that the beams in the Wharf - like those in the World
Trade Center would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside" {See CIA memorandum to the CIA
Inspector General from James Pavitt,CIA's Deputy Directorfor Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the
subject line, "Comments to DraftIG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program'
(2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detentionand Interrogation Activities," dated
III! 111 III I
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June 2003, after being confronted with contradictory reporting from Ammar al-Baluchi, KSM
admitted that he had actually shown the sketch to "Talha," whom KSM had not previously
mentioned.^^^^
8. The Capture ofHambali
Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation
techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which
thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the capture of Hambali
as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques. Specifically,
the CIA consistently represented that, as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,
KSM provided the "first" information on a money transfer by Majid Khan that eventually led to
Hambali's capture. These CIA representations were inaccurate. Majid Khan, who was in
foreign government custody, provided this information prior to any reporting from KSM. CIA
records indicate that the intelligence that led to Hambali's capture in Thailand was based on
signals intelligence, a CIA source, and Thai investigative activities.
February 24, 2004). As described, KSM discussed the sketch tlie first time it was shown to him. See
10787 (130716ZMAR 03).
See ••|||||h4420 ALECipi (1923i4Z MAY 03); ••• 11717 (201222Z
MAYoIT^^^H 12141 (27223IZ JUN 03);•••1^98 (131816Z MAR03), disseminated as •
The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that Abu Talha was "the individual managing the [Heathrow]
plot." Contrary to CIA assertions, CIA records indicate tliatAbu Talha served as an assistant to Ammar al-Baluchi
and KSM and played no leadership or managerial role in the plotting. KSM reported that Abu Talha's "primary
skill [was] his ability to gather infonnation," and that Abu Talha would not have been able to take over the
Heathrow plotting after the arrest of Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, "stress[ing] that Talha was not well
trained or particularly well connected to al-Qa'ida," did not know all of the components of the Heatlirow plotting,
and had no links to the unwitting Saudi operatives KSM was considering using in the plotting. KSM stated that after
the arrest of Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, Abu Talha "would have known that the plot was
compromised and over." (See HIB 12141 (272231Z JUN 03); 20525 (141731Z FEB 04). For
additional infonnation on the two potential Saudi Arabia-based operatives, Ayyub and Azmari, who were
investigative targets of a foreign government prior to detainee reporting, unwitting of the Heathrow plotting, and
assessed by tlie CIA to have been killed or detained as a result of terrorist activity unrelated to the aforementioned
plotting, see Volume 11.). The CIA's June 2013 Responsefurther states that "CIA lacked reporting on Abu Talha
prior to March 2003 and first learned of his specific role in the plot from debriefing KSM." A review of CIA
records found that on March 6, 2003, prior to any reporting from KSM or any other CIA detainee, Majid Khan, in
foreign government custody, discussed Ammar al-Baluchi's Karachi-basedassistant, "Talha." Majid Klian provided
a phone number for Talha, and used that number at the request of his captors in an effort to locate and capture
Ammar al-Baluchi through Talha. (See H|||||HHl3678 (070724Z MAR 03); ||^H^HU3710 (081218Z MAR
03); ALEC (081830Z MAR 03)~1H^B 13695 (08061IZ MAR 03)r^^H| 11092
l^m.) Ammar al-Baluchi, when he was in foreign government custody, provided adescription of Talha, whom
he called "Suliman," and stated that he had dispatched Talha, aka Suliman, to the United Kingdom to identify
operatives "suitable forhijacking or suicide operations." Ammar al-Baluchialsoidentifi^^ email address used by
III I II III II I II 14478|^HIHH;••• 14420
14304••••^^•rALECi^|(142B4H^Y 03).) As KSM had
not yet mentioned Abu Talha, Ammar al-Baluchi's reporting prompted Deputy ChiefofALEC^ationJ
Ito note tha^lKSMrouldbeintroub^ (See email from: to:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: action detainee
branch - Re: ammar and KSM).) In the context of the U.K. Urban Targets Plot, the CIA's June 2013 Response
states: "Abu Talha's arrest - a case CIA frequently cited as a success of the detainee program - would not have
happened if not for reporting from CIA-held detainees." As described elsewhere in this summary, and in greater
detail in Volume II, CIA records do not support this statement.
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P'urther Details: Ridiian bin Isomuddin, aka Hambali, was a senior
memberof Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a Southeast Asia-based teiTorist group, and served as an
interface between theJI and al-Qa'ida. Hambali was linked to terrorist activity prior to the
September 11, 2001, attacks. Shortly after those attacks, Hambali was described as the CIA's
"number one target" in Southeast Asia.^^^^ When the October 12, 2002, terroristattacks
occurred on the Indonesian island of Bali, killing more than 200 individuals, Hambali was
immediately suspected of being the "mastermind" of the attacks and was further described as
"one of the world's most wanted ten-orists."'^^'^
The capture of Hambali is one of the eight most frequently cited
examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques. Overa period of years, CIAdocuments prepared for and provided to
seniorpolicymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the capture of
Hambali as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after
applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to dismpt teiTorist plots" and "capture
additional terrorists.The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "othei-wise unavailable" and "saved lives."^ '^-^^
director (241921Z MAR 02)
Among other news sources, see "Tlie Secret MastermindBehind the Bali Horror," The Observer, 19 October
2002.
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005.1696 Prom 2003 tlirough 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA'senlianced
interrogation techniques provided a specific set ofexamples of terrorist plots "dismpted" and terrorists captured that
theCIA attributed to information obtained from the useof itsenhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from theuseof theCIA's enhanced intenogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in"saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see:
(1) CIA representations in the Department ofJustice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from theuse of
theCIA'senhanced interrogation techniques toassess their legality. The CIA representations referenced bythe
OLC include that the useof the CIA'senhanced inteiTogation techniques was "necessary" toobtain "critical,"
"vital," and"otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect
anddisrupt" terrorist threats. TheOLC memorandum further states that "[theCIA] ha[sj informed [the OLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within theUnited
States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30,2005, Re:
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture toCertain Techniques
thatMay BeUsed in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIArepresentations in the
Departmentof Justice Office of LegalCounsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on thetype of intelligence acquired from theuseof theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's intenogation program
(which was based onCIA-provided information), theOLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program—
and, inparticular, its use ofenhanced interrogation techniques—is intended toserve this paramount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President
explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans wecould notget anywhere else,
the programhas saved innocent lives.'" {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo,ActingGeneral Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Applicationof the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of theGeneva Conventions toCertain Techniques that May BeUsed bythe CIA in the Interrogation ofHigh Value
I (II MUM




As an example, in a bnefing prepared for the president's chief of
staff, Josh Bolten, on May 2, 2006, the CIA represented that the "[u]se of the DOJ-authorized
enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has
enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of
critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida."^^^^ The briefing document represents that "[ajssessing the
effectiveness of individual interrogation techniques is difficult," but provides 11 specific
examples of "Key IntelligenceCollectedfrom HVD Interrogations," including:
"Hambali's Capture: During KSM's interrogation we acquired information
that led to the capture of Hambali in August 2003 and to the partial
dismantling of the Jemaah Islamiyah leadershipin SE Asia. KSMfirst told us
about Majid Khan's role in delivering $50,000 to Hambali operatives for an
attack KSM believed was imminent. We then confronted Khan with KSM's
admission and [signals intelligence] confirming the money transfer and Khan's
travel to Bangkok. Khan admitted he delivered the money to an operative
named 'Zubair,' whom we subsequently identified and captured. Zubair's
capture led to the identification and subsequentcapture of an operative named
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIAbriefings for members of the National Security Council inJuly andSeptember 2003
represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another hadproduced significant intelligence
information thathad, in the view of CIAprofessionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[tjermination of
tliis program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." {See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for theRecord from
Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIAInterrogation
Program, July 29,2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum fortheRecord, Subject: Member Briefing; and
September 26, 2003, Memorandum for theRecord from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4)The
CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draftSpecial Review of theCIAprogram, which asserts:
"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawfuluse of enhanced inteiTOgation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly savedcountless American lives inside the United States andabroad. The evidence pointsclearlyto
the fact that witliout the use of such techniques, we and our allieswould [have] suffered major terrorist attacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral;from: JamesPavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IGSpecial Review, "Counterten-orism Detention
andInterrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
Director LeonPanetta in February2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the
[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that"[m]ost, if not all,of
the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in thisprogram would not have beendiscovered or reported by other
means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta,entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-
18FEB.2009" and grapliic attacliment, "Key Intelligence andReporting Derived from Abu Zubaydahand Khalid
Shaykli Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDIProgram" agenda, CIAdocument "EITsand
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chait: Attachment(AZ and KSM),"
"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and"supporting references," to include "Background
on Key Captures andPlots Disrupted.") (6)CIAdocument faxed to theSenate Select Committee on Intelligence on
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Conmiittee databases at DTS #2009-1258,
which provides a list of "someof thekey captures anddisrupted plots" that theCIAhad attributed to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIAassesses that most, if not all, of the timelyintelligence
acquired from detainees in thisprogram would nothavebeen discovered or reported by anyothermeans." See
Volume II for additional CIA representationsasserting tliat the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the
CIA to obtainunique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that"savedlives."
SeeMay 2, 2006, Briefing for theChiefof Staffto the President: Briefing forChiefof Staffto the President Josh
Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs.
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Lilie who was providing forged passports to Hambali. Lilie identified the
house in Bangkok where Hambali was hiding."
Similarly, on July 13, 2004, the CIA disseminated an Intelligence
Assessment entitled, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida."'^^^ On
Apn^2^005, the paper, as well as other materials on CIA detainee reporting, was faxed from
I^HHcTC Legal, to the Office ofLegal Counsel at the Department ofJustice, to support
the OLC's legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniquesThe document
states:
"...information that KSM provided on Majid Khan in the spring of 2003
was the crucialfirst link in the chain that led us to the capture of
prominent JI leader and al-Qa'ida associate Hambali in August 2003,
and more than a dozen Southeast Asian operatives slated for attacks
against the US homeland. KSM told us about [Majid] Khan's role in
delivering $50,000 in December 2002 to operatives associated with
Hambali. ... [Majid] Khan—who had been detained in Pakistan in early
2003—was confronted with KSM's information about the money and
acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named
'Zubair.' .. .Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June
2003.™
On August 24, 2009, this document was declassified with redactions and publicly released with
the inaccurate information unredacted.^^®^
The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the
capture of Hambali in 18 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of
1698 added. See May 2, 2006,Briefingfor Chiefof Staff to the PresidentJosh Bolten:CIA Rendition,
Detention and Interrogation Programs. The CIA's June 2013 Response maintains that the chronology in tliis passage
and similar representations are correct. The CIA's June 2013 Response describes the following as "standard
language" and the CIA's "typical representation" of Hambali's capture: "KSM provided information about an al-
Qa'ida operative, Majid Khan, who he was aware had recently been captured. KSM—possibly believing the
detained operatives was 'talking' admitted to having tasked Majid with delivering a large sum of money to
individuals working for another senior al-Qa'ida associate. In an example of how information from one detainee
can be used in debriefing another detainee in a 'building block' process. Khan—confronted with KSM's information
about the money—acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named Zubair and provided Zubair's
physical description and contact number" (italics added). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that this
chronology is "accurate." As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, this June 2013 CIA
representation is inaccurate. Majid Khan—who was in foreign government custody—first provided information on
the money exchange and Zubair, prior to any reporting from KSM.
1699 "KhalidShaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," wasauthored by [REDACTED],
CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB.
CIA fax to the Department ofJustice, entitled, "Hi, Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. H," dated 22
April 2005. For background on the intelligence product, see DTS #2004-3375.
Italics added. CIA Directorate of Intelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida,"dated July 13^004, faxed to the Department of Justice, April 22, 2005, entitled, "lil, Materials on KSM and Abu
Zubaydah. H-" This report was widely disseminated inthe Intelligence Community and provided tothe Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15, 2004.
See www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/Khalid_Shayhk_Mohammad.pdf
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Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.^^®^ In these representations, the CIAconsistently
asserted that "after applying" the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided "the
crucialfirst link" that led to the capture of HambaliJ^^
(TS^IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII^I^^F) Areview ofCIA operational cables and other records found that
information obtained from KSM during and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques played no role in the capture of Hambali. A review of CIA records further found that
prior to reporting from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques,
the CIA had intelligence on: (1) Hambali's role in the Jemaah Islamiyah; (2) funding by al-
Qa'ida and KSM of Hambali's terrorist activities; (3) the operative to whom Majid Khan
delivered the money, Zubair, and Zubair's links to terrorism, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Hambali;
and (4) Majid Khan's $50,000 money transfer from al-Qa'ida to Zubair in December 2002. CIA
records indicate that the intelligence that led to Hambali's capture was based on signals
intelligence, a CIA source, and Thai investigative activities in Thailand.
Prior to his capture, Hambali was known to have played a
supporting role in the KSM and Ramzi Yousef "Bojinka Plot," an effort in early 1995 to place
explosives on 12 United States-flagged aircraft and destroy them mid-flight.By the end of
2001, Hambali was suspected of playing a supporting role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, as well as helping to enroll Zacai-ias Moussaoui in flight school.By early 2002, a
body of intelligence reporting unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
indicated that KSM was providing Hambali with funding to conduct terrorist operations in
Southeast Asia.'^ ®^ In March 2002, Hambali was described as the CIA's "number one target" in
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in
Volume II.
Among other documents, see CIA Directorate of Intelligence, "Klialid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source
on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13, 2004, faxe^o tlie Department of Justice, April 22, 2005, fax entitled, "H|,
Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. H-" This Intelligence Assessment was widely disseminated in the
Intelligence Community and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15, 2004. On March
31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was
publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. See also CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of
Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2,2005, from Legal Group, DCI
Countertenorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation Techniques" and Classified
Statement for the Record, Senate Select ComnTittee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563).
See intelligence clironology in Volume II for detailed infomiation.
See United States Court ofAppeals^AugustTe 2001, U.S. vRamzi Ahmed Yousef, and DIRECTOR
(^•1 JAN 02). also q2).
December 15, 2001, CIA Briefing Document, "DCI Highlights." See also ALEC (262150Z APR 02) and
email from; REDACTED; to: REDACTED, HHHHil' others;
subject: "Debriefing results of Omani al-Qa'ida cell leader yields further connections between possibly Khalid
Shaykli Muhammed and the East Asia al-Qa'ida network"; date: April 16, 2002, at 9:56:34 AM. See also 9/11
Commission Report.
See intelligence chronology in VolumellJi^udingALE^^^^B also email from:
[REDACTED]; to[REDACTED], HHHIHHI' others; subject:
"Debriefing results of Omani al-Qa'ida cell leader yields further connections between possibly Klialid Shaykli
Muhammed and the East Asia al-Qa'ida network"; date: April 16, 2002, at 9:56:34 AM.




Southeast Asia.^^^^ That same month, the FBI provided information to the CIA stating that
foreign government detainee reporting indicated that KSM reimbursed terrorism-related
expenditures made by Hambali for the June of 2002, the CIA had entered into
discussions with representatives of the government regarding their willingness to
accept custody of Hambali once he was captured.On September 25, 2002, the CIA reported
that an individual in FBI custody since May 2002, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, reported that in
November 2001, he collected $50,000 from KSM for a Hambali-directed terrorist operation
targeting U.S. interests, as well as at least one other $10,000 payment.On the same day,
September 25, 2002, a CIA cable stated that Masran bin Arshad, while in the custody of a
foreign government, had detailed his connections to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and KSM.^ '^^
According to bin Arshad, after KSM's "Second Wave" plotting was "abandoned" in late 2001,
bin Arshad was tasked by KSM to meet with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in Pakistan and to deliver
$50,000 to HambaH for terrorist operations. Bin Arshad stated he was unable to deliver the
money.When the October 12, 2002, terrorist attacks occurred on the Indonesian island of
Bali, killing more than 200 individuals, Hambali was immediately suspected of being the
"mastermind" of the attacks and was further described as "one of the world's most wanted
terrorists.Open source information in October 2002 identified the funding for the Bali
bombings as flowing through Hambali from al-Qa'ida leadership in Pakistan. Through
November 2002, news reports highlighted link;s between senior al-Qa'ida leadership—including
KSM—and JI in the context of the Bali bombings. Hambali continued to be identified as a
potential mastermind of the bombing and likely residing in Thailand. These same reports
identified a Malaysian named "Zubair" as one of three individuals sought by security officials for
the Hambali-linked Bali bombings.
In early January 2003, coverage of a known al-Qa'ida email
account uncovered communications between that account and the account of a former Baltimore,
Maryland, resident, Majid Khan. The communications indicated that Majid Khan traveled to








See also "Teiror Informant for FBI Allegedly Targeted Agents,"
Washington Post, dated January 19, 2008, and Department of Justice documents on Mohammed Mansour Jabarah,
including Jabarah's "Sentencing Memorandum."
See section of this summary and Volume II on the "Infonnation on the Facilitator That Led to tlie UBL
Operation"for additional information on AbuAhmadal-Kuwaiti. Masranbin Arshad was in the custody of the
government ofB|||||||||| at this time.
DIRECTOR^^B(251938Z SEP02); 1H65903 ^^HaUG 02); CIAAUG 02);
•• 65903 (••aUG02);65902(BHiAUG02)
Among other open sources, see "The Secret Mastermind Behind the BaU Horror," The Observer, 19 October
2002.
Among other open source reporting, see "The Sadness of Bali is the Sadness of the World," The Strait Times,
dated November 16, 2002; "Jemaah Islamiyah Still Capable of Major Terrorist Attacks," Philippine Headline News,
dated November 27, 2002; "Police Arrest 13 Linked to Bali Bombers, Uncovers Plot to Blow Up Bank," AFP, dated
November26, 2002; "Bali Friends Have ArabiaLink,"New York Post, dated December2, 2002; "Finger Is Pointed
At Bomber," AFP-Hong Kong, dated November 26, 2002; and "Mastermind of Bali Bomb Arrested," The Strait
Times, dated November 22, 2002.
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with a "Zubair."^^^^ By this time, the CIA had significant information—prior to KSM's
capture—indicating that a "Zubair" played a cen^alsupportin^ in the Jl, was affiliated with
al-Qa'ida figures like KSM, had expertise in Southeast Asia, and was
suspected of playing a role in Hambali's October 12, 2002, Bali bombingsJ^^^ This information
was derived from traditional intelligence collection, open source reporting, and FBI debriefings
of Abu Zubaydah (prior to Abu Zubaydah being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques).On March 4, 2003, the day before Majid Khan's capture, the FBI requested
additional information from the CIA on the "Zubair" referenced in Majid Khan's emails.
March 6, 2003, the day after Majid Khan was captured in
Pakistan, and while being questioned by foreign government interrogators using rapport-building
techniques,Majid Khan described how he traveled to Bangkok in December 2002 and
ALEC m (170117Z JAN 03). At this time open source reporting also placed Hambali inTliailand. See, for
example, "FBI Report Pointed to Bali Bombing," TheAge,dated January 23, 2003; "Thailand's Denial of Tliieat
Fails to Convince," AFP, dated November 15, 2002; "We'll Hit You: Pre-Bali Alert," Herald (Australia), dated
November 16, 2002; "JI Terror Group Still Major Tlueat Despite Arrests," Agence France Presse (AFP), dated
November 26, 2002; "Indonesia Arrests a Top Suspect in Southeast Asia Terror Netv^/ork," New York Times, dated
December 4, 2002; and "Inside the Bali Plot: A TIME Inquiry Unearths the Roots of the Bombings and Shows How
the Masterminds Remain at Large," Time Magazine, dated December 9, 2002.
The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA "had some other information linking Zubair to al-
Qa'ida's Southeast Asia network," but states "that it was KSM's information that caused us to focus on [Zubair] as
an inroad to Hambali." The CIA's June 2013 Response further asserts: "KSM provided infonnation on an al-
Qa'ida operative named Zubair, we shared this information with Thai authorities, they detained Zubair, and he gave
actionable intelligence information that helped us identify Hambali's location." Tliis statement in the CIA's June
2013 Response is inaccurate. On October25, 2013, the CIA acknowledged the inaccuracy. Confirming information
in the Committee Study, the CIA stated that an additional review of CIA records by the CIA found that "No, KSM
did not name Zubair in his debriefings."
In May 2002, prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah identified
"Zubair" as a Malaysian national who was associated with KSM and who could be used by KSM to conduct attacks
in Thailand. According to Abu Zubaydah, Zubair also "assisted Abu Zubaydah in obtainmgpassportsfrom a printer
facility in eitlier Thailand or Malaysia." {See DIRECTOR jjj^H (271937Z MAY 02)||||||[||||^ ^ In
June 2002, Abu Zubaydah told an FBI interrogator that he sent a Canadian who sought to "help defend Muslims" in
Indonesia to a Malaysian named Abu Zubair. {See 10475 (141605Z JUN 02).) In July 2002, a U.S.
military detainee stated that "Zubair" was a member of tlie Jemaah Islamiyah and was connected to Jemaali
Islamiyah senior leaders. {SeeHi 11691 (141712Z JUL 02). For otlier intelligence identifyin |^Zuteir" as one
of several individuals suspected ofbeii^connected to the October 2002 Bali bombh^, 5eeJH|B|^ ^^B95612
(290615Z OCT 02); DIRECTOR•• (202057Z OCT 02); and DIRECTOR ••• ) Open
source news reports highlighted links between senior al-Qa'ida leadership—includingKSM—and Jemaah Islamiyah
in the context of the Bali bombings. Hambali continued to be identified as a potential mastermind of the bombing—
and likely residing in Thailand. These same reports identified a Malaysian named "Zubair" as one of three
individuals sought by security officials for Hambali's Bali bombings. Among other open source reporting, see "The
Secret Mastermind Behind tlie Bali Horror," The Obseiyer, 19 October 2002; "The Sadness of Bali is the Sadness of
the World," The Strait Times, dated November 16, 2002; "Jemaah Islamiyah Still Capable of Major Tenorist
Attacks," Philippine Headline News, dated November 27,2002; "Police Arrest 13 Linked to Bali Bombers,
Uncovers Plot to Blow Up Bank," AFP, dated November 26, 2002; "Bali Friends Have Arabia Link," New York
Post, dated December 2, 2002; "Finger Is Pointed At Bomber," AFP-Hong Kong, dated November 26, 2002; "Inside
the Bali Plot: A TIME Inquiry Unearths the Roots of the Bombings and Shows How the Masterminds Remain at
Large," TimeMagazine, dated December 9, 2002; and "Mastermind of Bali Bomb Anested," The Strait Times,
dated November 22, 2002. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional detailed information.
'^ 20 SeJ//gM 89601 (042006Z MAR 03).
'721 |||^|^^|l3678 (070724Z MAR 03). According to CIA records, "a [foreign government officer] talked
quietly to [Majid Khan] alone for about ten minutes before the interview began and was able to establish an
TOP SECRE^VV^^^BMi|^^MB//NQFQRN




provided $50,000 USD to "Zubair" at the behest of al-Qa'ida. Khan also stated that he updated
KSM's nephew, Ammar al-Bahichi, via email about the money exchange. Majid Khan's
physical description ofZubair matched prcviousintell^^ reporting already collected on
Zubair.On March 10, 2003, the requested that information about
Majid Khan's travel to Thailand and his delivery of money to "Zubair" be shared with Thai
authorities, along with the physicaMescriptioi^^ and aphone number for Zubair
provided by Majid Khan. proposed that it inform the Thais that "[w]e
are very concerned that the mone^nentioi^d may be funding terrorist activities, as well as the
individuals in question," and thatH^|B request the Thai government "provide any details
regarding these individuals and phone numbers."^^^^
Ori March 11, 2003, after being confronted with information that
confirmed KSM's financial support to Hambali, KSM admitted to providing Hambali with
$50,000 to conduct a terroristattack "in approximately November2002." KSM made no
reference to Majid Khan or Zubair.On March 17, 2003, after being confronted with Majid
Khan's reporting and a photograph of Majid Khan, KSM confirmed that Majid Khan—whom he
stated he knew only as "Yusif—was involved in the money transfer to Hambali.KSM
denied knowing Zubair—who would be the critical link to Hambali's capture—or any other
Hambali representative in Thailand.
(TS/^^^^^^^^^fc^^^^Ma^003^h^I^jad learned that asource the CIA had been
developing received a from a phone number
associated with Zubair. When the source was contacted by the CIA, he described a Malaysian
excellent level of rapport. The first hour and [a] half of the interview was a review of bio-data and information
previously [reported]. When [foreign government interrogators] started putting pressure on [Majid Klian] by pulling
apart liis story about his 'honeymoon' in Bangkok and his attempt to rent an apartment, safehouse, for his cousin
[Mansoor Maqsood, aka Iqbal, aka Talha, aka Moeen, aka HabibJ, at 1400, [Majid Khan] slumped in his chair and
said he would reveal everything to officers...."1722 13678 (070^4^MA^03)^Re^rds indicate that this information was also disseminated in FBI
channels. See ALEC For previous intelligence on Zubair's physical description, see
1DIRECTOR•••••••IHBIIIH. See
intelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed information.
181553 (lOlOlOZ MAR 03). The request was approved by CIA Headquarters on March 12, 2003(DIRECTOR^^H (March 12, 2003)).
|10755 (111455Z MAR 03). See also DIRECTOR (112152Z MAR 03). ALEC Station had
sent interrogators at the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLUE at least two "requirements" cables with information to use
in the interrogation of KSM specially about Hambali and KSM's money transfers to Hambali, See ALEC ^H||
(072345Z MAR 03); ALEC (090015Z MAR 03). KSM was rendered toCIA custody on March |, 2003,
and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques through March 25, 2003.
KSM was told the CIA had "stacks and stacks of emails," and that CIA officers were going to do a "test of his
honesty" by asking him a series ofquestions. 5&£|m^|l0865 (171648Z MAR 03).
The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "KSM provided information on an al-Qa'ida operative named Zubair, we
shared this infomiation with Thai authorities, theydetained Zubair, and he gave actionable intelligence information
that helped us identify Hambali's location." This statement in the CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. In a
document submitted to the Committeeon October25, 2013, the CIA acknowledged the inaccuracy. Confirming
information in the Committee Study, the CIA stated that an additional review of CIA records by the CIA found that,
"No, KSM did not name Zubair inhisdebriefings/^S^DTS #2013-3152.
•'27 84783 •••••y||[|HH8483^














184908 It unclear what specific actions the CIA or local authorities engaged in
as aresult oftlie information Zubair provided on |m|||||[ [Business Q] while in foreign government custody.
CIA records indicate that Thai authorities were engaged in their own unilateral efforts to track and identify leads
related to Hambali and Zubair. A June 28, 2003, CIA cable states tliat local authorities were investigating Zubair's
links tovarious [businesses^Late^n July 2003, th^I^earne^haTnia^uthoritie^Ta^^^
approachedaJ|c^ worked at ||H||||^^| [Business Q].
CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that prior to being transferred to CIA
custody, "[d]uring [foreign goveniment]debriefi^ Zubair reported on the |
and corroborated reporting on [Business Q] This information
when combined with reporting from other sources to form a complete picture of Hambali's status was critical in
helping identify Hambali's general location and led to his airest on 11 August by Thai [authorities]." A review of
CIA records found tliat the reporting referenced was obtained prior to Zubair's rendition to CIA custody.
84876
suspected this individual was the "Zubair" associated with Hambali and Majid KhanJ^^^ |
later, the source alerted the CIA that the person suspected of being Zubair would be
When Zubair amved at
photographed and followed by Thai authorities.A detainee in foreign government custody
confirmed the individual in tiie surveillance photo was Zubair.'^ ^® On June 8, 2003, Zubairwas
detained by the government of Thailand.While still in Thai custody, Zubair was questioned
about his efforts to obtain fraudulent mi documents, as well as his phone contact with
[Business Zubair admitted to seeking
documents on behalf of Hambali, as well as using [Business Q]
Signals intelligence had alerted the CIA that a phone number associated with
Zubair had been in frequent contact with [Business After being transferred
to CIA custody and rendered to the CIA's COBALT detention site, Zubair was immediately
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.Days later, Zubair was asked
about his efforts to obtain illegal documents for Hambali, at which point he again
acknowledged using ^^^m||||^^|||||||||^^m [Business Q]
1736 authorities unilaterally approached a "contact" [Business
. See also 84783
84837
. The detainee was in the custody of the government of
84837
84876 87617





In response to this
information, ||^^^^^^^^Hwrote, "Wow..this is just great... you guys are soooo closing in on Hmabali [sic].'
(See email fromTH^^m^^l; to: and others; subject; "wohoo—hilite for EA team
pis....aliases for Hambali"; date: June 2003, at 9:51:30 AM.) As noted, CIA records indicate tliat Thai
authorities were unilaterally following investigative leads related to Hambali and Zubair. It is unknown what
specific investigative steps were taken by Thai authorities (or by the CIA) between early June 2003 and July 16,
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Q], they obtained
An operatioiHargeth^ developed that focused
on surveillance of^^^HBpH [Business Q], As aresult of this surveillance, and the
cooperation of I^^^IH^ambali associate Amer was arrested on August 11, 2003.^^^^
Amer was immediately cooperative and assisted in an operation that led to the arrest of Lillie,
aka Bashir bin Lap, that same day.^^^^ Lillie was found tohave a key fob in his possession
imprinted with an address of an apartment building in Ayutthaya, Thailand. In response to
questioning, "within minutes of capture," Lillie admitted that the address on the key fob was the
address where Hambali was located. Fewer than four hours later, an operation successfully led
to Hambali's capture at the address found on the key fob.'^ "^^
on November 28, 2005, the chief of the CTC's Southeast Asia





'Frankly, we stumbled onto Hambali. We stumbled onto the [the source]
)ieking up the phone and calling his case officer to say there's
[related to Zubair]. ...we really saimbled over it. It wasn't police
work, it wasn't good targeting, it was we stumbled over it and it yielded up
Hambali. What I tell my people is you work really, really hard to be in a
position to get lucky."
2003, to investigate [Busines^^On July 16, 2003, the CIA learned that Thai
audiorities had been independently in contact with [Business Q]. After being transferred to CIA
custody and rendered to the CIA's COBALT detention site, Zubair was immediately subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. Days later, on June 25, 2003, Zubair was asked again about his efforts to obtain
aocument^o^lambali^^hicl^^ again acknowledged using [Business
As noted, Zubair had previously identified|
[Bus^ss Q] while in foreign government custody
HH. Tlie CIA has never claimed to policymakers that information obtained from Zubair after the use ofthe
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to Hambali'scapture. Nor are there any internalCIA records crediting
the use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques against Zubair as leading to Hambali's capture. As noted,
the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "During [foreign governmentldebriefings^Z^ reported on the |
Iand corroborated reporting on m||^m|||||||||m [Business Q]
This information when combined with reporting from other sources to form a complete picture of
Hambali's status was critical inhelpingidentify Hambali's general location and led to his anest on 11 August by







and II^^IIIH^^^H^Ham^li Capture." Lillie was later rendered to CIA custody.
Lillie had not yet been renderedto CIA custody. CIA Oral HistoryProgramDocumenting Hambalicapture,
interview of[REDACTED], interviewed b^REDACTED]^i^ovember28^005.
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Hambali was rendered to CIA custody on August 2003, and
almost immediately subjected to theCIA's enhanced interrogation techmques.^^"^^ OnSeptember
4, 2006, he was transferred to U.S. military custody.
G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations—Less Frequently Cited Disi-upted Plots,
Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided As Evidence for the Effectiveness
of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
In addition to the eight most frequently cited "thwarted" plots and
ten'orists captured, the Committee examined 12 other less frequently cited intelligence successes
that the CIA has attributed to the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques.
These representations are listed below:
Additional Intelligence the CIA Has Attributed to the Effectiveness ofthe CIA's
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
1
The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind
of the September 11, 2001, Attacks
2 The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias
3 The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh
4 The Capture of KSM
5 The Capture of Majid Khan
6 The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting
7
The Assertion That Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate
Sources
8 The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha
9 Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar
10 The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri
11 The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan
12 Information on the Facilitator That Led to the UBL Operation
(050744Z SEP 06); 2215 (051248Z SEP 06)
The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "our review showed that the Study failed to include examples of
important information acquired from detainees that CIA cited more frequently and prominently in its representations
than several of the cases the autliors chose to include." This is inaccurate. The CIA's June 2013 Response provided
three examples: the "Gulf shipping plot" (which is addressed in tlie full Committee Study and in this summary in the
context of the interrogation of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri), "learning important infomiation about al-Qa'ida's anthrax
plotting and the role of Yazid Sufaat" (which is addressed in the full Committee Study and in this summary in the
context of the interrogation of KSM), and "the detention of Abu Talha al-Pakistani" (wliich is addressed in the full
Committee Study and in this summary in the section on the "Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot
and the Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi.").




1. The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastennind of the
September 11, 2001, Attacks
The CIA represented that CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided
"important" and "vital" information by identifying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) as the
mastermind behind the attacks of September 11, 200CIA Director Hayden told the
Committee on April 12, 2007, that:
. .it was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the
mastermind of 9/11. Until that time, KSM did not even appear in our chart of
key al-Qa'ida members and associates."^^"^^
at least two prominent occasions, the CIA represented,
inaccurately, that Abu Zubaydah provided this information after the use of the CIA's enhanced
inten-ogation techniques. On May 30, 2005, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote in a now-
declassified memorandum:
"Inten'ogations of [Abu] Zubaydah—again, once enhanced interrogation
techniques were employed—furnished detailed information regarding al
Qaeda's 'organization structure, key operatives, and modus operandi' and
identified KSM as the mastermind of the September 11 attacks."
For example, in the September 6, 2006, speech validated by the CIA, President George W. Bush stated that:
"[Abu] Zubaydah disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and
used the alias Mukhtar. This was a vital pieceof the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM."
See also CIA document dated July 16, 2006,entitled, "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value
Terrorist InterrogationsProgram,"and "CIA Validation of Remarkson DetaineePolicy" drafts supportingthe
September 6, 2006, speech by President George W. Bush. See also unclassified Office of the Director of National
Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program," as well as CIA classified
Statementfor the Record,SenateSelectCommittee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1.563).
CIA classified Statement for the Record,Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael
V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12,2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detentionand
Interrogation Program." {See DTS #200|M56^n^D^#2007-3158.) This testimony contradicted statements
made in 2002 to theJoint Inquiry by in which she indicated that an operative arrested in
February 2002 in Bl, prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah^ovide '^proof... that KSM was asenior al-Qa'ida
terrorist planner." {See interview by the Joint Inquiry of [REDACTED],|, [REDACTED]; subject: Khahd Shaykh Mohammad (KSM); date: 12 August 2002 (DTS #2002-
4630).)
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury,Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re; Application of
UnitedStates Obligations UnderArticle 16 of theConvention AgainstTorture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.
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The OLC memorandum cited a document provided by the CIA to
support the statement.The OLC memorandum further stated that the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provide the U.S. goverrunent with "otherwise unavailable actionable
intelligence," that "ordinary inten-ogation techniques had little effect on...Zubaydah," and that
the CIA had "reviewed and confirmed the accuracy of [the OLC's] description of the
interrogation program, including its purposes, methods, limitations, and results."^^"^^
November 2007, the CIA prepared a set of documents and
talking points for the CIA director to use in a briefing with the president on the effectiveness of
the CIA's waterboard inten'ogation technique. The documents prepared assert that Abu
Zubaydah identified KSM as the "mastermind" of the September II, 2001, attacks after the use
of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques.
While Abu Zubaydah did provide information on KSM's role in
the September 11, 2001, attacks, this information was corroborative of information akeady in
CIA databases and was obtained prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques.
There is no evidence to support the statement that Abu Zubaydah's information—obtained by
FBI interrogators prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and while Abu
Zubaydah was hospitalized—was uniquely important in the identification of KSM as the
"mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks.
(U) The following describes information available to the CIA prior to the capture of Abu
Zubaydah:
• (U) Both the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities
Before and After the Ten'orist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and the CIA Office of the
Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks
include lengthy chronologies of the Intelligence Community's interest in KSM prior to
the attacks of September 11, 2001. The timelines begin in 1995, when the United States
determined that KSM was linked to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center,
leading to the determination by the National Security Council's Policy Coordination
See CIA Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, faxed to the OLC in April 2005. The "Briefing
Notes" state: "Within months of his anest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa'ida's organization structure,
key operatives, and modus operandi. It also was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the
mastermind of 9/11." As described in detail in Volume II, tliis CIA document did not specifically reference the
CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques; however, it was provided to the OLC to support the OLC's legal analysis
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The document included most of the same examples the CIA had
previously provided as examples of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. There are no
records to indicate that tlie CIA, in reviewing draft versions of the OLC memorandum, sought to correct the
inaccurate OLC statements.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees.
1750 "dciA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," and supporting materials, dated November 6, 2007,
with the notation tlie document was "sent toDCIANov^^t^reparationfor^ meeting."




Group that KSM was a top priority tai'get for the United States.The Congressional
Joint Inquiry further noted that information obtained prior to the September 11, 2001,
attacks "led the CIA to see KSMas part of Bin Ladin's organization."^ '^'^ There was also
CIA reporting in 1998 that KSM was "very close" to On June 12, 2001, it was
reported that "Khaled" was actively recruiting people to travel outside Afghanistan,
including to the United States wherecolleagues were reportedly already in the country to
meet them, to carry out terrorist-related activities for UBL. According to the 9/11
Commission Report, the CIA presumed this "Khaled" was KSMJ^^"^
On September 12, 2001, a foreign government source,
described as a member of al-Qa'ida, stated "the 11 September attacks had been
masterminded from Kabul by three people," to include "Shaykh Khalid," who was related
to Ramzi Yousef.^^^^
Also on September 12, 2001, a CIA officer familiar with
KSM wrote a cable stating that "[o]ne of the individuals who has the capability to
organize the kind of strikes we saw in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is Khahd
Shaykh Mohammad."
On September 15, 2001, a CIA officer wrote to a number of
senior CTC officers, "I would say the percentages are pretty high that Khalid Sheikh
Mohammad is involved [in the September 11, 2001, attacks].
On October 16, 2001, an email from a CTC officer who had
been tracking KSM since 1997, stated that although more proof was needed, "I believe
KSM may have been the mastermind behind the 9-11 attacks.
Joint Inquiry Into the Intelhgence Community Activities Beforeand After the TerroristAttacks of September
11, 2001, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelhgence and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, December2002, pp. 325- 331 (DTS #2002-5162); CIA Officeof the InspectorGeneral Reporton CIA
Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, June 2005, pp. xi, 100-126 (DTS #2005-3477).
Joint Inquii-y Into the Intelligence Community ActivitiesBefore and After the TerroristAttacksof September
11, 2001, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Decenibe^002^^^ (DTS #2002-5162).
DIRECTOR (III^II^EP 98), disseminated as Office of the Inspector General
Report on CIA Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Reportof the
Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence CommunityActivitiesBefore and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,2001
(DTS #2005-3477), pp. 105-107.
The 9/11 Commission Report; Final Reportof the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States^^T^
WttM 64626 (131842Z SEP 01); 64627 (131843Z SEP 01)
CIA Office of the Inspector GeneralReport on CIA AccountabilityWith Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, June 2005,
p. 113 (DTS #200^4^^^^^^
from:^^^^H^|PI||||^^|; to: cc:[REDACTED], |m|||Hf[REDACTED]; subject: Re: RAMZI LEADS...; date: September 15, 2001, at
5:04:38 AM.
CIA CTC internal email from: [REDACTED]; to multiple [REDACTED]; date: October 16, 2001, at 09:34:48
AM.
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//NF) A foreign government informed the CIA that in late
source,
provided information on the attacks of September, 11, 2001, and
stated, "Khaiid Shayk Muhammad, the maternal uncle of Ramzi [YousefJ... was the
person who supervised the 'final touches' of the operation."
• Other reporting piior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah stated
thatKSM was: "oneof the individuals considered the potential mastermind";^^^® "one of
the top candidates for having been involved in the planning for the 11 September attacks"
and one of "the masterminds"and "one of the leading candidates to have been a
hands-on planner in the9/11 attacks."^^^^
2. The Identification ofKSM's "Mukhtar" Alias
The CIA represented that CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided
"important" and "vital" information by identifying Khaiid Shaykh Mohammed's (KSM) alias,
"Mukhtar."^^^^ In at least one instance in November 2007, in a set of documents and talking
points for the CIA director to use in a briefing with the president on the effectiveness of the
CIA's waterboard interrogation technique, the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM
as "Mukhtar" after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
While Abu Zubaydah did provide information on KSM's alias, this
information was provided by Abu Zubaydah to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—and while Abu Zubaydah was still in the intensive
care unit of a hospital recovering from a gunshot wound incurred during his capture.
Further, the information was coiToborative of information already in CIA databases.Prior to
the information provided by Abu Zubaydah, the CIA had intelligence, including a cable from
August 28, 2001, indicating that KSM was now being called "Mukhtar.
1759
1760 director HBI added "KSM is an ally of Usama bin Ladin andhas been
reported at facilities clearly associated with UBL."
DIRIIIH NOV 01). The cable referenced reporting that KSM, along with one other individual,
*'were the masterminds of the 11 September attacks."
DIR 02)
1763 pqj.example, in the September 6, 2006, speech validatedby tlie CIA that publicly acknowledged the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program, President George W. Bush stated that: "[Abu] Zubaydali disclosed Khaiid
Sheikli Mohammed, or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Muklitar. This was a
vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM."
1764 Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," and supporting materials, dated November 6, 2007
with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."
See Volume II, the Abu Zubaydali detainee review in Volume III, and Federal Bureau of Investigation
documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidali" provided to the Senate
SelectCommitt^ Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20,2010 (DTS #2010-2939).
1766 93972 (281153Z AUG 01). See also the 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, p. 277. The cable was directed to the CIA's UBL Station,
where it was viewed by the chief of Station and chief of targeting, and to the analytic unit responsible for UBL,
where two analysts saw it. {SeeOffice of the Inspector General Report on CIA Central Intelligence Agency
Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Report of the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community
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3. The Capture ofRamzi bin al-Shibh
The CIA has represented that information acquired from CIA
detainee Abu Zubaydah, as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, led to the
capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. This CIA representation was included in President Bush's
September 6, 2006, speech on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The speech,
which was based on CIA information and vettedby the CIA, stated that the intelligenceprovided
by CIA detainees "cannot be found any other place," and that the nation's "security depends on
getting this kind of inforraation."^^^^ The speech included the following:
"Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures [the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques], and soon he began to provide information on key al-
Qa'ida operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more
of those responsible for the attacks on September the 1 example,
Zubaydah identified one of KSM's accomplices in the 9/11 attacks, a terrorist
named Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The infonnation Zubaydah provided helped lead
to the capture of bin al-Shibh. And togetlier these two terrorists provided
information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that
captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
While the speech provided no additional detail on the capture of
bin al-Shibh, an internal email among senior CIA personnel provided additional background for
Activities Before and After the TerroristAttacksof September 11, 2001 (DTS #2005-3477), p. 112.) The CIA's
June 2013 Responsestates that "[w]e continue to assess that Abu Zubaydah's information was a critical piece of
intelligence." The CIA's June 2013 Responseacknowledges the August 28, 2001, cable identifying KSM as
"Mukhtar," but states tliat CIA officers "overlooked" and "simply missed" tlie cable.
See President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism and the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,
September 6, 2006; and CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, September 6, 2006, Draft #3
(validating speech received on August 29, 2006); email from: [REDACTED]; to:
§••1; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],^
[REDACTED]; subject: "Speechwriter's Questions on Monday"; date: September 5, 2006, at 10:30:32 AM.
Italics added. As described in this summary and in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume 111, this
statement was inaccurate. Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and
relationships, in addition to informationon its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making
processes, training, and tactics prior to, during, and after the utilization of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide informationon the next attack in the United States and operatives
in the United States was the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative" and the CIA's
determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to become
"compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding—the names of operatives in the
United States or information to stop the next terrorist attack. At no point during or after the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type of information.
Italics added. See President George W. Bush,Speech on Terrorism and the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program, September 6, 2006; and CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, September 6, 2006,
Draft #3 (validating speech received on August 29, 2006); email from: [REDACTED]; to:
cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTEDUREDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: "Speechwriter's Questions on Monday"; date: September 5, 2006, at
10:30:32 AM.
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why the CIA included "the capture of Ramzi bin ai-Shibh" in the president's speech as an
example of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. After the speech,
the chief of the Department in CTC, |^H^HH^|^|^ent an email to the chief of
CTC, |H|jj^|CTC LegalT^^^^^^^^I, and two
CIA Office of Public Affairs, among others. The email addressed press speculation that the
intelligence successes attributed to CIA detainees and the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques in the president's speech were not accurate. Defending the accuracy of the speech,
the chief of the Department in CTC wrote: "The NY Times has posted a story
predictably poking holes in the President's speech." Regarding the CIA assertion that Abu
Zubaydah provided information after the use of the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques that
led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the chief explained:
"...we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured;
however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that -when added
into other information—helped us track him. Again, on this point, we were
very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh."^^^^
In addition, on February 17, 2007, the deputy chief of the
Department in CTC, testified to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence that Abu Zubaydah "led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who in kind of [sic] started the
chain of events" that led to the capture of KSIVI.^^ '^
See from: to; Mark Mansfield,
Gimigliano, and others; subject: "Questions about Abu Zubaydah's Identification of KSM as 'Muklitar'"; date:
September 7, 2006. A September 7, 2006, ailicle (published September 8, 2006) in the New York Times, by Mark
Mazzetti, entitled, "Questions Raised About Bush's Primary Claims of Secret Detention System" inckided
comments by CIA officials defending the assertions in the President's speech: "Mr. Bush described the
interrogation techniques used on the C.I.A. prisoners as having been 'safe, lawful and effective,' and he asserted that
torture had not been used. .. .Mr. Bush also said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identified Mr. bin al-
Shibh as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh's role in the
attacks months before Mr. Zubaydah's capture. A December 2001 federal grand jury indictment of Zacarias
Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker, said that Mr. Moussaoui had received money from Mr. bin al-Shibh and that
Mr. bin al-Shibh had shared an apartment with Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the plot. A C.I.A. spokesman said
Thursday [September 7, 2006] that the agency had vetted the president's speech and stood by its accuracy. ...[CIA]
spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, said in a statement... 'Abu Zubaydah not only identified Ramzi Bin al-Shibh as a 9/11
accomplice — something that had been done before — he provided information that helped lead to his capture."
For additional news accounts on this subject, see former CIA Director Michael Hayden's interview with tlie New
York Times in 2009, in which former Director Hayden "disputed an article in the New York Times on Saturday
[4/18/2009] tliat said Abu Zubaydali had revealed nothing new after being waterboarded, saying that he believed that
after unspecified 'techniques' were used, Abu Zubaydah revealed information that led to the capture of another
terrorist, Ramzi Binalshibh." See "Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects," New York Times, dated April 20,
2009.
CIA Testimony of||Hm||H, Transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007
(DTS #2007-1337). See also Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for
Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with tiie subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's
Countertenorism Detention and Intenogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. Pavitt states: "Abu Zubaydah -
a master al-Qa'ida facilitator - was similarly arrogant and uncooperative before the lawful use of EITs. .. .His
information is singularly unique and valuable from an intelligence point of view, but it also has produced concrete
results tliat have helped saved lives. His knowledge of al-Qa'ida lower-level facihtators, modus operandi and




^ review of CIA records found no connection between Abu
Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin al-Shibh's capture. CIA records
indicate that Ramzi bii^^hibl^a^aptured unexpectedly—on September 11, 2002, when
Pakistani authorities, were conducting raids targeting Hassan Ghul in
Pakistan.
While CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah provided
information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, there is no indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah
provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts. Further, while Abu Zubaydah provided
information on bin al-Shibh while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, he provided similar information to FBI special agents prior to the initiation of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.Prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, during interrogation sessions on May 19, 2003, and May 20, 2003, Abu
Zubaydah reviewed photographs of individuals known by his interrogators to be associated with
safehouses, which he shaied with us as a result of the use ofEITs, for example, played a key role in the ultimate
capture of Ramzi Binal-Shibh" (italics added).
'^ ^^mon^theo^cords, seeCXkW^^^ (H|H SEP 02) CIA (jjBHI ^2)
ALEC •if(111551Z SEP 02).
See additional information below, as well as the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and Federal
Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah"
provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS# 2010-2939).
The CIA's June 2013 Response includes the following: "...the Study states that Abu Zubaydah 'provided similar
information to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques.' This is
incorrect. Abu Zubaydah's unique information conceiTiing his contact with Hassan Gul was collected on 20 August
2002, after he had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques." This assertion in the CIA's June 2013
Response contains several enors: First, as described, the statement in the December 13, 2012, Committee Study
pertains to Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, not Hassan Ghul. As detailed in this summary and in
other areas of tlie full Committee Study, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh after the
use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information on bin al-Shibh to FBI
interrogators prior to the use and approval of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Second, as detailed in
the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah provided considerable infomiation on Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. (Some of this reporting has been declassified; for example, see the 9/11
Commission Report, specifically the Staff Report, "9/11 and Terrorist Travel," which highlights reporting by Abu
Zubaydah on Hassan Ghul that was disseminated by the CIA on June 20, 2002.) Third, in referencing information
that Abu Zubaydah provided on Hassan Ghul on August 20, 2002, the CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that this
was "unique information." The CIA's June 201^Respons^tates^|AbuZubaydal^tated^ ifhe personally
needed to reach Hassan Gul, he would contact well-known
associate ofHassan Ghulj^Weprovidedtim to Pakistani authorities, who then interviewed [the well-
known associate] and [a specific family member of the well-known associate]—which
ultimately led them to an apartment linked to Gul." The CIA's June 2013 Responseadds that the "unique
information concerning his contact with HassanGul was collected on 20 August 2002, after [Abu Zubaydah] had
been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques." CIA records indicate, however, tliat the information
describedin the CIA's Response was not unique. Pakistani authorities had raided the home and interviewed B
[the same well-known associate] more than a month earlier on July 2002, based on similar reporting
from a cooperating detainee in foreign government custody. The CIA had specific and detailed knowledgeof this
raid and the resultin^nter^w of t^he well-known associate]. Pakistani authorities remained in
contac^v^ [the well-known associate], theprimary person interviewed, who was cooperative and
sent mil to help Pakistani authorities identify apossible al-Qa'ida safe house—which the CIA noted was
"extremely close to (if not an exact match)" for a safe house the FBI connected KSM to weeks earlier on June 18,
2002.
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the bombing of the USS Cole, as well as the September 11, 2001, attacks. Abu Zubaydah
identified a picture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh as "al-Shiba" and "noted that he is always with"
Another record of this interrogation stated that showing Abu Zubaydah the photos:
"was done to gauge his willingness to cooperate and provide details about
people, the last times he saw them, where they were going, etc. He appeared to
be very cooperative, provided details on people that we expected him to know,
the collective groups when they departed Afghanistan, where he thinks they
may now be, etc."^^^^
Shortly thereafter, on June 2, 2002, an FBI special agent showed
Abu Zubaydah theFBI"PENTTBOM photobook"^^^^ which contained photographs numbered 1-
35. A cable states that Abu Zubaydah was volunteering information and was "forthcoming and
respond[ing] directly to questioning." Abu Zubaydah, who was not asked any "prepai'atory
questions regarding these photographs," identified photograph #31, known to the interrogators as
Ramzi bin al-Shibh, as a man he knew as al-Shiba, and stated al-Shiba was with KSM in
Qandahar circa December 2001. Abu Zubaydah stated that al-Shiba spoke Arabic like a Yemeni
and noted that al-Shiba was in the media after the September 11, 2001, attacks.
In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators recommended
that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members
traveled |m| "as a means ofkeeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed
time off for a break and to attendto^rsonal matters as well as to discuss "the
endgame" of Abu Zubaydah with officers from CIA Headquarters.As a result, on
June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation.Abu Zubaydah spent the remainder of
June 2002 and all ofJuly 2002, 47 days in total, in solitary detentior^ithou^e^^
questions. During this period, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators
FBIspecial agents never returned to the detention site.^^^^
When CIA officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, on August 4,
2002, they immediately used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah,
including the waterboard.^^ '^ On August 21, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still being
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, a CIA cable noted that Abu Zubaydah
DIRECTOR•• (271905Z MAY 02)|
Volume III for additional details.
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).
Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidali" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).
>^^^^^^•10428 (071058Z JUN 02)
10424 (070814Z JUN 02)
10487 (181656Z JUN 02)
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.
••• 10644 (20I235Z AUG 02) and email from; [REDACTED]; to: and
[REDACTED]; subject: "Re: So itbegins."^ate^ugus^^002^^9^45j0^AM.
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was shown several photographs and "immediately recognized the photograph of Ramzi bin al-
Shibh. Abu Zubaydah described bin al-Shibh as having "very dark, almost African looking"
sJdn and noted that he first met bin al-Shibh after the 9/11 attacks in Kandahar, but added that he
"did not have in-depth conversations with him."^^^^ A cablestated that, after being shown the
photograph of bin al-Shibh, Abu Zubaydah told interrogators that he was told bin al-Shibh stayed
at the same safe house that KSM "had established for the pilots and others destined to be
involved in the 9/11 attacks.An accompanying intelligence cable stated that Abu Zubaydah
informed interrogators that he did not know—and did not ask—whether bin al-Shibh had been
involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001, but did state that he believed that bin al-Shibh
was "one of the operatives working for Mukhtar aka Khaiid Shaykh Mohammad."
The information Abu Zubaydah provided while being subjected to
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was described by CIA interrogators as "significant
new details.However, the information provided by Abu Zubaydah was similar to
information Abu Zubaydah provided prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, or was otherwise already known to the CIA. CIA records indicate that as early as
September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was identified as an associate of the September 11,
2001, hijackers who attempted to obtain flight training in Florida.A July 27, 2002, cable
from the CIA's ALEC Station provided "background information" on bin al-Shibh and stated
that he was "suspected of being the original '20th hijacker,' whose participation in the 11
September attacks was thwarted by his inability to obtain a visa to enter the United States."
Ramzi bin al-Shibh was also identified as "a member of the Hamburg cell that included hijacker
Mohammed Atta,"^^^^ and bin al-Shibh was featured in one of "five suicide testimonial videos
found in December 2001 at the residence of former UBL [Usama bin Ladin] lieutenant
Mohammad Atef in Afghanistan."^^^^
None of the above information resulted in Ramzi bin al-Shibh's
capture. As detailed below, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured unexpectedly during raids in
Pakistan on September 11, 2002, targeting Hassan Ghul.'^ ^^
Prior to Abu Zubaydah's capture, the CIA considered Hassan Ghul
a "First Priority Raid Target," based on reporting that:
10654 (211318Z AUG 02);I
10654 (211318Z AUG 02);
10654 (211318Z AUG 02); |
"85 director•• (261338Z AUG 02)|^^^ll£654 (211318Z AUG 02); T
AI^C^M| (222334Z SEP 01);
ALEC (270132Z JUL 02)
alec1^1(270132Z JUL 02). See also 97470 (281317Z MAR 02) ("In November 1998,
[Muhammad] Atta, [Ramzi]Binalshibh, and [Said] Bahajimoved into the 54 Marienstrasse apartment in Hamburg
that became the hub of the Hamburg cell.").
ALEC (270132Z JUL 02). See also 62533 (information from a foreign
government concerning the al-Qa'ida suicide operatives portrayed on videotapes found in Afghanistan).
ALEC •• (292345Z AUG 02); ALEcl^M (111551Z SEP 02)
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"Ghul has been a major support player within the al-Qa'ida network and has
assisted al-Qa'ida and Mujahadin operatives by facilitating their travel. He is a
senior aide to Abu Zubaydah who was heavily involved in fund raising for a
terrorist operation in spring 2001."^^^^
Additional reporting noted that Hassan GhuFs phone number had
been linked to a terrorist operative who "was ready to conduct a 'surgical operation' at any
time,"^^^^ while other reporting indicated that Hassan Ghul was working on a "program"
believed to be related to terrorist activity.
According to CIA cables, once captured, and prior to the initiation
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah confirmed that Hassan Ghul was
a high-level al-Qa'ida facilitator who had contact with senior al-Qa'ida members, including
Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.^^^^ Abu Zubaydah also corroborated intelligence in
CIA databases that Ghul was involved in al-Qa'ida fundraising efforts.During this same
period, the CIA continued to receive additional intelligence on Ghul from foreign governments,
including that Ghul was responsible for facilitating the movement of Saudi fighters through
Pakistan.^^^^ As noted, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation and was not
asked any questions for 47 days.^^^^
(m
continuin
In early July 2002, Pakistani authorities and the CIA were
their efforts to locate and capture Hassan Ghul. A detainee in Pakistani custody,
was providing detailed
information to Pakistani authorities on Hassan Ghul.^ '^- '^^ [the detainee in Pakistani
custody] had been an'ested with in May 2002, during
^^IfllllljUHIIH government raids on multiple residences thought to be associated with
al-Qa'ida.During interviews with Pakistani authorities concerning how to locate and capture
Hassan Ghul, detainee in Pakistani custody] identified
[a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul] and the location of the
[well-known associate's] home.^^^^
July |, 2002, seeking to capaire Hassan Ghul, Pakistani
authorities|^^^^^^|^|raided the home of |
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[and family members of the well-known associate]. A providing
details on the raid states that [^he well-knownassociate] was interviewed on the spot
and was fully cooperative with [Pakistani authorities]." [the well-known
associate] stated that he had not seen Hassan Ghul or
since June 3, 2002, but that he believed they were still in Karachi. According to^^^H[the
well-lmown associate], he had already informed Pakistani authorities that Hassan Ghul was an
al-Qa'ida member. According to a cable [the well-known associate]
stated that, as a result of his reporting on Ghul to Pakistani officials, he received "a death threat
from Hassan Ghul," causing Ghul to "cease coming to the [the well-known
associate's] house."^^^^
records indicate that Pakistani authorities continued to
intervievrtheJ^^^^HI [the well-known associate] in an effort to acquire information and
capture Hassan Ghul. ACIA cable dated JuW |, 2002, states that the Pakistani government "is
keying on any information which could get m closer to bagging [Hassan] Ghul," specifically
"through of
well-^own associate ofHassan Ghul]." According to the cable, during one of the interviews,
Hm [the well-known associate] told Pakistani authorities about an address where Hassan
Ghul used to reside circa December 2001. m [the well-known associate] sent with
the Pakistani officers to identify the home.'^ ^^ The CIA officers wrote that the location "is
extremely close to (if not an exact match)" to a location where KSM once resided, according to a
June 18, 2002, report from the The identified home was raided, but found empty. The
CIA wrote are hitting the right places [safe houses], albeit at the wrong time. Our efforts
have got us closer than evenoatleastl^ssan Ghul."^ '^^ ^ During the meetings between the
Pakistani authorities and [the well-known associate],
well-known associate] provided the Pakistani authorities with acopy ofa^^^B^^ortedly
belonging to Hassai^l^l" " <^he same cable, tlie
CIA reported thaJB^B [the well-lmownassociate]^^ "approached the police for assistance
in retrieving who was [a specific family member of the well-
known associate].
On July I^002^T^officers at CIA Headquarters wrote that they
were reading the cables from th^IAl|^m||^P|, noting they were "particularly interested
in the associate of Hassan Ghul],
admitted knowledge of Ghul's
involvement in al-Qa'ida activities." The cable stated:
"[r]ecognize that |||||H [the well-known associate] claims his contact with
Ghul stopped approximately one month ago, when he reported Ghul to the





See references to prior acquisition of pass
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association] to one of ourhigh interest targets, request |
initiate teclinical surveillance of [the well-known associate's]
telephone... to determine if they may yield any information on Ghul's current
whereabouts."^^<^^
CIA records do not indicate if "technical surveillance" of |
associate's] telephone was conducted.^^®^
//NOFORN
[the well-known
According to CIA records, once captured, and prior to the initiation
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah confirmed that Hassan Ghul was
a high-level al-Qa'ida facilitator who had contact with senior al-Qa'ida members, including
Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Zubaydah also corroborated intelligence in CIA
databases that Ghul was involved in al-Qa'ida fundraising efforts.As noted, on June 18,
2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation and therefore was not questioned on the July 2002
raids on m^|^H||^H^H^^H|[thewe^knownassociate's] home or the information
acquired from the interviews of^^mm Ithe well-known associate] conducted by
Pakistani authorities.On August 4, 2002, after Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation,
CIA interrogators entered his cell and immediately began subjecting Abu Zubaydah to the CIA's
enhanced inten-ogation techniques, including the waterboard.^^ '^ Ashe had before the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, when asked questions, Abu Zubaydah continued to
provide intelligence, including on Hassan Ghul. On August 20, 2002—while still being
subjected to the CIA's enlianced inten'ogation techniques—Abu Zubaydah was asked
specifically how he would find Hassan Ghul. There are no records indicating that Abu Zubaydah
had previously been asked this question. In response, Abu Zubaydah provided corroborativeS'ig: diat Hassan Ghul could possibly be located through
[the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul].^ '^^ ThercarenoCIA records indicating that
Abu Zubaydah provided information on the location of [the well-known
ALEC
As noted throughout this Study, CIA produced more than six million pages of material, including records
detailing the interrogation of CIA detainees, as well as the disseminated intelligence derived from the interrogation
of CIA detainees. The CIA did not provide—nor was it requested to provide—intelligence records that were
unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. In other words, this Study was completed without
direct access to reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign liaison assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee
debriefings, law enforcement-derived information, and other methods of intelligence collection. Insomuch as this
material is included in the analysis herein, it was provided by the CIA within the context of documents directly
related to tiie CIA Detention and InteiTogation Program. As such, there is likely significant intelligence related to
the tenorist plots, terrorists captured, and other intelligence matters examined in this Study that is within the
databases of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but which has not been identified or reviewed by the Committee for
this Stud> _
10091 (210959Z APR 02); •••||l01^2 (230707Z APR 02); 10144 (271949Z APR
"10271 (15I654Z MAY 02)TaLEC^BH (24I447Z MAR 02)
10487 (181656Z JUN 02)
10644 (201235Z AUG 02) and email from; [REDACTED]; to:
[REDACTED]; subject: "Re: So it begins."; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09 AM.
ALEC ••I (292345Z AUG 02)
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associate's] home, which, as noted, had been raided weeks earlier, on July |, 2002, and was
already known to the CIA and Pakistani authorities.'^'^
Nine days after Abu Zubaydah referenced
[the well-known associateof Hassan Ghul], on August 29, 2002, CIA Headquarters asked
to request that Pakistani authorities "reinterview [the well-known
associate] for additionalintelligence on Hassan Ghul."'^ ^"^ The next day, August30, 2002,
informed CIA Headquarters that Pakistani authorities were "in contact with the
[the well-knownassociate],'' but that would nonetheless ask the Pakistani
authorities to question associate] again about Hassan Ghurs
location.^ '^^ On AugustTl72002^^B|H|^ J relayed that Pakistani authorities and
believed it was possible that well-known associate] was not being fulb
truthful in his interviews with Pakistani authorities.On September 3, 2002,
reported that Pakistani authorities had re-interviewed
known associate] an unknown number of times, and that the Pakistani authorities noted that at
times [die well-known associate] contradicted himself.Approximately one
week later, on September 9, 2002, Pakistani authontiesreturi^^ to t^he
well-known associate's] home and interviewed ^^|H^^^^H|[aspecific family member of




11746 CIA's June 2013 Response highlights the following statement in
the December 13, 2012, Committee Study: "It is possible that the sourcing for CIA claims that *as a result of the use
of EITs' Abu Zubaydah provided information that 'played a key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh,'
are related to Abu Zubaydah's information indicating that Hassan Ghul could be located through
[the well-known associate]." The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "It is true that Abu Zubaydah provided no
information specificallyon Bin al-Shibh's whereabouts, but as the Study explicitlyacknowledges, he did provide
information on another al-Qa'ida facilitator that prompted Pakistani action that netted Bin al-Shibh." The
Committee could find no CIA records of the CIA ever making this claun externally, or internally within the CIA,
prior to the CIA's June 2013 Response. Rather, as described, the CIA claimed both before and after the President's
September 2006 speech that Abu Zubaydal^rovid^ infonnatioi^jelate^^i al-ShiblUhaUes^ed in bin al-
In an email from to and dated
September 7, 2006, jHHstates: "...AZ gave us infomiation on his recent activities that -when added into other
information—helped us track him." The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that die information Abu Zubaydah
provided—that Hassan Ghul could possibly be located through well-known associate of Hassan
Ghul]—was "unique information" and that bin al-Shibh's "capture would not have occurred" "without Abu
Zubaydah's information," which was collected "after he had been subjected to the enhanced interrogation
techniques." As detailed in this summary, and in greaterdetail in Volume II, the statementprovided by Abu
Zubayah was not unique, but corroborative of information akeady collected and acted upon by government
authorities.
I(292345Z AUG 02)
12148 (300601Z AUG 02)
12151 (301107Z AUG 02)
12207 (050524Z SEP 02)1818 it is unclear from CIA records how Pakistani authontieslearned^^||||^^^|||| [the specific family
member of the well-known associate] had returned homej^^^H^^HHTthe well-known associate] had
sought the help ofPakistani authorities in retrieving Hm^^^|[die specific family member of the well-known
associate]. Further, the CIA in early July 2002 had requested "teclinical surveillance" of|^^^m|||||||||||[|||| [the
well-known associate^sHelephone, and CIA records indicate tiiat Pakistani authorities were maintaining regular
contact with [the well-knownassociate^fteMh^nit^ raid.
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I" interviews with Pakistani authorities, [the
specific family member of tlie well-known associate] was cooperative and told the Pakistani
authorities where Hassan Ghul's last apartment was located.Based on the information
provided on Ghul's apartment, Pakistani authorities conducted a raid, but found the apartment
empty. 1820
UN¥) Pakistani authorities then located and interviewed
[a third individual at the apartment complex]. From the
interview [of the third individual], Pakistani authorities learned that while Hassan Ghul had
vacated the apartment, he was scheduled to retum to the complex|. Based on this information,
Pakistani authorities placed the complex under surveillance and waited for Hassan Ghul to
return.^^^^ On September 10,2002, Pakistani authorities arrested two individuals believed to be
Hassan Ghul and his driver outside of the apartment complex.A CIA cable noted that "Ghul
had returned to the apartment to however, he got more
than he bargained for."'^ ^^ Another CIAcable stated:
"Interestingly, he denies being Hassan Ghul - claiming Hassan Ghul is
someone else. While fairly certain we do in fact have
Hassan Ghul in custody, wewould like to make every effort to verify."^^^"^
September 11, 2002, it was determined that an individual
named Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani, aka Abu Badr, and his driver were arrested, not
Hassan Ghul.^^^^ Abu Badr's driver, Muhammad Madni, was immediately cooperative and told
the arresting officers that Abu Badr was a "major al-Qa'ida [facilitator]." He then proceeded to
provide Pakistani authorities with information about al-Qa'ida-affiliated residences and safe
houses in Karachi.
(TS^HBI^^^H^^B^ed on the information provided by Muhammad Madni,
Pakistani authorities^^H^KI conducted raids in Karachi over the next two
days.^^^^ Raids of theinitial sites resulted in therecovery of "a number of modified electrical
switch type mechanisms, modified circuit and 'game' boards and other miscellaneous wires with
alligator clips and battery attachments."On September 11, 2002, additional raids resulted in
ALEC
12249 (091259Z SEP 02)
12249 (091259Z SEP 02)
12249 (091259Z SEP 02)
12251 (l^m SEP 02); CIA
12251 HHI SEP 02); CIA |
12254 (1005 lOZ SEP 02)
33363 (111226ZSEP02)
12251 (§•• SEP 02); CIA ||^|(•• SEP 02)|
(111551Z SEP 02). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam
Rabbani, aka Abu Badr, provided the information on the "safe houses in Karachi." This is inaccurate. Multiple CIA
records state this information was provided by Abu Badr's driver, Muhammad Madni, who was cooperating witli
Pakistani authorities and providing information for the raids.
'828 alec (101749Z SEP 02)






the arrestof 11 individuals, including Ramzi bin al-Shibh.^®^^^ According to CIArecords, bin al-
Shibh initially identified himself as 'Umar Muhammad 'Abdullah ba-'Anu*, aka "Abu
'Ubyadah," but the CIA noted:
"This individual strongly resembled pictures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. When
asked if he was videotaped in al-Qa'ida videos, he answered yes."^^^^
Shortly thereafter the CIA confirmed Ramzi bin al-Shibh was the
individual in Pakistani custody
Hassan Ghul was ultimately captured by foreign authorities in the
Iraqi Kurdistan Region, on January 2004.Hassan Ghul's capture was unrelated to any
reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
4. The Capture ofKhalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM)
On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered a speech based on
information provided by the CIA, and vetted by the CIA, that included the following statement;
"Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures [the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques], and soon he began to provide information on key al-
Qa'ida operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more
of those responsible for the attacks on Septemberthe 11^. For example,
Zubaydah identified one of KSM's accomplices in the 9/11 attacks, a terrorist
named Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The information Zubaydah provided helped lead
to the capture of bin al-Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided
information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that
captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammedr^^^^
ALEC^HIOl^lZSEP02)
CIA SEP 02)
ALEC^Hjf(130206Z SEP 02). The CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute the narrative described by
the Committee, and states the "[CIA] should have more clearly explained the contribution [Abu Zubaydah's]
reporting made to this operation."
On Januarv"B!^004. Hassiin Ghul was transferred to U.S. military custody^On January B.2004. Hassan Ghul




173426 IIHIHIIB^IHrand Committee Notification from the CIA
dated (DTS #2012-3802).
Italics added. President Geore^W^ush^peech on the CIA's Terrorist Detention Program, (September 6,
2006). See also CIA officer IHllfj^l^Hlljjl's February 14, 2007, testimony to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence in wliich she stated that Abu Zubaydah "really pointed us towards Khalid Shaykh Mohammad and how
to find him," adding "[h]e led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who in kind of [sic] started the chain of events." See
transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence^etouar^4^00^DTS^007-1337).
I(II I (III I I"IIII




Contrary to CIA representations, there are no CIA records to
support the assertion that Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other CIA detainee played
any role in the "the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed." CIA records clearly describe how the capture of KSM was attributable to a
unilateral CIA asset ("ASSET who gained access to KSM through with
whom the CIA asset had prior independent connections. ASSET X's possible access to KSM
through was apparent to the CIA as early as the fall of 2001, prior to his formal
recruitment. The CIA had multiple opportunities to exploit ASSET X's access to KSM's
in 2001, and in 2002, after he was recruited, but did not. In February-March 2003,
ASSET X led the CIA directly to KSM. The contemporaneous documentary record of this
narrative is supported by numerous after-action interviews conducted by the CIA's Oral History
Program. As the CIA officer who "handled" ASSET X and who was direcdy involved in the
capture of KSM stated, "[t]he op[eration] was a HUMINT op pretty much from start to
finish."^^^^
Within days after the attacks of September 11, 2001, CTC officers
suspected KSM of playing a key role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.Shortly
thereafter, CTC officers also noted the "striking similarities" between the September 11, 2001,
attacks, and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by KSM's nephew, Ramzi Yousef,
On September 26, 2001, the CIA's ALEC
Station issued a cable on KSM and Ramzi Yousef that described extensive derogatory
The CIA officer who drafted the September 26, 2001,
1835 records provided to the Committee identify the pseudonym created by the CIA for the asset. The Study
lists the asset as "ASSET X" to further protect his identity.
1836 TP interview, CIA ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM, SEPTEMBER 14, 2004], Presentation to the CTC
miimiH 14 September 2004 by See also Interview of [REDACTED], by
[REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14
September 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004,
CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 30 November 2004, CIA Oral History
Program; Interview of by [REDACTED], 25 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of
[REDACTED], by [REDACTED]; 24 November &15 December 2004, Cl^rnmistor^rogiam.
See, for example, the September 15, 2001, email from a CIA officer to of ALEC Station, in
which the officer wrote, "I would say the percentagesareprettyhighjhayaalid Sheikl^ is invo^d [in
the September 1U2001^attack '^ See email from;J|H^H^H^^^^|; to: ||[|||||H||||||||||||||; cc: ||H|[REDACTED], |^^^^|j^D^TED]; subject: Re: RAMZI LEADS^
date: September 15, 2001, at 5:04:38 AM). See also DIRECTOR m (132018Z SEP 01), disseminated as |[|||||
ALEC (231718Z SEP 01). Ramzi Yousef is semn^^if^entenc^iUh^ni^
A CIA source from 1995 reported that "all members are acting
together on behalf ofa largerandwel^rganized group." iiiiiii ml in hiii liiiiiiil and
villains." (5e^WHDCj||B|H 95).) Reporting from 1998 indicated that "Sheikh Khalid" (KSM),
along with had "switched their allegiance" and were "part of the bin Ladin organization in
Afghanistan." (See DIRECTOR l^^^BSEP 98), disseminated as ) CIAcables
describe I
[specific intelligence collectedon KSM's |
FUL 99); WHDC HI^BQCT 95); 89173
lUN 95);••mH 90757 95);
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wrote an email were
with terrorists," and that is a close associate of In a
separate email, the CIA officer wrote that, "at a minimum, we should go after"
Both emails were sent to CIA officers who, a few days later, would consider]
ASSET X, a potential CIA source whose access to KSM through
was readily apparent.
66193
ASSET Xcame to the CIA's attention in the spring of20011
However, CIA officers did not meet
with ASSET X until after the September 11, 2001, attacks.^^"^^ On September 28, 2001, ALEC
Station sent a cable
noting that "[gjiven the events of 11 September... [w]e are very interested in
exploring whatever information [ASSETX] may have with regard to terrorist plans by[UBL]."'^ '^ ^ The CIA held its firs^ieetiii^witl^SS^^^m]^^^^d, 2001, at which time
ASSET X indicated that he knew cable desciibing the first
meeting states that "[ASSET X's] knowledge^^^^^^^^^^^^Uppears to check out and
demonstrates some degree of access/knowledge^jjjjjjj^^^^^^^^H."^ '^^ ^ HHIIHIi' 2001,
the cable describing the first meeting with ASSET X was forwarded by the drafter of the
September 26, 2001, cable on the derogatory information concerning to a
number of CTC officers in an email with the subject line: "Re; [ASSET X] Information Re
IaUG 95); DIRECTOR |
169789 95); f
70158B^H^R 95);
rUL 00); ALEC ^^B^^^BaPR 99).
18-10 from:
[REDACTED]; subiect^h^ousefcohortsj^^^B^ate^^tember 25, 2001, at 6:58:17 PM.
Emai^rom^fl||HAH|H subject:
Re: October4, 2001, at 12:52:46 PM. The CIA's June 2013 Response states
that the Study "claims it was [ASSET X], not detainees, who first identified KSM's for us." This is
inaccurate. The Committee Study does not claim it was ASSET X who first identified KSM's for the CIA.
TheCommUtee Study details how the CIA had extensive information on KSM's as early as 1995; and how
in^^^^^^^Ol, prior to CIA detainee reporting, ASSET Xhighlighted how KSM^I
to locating and capturing KSM.
subjec^^h^able from the CIA |^||||||M|||||||||m^ was "possibleleadtoUBL target." (See
IH73245^^mi||^| [spring] 01). Seealso^/////////j[A\A95 Interview[REDACTED], by [REDACTEDW^Octobe^004^I^Oraniistor^^^^^^^^^^^^^ine^OOI, ASSETX
I^I^^^^^I^^Blnt^ew of [REDACTED], by [REDACTEDL14Septembe^004^0^ Oral History
Program.
















The following day, thecable was forwarded again to CTC officers
with the subject line: "Access to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad,"
On IBHI' 2001, ASSET Xheld his second meeting with CIA
officers, who described ASSET X as "very willing to clandestinely assist the USG as
directed." At the same meeting, ASSCTXiden^ied aphotograph |
on 2001, CIA Headquarters wrote that the
CIA would be "keenly interested" if ASSET X "can dig into the [KSM]
"1850
In 2001^SSE^^)ropose^nultipl^iine^o the CIA
that he use his contacts to locate KSM through
1^—the same approach that would lead tlie CIA to KSM more than 15 months later.
ASSET X also argued for "a more aggressive and proactive approach
but was eventually convinced by CIA officers to|, instead.After ALEC Station rejected the CIA case officer's
recommended financial compensation for ASSET X, ASSET X declined to work with the CIA as
a CIA source.Over the next nine months, the CIA continued to believe that ASSET X had
the potential to develop information on KSM and his location, and sought, but was unable to
reestablish contact with ASSET During this time, the CIA continued to collect
^8"^ Email
that our source knew







ASSET X considered the CIA's initial offer of
166586_^^^^^^m|||. CIA officers
[REDACTED]; included in response email from:
I, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],]
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: [ASSE]^]^date^Jovemb^ 2001,
at 6:54:40 AM.) Tlie Station's appeal was denied by ALEC Station. See ALEC |H||[
^66660^^H^^PH; 68881
^H^^^^^^^^H||c^inued to stress that ASSETX was a"financial risk woith taking." (See \
67522^^^^H^HH3aLEC Station remained interested in ASSET X, but continued to oppose the
compensation package proposed by See ALEC Se^l^
68881 68918HHHIHI;67522
[REDACTED [REDACTED], I|; subject: Re: [REDACTED]
[,at3:59:00 PM.
I; cc: [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED]^^^H^H^ubiectjAc^ to Klialid Shaykh
Muhammad; date: 2001, at 6:12:17 AM. See also |||||||66193A^HH The CIA's June
2013 Response states that "detainees gave us the critical information on KSM's^^Hthatall^ed us to understand
This is inaccurate. As detailed, ASSET X's potential
Iwasapparent to theCIA in 2001, priorto anyCIA detainee reporting.
resaged the 2003 operation. See
on.
TOP SECRET//
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See CIA disseminated as |
CIA officers proposedrecontacting a 1995 asset with possible access to KSM through|
(See email from: [REDACTED]; to: Jose Rodriguez, |
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTE^; subject: Finding Khalid Sheikli Muhammad; date:
2002, at06:49:13 PM.) Tlie email was resent, on Hm, 2002, toadditional addressees. (See email from:
[REDACTED]; to: [REDACTEDU^DACTED], [REDACTED], cc: subject: Finding
Khalid SheiJch Muhammad; date: HH, 2002, at 3:46:13 PM.) At this point, the nefarious activities of KSM's
were ofsignificant interest to the Intelligence Community and policymakers. KSM's HI
terrorism were briefed to the Presidentand were the subject of a direct tasking by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense. ALEC|
Tlie detainee was [DETAINEE SI.
time, the CIA offered^^ompensa^npac^ge that was increased from tlie CIA's previous offer.
'^^^••^062^H|H|||I; 1101 ^^HHj^HiDIR
Interview
of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004,CIA OralHistory Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by
[REDACTED], 14 September 2004^I^Ora^listor^rogran^DuringthistiiT^^ that he
madecontactwithJ^M^sJ|PI|^^^|^^^^^H|H^^^H||||^H^^^^^^^H|m10084^^^^^^^!; ^•l0090^^^^^^H[^^m088^^H|||^^B^I^CTOR|.) Also during this period, CIA of^cersJH^HH^^^H^ntinued to note that ASSET X














intelligence on and sought other opportunities to gain access to
KSM through a detainee in foreign government custody provided
extensive information on KSM's and confirmed that KSM was "very close" to
who "should know how to contact
^/N¥) When the CIA finally located and met again with ASSET X on
2002, ASSET X stated that "he could
within a few weeks," and was "willing to travel to locate
^I'^ ^^ASSETJ^as recruited as asource by the CIA, but, despite his offer to track
KSM^s ASSET X was dispatched by the CIA to
1859
See email from: to: [REDACTED];|; subject: another for the highlights; date:
Ul^








By the time ASSET Xreturned to 2002^
his previous CIA case officer "handler" there had departed for another CIA assignment HH.
ASSET X was thus handled by a new CIA officer who was unfamiliar with ASSET X's potential
utility in tracking Seeking guidance on how to proceed with ASSET X, the new CIA
case officer sent several cables to CIA Headquarters, which he later described as disappearing
into a "black hole." According to an interview of a CIA officer involved in the operation, the
cables were being sent to a special compartment at CIA Headquarters which had been previously
used by the teamJjB^HIHHHiiHHi^lHIH^I- dispersal ofthat CIA
team, however, the compartment was idle and no one at CIA Headquarters was receiving and
reading the cables being sent to the special compartment. When the CIA case officer
received no response to the cables he was sending to CIA Headquarters, he made preparations to
terminate the CWsrelationshipwithAS^ to interviews, in HHiH 2002,
the CIA officer and was on his way to meet ASSET X to
terminate the asset'srclationshipwith^^ By chance, ^I^office^vh^iad previously
handled ASSET X visiting This
visiting CIA officer overheard the discussion between the chief of Base and the CIA case officer
concerning the CIA's termination of ASSET X as a CIA source. The discussion included names
that ASSET Xhad been discussing with the case officer ^—names that the visiting
officer recognized |^^^H||||||||H. The visiting CIA officer interceded and recommended
that the CIA Base delay the termination of ASSET Xas a CIA source.^^^"^ At the next meeting
ASSET X again demonstrated that he had direct access to KSM's
1865 ^ result, the CIA decided not to terminate ASSET X's work as a
CIA source.
1861
• 37701 41495 2426
Interview of [REDACTED], by[R^ACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program. See
•••••••; DIRECTOR••
'8" Interview of[REDACTED], by [REDACTEDM^ctobe^OO^I^r^istory Program.
ASSET X had been using the same names since 2001. See interview of
[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by
[REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
•sesjTDINTE^IEW^ CIA ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM, SEPTEMBER 14, 2004] Presentation to Uie CTC
14 September 2004.
'8''^ Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program. The CIA's June
2013 Response claims that the "CIA conectly represented that detainee reporting helped us capture [KSM]." This
CIA assertion is based on an indirect chain of causation purporting to connect the reporting of Abu Zubaydah to the
intervention of the visiting CIA officer and flie subsequent capture of KSM. This account, which the CIA
represented for the fu*st time in June 2013, is inaccurate in numerous ways: (1) The CIA represents that
"information provided by Abu Zubaydah... helped lead to the capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh [RBS]." The
inaccuracies of this representation are described in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II. (2) The CIA
represents that reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was not in CIA custody at the time) regarding Ammar al-
Baluchi was key tocapturing KSM. This too is inaccurate. As detailed in the Study^Ammar^^ no
role in the operation that captured KSM, wliich centered around ASSET Xand |HIHHHHIH^Hi:_(3)
The CIA represents that bin al-Shibh's reporting on Ammar al-Baluchi was "used... to debrief
2431
[DETAINEE R]," who was in foreign government custody, and that as a result, DETAINEE R
discussed statement not supported by CIA records. CIA
records related to DETAINEE R's intenogation in foreign government custod^ndicat^ha^ETAINE^R's
reporting was prompted using aphotograph and aletter. (See 101 ISdjHHjjjjjjjjjjj^HJ^
10158||H^HIH; WASHINGTBHl^H^BH^^|il
10116 (4) The CIA representsdia^ETAlNE^^^^nf^Tianoiion|||||||H||^ '^ ^^^
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Shortly thereafter, inH^^OOB^SSET X traveled onhis own
volition, and without prior discussion with the CIA, to
~ I' and aface-to-face meeting with KSM. When ASSET
X later informed CIA officers about his trip.
direct access to KSmI
//NOFORN
andXand his CIA handlers urging the CIA to delay action and wait for an opportunity for ASSET X
to locate KSM.^ '^^ ^ ALEC Station initially supported immediate action to capture any KSM
associate ASSET Xcould lead them to, before reversing its position on February fl, 2003.'^ ^^
The next day, ASSET X arrived in Islamabad
|, where he was surprised to find KSM.
CIA to understand the value of the access [ASSET X] had to This is also inaccurate. As
detailed in the Study, Uie value of ASSET X's access to KSNTs^^^Bwas^parent to the CIA in 2001. (5) Tlie
CIA states thaUhyjisitin^IA officer who intervened to forestall the termination of ASSET Xdid so because,
havmg been he was familiar with DETAINEE R's reporting on KSM's HH. Tliis
representat^^^^^e fact that the visiting CIA officer was amember of the team that handled ASSET Xwhile
ASSET X That team received information concerning ASSET X's stated access to KSM through
^^^^^Thynformation was provided to the team prior to the capture of DETAINEE R. (See
(6) Tlie CIA asserts that DETAINEE R's reporting "helped CIA to redirect [ASSET X]
1»" an effort to locate KSM." Tliis is inaccurate. As detailed in the Study, ASSET Xhad
^g^^icating that he had access to KSM through since 2001 and, as detailed, contacted KSM's
on his own. CIA records indicate that the detainees who provided corroborating information about KSM's
PII^H, DETAINEE Sand DETAINEE R, were in foreign government custody at the time they provided the
information. DETAINEE Rwould later be rendered to CIA custody and approved for the use oftlie CIA's
enhanced intenogation techniques, although there are no CIA records indicating that he was subjected to the
tecliniques.
'8 '^ DIR MB Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral
History Program;
Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 OctoteSTaASS^ISm; Interview of
[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3December 2004, CIA Oral Histoiy Program
Interview of[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program
Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by
[REDACTED]; 24November &15 December 2004. CIA Oral History Program; Interview of fREDACTEDl bv
[REDACTED], 30 November 2004. 41034
•J^^rviewomED^ by [REDACTED], 3December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; DIRECTOR
TOP iSECRET//





"I M W KSM."1 '^^ 2
sent a text message to his CIA handler stating:
ASSET X
contacted the CIA and conveyed what had just occurred.^^^^
In an interview with the CIA's Oral History Program, the
CIA case officer described what happened:
"We went around, you know,
[ASSET X1 turns around to me and says, look I don't know, I guess
pjYi nervous, ^said, Look bro^e^^^^e are
twenty five million frigging reasons why you need to find That's
what the reward was. He looks at me and says, *I understand. I
understand.
shortly thereafter, ASSET Xfound and, in the early
morning hours of March 1, 2003, Pakistani authorities conducted araid and captured
On March |, 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody.
'872 Interview of[REDACTED], by [REDACTED],i4 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
'873 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED],14 October 2004, CIA Oral Histor^rogram^erview of
IRFnACTEDI. bv [REDACTED], 3December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490
Interview of•••, by [REDACTED], 25 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program;
Interview of[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
'874 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral Histon^rogmm^erview of
[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490
'875 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral Histor^rogram^ of
[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490
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5. The Capture ofMajid Khan
The CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainee KSM led to the capture ofMajid
Khan. These representations were inaccurate.
In multiple interviews with the CIA Office of Inspector General,
CIA officers stated that "information from KSM led to the capture of [Majid] Kahn [sic]," and
that "KSI^gav^i^Maii^^an."^^^^ The deputy chief of ALEC Station and former KSM
debriefer represented that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the
arrest of... Majid Khan, an operative who couldget into the U.S. easily."^^^^ The draft OIG
Special Review repeated the representations of and others, stating that KSM "provided
information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Majid Khan, an operative
who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks against U.S. water
reservoirs.On February 27, 2004, DDO James Pavitt submitted the CIA's formal response
to the draft Inspector General Special Review. Pavitt's submission represented that Majid Khan
was in custody "because of the information we were able lawfully to obtain from KSM."^^^^ The
final, and now declassified, CIA Inspector General Special Review states that KSM "provided
information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Majid Khan, an operative
who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks....In its
analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC relied on
passages of the Inspector General's Special Review that included this inaccurate
representation. 1885
On July 29, 2003, CIA leadership met with select members of the
National Security Council to obtain reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA
stated that "detainees subject[ed] to die use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had
produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved
Intei-view ofJohi^^cLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,
September 5, 2003; Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief,
Counterterrorist Center AI-Qa'ida Department; date: 28 July 2003; Interview of t)y
Office of the Inspector General, August 18, 2003.|, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center
ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG),
January 2004.
1883 Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "CounterteiTorismDetention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG);
date: Febmary 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review- Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program,
(2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
1885 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques tliat May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees, pp. 10-11, citing CIA Office of Inspector General,
Special Review, pp. 85-91.




lives."^^^^ Briefing slides provided by the CIA stated that"major threat" information was
acquired, providing the "Identification of... the Majid Khan Family" by KSM as anexample,^ '^^ ^
The same slides were used, at least in part, for subsequent briefings.On September 16, 2003,
a briefing was conducted for Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, the content of which was described as "virtually identical" to the July 29, 2003,
briefing.^^^^ The slides were also used in an October 7, 2003, briefing for Assistant Attorney
General Jack Goldsmith.
CIA records indicate that Majid Khan was identified and located
prior to any reporting from KSM, There is no indication in CIA records that reporting from
KSM—or any other CIA detainee—played any role in the identification and capture of Majid
Khan.>«5^
(TS/^IIIIIIIHII^^^B^^) On January 10, 2003, the FBI's Baltimore Field Office opened a
full field international terrorism investigation on the email account "BobDesi(@)hotmail.com."
According to FBI investigative records, the investigation was "predicated upon infoimation
received through the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA)concerning" a known al-Qa'ida email
account that was already "under FTSA coverage Six days later, on January 16,
2003, open source research related to the "BobDesi" email account "revealed a personal website
1886 Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program, " dated
July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
See briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House
officials. Those attending the meeting included Vice President Richard Cheney, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General John Ashcroft, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Patrick Philbin, and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger.
1888 CIA's June 2003 Response states that "CIA mistakenlyprovided incorrect information to the Inspector
General (IG) that led to a one-time misrepresentation of this case in the IG's 2004 Special Review." The CIA's June
2013 Response adds that, "[tjhis mistake was not, as it is characterized in the 'Findings and Conclusions' section of
the Study, a 'repeatedly represented' or 'frequently cited' example of the effectiveness of CIA's enhanced
interrogation program." TTie CIA's June 2013 assertion that this was a "one-time misrepresentation" is inaccurate.
As described, the inaccurate information was provided numerous times to the Inspector General, in multiple
interviews and in the CIA's official response to the draft Special Review. Afterwards, the CIA relied on the section
of the Special Review that included the inaccurate inforniation on the capture of Majid Khan in obtaining legal
approval for tlie use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from the Department of Justice. Tliis
information was also provided by the CIA to the CIA's Blue Ribbon Panel for tlieir review of the CIA's Detention
and Interrogation Program. The CIA also included the inaccurate representation about the identification of Majid
Klian and his family to tlie National Security Council principals on multiple occasions. Further, as noted, the
inaccurate information in tlie CIA OIG Special Review was declassified and has been used in multiple open source
articles and books, often as an example of the effectiveness of the CIA program.
1889 Memorandum for tlie Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September 27, 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50088).
Slides, CIA Interrogation Program, 16 September 2003. John B. Bellinger III, Senior Associate Counsel to the
President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council; Memorandum for the Record; subject: Briefing of
Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld regarding Intenogation of High-Value Detainees; date: September 30, 2003.
Scott W. Muller; Memorandum for the Record; Interrogation briefing for Jack Goldsmith; date: 16 October 2003
(OGC-FO-2003-50097).
For additional details, see Volumes II and Volume III.
See FBI 302 on FBI case file and 88793
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for the user, Majid Khan."'^ ^^ In February 2003, tracking Majid Khan's Internet
activity and was confident he was located at his brother's house in Karachi, Pakistan.On
March 4, 2003, ALEC Station noted that activity on an al-Qa'ida email account—associated with
Khallad bin Attash—that was in contact with Majid Khan, had been dormant. ALEC Station
recommended that move to capture Majid Khan
in the hope that Majid Khan could lead CIA officers to Khallad bin Attash.The following
morning, March 5, 2003, officers from Pakistan^^^^^|^|[||| carried out a raid on Majid
Khan's brother's house, detaining Majid Khan.^^^^
On March 15, 2003, Deputy Chief ofALEC Station |^HH
sent an email to CIA Headquarters noting that she had read the reporting from Majid
Khan's foreign government interrogations and was requesting photographs of Majid Khan and
his associates to use in the KSM interrogations.CIA Headquarters provided the photographs
the same day.'^ ^^ On March 17, 2003, KSM was shown the photograph of Majid Khan and
discussed the person he stated he knew as "Yusif," for the first time."^^^
6. The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting
The CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques thwarted plotting against the U.S. military base. Camp
Lemonier, in Djibouti. These representations were inaccurate.
(U) In the September 6, 2006, speech, acknowledging the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, President
George W. Bush stated:
"This is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And our security
depends on getting this kind of information."
The speech continued:
"These are some of the plots that have been stopped because of information






13571 (260330Z FEB 03)
(040329Z MAR 03)
13658 (050318Z MAR 03); 13659 (050459Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR|H|(050459Z
MAR 03).
'897 Memorandum for; •••••, [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED],OFFICE; ^^^^[DETENTION
SITE BLUE]; subject; Baltimore boy and KSM; date; 15 March 2003, at 07:08;32 PM.
'898 ALEC Station sentDETENTION SITE BLUE photographs foruse with KSM andotherdetainees. They
inckided Majid Khan, Muhammad Khan, Sohail Munir, lyman Faris^4aiM Khan's cousin (Mansour), Fayyaz
KaiTiranjA^nbelge, Khalid Jamil, and Aafia Siddiqui. See ALEC |B||||| (152212Z MAR 03).1899 10865 (171648Z MAR 03); ^••||| 10886 (182219Z MAR 03); ••• 10870 (172017Z
MAR 03)
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information that helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp
Lemonier in Djibouti."^^"'^
An Office of the Director of National Intelligence public release
accompanying the September 6, 2006, speech, states that "the CIA designed a new interrogation
program that would be safe, effective, and legal." The document asserts: "In early 2004, shortly
after his capture, al-Qa'ida facilitator Gouled Hassan Dourad revealed that in mid-2003 al-
Qa'ida East Africa cell leader Abu Talha al-Sudani sent him from Mogadishu to Djibouti to case
the US Marine base Camp Lemonier, as part of a plot to send suicide bombers with a truck
bomb."^^oi
Similarly, in a prepared briefing for the chairman of the House
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, John Murtha, on October 30, 2007, the CIA represented
that the CIA could not conduct its detention operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because
"interrogations conducted on US military installations must comply with the Army Field
Manual." The CIA presentation stated that the CIA program was "critical to [the CIA's] ability
See "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by
President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program, as well as
an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value
Tenorist Detainee Program." In October 2007 CIA officers discussed a section of the President's speech, which
was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, related to Camp Lemonier. Addressing tlie section of the
speech that states, "[t]errorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop the planned
strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti," a senior CIA officer higlilighted that the plotting had not
been stopped, but in fact was ongoing. The officer wrote: "I have attached the cable from Guleed that was used to
source the Sept '06 speech as well as a later cable from a different detainee affirming tliat as of mid-2004, AQ
members in Somalia were still intent on attacking Camp Lemonier... As of 2004, the second detainee indicates that
AQ was still working on attacking the base." The CIA officer explained that the "reasoning behind validation of the
language in the speech—and remember, we can argue aboutwhetheror not 'planning' consistitutes [sic] a 'plot' and
about whether anything is ever disrupted—was that the detainee reportin^ncrea^^ awarenes^^tack plotting
against the base, leading to heightened security." {See email from; to; H|H||||||||; subject:
"More on Camp Lemonier"; date; October 22, 2007, at 5:33 PM). The President's reference to Camp Lemonier in
tlie context of "this vital program" came immediately after the passage of the speech referencing the use of the
CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against KSM and immediately before statements about the thwarting of the
Karachi and Heathrow Airport plots, both of which have been exphcitly attiibuted by the CIA to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The disruption of the Camp Lemonier plotting was also referenced as an
intelligence success in the context of the March 2008 presidential veto of legislation that would have effectively
banned the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. See "Text; Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill," The New York
Times, dated March 8, 2008, which states, the "main reason this program has been effective is that it allows the CIA
to use specialized intenogation procedures... limiting the CIA's intenogation methods to those in the Army field
manual would be dangerous...."
Italics added. Unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the
High Value Tenorist Detainee Program." CIA records indicate that the CIA had intelligence that al-Qa'ida
affiliated individuals were targeting Camp Lemonier with an "explosives-laden tmck" in early 2003. The CIA
sought to detain Gouled because of the intelligence ahready collected, indicating that in 2003—at the likely behest of
Abu Talha al-Sudani—Gouled was conducting casings of Camp Lemonier. Once captured, and prior to being
transfened to CIA custody, Gouled confumed that he cased Camp Lemonier for a potential tenorist attack. Despite
the use of the term "revealed" in the 2006 document, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "We did not represent
that we initially learned of the plot from detainees, or that it was disrupted based solely on information from
detainees in CIA custody." The CIA's June 2013 Response further states that the CIA "agree[s] with the Study that
[tlie CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition" of Guleed
Hassan Dourad.
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to protect the American homeland and US forces and citizens abroad from terrorist attack," that
"[m]ost, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this [CIA] program
would Likely not have beendiscovered or reported in any other way," that the CIA program "is in
no way comparable to the detainee programs run by our military," and that the CIA used
information derived from the program "to disrupt terrorist plots—including against our
militaryThe CIA presentation then stated:
"[A CIA detainee] informed us^^"^ of an operation underway to attack the U.S.
military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. We believe our understanding of this
plot helped us to prevent the attack.
A review of CIA records found that: (1) the detainee to whom the
CIA's representations refer—Guleed (variant, Gouled) Hassan Dourad—was not subjected to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) the CIA was aware of and reported on the terrorist
threat to Camp Lemonier prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees(3) Guleed
provided corroborative reporting on the threat prior to being transferred to CIA custody; and (4)
contrary to CIA representations, the plotting did not "stop" because of information acquired from
CIA detainee Guleed in 2004, but rather, continued well into 2007.^^^^
Emphasis in original. See CIA Talking Pointsdated October 30, 2007, entitled, "DCIA Meeting with Chairman
Murdia re Rendition a^d Detention Programs" and attachments.jiie CIA's June 2013 Response states; "We did not represent that we initially learned of the plot from detainees,
or that it was disrupted based solely on infomiation from detainees in CIA custody." The CIA's October 30, 2007,
talking points for the chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, John Murtha, make no
reference to the CIA receiving intelligence on theCamp Lemonierplottingfrom other intelligencesourcesprior to
CIA detainee reporting. Nor do the talking pointsindicate that the CIA detainee initially provided informationon
the plotting prior to being transferred to CIA custody. In addition, as described, an Office of the Director of
National Intelligence public releaseon the CIA's Detention and Interrogaton Program from September 6, 2006,
states that "the CIA designed a new interrogationprogram that would be safe, effective, and legal;" and that "al-
Qa'ida facilitator Gouled Hassan Douradrevealed" that he had been sent to "case the US Marine base Camp
Lemonier."
See CIA Talking Points dated October 30, 2007, entitled, "DCIA Meeting with Chainnan Murtlia re Rendition
and Detention Programs" and attachments. The talking points further state that the "Presidentially-mandated
detention program is critical to our ability to protect the American homeland and US forces and citizens abroad from
teiToristattack." The attachment to the document, labeled "points from CTC," further asserts that while CIA
rendition activities "did yield intelligence, it did not do so in a timely, efficient, and thorough way, raising
unacceptable risks," and that the CIA "experiencehas shown that exclusive control by CIA, in a Agency designed,
built, and managed facility, allows us complete oversight and control over all aspects of detention, to include
conditions of confinement, approved interrogation activities, humane standards, medical treatment, detainee
engagement, security, hygiene, and infrastructure." The document references a U.S. House of Representatives
Appropriations bill providing a reduction in funding for the Covert Action CT Program and states: "Had the mark
been directed against the rendition and detention programs specifically, the CIA would have recommended a
Presidential veto. In its appeal, CIA detailed the impact ofa$H| million cut to the CA CT Program. The Agency
also made it clear that it would continue the rendition and detention program because of the high value of these
activities."
See aforementioned CIA representations that: (1) "This is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And
our security depends on getting this kind of information,"and (2) "Most, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from
high-value detainees in this [CIA] program wouldlikely not have been discovered or reported in any other way."
As noted, the CIA's June 2013 Response states tliat the CIA "agree[s] with the Study that [the CIA] had threat
reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition" of Guleed.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information.
III! 11 III I I III! (iiii I




March 4, 2004, Guleed was captured in Djibouti based on
information obtained from a foreign government and a CIA source.Prior to entering CIA
custody, Guleed was confronted with information acquired from signals intelligence, and he
confirmed that he cased Camp Lemonier for a potential teiTorist attack. CIA sought to render
Guleed to CIA custody in order to question Guleed about senior al-Qa'ida East Africa members
Abu Talha al-Sudani and Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan. A CIA cable states:
"Guleed represents the closest we have come to an individual with first hand,
face-to-face knowledge of Abu Talha [al-Sudani] and Nabhan, and our hope is




MAR 04). See also \
93364 (Januai
HEADQUAR^^B^^^^^^H;IH 93364 (January 8, 2008).
1329June2013Response states: "In March 2004,|
based [on] information from a clandestine source-detained and rendered to CIA custody the primary
facilitator for al-Qa'ida's Camp Lemonier plot, Guleed Hassan Ahmed, who had cased the Camp on behalf of al-
Qa'ida. Guleed provided details about tlie plot and al-Qa'ida's Somali support network, which drove CIA's targeting
efforts." As described in this summaiy and in greater detail in Volume U, Guleed confirmed intelligence reporting
already collected on his casing of Camp Lemonier prior to being rendered to CIA custody. See reference to material
on recorded interrogations of Guleed Hassan Dourad in the cable, 93364 (January 8, 2008).|Hi 1543
1573 (160217Z MAR 04), later reissued as CIA•• (021549Z APR 04)/ and
used to support the president's speech on September6^2006^^^^^^^^^^
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UNF) Prior to Guleed's rendition to CIA custody, he provided detailed
information on his casing of Camp Lemonier to CIA officers. On March 2004, Guleed
was rendered to CIA custody.There are no records to indicate that Guleed was subjected to
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, nor are there any CIA records to indicate that
Guleed provided the information that was the basis for his rendition to CIA custody—
information leading to the capture of Abu Talha al-Sudani or Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan.
While in CIA custody, Guleed continued to provide information on
his targeting of Camp Lemonier. Guleed stated that Abu Talha al-Sudani had not yet picked the
operatives for the attack against Camp Lemonicr,^^^- tliat the attack was "on hold while they-






raised the necessary funds via tlie bank robbery operation,and that "he [Guleed] was not
informed of the operational plan."^^ '^^
Neither the detention of Guleed, nor the information he provided,
thwarted terrorist plotting against Camp Lemonier; and CIA records indicate that attack planning
against Camp Lemonier continued well after Guleed's capture in March 2004, to include a time
period beyond the president's September6, 2006, speech. In March 2005, the CIA sought
approval to render an associate of Guleed whom the CIA stated was "planning terrorist attacks
on U.S. targets in East Africa, particularly against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.In October
2005, a cable stated, "a body of reporting indicates that East Africa al-Qa'ida network operatives
are currently planning attacks on U.S. interests in the region, particularly... the U.S. military
base Camp Lemonier inDjibouti,"'^ ^^ InApril 2007, thecontinued terrorist threat reporting
against Camp Lemonier resulted in a request for the Camp to further "alter their security
practices."^^^^
In October 2007, in light of the ongoing threat reporting related to
Camp Lemonier, CIA officer attempted to explain the CIA-validated
statement in the president's September 6, 2006, speech that "[tjerrorists held in CIA custody
"helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.
1913 The CIA's June 2013 Response links the "disrupt[ion]" of the Camp Lemonier plotting to
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program via the arrest of KSM, stating: "According to Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad (KSM), his arrest in March 2003 (which we note in Example 12 resulted in part from infomiation
provided by Ramzi Bin al-Shibh) prevented him from transferring 30,000 euros from al-Qa'ida in Pakistan to al-
Qa'ida in East Africa leaders, someof\^iomwere plotting the Camp Lemonier attack. Funding shortages were cited
repeatedly by detainees and in [technical collection] as a reason for the Camp Lemonier plot's
delays." Prior to the CIA's June 2013 Response, there were no CIA recordsattributing the delay or disruptionof the
plotting to the capture or detention of KSM. While a body of intelligencereporting indicated that fimding shortages
contributed to delays in the targetingof Camp Lemonier, no CIA intelligencerecords were identified that cite any
deficit of expected funds resulting from KSM's capture. As detailed in this Study, KSM was captured on March 1,
2003. Intelligence reporting indicates that Abu Talha al-Sudani sent Guleed to case the security at Camp Lemonier
more than six months later, in September 2003. In early March 2004, the CIA reported that |||^^||||||^g
[technical collection] revealed that "Abu Talha and Guleed were working together in search of funding necessary to
carry out planned operations." In late March 2004, after Guleed's detention, several associates were detained after
an attack on aGerman aid delegation, whicl^a^uspe^d ofbeing an attempt to kidnap individuals for ransom. A
cable reporting this information stated that^^^^^^| [technical collection] "indicated Abu Talha continues to
press forward on plans to target Western interests in Djibouti." Several days later, CIA officers surmised that the
kidnapping attempt was likely an attempt"by Abu Talha to raise the operational funds for his plan to attack Camp
Lem^ier." {See intelligence chronology in Volum^I^ncludin^jepoi^^ in HEADQUARTERS
IBB (101756^^^ 04) and connected to ALEC HIH MAR
04); and ALEC ^HII (292353Z MAR 04).) As detailed in the section ofthis summary and Volume IIon the
Capture of Khalid ShayJdi Mohammad(KSM), the capture of KSM did not result from information provided by
Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
1914 I
Draft cable an email from: to: and subject: "Hjjjl
DDO Approval to render Somali Jihadist and al-Qa'ida facilitator Ahmed Abdi Aw Mohammad to [CIA] control";
date: May II, 2005, at 5:42:50 PM.
HEADQUARTERS IH(252044Z OCT 05)
10555 (101434Z APR 07)1917
See "CIA Validation of Remarks on DetaineePolicy," drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by
President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA's Detentionand Interrogation Program, as well as
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who was involved in vetting of the speech, wrote to a CIA colleague tracking the ongoing threats
to Camp Lemonier that:
"The reasoning behind [the CIA] validation of the language in the speech—and
remember, we can argue about whether or not 'planning' consistitutes [sic] a
'plot' and about whether anything is ever disrupted—was that the detainee
reporting increased our awareness of attack plotting against the base, leading to
heightened security.
A review of CIA records, however, found no indication that CIA
detainee reporting from Guleed, or any other CIA detainee, alerted the CIA or the U.S. military
to increased terrorist targeting of Camp Lemonier. To the conti"ary, CIA records indicate that the
CIA was in possession of substantial threat reporting demonstrating that Camp Lemonier in
Djibouti was being targeted by al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida affiliated extremists prior to the detention
of Guleed on March 4, 2004.'^ -" For example, on January 28, 2003, a foreign government report
disseminated by the CIA stated that al-Qa'ida operatives were planning "to ram an explosives-
laden truck into a military base, probably Camp Lemonier."On March 10, 2003, a "Terrorist
Advisory" was issued, which stated that "U.S. forces stationed at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti...
could be targeted.Similar reporting continued thimgh 2003, and by the end of the year, the
CIA had H coverage^^--^ indicating that Guleed and other identified operatives were being
an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value
Terrorist Detainee Program/^^^^^
See email from: IHHHIi others; subject: "More onCamp Lemonier"; October
22, 2007, at 5:33 PM. In a reply email, a CIA officer wrote that Guleed's statement was only "that the plan was
suspended while Abu Talha tried to acquire the necessaiy funds," and continued, "I don't want anyone to walk away
from this thinking that the POTUS speech from 2006 is the only language/view we are allowed to hold, especially
since most or all of us were not involved in the original coordination" of the President's September 6, 2006, speech.
See email from: jBHHjl; to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; cc: subject: "Camp
Lemonier"; date: October 24, 2007, at J :22;44 PM.1920mm 1313 (041524Z MAR 04)
See January 28, 2003, CIA Presidential Daily Brief, entitled, "Al-Qa'ida Planning Attack in Djibouti." The
CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA "agree[s] with the Study that [the CIA] had threat reporting against
Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition" of Guleed, but argues that the threat reporting
provided to the President on Januaiy 28, 2003, had "no relation to [al-Sudani's] plot," and was "later recalled after
being revealed to be a fabrication." The CIA did not provide a date for the recall. The reporting, which indicated al-
Qa'ida operatives were planning "to ram an explosives-laden truck into a military base, probably Camp Lemonier,"
would later be corroborated by other intelligence reporting, including by Guleed in his description of al-Sudani's
plotting. See intelligence chronology in Volume II.
'922 CIA WASHINGTON DC (110056Z MAR 03). See also ••• 17366 (121355Z MAR 03). The
CIA's June 2013 Response asserts tliat the March 2003 reporting was "an analytical assessment that Djibouti was a
potential target given its US Militaiy presence," was "not based on specific intelligence," and was analysis related to
"a different al-Qa'ida cell." The CIA's June 2013 Response also disputes the relevance of the May 2003 reporting
that al-Qa'ida affiliates were "waiting for the right time to cany out large-scale attacks, possibly involving suicide
bombers, against a U.S. military base or U.S. naval ship in or near Djibouti." The CIA's June 2013 Response states
that this threat reporting "was later found to be unrelated." Notwithstanding these assertions, the CIA's June 2013
Response states that the CIA "agree[s] with the Study that [the CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier
prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition" of Guleed.
'923 alec (021825Z OCT 03)
III! MUM imiimii




directed by Abu Talha al-Sudani to target CampLemonier.^^-'^ By the end of December2003,
Djiboutian authorities confirmed that Guleed had cased Camp Lemonier and that Guleed
appeared to have "formulate[d] a complete targeting package, which included an escape
route.It was this reporting that led to capture Guleed on March 4, 2004. 1926
7. The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help
Validate CIA Sources
In addition to CIA claims that information produced during or after
the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to the disruption of terrorist plots and the
capture of specific terrorists, the CIA also represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques
were necessary to validate CIA sources. The claim was based on one CIA detainee—Janat
Gul—contradicting the reporting of one CIA asset.
The CIA repeatedly represented to policymakers that information
acquired after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques helped to "validate" CIA
sources. For example, CIA Director Michael Hayden provided testimony to the Committee on
April 12, 2007, that:
"Detainee information is a key tool for validating clandestine sources. In fact,
in one case, the detainee's information proved to be the accurate story, and the
clandestine source was confronted and subsequently admitted to embellishing
or fabricating some or all [of] the details in his report."
Similarly, in January 2009, the CIA compiled a detailed briefing
book for a planned three-hour briefing of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program for
President-elect Obama's national security staff. Included in the materials was a document that
stated, "[k]ey intelligence [was] collected from HVD interrogations after applying [the CIA's
enhanced] interrogation techniques." After this statement, the CIA provided examples, including
that the "most significant reporting" acquired from CIA detainee Janat Gul after applying the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was information that helped the CIA "validate a CIA
asset."'^ ^®^ The document states:
'924 Referenced in HEAD
See also
'92'' CIA WASHINGTON DC (302034Z DEC 03) / SERIAL:
1313 (041624Z MAR 04)
'927 CIAclassified Statement for theRecord, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael
V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and
Interrogation Program" (DTS #2007-1563). See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for
the War Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June
1, 2005, and was broadly disseminated on June 3,2005, as an Intelligence Assessment. On March 31, 2009, former
Vice President Cheney requested the declassificationof this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released
with redactions on August 24, 2009.
'928 Italics in original. CIA Briefing for Obama National SecurityTeam - "Renditions, Detentions, and
InteiTogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced
materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect
Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Teair^uesday^^anuar^009^|3^ 11:30 a.m." Expected participants
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"Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul's most significant reporting helped us
validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 pre
election threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between
himself and al-Qa'ida's chief of finance, Shaykh Sa'id, a claim that Gul
vehemently denied. Gul's reporting was later matched with information
obtained from Sharif al-Masri and Abu Talha al-Pakistani, captured after Gul.
With this reporting in hand, CIA the asset, who subsequently
admitted to fabricating his reporting about themeeting."^^^^
The CIA representation that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques produced information that allowed the CIA to identify the reporting of a CIA asset as
fabricated lacked critical contextual information. The CIA representations did not describe how
the CIA asset's reporting was already doubted by CIA officers prior to the use of the CIA's
enlianced inten'ogation techniques against Gul. Nor did the CIA representations acknowledge
that the asset's fabricated reporting was the reason that Janat Gul was subjected to the techniques
in the first place. The CIA concluded that Janat Gul was not a high-level al-Qa'ida figure and
did not possess threat information, but this conclusion was not included in CIA representations.
In March 2004, the CIA received reporting from a CIA asset,
"ASSET that Janat Gul was planning with senior al-Qa'ida leaders to conduct attacks
inside the United States. The attacks were reportedly planned to occur prior to the U.S. elections
in November 2004.^^ '^ ASSET Y, who cited Janat Gul as the source of the information, stated
that Gul was going to facilitate a meeting between Abu Faraj al-Libi and ASSET Y in support of
the operation.As noted, CIA officers expressed doubts about ASSET Y's reporting at the
included, "Senator Boren, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Brennan, General Jones, Mr^raig^r^ippert^r. Smith,
Senator Hagel," as well asseveral CIA officialsjncl^ing Director Hayden, John Rizzo,
[REDACTED], and Legal The briefing book includes the document "Briefing Notes
on die Value of Detainee Reporting," dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims found in the
document of the same name, but dated April 15, 2005. The "Briefing Notes" document was provided to the
Department of Justice in April 2005, in the context of the Department's analysis of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.
Italics added. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and InteiTogations
(RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials
attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack
[sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." Expected participants included,
"Senator Boren, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Brennan, General Jones^li^raie^l^Lippert, Mr. Smith, Senator Hagel,"
as well as several CIA officials, including Director Hayden, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], and
^^|CTC Legal ^|[|||m||. Tlie briefing book includes the document "Briefing Notes on the Value of
Detainee Reporting," dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims found in the document of the
same name, but dated April 15, 2005. The "Briefing Notes" document was provided to the Department of Justice in
April 2005, in the context of the Department's analysis of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques.
CIA records provided to the Committee identify the pseudonym created by the CIA for the asset. The Study
lists the asset as"ASSET Y" tofurther protect hisidentity^^
WASHINGTON19045^^HHmAR 04)
19O45^HHMARO40jlj^^H3633^^^^H04)




time it was received.^^^^ Asenior CIA officer, who formerly served as chief of
the Bin Ladin Unit, raised questions about the reliability of the asset's reporting on March
2004, stating that the reportingwas "vague" and "worthless in terms of actionable intelligence,"
and that al-Qa'ida "loses nothing" by disclosing the information. He further stated that, given an
al-Qa'ida statement emphasizing a lack of desire to strike before the U.S. election, and al-
Qa'ida's knowledge that "threat reporting causes panic in Washington" and "leaks soon after it is
received/^h^por^Svou^^ be an easy way [for al-Qa'ida] to test" ASSET ALEC Station
officer ^mH^H[|||||||||| expressed similar doubts about the source's reporting in response to
the email.
three month^ater^J^at Gul was captured in on
June BlOoT^^On June 2004, CIA's proposed that Gul be rendered to
CIA custody, citing ASSET Y's reporting.During this period, however, the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques had been suspended by the CIA director.On June 29,
2004, a draft memorandum from DCI Tenet to National Security Adviser Rice sought special
approval from the National Security Council Principals Committee to use the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against Janat Gul to learn more about the threat reporting from ASSET
Y 1939 memorandum referenced ASSET Y's reporting and stated that if the CIA could use
the techniques, "the Agency would be in an optimum position to obtain from Gul critical
intelligence necessary to save American lives by disrupting the pre-election plot, locating senior
al-Qa'ida leaders still at large, and learning how Usama Bin Laden communicates with his
operatives." The memorandum further stated that "[gjiven the magnitude of the danger posed by
Email from:
'^ 35 Email from:
[REDACTED],
REDACTED]?; date: March |
131211936
to cc:
|; subject: Re: could AQ be testing [ASSETY] and [Source Name
I, 2004, at 7:52:32 AM.
^3111
363T(||m^^^^04), which states "Gul is the source of[ASSET Y's] pre-election threat
information. This information forms a substantialpart of the USG's current pre-election threat assessment. Station
believes that ifGul haspr^le^on threat information, we must exploit him using ourbest resources. Those
resources do not exist in Station has interrogated many al-Qa'ida members in and while we have
been successful at times, our best infomiation is obtained when the detainee is interrogated in a CIA controlled
facility ([DETENTION SITE COBALT] or blacksite)."
"^38 Memorandum forDeputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, June 4,2004,subject,
"Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques." Memorandum for the National Security Advisor from DCI
George Tenet, June 4, 2004, re Review of CIA Interrogation Program.
1939 Draft memorandum from George Tenet to National SecurityAdvisorre Counterterrorist Interrogation
Techniques, attached to email from: ||||^|||||H||^H|^o^ohn MosemanJRED^TED], [REDACTED],
Stanley Moskowitz, Scott Muller, John RizzoTijj^^^lHl subject: Draft Documents
for Friday's NSC Meeting; date: June 29, 2004.
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to: [REDACTED],
|; subject: could AQbe testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?; date: March|
2004, at 06:55 AM.
Email from: to: [REDACTED],
|; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and[Source Name REDACTED]?; date: Marcl
2004, at06:55 AM. The eiiiai^ef^nces a March 17, 2004, al-Qa'ida statement. Speaking ofa second source
)rovidinfi threat reporting, noted that "i [sic] have always been concerned that [the asset]
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET// //NOFORN
the pre-election plot, and [Janat] Gul's almost certain knowledge of any intelligence about that
plot, I request the fastest possible resolution of the above issues."
^004, the day that CIA Headquarters approved the
rendition of Janat Gul to CIA custody,the CIA represented to select members of the National
Security Council that Janat Gul was one of the "most senior radical Islamic facilitators in
Pakistan," and noted that he was "assessed by a key source on [the] pre-election plot to be
involved in or [to] have information on the plot."^ '^^ ^ OnJuly 15, 2004, based on the reporting of
ASSET Y, the CIA represented to the chairman and vice chairman of the Committee that Janat
Gul was associated with a pre-election plot to conduct an attack in the United States.On July
20, 2004, select National Security Council principals met again, and according to CIA records,
agreed that, "[g]iven the current threat and risk of delay, CIA was authorized and directed to
utilize the techniques with Janat Gul as necessary."On July 22, 2004, Attorney General
Ashcroft approved the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul
based on ASSET Y's reporting.
1940 Draft memorandum from George Tenet to National Security Advisor re Countertenorist Interrogation
Techniques, attached to email from; ^^^H|^|^|^^^o^ohn MosemanJREDACTED], [REDACTED],
Stanley Moskowitz, Scott Muller, John RizzoT^^^^^^^^I and subject; Draft Documents
for Friday's NSC Meeting; date; June 29, 2004.
DIRECTOR (022300Z JUL 04)
'9'*^ Tlie CIA briefing slides fiirther asserted that debriefmgs ofJanat Gul by |||mm [foreign government]
officials were "not v^orking." {See CIA briefing slides, CIA Request for Guidance Regarding Interrogation
of Janat Gul, July 2, 2004). National Security Advisor Rice later stated in a letter to the CIA Director that "CIA
briefers informed us that Gul likely has information about preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as a
result of Gul's close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots." See July 6, 2004, Memorandum from
Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Honorable George Tenet, Director
of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul.
According to handv^ritten notes of the briefing, CIA briefers described Janat Gul as "senior AQ" and a "key
facilitator" with "proximity" to a suspected pre-election plot. Committee records indicate that CIA briefers told the
chairman and vice chainnan that, given the pre-election threat, it was "incumbent" on the CIA to "review [the] need
for EITs," following the suspension of"EITs." (See Handwritten notes ofAndrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077)^IA
notes (DTS #2009-2024 pp. 92-95); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 110-121).) ••jj^HCTC Legal ••
^mill later wrote that the "only reason" for the chairman and vice chairman briefing on Janat Gul was the
"potential gain for us" as "the vehicle for briefing the committees on our need for renewed legal and policy support
for the CT detention and interrogation program." See email from: mmil; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re:
Priority: congressional notification on Janat Gul; date: July 29, 2004.
July 29, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller re Principals Meeting
relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004.
Letter from Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCI McLaughlin, July 22, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4).
Attorney General Ashcroft, who attended the July 2, 2004, meeting, had opined earlier on the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogationtechniques against Janat Gul. See letter from Assistant Attorney General Ashcroft to
General Counsel Muller, July 7, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 3); July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting with
National Security Advisor Rice in the White House Situation Room, Friday 2 July re Interrogations and Detainee
Janat Gul; July 6, 2004, Memorandum fiom Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs to George Tenet, Director ofCentral Intelligence re Janat Gul; Memorandum from HHIHilH, to Jose
Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, m||||||m||, [REDACTED], restandard interrogation techniques
- DOJ limits, July 2, 2004.




Janat Gul was rendered to CIA custody on July 2004.^^"^^ On
August 2, 2004, Janat Gul denied knowledge of any imminent threats against the United States
homeland. Gul's denial was deemed a "strong resistance posture" by CIA detention site
personnel.Janat Gul was then subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from
August 3, 2004, to August 10, 2004, and then again from August 21, 2004, to August 25,
2004.'948
On August 19, 2004, CIA personnel wrote that the interrogation
"team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information."On August 25,
2004, CIA interrogators sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul "may not possess
all that [the CIA] believes him to know." The interrogators added that the interrogation "team
maintains a degree of caution in some areas, as many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida ai'ederived
from single source reporting," a reference to the CIA source, ASSET
That same day, August 25, 2004, the CIA's associate general
counsel provided a letter to the DOJ seeking approval to use additional CIA enhanced
interrogation techniques against Janat Gul: dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing, and the
abdominal slap. The letter asserted that Janat Gul had information concerning "imminent threats
to the United States" and "information that might assist in locating senior al-Qa'ida operatives
whose removal from the battlefield could severely disrupt planned terrorist attacks against the
United States." The letter stated;
"In addition, CIA understands that before his capture, Gul had been working to
facilitate a direct meeting between the CIA source reporting
on the pre-election threat [ASSET Y] and Abu Faraj himself; Gul had arranged
a previous meeting between [ASSET Y] and al-Qa'ida finance chief Shaykh
Sa'id at which elements of the pre-election threat were discussed."
The letter from the CIA's associate general counsel asserted that
Janat Gul's "resistance increases when questioned about matters that may connect him to al-
Qa'ida or evidence he has direct knowledge of operational terrorist activities."'^^- The letter
stated that the CIA sought approval to add four enhanced interrogation techniques to Janat Gul's
)^e^Volume II and IIIforadditional information.
1574 04). Notwithstanding this assessment, on August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA
Headquarters stated that Janat Gul "is believed to possess information about risks to the citizens of the United States
or other nations," that the "use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that information," and that
CIA Headquarters was therefore approving theresumed use of theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against
Janat Gul. See HEADQUARTERS MM 04).1622 (|||BH|04^^^
August 25, 2004, Letter froml^^H^H, Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office ofLega^ounse^DTC #2009-1809, Tab 10).
•952 August 25,2004 Letter from Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DTS #2009-1809, Tab 10).
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interrogation plan "in order to reduce markedly Gul's strong resistance posture and provide an
opportunity for the interrogation team to obtain his cooperation."^ '^'^ On August 26, 2004,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin informed CIA Acting General Counsel Rizzo that
the use of the four additional enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate any U.S. statutes,
the U.S. Constitution, or U.S. treaty obligations. Levin's letter stated that "[w]e understand that
[Janat] Gul is a high-value al Qaeda operative who is believed to possess information concerning
an imminent terrorist threat to the United States."^^^"^
August 27, 2004, Gul's CIA interrogators reported that "in
terms of overt indications of resistance, [Gul's] overall resistance is currently judged to be
minimal."^^^^ Nonetheless, on August 31, 2004, the CIAinterrogators asked CIA Headquarters
to approve an extension of all CIA enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul.^^^^ The
CIA's associate general counsel objected, writing:
"In the end, its [sic] going to be an operational call. I just want to be siu*e that
the record is clear that we're not acting precipitously and are taking into
consideration everything we're learning about this guy. We open ourselves up
to possible criminal liability if we misuse the interrogation techniques. I
reflect again on the cable or cables from the interrogation team that opines that
physical EITs (facial slap, walling, etc.) do not work on him. I would sti'ongly
encourage, then, HQS not to approval [sic] the use of physical interrogation
techniques because if they don't work, then our motives are questionable. If
our motives might bequestioned, then wegetourselves in trouble."^^^^
Despite these concerns, on September 3, 2004, CIA Headquarters
released a cable extending approval for sleep deprivation for 30 days. CIA records indicate,
however, that Gul was not subjected to sleep deprivation, or any other enhanced interrogation
technique, foUowing this approval.^^^^
On September 7, 2004, more than a month after Janat Gul was
rendered to CIA custody, a CIA officer who had observed the interrogations of Gul prepared a
memorandum for the leadership of the CIA's Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations Group,
stating:
"The definition of an HVD has probably become blurred over the past year as
[CIA] began to render a higher number of MVDs [medium value detainees],
but [Janat Gul] would not be considered an HVD when compared to Abu
1953 25, 2004 Letter from Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DTS #2009-1809, Tab 10).
Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; frora Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
August 26, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 6).
1631 (271859Z AUG 04)
HHH 1650£11620Z^G 041
See email frora: |||||HHIIHii'
IHmm, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: "Req toextend authorization touse EITs"; date;
September 1, 2004.
HEADQUARTERS •• (032155ZSEP 04)




Zubaydah, KSM, and similar level HVDs. [Janat Gul] should likewise not be
considered an operational planner or even an operator. It is very likely that
[Janat Gul] came into contact with operational information, but we lack
credible information that ties him to pre-election threat information or direct
operational planning against the United States, at home or abroad. Likewise,
we lack any substantive information that connects [Janat Gul] to UBL,
Zawahiri, and Abu Faraj Al-Libi."^^^^
Oil September 16, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that
Janat Gul's reporting directly contradicted information from ASSET Y from March 2004, and
stated that, "[m]uch of our derogatory information on [Gul] came from [ASSET Y] reporting, as
did much of our pre-election threat information.
On September 17, 2004, following the reports about the
discrepancies between the comments made by Janat Gul and ASSET Y, as well as similar denials
from Sharif al-Masri, who was in foreign government custody, the CIA undertook a
counterintelligence review of ASSET Y to assess the validity of ASSET Y's reporting.
//NF) On October i^004^nd October |, 2004, CIA officers provided a
assessment of ASSET Y. That assessment indicated that ASSET Y was
deceptive in response to questions regarding his alleged meeting with a senior al-Qa'ida official,
Shaykh Sa'id, at which ASSET Y claimed to have learned about the pre-election threat. ASSET
Y then admitted to having fabricated the information about the meeting.
Despite the recantation of reporting from ASSET Y, officers from
the CIA's ALEC Station continued to assess that Janat Gul "was one of the highest-ranking
facilitators in Pakistan with long-standing access to senior leaders in al-Qa' ida" and other
groups.^^^^ This assessment was not shared by CIA personnel involved inGul's interrogation.
On November 10, 2004, the CIA's chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK, the CIA
detention site hosting Gul, wrote that the words used by ALEC Station to describe Janat Gul:
Rather than a "high value detainee," the memo characterized Janat Gul as a "senior facilitator." The CIA officer
concluded that Gul was likely "not directlyincludedin operational planning and operations." See September7,
2004^I^Dorament EYES ONLY - written by
1706 (161749Z SEP 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "Janat Gul's claim that
[ASSET Y] never met the al-Qa'ida finance chief—who [ASSET Y] said told him about the pre-election tlireat—
was vital to CIA's assessment and handlingofttieMse. CIA officers assessed Gul was cooperating during his
interrogations by that time, leading CIA toj|||m||||| [ASSET Y] on the meeting and the plot, which he ultimately
recanted." As described earlier, CIA records indicate that Janat Gul denied knowledge of any imminent threats
against the United States homeland, which had been reported by ASSET Y, prior to the use of the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques againstGul. At the time, Gul's denial was deemed a "strong resistance posture"
by the CIA. 1497 04).
HEADOUARli^^^HJIPHIlB^;04)
1411 The cable states: "Afterm||||^|decepnm on the question
of meeting Sa'id, [ASSET Y] quicklyconfessed to [the CIA officer] that he had fabricated his meeting and blamed
pressure from his handling [CIA] officer to produce leads as the catalyst for his Ues." ASSET Y continued to assert
that he discussed the pre-election threat with Janat Gul, who, as noted, had denied to CIA interrogators that he had
any knowledge^ imminent threats to the United States.
'^ <^3 alec IIII (092126Z NOV 04)




..fly in the face of what is now a rather long history of debriefings which, 1
would assert, paint a very different picture of him. While [Janat Gul] was
certainly a facilitator, describing him as 'highest-ranking' gives him a stature
which is undeserved, overblown and misleading. Stating that he had 'long
standing access to senior leaders in al-Qa'ida' is simply wrong.... To put it
simply, [Janat Gul] is not the man we thought he was. While he no doubt had
associations and interactions with people of interest, [Janat Gul] is not the
pivotal figure our pre-detention descriptions of him suggest. We do a
disservice to ourselves, the mission and even [Janat Gul] by allowing
misperceptions of this man to persist."^^^
On November 22, 2004, a CIA officer noted the discrepancy
between the CIA's description of Janat Gul as a "potential source of intelligence information
regarding an attack by al-Qa'ida" in a draft OLC memorandum and the current assessment of
Janat Gul.'^ ^^ In an email, the CIA officer indicated that he had spoken to the CIA's associate
general counsel, informed him that "the state of our knowledge about
Gul had evolved since he was captured." The email noted that, "[a]t first, we believed he had
attack information of a more imminent nature," but "[n]ow it appears that he does not have such
information," The email indicated that would talk to personnel at OLC about the issue
to "[amend] the draft opinion to reflect the state of ourknowledge."^^^^ The OLC memorandum
was not updated.
On December 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote again
that Janat Gul was "not/not the man [CIA Headquarters] made him out to be," and that "[h]e is a
very simple man who, no doubt, did a capable job as a facilitator but he is not the link to senior
AQ leaders that [CIA Headquarters] said he was/is."^^^^
Email from: rREDACTED]; to:
subject: re ALEC I^HB^ate^ovei^er 10, 2004.
See email from;
November 22, 2004, a^^2^AM^^^^
See from:
November 22, 2004, at 8:25 AM.
CIA "Comments on Detainees," December 19, 2004, notes from DETENTION SITE BLACK. In April 2005,
the chief of Base where Janat Gul was held emailed that "[Janat Gul] was never the person we thought he was. He
is not the senior Al-Qa'ida facilitator that he has been labeled. He's a rather poorly educated village man with a
very simple outlook on life. He's also quite lazy and it's the combination of his background and lack of initiative
that got him in trouble. He was looking to make some easy money for little work and he was easily persuaded to
move people and run errands for folks on our target list. While he openly admits that he helped move people, it's
pretty well established that the vast majority of liis work involved seeking medical care and providing housing for
family members ofTaliir Jan's Uzbek organization. There simply is no 'smoking gun' that we can refer to that
would justify our continued holding of [Janat Gul] at a site such as [DETENTIONSITE BLACK]. It should be
noted, however, that [Janat Gul] has made what I think is great progress. He fingered [ASSET Y] as a fabricator
and has been generally responsive to requirements tliough, it must be said, he never had access to most of the
information we seek from him." See email from: [REDACTE^HCOB DETENTIO^SIT^BLACK); to:
cc: HHIHIH' subject: re date:
2005.
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April 6, 2005, as the OLC approached completion of its
analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC asked the CIA
about the interrogation of Gul using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically,
"what [the CIA] got from Janat Gul, was it valuable, [and] did it help anything....The CIA
di^ioHmmediately respond to this request and the CIA's Associate General Counsel
noted that OLC personnelhad "taken to calling [him] daily" for information. On
April 14, 2005, a CIA officeremailed talkingpoints stating that:
"Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul's most significant reporting helped us
validate a CIA asset who was providing informationabout the 2004 pre
election threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between
himself and al-Qa'ida's chief of finance, Shaykh Sa'id, a claim that Gul
vehemently denied.
Gul's reporting was later matched with information obtained from Sharif al-
Masr^n^Abu Talha, captured after Gul. With this reporting inhand, CIA
the asset, who subsequently admitted to fabricating his reporting
about the meeting."
May 10, 2005, the OLC issued a formal memorandum that
included a discussionof the legality of the use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques
against Janat Gul.^^ '^ Citing information provided in the CIA's August 25, 2004, letter, the OLC
memorandum stated:
"You asked for our advice concerning these interrogation techniques in
connection with their use on a specific high value al Qaeda detainee named
Janat Gul. You informed us that the CIA believed Gul had information about
al Qaeda's plans to launch an attack within the United States. According to
CIA's information, Gul had extensive connections to various al Qaeda leaders,
members of the Taliban, and the al-Zarqawi network, and had arranged
meetings between an associate and al Qaeda's finance chief to discuss such an
attack. .. .Our conclusions depend on these assessments,
Email from: to;
[REDACTED]; subjectjquest^ from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 6,2005.
Email from: to:
[REDACTED]^ubie^question^jon^L^o^rn^pinion^ate^^^^ 2005; email from:
questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 14, 2005.
from; pBHHH' IHHIHI'
I; subject: response to no. 5request froiTi^^H||^^|rOTA's Detainee Reporting Brief; date;
April 14, 2005.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo,SeniorDeputyGeneral Counsel,Central IntelligenceAgency, from StevenG.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 10,2005,Re; Application of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340Ato CertainTechniques That May Be Used in the Inten'ogation of a High Value al Qaeda
Detainee.
Memorandumfor John A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputyGeneral Counsel,Central IntelligenceAgency, from StevenG.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attoni&^eneral^ffic^^ega^ou^ May 10, 2005, Re: Application of
im M III I




On May 30, 2005, the OLC issued a memorandum concluding that
the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees did not violate
Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture. In the memorandum. Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Steven G. Bradbury used the example of Janat Gul as a detainee who
was "representative of the high value detainees on whom enhanced techniques have been, or
might be, used."^^ '^^
Bradbury wrote:
Citing information from the CIA's August 25, 2004, letter,
"the CIA believed [that Janat Gul] had actionable intelligence concerning the
pre-election threat to the United States... Gul had extensive connections to
various al Qaeda leaders, members of the Taliban, and the al-Zarqawi network,
and intelligence indicated that 'Gul had arranged a... meeting between [a
source] and al-Qa'ida finance chief Shaykh Sa'id at which
elements of the pre-election threat were discussed.
As noted, the CIA had represented that the use of the CIA's
enhanced inteiTogation techniques was necessary for Janat Gul to provide information on an
imminent threat to the United States, the pre-election threat. As further noted, Gul did not
provide this information and records indicate tliat the threat was based on fabricated CIA source
reporting. When the OLC requested the results of using the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation
techniques against Janat Gul, the CIA represented that "Gul has provided information that has
helped the CIA with validating one of its key assets reporting on the pre-election threat." This
information was included in the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, which also stated that Gul's
information "contradicted the asset's contentionthat^Gul met with Shaykh Sa'id," and that,
"[a]nned with Gul's assertions, the CIA the asset, who then admitted that he had
lied about the meeting."^^^^ There are no indications in thememorandum that the CIA informed
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda
Detainee.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the ConventionAgainstTorture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal DeputyAssistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of tlie Convention AgainstTorture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal DeputyAssistant Attorney General, Office of LegalCounsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the ConventionAgainstTorture to Certain Techniques that May Be
Used in tlie Interrogation of High Value al QaedaDetainees (brackets in the original). The OLC memorandum also
cited an "Undated CIA Memo, 'Janat Gul' {'Janat Gul Memo'). The OLC also relied on CIA representations that
Janat Gul's intenogations "greatly increasedthe CIA's understanding of our enemy and its plans."
1976 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attonie^General^ffic^^ega^oun^l, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
1(11 I (III I IKII Mill I
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the OLC that CIA officers had concluded that Gul had no information about the pre-election
threat and had determined that Gul was "not the man we thought he was."'^ ^^ As noted, after the
May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, the CIA continued to represent that the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques allowed the CIA to validate sources.
8. The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha
The CIA represented that information obtained through the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable intelligence that led
to the identification and/orarrestof UzhairParacha and his father SaifullahParacha (aka, Sayf
al-Rahman Paracha). These CIA representations include inaccurate information and omit
significant material information—specifically a body of intelligence reporting acquired prior to
CIA detainee reporting that linked the Parachas to al-Qa'ida-related activities.
CIA representations also credit the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques with the identification of a plot to smuggle explosives into the United
States involving the Parachas.CIA records indicate that the plotting was denied by the
supposed participants, and that at least one senior CIA counterten'orism official questioned the
plausibility of the explosives smuggling plot given the relative ease of acquiring explosive
material in the United States.
The CIA provided information to the CIA Office of Inspector
General that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our successes," and
stated that the CIA OIG Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts
have thwarted attacks and saved lives."'^ ^^ The CIA further represented to tiie OIG that KSM
United States Obligations Under Article 16of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques thatMay Be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
The OLC relied on CIA representations that Janat Gul hadinfoniiation, but thathe withheld it. In describing the
interrogation process, theOLC stated tliat Janat GuI's resistance increased as questioning moved to his "'knowledge
of operational terrorist activities.'" The OLC also wrote that "Gul apparently feigned memory problems (which CIA
psychologists ruled out tlirough intelligence and memory tests) in order to avoidanswering questions." The OLC
furtherconveyedthat the "CIA believes that Janat Gul continues to downplay his knowledge." See Memorandum
forJohn A. Rizzo, SeniorDeputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United
StatesObligations UnderArticle 16of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that MayBe Used in
the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
As described elsewhere, on April21, 2009, a CIA spokesperson confirmedthe accuracyof the information in
the OLC memorandum in response to the partial declassification of this memorandum and others.
Amongotlierdocuments,see Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Directorfor
Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IGSpecial Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation
Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of
CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.
See details in the intelligence chronology in Volume II.
CIA memorandum to the CIA InspectorGeneral from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Directorfor Operations,
dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Countertenorisra Detention
and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004.
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"provided information that helped lead to the arrest of... Uzair Paracha, a smuggler,"and that
"as a result of the lawful use of EITs";
"KSM identified a mechanism for al-Qa'ida to smuggle explosives into the US
via a Pakistani businessman and textile merchant who shipped his material to
the US. The businessman had agreed to use this method to help al-Qa'ida
smuggle inexplosives for follow-on attacks to 9/11."^^^^
Similarly, on July 29, 2003, the CIA made a presentation to a
select group of National Security Council principals, including Vice President Cheney, seeking
policy reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA briefing materials state that "the
use of the [CIA interrogation] techniques has produced significant results," and warned that
"[t]ermination of this [CIA] program wiUresult in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA
conveyed that "[m]ajor threats were countered and attacks averted," and under a briefing slide
entitled "RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO," represented that information obtained from
KSM after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to the "identification" of
Saifullah Paracha.
A widely disseminated CIA Intelligence Assessment, entitled
"Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," that was described in internal CIA
emails as being "put together using past assessments" and initially intended for the White House
only, with "marching orders" to"throw everything in it,"^^^^ states:
"Since 11 September 2001, detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of
US counterten-orism efforts, aiding... operations to capture additional
terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots... KSM's revelation in March 2003
1982
, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center
ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. These representations were included in the final, and now declassified Special
Review of the Inspector General, which states that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrests of
tenorists including Sayfuliah Paracha and his son Uzair, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muhammad planned to
use to smuggle explosives in New York." (SeeCIA InspectorGeneral Special Review, Counterteri'orism Detention
and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004). The statements in the
Special Review regarding the purported effectivenessof the program, including the reference to the Parachas, were
cited by the Office of Legal Counsel in its analysis of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques. See
Memorandum for John A, Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, ft-om Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Officeof LegalCounsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be
Used in the Interrogation ofHigh Value alQaedaDetamees, pp. l^^^citin^G Special Review, pp. 85-91.
Email firom: to: •!••••; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
; subject: re Additionon KSM/AZ and measures; date: February9, 2004. Memorandum for:
InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt,Deputy Directorfor Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG
Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Inten-ogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004;
attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's CounterteiTorism Detention and Interrogation
Activities.
1984 memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefingslides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program, " dated
July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
See email from: [REDACTED]; to: multipleaddresses; subject: "Draft of lA on 'Detainee ReportingPivotal to
the War on Terrorism'"; date: May 16, 2005, at 2:08 PM.




that he was plotting with Sayfal-Rahman Pamcha—who also used the name
Saifullah al-Rahman Paracha—to smuggle explosives into the United States
for a planned attack in New York prompted the FBI to investigate Paracha's
business ties in the United States
CIA representations related to the "identification" of the Parachas
and/or the anrest of Uzair Paracha—as well as the identificationof an explosives smuggling
plot—omitsignificant information acquired by the Intelligence Community prior to any
reporting from CIA detainees. Specifically, prior to KSM's reporting, the Intelligence
Community had already collected and acted upon significant information related to the Paracha
family's connections to al-Qa'ida and international terrorism:
• Information on Saifullah Paracha was found in documents seized during a March 28,
2002, raid against al-Qa'ida targets associated with Hassan Ghul, which resulted in the
capture of Abu Zubaydah. The documents identified "Saifullah Piracha" (the spelling
found in the document seized during the raid) and phone numbers, which would be
associated with his Karachi-based business. International Merchandise Pvt Ltd, as early
as April 2002. An address associated with the business was also identified.
• The name "Saifullah Piracha" was provided to Pakistani officials by the CIA in
December 2002. The CIA wrote: "Information below leads us to believe that the
following individual and phone numbers may have a connection to al-Qa'ida and
international terrorism.... We request your assistance in investigating this individual to
determine if he is involved in terrorist activity." The request included three phone
numbers found in the documents seized on March 28, 2002, one of which was associated
with Saifullah Paracha's Karachi-based company, International Merchandise Pvt Ltd. '^^ ^^
• In April 2002, the FBI opened an investigation on another at a
New York-based business associated with Saifullah Paracha. During the course of the
investigation, the FBI interviewed an employer at a New York address and acquired
additional information on the business and the Parachas. business
card, identifying him as an employee of International Merchandise Limited, was found
among documents seized during the April 2002 Karachi raid.'^ ^^
1986 Italics added. CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal fortheWar Against Al-Qa'ida," June
2005, which CIA records indicatewas provided to White House officialson June 1,2005. The Intelligence
Assessment at the SECRET//NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June 3,2005. On
Maich 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheneyrequested the declassification of this IntelligenceAssessment, wliich
was publicly released with redactions onAugust 24, 2009.
DIRECTOR (221835Z APR 02); ALEC•• (222235Z DEC 02); DIRECTOR•• (221835Z
APR 02)
ALEC (222235Z DEC 02)
1989 pgj WASHINGTON DC(271623Z MAR 03); ALEC (191630Z MAY 03) (cables explaining previous
FBI investigative action on Paracha). On March 28, 2003, tlieFBI wouldreturn to the sameemployerand the same
address, leading to the apprehension of Uzhair Paracha, who wouldvoluntarily provide significant reporting to the
FBI.
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• Months later, financial documents seized during the September 11, 2002, raids that
resulted in the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh identified an email address attributed to
International Merchandise Pvt Ltd., with the same contact—Saifullah A. Paracha—as
well as the same address and phone number as the business identified after the March
2002 raidJ^^o
• Based on the information obtained during the September 2002 raids, the CIA informed
the FBI, the NSA, and the Department of Treasury that they suspected "Saifullah
Paracha" was engaged in terrorist financing activities, specifically for al-Qa'ida. The
cable included detailed information on Saifullah Paracha and International Merchandise
Pvt Ltd in Karachi, and noted the CIA's ongoing interest in, and analysis of, the
information.
• FBI investigative activity of terrorism subject lyman Faris found that Paris was linked to
Paracha Imports via his Ohio-based housemates,
• Majid Khan, who was in foreign government custody, provided reporting that "Uzhair"
ran the New York branch of his father's Karachi-based import-export business.
According to the reporting, Uzhair was assisting Majid Khan and Ammar al-Baluchi in
their efforts to resettle Majid Khan in the United States for terrorism-related purposes.
Khan provided a detailed physical description ofboth Uzhair and his father,'^ ^^
was captured on March 1, 2003. On March |, 2003, KSM
was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.A CIA interrogation report from March 24, 2003, states that during the
afternoon, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,
including the waterboard, for failing to provide information on operations in the United States
and for having "lied about poison and biological warfare programs."That evening, KSM's
interrogators received reports oninformation being provided by Majid Khan,'^ ^^ who was in
foreign government custody and being interviewed by FBI special agents and foreign
government officers. The information included details on a U.S.-based individual associated
with al-Qa'ida named Uzhair. According to Khan, this Uzhair ran the New York branch of his
CIA (040123Z DEC 02)/
CIA^^I (040123Z DEC 02)/
ALEC ^^^222235Z DEC 02).
See FBI investigative file
138901993
. See also
\. See also and
The cable describing Majid Khan's foreign government intenogation
also included Khan's reporting on how Ammar al-Baluchi intended to have Uzhair use Majid Khan's credit card to
create the appearance that Majid Khan was already in the UnitedStates. As described in the full Committee Study,
the cable further detailed Khan's two meetings with Uzhair and his father, and a subsequent phone call with Uzhair
(following Uzhair's return to the United States), all of which were facilitated by Ammar al-Baluchi.
See ••• 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); 10972 (241122Z MAR 03); and the KSM detainee review
in Volume III.
•'-'95 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); ••• 10972 (241122Z MAR 03)
Majid Khan was detained in Pakistani on March 5,2003. See HUH 13658 (050318Z MAR 03);
13659 (050459Z MAR 03); DmECTOR^^B(050459ZMA^3).




father's Karachi-based import-export business.CIA cables describe KSM as being "boxed
in" by reporting from Majid Khan^^^^ before providing the following information on the
Parachas and a smuggling plot:
• KSM corroborated reporting from Majid Khan that Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan
approached Uzhair Paracha for assistance in rcsettling Majid Khan in the United
States.
• KSM stated that he was close to Uzhair's father, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha, who provided
assistance throughhis business and by helping to find safe houses in Karachi.-^^®
• KSM claimed that Ammar al-Baliichi and Majid Khan approached Sayf al-Rahman
Paracha with a plan to use Sayf al-Rahman Paracha's textile business to smuggle
explosives into the United States. KSM stated that Paracha agreed to this plan and was
arranging the details with Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan at the time of his (KSM's)
capture.~®^^ A later CIA cable provided additional background, stating: "KSM did not
volunteer [the explosives plot] information on Paracha. He provided this reporting only
when confronted with details on his role and otlier information on the plot, which had
been provided by detainee Majid Khan," who was in foreign government custody
According to CIA records, on March 28, 2003, at a FBI field
office, Uzhair Paracha provided significant information to interviewing FBI special agents on his
father's links to al-Qa'ida and his own efforts to assist Majid Khan's reentry to the United States.
Uzhair denied knowing anything about an explosives smuggling plot. '^^ ^
April 29, 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi was detained by Pakistani
authorities as a result of reporting unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
Records indicate Ammar al-Baluchi provided significant information prior to being transferred to
CIA custody. '^^ '^^ OnMay 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi was rendered to CIA custody and
alec
13890 ••• 10984 (24235IZ MAR 03)
10983 (242321Z MAR 03). The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that "[r]eporting from
interrogations of KSM was directly and uniquely responsible for the arrests of Saifullah Paracha and his son Uzhair
Paracha." The CIA Response also asserts that Majid Khan's reporting "was disseminated iust after KSM provided
the information that allowed us to identify Paracha" (emphasis in the original). This is inaccurate. The cable
describing KSM's interrogation specifically references the cable describing Majid Khan's detailed reporting from
interrogations in foreign government custody andhow KSM was "boxed in" by the information provide by Majid
Khan.
10984 (24235IZ MAR 03), disseminated as
10984 (24235 IZ MAR 03), disseminated as
10984 (24235 IZ MAR 03), disseminated as |
I(052230Z MAY 03)|(012248ZAPR03)
section of this summary on the Karachi Plots, including I429I (021645Z MAY 03) and ALEC
m (142334Z MAY 03). ACIA cable describes aCIA officers meeting with the foreign government officer
who used rapport-building techniques to acquire information from Ammar al-Baluchi. The officer stated that
Ammar al-Baluchi was "more chatty" than Khallad bin Attash (who was also in foreign government custody at the
time), and that Ammar "acknowledgedplans to attack U.S. Consulate officials at the airport, the Consul General's
Residence and the Consulate itself." See m^^Hl9647^^^^H^^|0^.




immediately subjected to theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^^ The CIA stopped
using theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ammar al-Baluchi on May 20, 2003.^"^^
A June 18, 2003, cable states that Ammar al-Baluchi denied that he and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha
agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States. Ammar al-Baluchi stated he only asked
Sayf al-Rahman Paracha questions and made inquiries about how explosives shipping could be
done. Ammar al-Baluchi maintained thathe did not take any action basedon the discussion.^®^^
On July 5, 2003, Saifullah Paracha was detained injjHHfl, inan
operation orchestrated by die FBI.^°°^ Shortly thereafter, Saifullah Parachawas rendered to U.S.
military custody at Bagram Air Force Base.^^^ At Bagram, Saifullah Paracha was questioned by
an FBI special agent.^^^^ A CIAcable from July 17,2003, relays that SaifuUah Paracha stated
that Ammar al-Baluchi had asked if he knew a forwarding agent who could ship garments and
"materials" to Europe, which Saifullah Paracha inferred were either explosives or chemicals.
Paracha stated he had no information to provide to Ammar al-Baluchi on this topic and tliat no
further action was taken on the matter.^'^' ^
(i^!S/4l|[||||||||HHHIil^^) With regards to the explosives smuggling reporting, a senior CIA
counterterrorism official commented:
2011
"again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable knuckleheads... why
'smuggle' in explosives when you can get them here? neither fertilizer for
bombs or regular explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to
86058
Email from; to: [REDACTE^; subject^o^|oo^^tion - DCI Highlight on
Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:10 AM; email from: to; cc: [REDACTED];
subject: Re: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date; July 7, 2003, at 11:18:39 AM.
13588 (171505Z JUL 03)
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2006 pqj. additional details, see detainee review for Ammar al-Baluchi in Volume in.
DIRECTOR•• (181929Z JUN 03), disseminated as 39239
(301600ZMAY 03)2008 fcom; [REDACTED]; subject^o^ooMi^tion -DCI Highlight on
Paracha; date; July 7,2003, at 11:10 AM; email from; ||^B|||H||B; to; cc; [REDACTED];
subject: Re: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; datejJuly7^2003^atl^
{See /nterview of Office of the Inspector General, August 5,2003). The
CIA originally sought to take direct custodyofSaifullah Parach^Or^la^^OO^ CTC's chief of opemtions,
sent an email to and CTC attorney HH
|, with a proposal for the CIAto detain Saifullah Paracha and interrogate him using the CIA's enhanced
inteiTogation techniques, writing; "we MUST have paracha arrested witliout delay and transferred to cia custody for
interrogation using enhanced measures, i understand that paracha's us person status makes this difficult, but tliis is
dynamite and we have tomove forward witli alacrity^wha^o you needtodothat?wha^ we need todo that?"
See CIA document for; date; 6 May
According to CIA records noted above, Saifullah Paracha's eventual capture and rendition to U.S. military custody
was complicated by According to emails witliin CTC
Legal, Paracha was '1
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET// //NOFORN
conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks and got everything he needed right
here, this may be tme, but it just seems damn odd to me."^^^-
9. Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jajfar al-Tayyar
The CIA made repeated claims that the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques resulted in "key intelligence" from Abu Zubaydah and KSM on an
operativenamed Jaffar al-Tayyar,later identifiedas Adnan el-Shukrijumah.^^^"^ TheseCIA
representations frequently asserted that information obtained from KSM after the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in an FBI investigation that prompted al-
Tayyar to flee the United States. These representations were inaccurate. KSM was captured on
March 1, 2003. Jaffar al-Tayyar departed the UnitedStates in May 2001.^®^^
CIA representations also omitted key contextual facts, including
that: (1) the Intelligence Community was interested in the Florida-based Adnan el-Shukiijumah
prior to the detention of the CIA's first detainee;^®^^ (2) CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided a
description and information on a KSM associate named Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI special agents in
to:
BH^^BBBHrsu^ectTseehighlight: again, another ksm op worthy ofthe lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at
6:29:08 AM.
Also known as (aka) Adnan GulshairMuhammad el-Shukrijumah, Jafaar al-Tayyiir, and Abu Jafar al-Tayer.
Spellingused throughout the Committee Studyreflects, to the extentpossible, the spellingfound within intelligence
records.
CI^Memorandim Bradbury atOffice ofLegal Counsel, Department ofJustice, dated March 2, 2005,
from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." See also CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director,Central Intelligence Agency, 12
April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563). See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War
Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005.
Tlie Intelligence Assessment at the SECRET//NOFORN level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On
March 31, 2009, fonner Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which
was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. See also CIA graphic attachment to several CIA
briefingson the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques, entitled, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from
Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)." See also CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta
entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009."
2015 The CIA's June 2013Response states that "therewerecases in whichwe either made a factual enor or used
imprecise language, but these mistakes were not central to our representations and none invalidates our assessment
that detainee reporting providedkey intelligence on this important tenorist." As one of two examples, the CIA's
June 2013 Responseacknowledges that the "[CIA] inconectly stated al-Tayyarfled the UnitedStates in responseto
the FBI investigation, although he had in fact already departed the United States by this time." The Committee
found that this inaccurate statement was central to the CIA's representations. The CIA asserted that "Ja'far al-
Tayyar" fled the United States becauseof KSM's reporting after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques in the context of representations that the use of the techniques "has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has
failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West."
ALEC (210218ZMAR03). Extensive open source records include"Broward Man Sought as Terror
Suspect," Miami Herald, dated March 21, 2003; "Pursuit of al-Qaeda keeps coming back to Fla.," USA Today, dated
June 15, 2003; and "A Hunt for 'The Pilot,'" U.S. News and World Report, dated March 30, 2003. For context, see
also United States District Court SouthernDistrict Florida, Case No. 02-60096, UnitedStates of America v. Imran
Mandhai and Shueyb Mossa Jokhan, filed May 16, 2002.
I (II MUM i




May 2002, prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques(3) CIA
personnel distmsted KSM's reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar—stating that KSM fabricated
information and had inserted al-Tayyar "into practically every story, each time with a different
role";^°^^ (4) otherCIAdetainee reporting differed from KSM's reporting in significant
ways;^^^^ and (5) CIArecords indicate that KSM did not identify al-Tayyar's true name and that
it was Jose Padilla—in military custody and being questioned by the FBI—who provided al-
Tayyar's true name as Adnan el-Shukrijumah.^^-^ Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM the
characterization of al-Tayyar as the "next Mohammed Atta," despite clarifications from KSM to
the contrary
For example, in a March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum with the
subject line, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," the CIA
responded to a request from the Office of Legal Counsel "for the intelligence the Agency
obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of
intelligence [value]." Under a section entitled, "Results," the CIA stated:
"CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced inteiTogation techniques, as part of a
comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt ten-orist
plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical
intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these
interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a
spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III and!
2018 10334 (132140Z MAR 03); email from: to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED];
subject: Re: Reissue/Correction: CT: Comments on Khalid Shaykli Muhammad on imminent threats to U.S. targets
in Tliailand, Indonesia, and the I^iilipin^^ate^l^h 12, 2003, at 9:36:57 AM; 42247
(210357Z JUL 03); email from: to: [REDACTED], f
I, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED];
subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi's Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar~If Ammar
is Conect, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme--and His Deception
Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03 11:24 AM.
Email from: ^^•••1; to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: REISSUE/CORRECTION:
CT: CT: Comments on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad on imminent threats to U.S. targets in Thailand, Indonesia, and
the Philipines; date: March 12,2003, at9:36:57 AM; National Countertemmsn^ente^REFLECTTO "Ja'far al-
Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa'ida OperatjonaTrh^^ December 2005; 42247
(210357Z JUL 03); email from: [REDACTED],
I, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED];
subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi's Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar~If Ammar
is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jafftirin a Extended Deception Scheme—and His Deception
Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03 11:24 AM.
CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on
Aprin5^005, at 10:47AM. For KSM's inabihty to identif^;jiamej_£££j|^ |||H 10741 (100917Z MAR 03);
^taHHH^10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as \
10787 (130716Z MAR 03); 10863 (171028Z MAR 03). For example, November 6, 2006,
talking points prepared for a briefing with the President stated that "KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad
Atta." See CIA document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6,
2007, with the notation the document was "senn^DCI^Nov^ni^reparatioi^or POTUS meeting."
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collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation
techniques
The CIA then listed "Jafaar al-Tayyar" as one of 11 examples.
"Jafaar al-Tayyar: Tayyar is an al-Qa'ida operative who was conducting
casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs.
KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar—who is still at large—to conduct a
major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next
Muhammad Atta. Tayyar's family is in Florida and we have identified many
of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly
publicized Tayyar's true name and aggressively followed up with his family
and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the United States.
In January 2009, the CIA compiled a detailed briefing book—
CIA Director Hayden produced his own prepai-ed remarks—for a three-hour briefing on the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program for President-elect Obama's national security
staff.Included in the materials was a document entitled, "Key Impacts," which states:
"Results: CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as
part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt
terrorist plots, capture additional ten'orists, and collect a high volume of critical
intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these
interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a
spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence
collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques:^^^^
and
Emphasis in original document. CIA Memorandumfor Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department
of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject
"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."
CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005,
from ILegal Group, DCICounterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist InteiTogation Techniques."
CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including
"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials attached to cover
memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama
National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." The briefing book includes the previously
mentioned "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same
intelligence claims found in the documentof the same name, but dated April 15, 2005. Expected participants
included "Senator Boren, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Brennan, General Jones, Mr. Craig, Mr. Lippert, Mr. Smith, Senator
Hagel," as well as several CIA officials, including Director Hayden, IHHUHI' Rizzo,
[REDACTED], and ••^•1 Legal, |
Emphasis in original.
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... Jafaar al-Tavvar: Tayyar is an al-Qa'ida operative who was conducting
casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs.
KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar—who is still at large—to conduct a
major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next
Muhammad Atta. Tayyar's family is in Florida and we have identified many
of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly
publicized Tayyar's tme name and aggressively followed up with his family
and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee theUnited States.^^^^
Prior to receiving information from the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program, the U.S. Intelligence Community was interested in Adnan el-
Shukrijumah. According to CIA and open source records, the FBI interviewed the parents of
Adnan el-Shukrijumah several times between September 2001 and October 2002 concerning
their son and his suspected contact with a known extremist. The family provided no significant
information on their son, except to alert the FBI that he had departed the United States circa May
2001.2^2^
CIA representations that Jaffar al-Tayyar fled the United States in
2003 in response to an investigation prompted by reporting from KSM were incongruent with
CIA records at the time of tlie representations, which indicated that al-Tayyar had already
relocated to Pakistan. In March 2003, when Jose Padilla identified Jaffar al-Tayyar as Adnan al-
Shukrijumah, he stated that he had last seen al-Tayyar at a KSM safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan,
in March 2002.^^^^ Otherreporting indicated al-Tayyar'spresence in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003,
as well. For example, KSM consistently reported that al-Tayyar was not in the United States and
noted during a 2004 interrogation that al-Tayyar "would not return to the United States because
2026 CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]n some of the early representations, we incorrectly stated al-
Tayyar fled tlie United States in response to the FBI investigation, although he had in fact already departed the
United States by this time" (italics added). As noted, tliis representation was made by the CIA as late as January
2009, to President-elect Obama's national security team.
2027 Eniphases in original. CIA Briefingfor Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions,and
Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced
materials attached to cover memorandum with tlie title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect
Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." The briefing book
includes the previously mentioned "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" dated 15 May 2006, wliich
provided the same intelligence claims in the document of tlie same name, but dated April 15, 2005. See "RDI Key
Impacts."
ALEC (210218Z MAR 03). Extensive open source records include "Pursuit of al-Qaeda keeps coming
back to Fla.," USA Today, dated June 15, 2003; "Broward Man Sought as Terror Suspect," Miami Herald, dated
March 21, 2003; and "A Hunt for 'The Pilot,'" U.S. News and World Report, dated March 30, 2003. Tlie FBI
confirmed for the Committee that Adnan el-Shukiijumah departed the United States in May 2001. See DTS #2013-
0391.
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc;j^HH; subject: Padilla Breaks; date: May 1, 2003, at 08:51 AM; CIA "Briefing Notes on the Valu^^etainee
Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the Department ofJustice on April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM; ALEC mm
(210218ZMAR03).




his name was known to U.S. authorities.""^^ Further,
2031
On May 20, 2002, prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques—and while being questioned by FBI special agents—CIA detainee Abu
Zubaydah provided information on "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" in the context of discussing associates
of KSM. Abu Zubaydah provided a detailed description of "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" and stated that
he was an English speaker who had studied in the United States. Abu Zubaydah stated that he
first met "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" in Birmal,Afghanistan, circa January 2002, and that "Abu Jafar
al-Tayer" was at that time seeking to travel to Pakistan. Abu Zubaydah repeated that "Abu Jafar
al-Tayer" spoke "very good English" and was "short and stocky with black hair and dark
skin."^^^^ Abu Zubaydah did not provide significant additional information on Abu Jaffar al-
Tayyar after the CIA used its enlianced interrogation techniques againsthim in August 2002."^^^
September 11, 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured in
Karachi, Pakistan.-^^"^ During the capture operation, a letter referencing Jaffar al-Tayyar was
seized. According to a translation of the letter, it stated "tell an unidentified pilot named Ja'far
that he should be ready for travel."-'^ ^^ Shortly afterhis capture, binal-Shibh was rendered to
foreign government custody."^^^ In November 2002, while still inforeign government custody,




I^IRECimBMI (210549Z SEP 04); 24533 (171207Z SEP 04). See also
14425 ^^If^^^mrdescribing reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar from the interrogation ofAmmar al-
Baliichi in foreign government custody.
HEADQUARTERS
and Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee
Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated
July 20,2010, (DTS #2010-2939). See also 10092 (211031Z APR 02); 10022 (121216Z
APR 02); •••••; ^0321 (231427ZMAY 02); |
2033 See HEADQUARTERS ^^K^0239Z JAN 03);
For example, in January 2003, a CIA cable stated that Abu Zubaydah repeated that al-Tayyar studied in the
United States. TTie only new information provided by Abu Zubaydahwas that al-Tayyar's nickname, "the pilot,"
did not necessarily mean that al-Tayyarcould fly an airplane. Abu Zubaydah explained to CIA officers that the tern
"the pilot" also means someone who is righteous.
ALEC^IP (11155IZ SEP 02)
CIA B^Hf^72303Z NOV 02). See "Klialid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths,
Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003. For more on the letters that were seized during the
September 11, 2002, raids in Pakistan, see ALEC•• (110154Z JAN 03). See also DIRECTOR |
(172117Z SEP 02).
See••H 22507 22508 20744
(072303Z NOV 02)
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On March 1, 2003, KSM was captured. A notebook associated
with KSM retrieved during the capture operation included the name "Jafar al-TAYYAR."^®^^
After his capture, KSM was rendered to CIA custody, and immediately subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques,
On March 7, 2003, CIA Headquarters sent information on Jaffar al-
Tayyar to the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLUE, where KSM was located, for use in the
interrogation of KSM.^^"^® The documents included the following:
• a "targeting study" onJaffar al-Tayyar completed by the CIA in January 2003;^^^
• a letter from KSM to bin al-Shibh referencing "Jafar the Pilot" and indicating that
"Jafar" "ought to prepare himself to smuggle himself from Mexico into an unspecified
countiy;
• a letter from Jaffar al-Tayyar to Ramzi bin al-Shibh asking for clarification of KSM's
letter; and
• additional background and reporting information onJaffar al-Tayyar.^^"^^
The requirements cable from CIA Headquarters to the detention
site included numerous specific questions, relying on the information akeady known about Jaffar
al-Tayyar.2043
According to CIA records, on March 9, 2003—while KSM was
being interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but before he was
subjected to the waterboard interrogation technique—die CIA interrogation team used two letters
referencing al-Tayyar as the "interrogation vehicle" to elicit information from KSM on Jaffar al-
Tayyai*.^®'^ '^ CIA cables state that KSM did not provide—and claimed not to know—Jaffar al-
Tayyar's true name. However, KSM stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar's father lived in Florida and
was named "Shukri Sherdil."- '^^ ^ This information was not accurate. Open source reporting
indicates that Jaffar al-Tayyar's father's true name was "Gulshair El Shukrijumah.^ '^^ ^
2038 3 2003, IntelligenceCommunity Terrorist Threat Assessment regarding KSM threat reporting, entitled
"Khalid ShaykliMuhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Sunounded by a Bodyguard of Lies."
See KSM detainee review in Volume III.
20"° ALEC (072215Z MAR 03)
ALEC ^^1(1102097 JAN 03)
alec (072215Z MAR 03)
ALEC (072215Z MAR 03). For more on the letter^i^ were seized during the September 11, 2002,
raids in Pakistan, andAbuZub^ah's reporting, see ALEC |[^HU(n0^154Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR]
(172117Z SEP 02); 10092 (21103IZ APR 02)T^^^B 10022 (121216Z APR 02);
1; 111111111110321 (231427Z MAY 02); Federal Bureau of Investigation
documents pertaining "to the interrogationof detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939).2044 HHH 10741 (100917Z MAR 03)
10741 (100917Z MAR 03); 10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as •
2046 Among other open source news reports, see "Father denies son linked to terror." St. Petersburg Times, published
March 22, 2003.




over the course of the next two weeks, during the period when
KSM was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—inckiding the
waterboard—KSM referred to Jaffar al-Tayyar as being engaged in multiple terrorist operations.
As a result, the CIA's detention site began describing Jaffar as the "all-purpose" al-Tayyar whom
KSM had "woven... into practically every story, each time with a different role."-®'^ ^ CIA
records confirm that KSM made numerous statements about Jaffar al-Tayyar's terroristplotting
that were deemed not to be credible by CIA personnel,including, but not limited to,
statements that:
• al-Tayyar was engaged in terrorist plotting with Jose Padilla;^®"^^
• al-Tayyar was engaged in terrorist plots against Heathrow Airport;^^ '^^
• al-Tayyar was involvedin terrorist plotting with Majid Khan;^®^^ and
• al-Tayyar was engaged in an assassinationplot against former President Jimmy
Carter.-^^-
March 12, 2003, when KSM was confronted with a page in his
notebook about al-Tayyar, KSM stated that he "considered al-Tayyar to be the 'next 'emir' for
an attack against the US, in the same role that Muhammad Atta had for 11 September."-^^^ On
March 16, 2003, KSM stated that the only comparison between Atta and al-Tayyar was their
education and experience in the West.-'^ '^^
An email exchange the afternoon of March 18, 2003, between CIA
personnel expressed the views of interrogators and officers at CIA Headquarters with regard to
KSM and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The email from KSM debriefer stated:
"we've finally gotten [KSM] to admit that al-Tayyar is meant for a plan in the
US, but I'm still not sure he's fessing up as to what Jafar's role/plan really is.






142247 (210357Z JUL 03); email from: ; to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi's
Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar--If Ammar is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a
Extended Deception Scheme-and His Deception Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03, at 11:24 AM.
See also CIA (072303ZNOV02) and "KhalidShaykhMuhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths,
Surrounded by aBodyguard ofLies," HCT^pri^, 2003.
10741 (100917Z MAR 03); 11377 (231943Z APR 03),disseminated asI
10778 (12I549Z MAR 03), disseminated as 10883 (182127Z MAR
03), disseminated as IHUHl 1717 (201722Z MAY 03), disseminated as i|||^|H||HH||
10894 (191513Z MAR 03)I^^^H 10902 (201037Z MAR 03)
10959 (231205Z MAR 03); 10950 (222127Z MAR 03)
10787 (1307I6Z MAR 03)
10863 (171028Z MAR 03). It is unclear if KSM made the comparison in the first instance, or if the
March 13, 2003, cable provided an inaccurate account of KSM's statements. The CIA's June 2013 Response states
that "KSM did not call al-Tayyar 'the nextMuhammad Atta.'" The CIA's June 2013 Response characterizes the
inaccuracy as "an imprecise paraphrase of KSM."




before Padilla - you get the point. Anyway, I'm still worried he might be
misdirecting us on Jafar."- '^''^
An officer from CIA Headquarters responded, "I agree.. .KSM is
yanking our chain about Jafar... really trying hard to throw us off course... suggesting whatever
Jafar really is up to must be baaaad [sic]." The officer noted that "[ajnother big hole is Jafar's
true name," and relayed that KSM's use of "another Abu name... Abu Arif... doesn't get us
far."^^^^ When KSM was confronted with the reporting he had provided on Jaffar al-Tayyar,
KSM claimed that he had been forced to lie about al-Tayyar because of the pressure he was
under from his CIA interrogators, who had been subjecting KSM to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques since his rendition to CIA custody.
Additional CIA records from this period indicate that, while KSM
claimed not to know Jaffar al-Tayyar's true name, KSM suggested that Jose Padilla, then in U.S.
military custody, would know his name. According to CIA records, the "FBI began participating
in the militaiy debriefmgs [of Jose Padilla] in March 2003, after KSM reported Padilla might
know the true name of a US-bound al-Qa'ida operative known at the time only as Jaffar al-
Tayyar. Padilla confirmed Jaffar al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan El Shukrijumah."-^^^
March 2003, a senior CTC officer noted differences between
KSM's reporting and reporting from Ramzi binal-Shibh.^®''^ In April 2003, an Intelligence
Community assessment concluded, based on comments from other detainees—including those
not in CIA custody—that "[i]t seemed obvious that KSM was lying with regard to Jaffar al-
Tayyar."^^^® In July 2003, afterAmmar al-Baluchi stated thatJaffaral-Tayyar was not suited to
be an operative and was "not doing much of anything," the deputy chairman of the Community
Counterterrorism Board warned:
"If [KSM] has pulled off focusing us on a person who is actually no threat, it
would mean that our interrogation techniques have not/not broken down his
resistance to any appreciable extent - and that we wiU have to doubt even more
strongly anything he says."^*^ '^
2055 Note for- [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED], OFFICE: [DETENTION SITE BLUE]; Subject: JAFAR
REQUEST; date: March 18, 2003, at 08:16:07 PM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March 18, 2003, at
03:49:33 PM.2057 [^^H^io902 (201037Z MAR 03); •|||^| 10959 (231205Z MAR 03); 10950 (222127Z MAR
03);HH| 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as
2058 "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting"faxed from tlie CIA to the Department of Justice on
April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM. On March 21, 2003, CIA records state that a photograph of Gulshair El Shukrijumah's
son was obtained from the FBI and shown to KSM, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Zubaydah, who all identified the
photograph as that ofal-Tayyar. See ALEC ||HH (210218Z MAR 03).
Email from: to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: REISSUE/CORRECTION:
CT: COMMENTS OF KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD ON IMMINENT THREATS TO U.S. TARGETS IN
THAILAND, INDONESIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES; date: Maich 12, 2003, at 9:36:57 AM.
2060 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Tlireat Reporting - Precious Truths, Sunounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT,
April 3, 2003.
42247 (210357Z JUL 03); email from: to: [REDACTED],
J, [REDACTED],
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InDecember 2005, an NCTC Red Team report, entitled "Ja'far al-
Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa'ida Operational Threat," highlighted the possibility that the
information provided by KSM on al-Tayyar's capabilities and terrorist plotting was simply
deception. The report described alarge body of other detainee reporting—from Abu Faraj al-
Libi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, 'Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani, and Ammar al-Baluchi—
consisting of largely dismissive statements about Jaffar al-Tayyar's capabilities and role in al-
Qa'ida.-"^-
10. The Identification andArrestofSaleh al-Marri
The CIA represented to the CIA Office ofInspector General that
as a result of the lawful use of EITs,"^°^^ KSM "provided information that helped lead to the
arrests of terrorists including... Saleh Almari, a sleeper operative inNew York."^"^ This
information was included in the final version of the OIG's May 2004 Special Review under the
heading, "Effectiveness.""®^^ This CIA representation is inaccurate. KSM was captured on
March 1, 2003.^®^ Saleh al-Marri was arrested in December 2001.^®^^
The inaccurate statements about al-Marri to the OIG began with
the July 16, 2003, OIG interview ofDeputy Chief ofALEC Station and
[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS; subject: RATHER
PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi's Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar--If Ammar is Correct, then
KSM Appears to Have aFocused Us on Jaffar in aExtended Deception Scheme-and His Deception Capabilities are
Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03, at 11:24 AM.
National Counterterrorism Center, REFLECTIONS, "Ja'far al-Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa'ida Operational
Tlireat, 22 December 2005. While NCTC's "mainline analytic group" disagreed with the Red Team's analytical
conclusions, records do not indicate that the Red Team's account of the contrary detainee reporting was challenged
Draft MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE from the Office ofthe Director
of^National Intelligence General Counsel; SUBJECT:
See CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations
dated February 27, 2004, witli the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes ofCIA's Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogatioi^^ities," dated February 24, 2004.2064 Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center
ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003; and CIA Office ofInspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism
Detention and Intenogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Intenogation Program,
(2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
2066 41351
Information on ALI SALEH MKAL-MARRI, provided by the FBI to the Committee, March 26, 2002 (DTS
^2002-1819).(^^^M6^003, informed the OIG that KSM's information "helped lead to the arrest of al-Marri.
Memorandum for the Record; subjec^eeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center
ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003). Two days later, wrote an email with information intended for CIA
leadership that stated, accurately, that al-Marri "had been detained on a material witness warrant based on
information linking him to the 911 financier Hasawi." {See email from: to-
^[REDAOTDl^^Mjjj^M, [REDACreD] '
valueof detainees; date: July 18.
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were repeated in DDO Pavitt's formal response to the draft OIG Special Review.-®^^ The
inaccurate statements were then included in the final May 2004 Special Review. Ihe
"Effectiveness" section of the Special Review was used repeatedly as evidence for the
effectiveness of theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including in CIArepresentations
to the Department of Justice. The passage in the OIG Special Review that includes the
inaccurate CIA representation that KSM provided information helping to lead to the arrest of al-
Marri was referenced in the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum analyzing the legality ofthe
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.The portion of the Special Review discussing al-
Marri has been declassified, as has the OLC memorandum.^®^^
The CIA also represented, in Pavitt's formal response to the OIG,
that prior to reporting from KSM, the CIA possessed "no concrete information" on al-Marri.2<^^^
The January 2004 draft OIG Special Review included the inaccurate information provided by that
KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Saleh Ahnery, asleeper
operative in New York." (See CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG) January 2004). CTC's response to the draft Special Review was likewise
prepared by HHl' ^ho wrote: "KSM also identified aphotograph of asuspicious student in New York whom
tlie FBI suspected of some involvement with al-Qa'ida, but against whom we had no concrete information. Aftei
describing KSM's renorting. wrote, "[tlhis student is now being held on a material witness warrant." {See
emaU from; cc: •••lil. [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004.) DDO Pavitt sformal
response to the OIG draft Special Review included this representation, adding that the information was provided "as
a result ofthe lawfijl use ofElTs." Pavitt's memo to die OIG did not acknowledge that the "student now being held
on a material witness waixant" had been anested more than a year prior to the capture ofKSM. Nor did itcorrect
the inaccurate information in the OIG's draft Special Review tiiat KSM's information "helped lead to the arrest" of
al-Marri. See memorandum for Inspector General from James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG);
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program,
(2003-7123-IG), May 2004. . . , ^
In its May 30,2005, memorandum, the OLC wrote, "we understand that interrogations have led to specific,
actionable intelligence," and "[w]e understand that the use of enhanced techniques in the interrogations of KSM,
Zubaydah and others... has yielded critical infonnation" (Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General
Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the
Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda
Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11), citing IG Special Review at86,90-91.
20^2 The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "CIA mistakenly provided incorrect information to the Inspector General
(IG) tliat led to aone-time misrepresentation of this case in tlie IG's 2004 Special Review. The CIA sJune 2013
Response states that "[t]his mistake was not, as it is characterized in the 'Findings and Conclusions section of the
Study, a 'repeatedly represented' or 'frequently cited' example of the effectiveness of CIA's interrogation program.
Tlie Committee found that, in addition to the multiple representations to the CIA OIG, the inaccurate information in
the final OIG Special Review was, as noted above, provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice to support the
Department's analysis of the lawfulness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The OIG Special Review
was also relied upon by the Blue Ribbon Panel evaluating the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogaUon
techniques, and later was cited in multiple open source articles and books, often in the context of the "effectiveness"
to: co: [REDACTED,. [REDACTED],
^^^^^^J^ubjecTreAddition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9,2004. Memorandum for:
Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG
Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTogation Program"^2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004;
1(11 iM III I ini mil I




This representation is incongruent with CIA records. CIA records indicate that prior to the
CIA's detention of KSM, the CIA possessed significant information on al-Marri, who was
an-ested after making attempts to contact a telephone number associated with al-Qa'ida member
and suspected 9/11 facilitator, Mustafa al-Hawsawi.-^^"^ CIA records indicate that al-Mam had
suspicious information on his computerupon his arrest,^^^^ that al-Marri's brother had travelled
to Afghanistan in 2001 to join in jihad against the United States,^®^^ and that al-Marri was
directly associated with KSM, as well as with al-Hawsawi.^®^^
The FBI also had extensive records on al-Marri. On Maich 26,
2002, a year before any reporting from KSM, the FBI provided the Committee with biographical
and derogatory information on al-Mani, including al-Marri's links to Mustafa al-Hawsawi,
suspicious information found on al-Marri's computer, and al-Marri's connections to other
2078
extremists.
11. The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan
the context of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, the CIA represented to policymakers over several years that "key
intelligence" was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that
revealed Shkai, PakistaiM^^|^Tiaio^^£idahubiiU tribal areas," and resulted in
"tactical intelligence in Shkai, Pakistan."-^^^ These CIA
attachment; February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's CounterteiTorism Detention and Interrogation
Activities.
ALEC (292319Z APR 03)
The laptop contained files and Internet bookmarks associated with suspicious chemicals and chemical
distributors, aswell as computer programs typically used by hackers. See WASHINGTON (122314Z MAR
03); ALEC (292319Z APR 03).
CIA WASHINGTON DC (260018Z MAR 03)
2077 p^Qj. jQ capture of KSM, Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani told the FBI that al-Marri had called KSM and had
been seen with KSM at an al-Qa'ida guesthouse. In addition, email accounts found on a computer seized during the
raid that captured KSM revealed links to accounts associated with al-Marri. See ALEC |^ BH^92319Z APR 03);
WASHINGTON•• (122314Z MAR 03); ALEC (031759Z MAR 03); ALEcHH (052341Z MAR
03).
The FBI information included that al-Mairi's brother "traveled to Afghanistan in 1997-1998 to train in Bin -
Laden camps." It also indicated that al-Marri's computer revealed bookmarks to websites associated with religious
extremism and various criminal activities, as well as hacking tools {See FBI document on Ali Saleh MK Al-Marri,
provided to the Committee, March 26, 2002 (DTS #2002-1819)). Despite the extensive derogatory information on
al-Marri in the possession of both the CIA and FBI, the CIA's June 2013 Response repeats previous CIA
representations that prior to KSM's reporting, the CIA had "no concrete information" on al-Marri. The CIA's June
2013 Response also states that the previously obtained information was "fragmentary," and that while the CIA and
FBI were aware of al-Marri's links to al-Qa'ida and "stronglysuspectedhim of having a nefarious objective,""botli
agencies... lacked detailed reporting to confirm these suspicions...."
Among other documents, see\ (1) CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central
Intelligence/^ubje^"Effectivenes^f^^ Counterten^^nten-ogation^^ included in email
from; to; and subject: on
value of interrogation techniques"; date; December 6, 2004, at 5;06:38 PM. The email references the attached
"information paper to Dr. Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques," (2) CIA Memorandum for
Steve Bradbury atOffice ofLegal Counsel, Department ofJustice, dated March 2,2005, from Hm||||||||||,
m Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation
Techniques," (3) CIA Talking Points entitled/Talkin^oint^^^^Marcl^OOS DCI Meeting PC; Effectiveness of




representations were based on the CIA's experience with one CIA detainee, Hassan Ghul. While
CIA records indicate that Hassan Ghul did provide information on Shkai, Pakistan, a review of
CIA records found that: (1) the vast majority of this information, including the identities,
activities, and locations of senior al-Qa'ida operatives in Shkai, was provided prior to Hassan
Ghul being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) CIA's HjjfjjlH
assessed that Ghul's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques contained sufficient detail to press the Pakistani and (3)
tlie CIA assessed that the infonnation provided by Ghul corroborated earlier reporting that the
Shkai valley of Pakistan served as al-Qa'ida's command and control center after the group's
2001 exodus from Afghanistan.^®^^
As an example of one of the CIA's representations on Shkai,
Pakistan, and the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, on March 2,
2005, the CIA responded to a request from the OLC "for the intelligence the Agency obtained
from detainees who, before their inteiTogations, were not providing any information of
intelligence [value]." The resulting CIA memorandum, with the subject line "Effectiveness of
the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included the following under the heading,
"Results":
"CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a
comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disnipt terrorist
plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical
intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these
interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a
spectaculai* attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence
collected from HVD interrogations after applying inteiTogation
techniques:"^^^^
UN¥) The CIA then listed "Shkai, Pakistan" as an example, stating:
"Shkai, Pakistan: The inteiTogation of Hassan Ghul provided detailed tactical
intelligence showing that Shkai, Pakistan was a major Al-Qa'ida hub in the
tribal areas. Through use of during the Ghul
the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," (4) CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006,
entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the
President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Progiams," (5) CIA classified Statement for the
Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central
Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563), and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation
Program" (DTS #2007-3158), iind (6) CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions,
and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009, "
prepared "13 January 2009."
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date:
December 30, 2005, at 8:14:04 AM.
Italics in original document. CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of
Justice, dated March 2,2005, from HiLegal Group, DCI CounterteiTorist Center, subject
"Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterten:orist Interrogatior^echnique^^^^^^




interrogation, we mapped out and pinpointed the residences of key AQ leaders
in Shkai. This intelligence was provided
The CIA representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable tactical intelligencerelated to Shkai,
Pakistan, was provided to senior policymakers and the Department of Justice between 2004 and
2009.2083
Hassan Ghul was captured on January B' ^004, by foreign
authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.^^^ Ghul was reportedly first interrogated by |
2085 transferred to U.S. miHtary custody and questioned, and then rendered to CIA
custody on January B' 2004?^^^^ Hassan Ghul spent two days atDETENTION SITE COBALT
before being transfeiTed to the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLACK on January B, 2004. Prior to
his capture, the CIA assessed that Ghul possessed substantial knowledge of al-Qa'ida facilities
and procedures in Wana and Shkai, Pakistan.
(^PS/y^BBI^Hflll^^) During Hassan Ghul's two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT,
CIA interrogators did not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul. Instead,
CIA cables state that upon his arrival at the CIA detention site, Hassan Ghul was "examined, and
CI^Memorand^ for^ Bradbury atOffice ofLegal Counsel, Department ofJustice, dated March 2, 2005,
from ^B1 Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness ofthe CIA
Counterterrorist InteiTogation Techniques." In itsJune 2013Response, the CIA states: "We neverrepresented that
Shkai was previously unknown to us or that Gul only told us about it after he was subjected to enhanced
interrogation techniques. We said that after these techniques were used, Gul provided 'detailed tactical
intelligence.' That intelligencedifferedsignificantly in granularity and operational utility from what he provided
before enhanced techniques." As described in this summary,CIA representationsabout intelligence on Shkai were
used as evidence of the necessityand effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA did
not inform policymakers or the Departmentof Justice about the extensive information provided by Hassan Ghul on
Shkai prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
See, for example, CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,"
Subie^"Effectivenes^nh^^ Counterterrori^nterroeat^^ included in email from:
BBB> BBUBlBiii^Bl' IBBI^^^I> BiBBIIIBBB> subject: on value
interrogation techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM; CIAMemorand^ for Steve Bradbury at Office
ofLegal Counsel, Department ofJustice, dated March 2, 2005, fi-om B^^^^BI> BBI Legal Group, DCI
Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."2084 21753 HEADQUARTERS BH^HBtAN 04)
On April 16, 2013, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film,
"Manhunt." The forumincluded former CIA officerNadaBakos,whostatesin the film that HassanGhul provided
critical informationon Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti'sconnection to UBL to Kurdishofficials prior to entering CIA
custody. When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds, Bakos stated: .honestly, Hassan
Ghul.. .when he was being debriefed by the Kurdishgovernment,he literally was sitting there having tea. He was in
a safe house. He wasn't lockedup in a cell. He wasn't handcuffedto anything. He was—he was having a free
flowing conversation. And there's—you know, there's articles in Kurdishpapers about sort of their interpretationof
the story and how forthcoming hewas." See www.cfrorg/counterte^risiTi/film-screeninfi-manhunt/p30560.
^2^15|HipH||J||||^^H||||2m3
HEADQUARTERS |^B^^^BAN^iJTIBBII^I^BBiB 1 ^^^HJAN 04); DIRECTOR
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placed in a cell, given adequate clothing, bedding, water and a waste bucket."^^^^ During this
two-day period (January 2004, and January 2004),-"^^ Ghulprovided information for at
least 21 intelligence reports.^"^® As detailed below, Ghul's reporting on Shkai, Pakistan, and al-
Qa'ida operatives who resided in or visited Shkai, was included in at least 16 of these
intelligence reports.^®^^ The reports included information on the locations, movements, and
operational security and training of senior al-Qa'ida leaders living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as
the visits of leaders and operatives to the area. The information provided by Ghul included
details on various groups operating in Shkai, Pakistan, and conflicts among the groups. Hassan
Ghul also identified and decoded phone numbers and email addresses contained in a notebook
seized withhim, some of which were associated with Shkai-based operatives.^^^
Hassan Ghul described the origins of al-Qa'ida's presence in
Shkai, including how Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi became the original group's military commander and
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AN 04). CIA records state that Hassan Ghul was removed from
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1656 the dissemination
of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was cooperative with CIA
personnel prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques. In an interview with tiie CIA
OIG, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul stated, "He sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was











Hassan Ghul also described the roles of 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kanadi, aka Alimed Sai'd al-Khadr, and Abu Hamza
1685 ^^^KjAN 04)).



















mediating role of Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the role of Khalid Habib.-®^"^ Hassan Ghul explained
how he moved to Shkai due to concerns about Abu Musa'b al-Baluchi's contacts withlmH
how he traveled to Shkai to make contact with Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and how Abu
Faraj mediated between Ghul and Hamza Rabi'a.^®^^ Ghul stated that he last saw Abu Faraj in
the summer of 2003, when Ghul was seeking Abu Faraj's assistance in moving money from
Saudi Arabia to deliver to al-Hadi for support of their community in Shkai.
According to Hassan Ghul, Abd al-Hadi al-Ii'aqi moved
periodically among various houses within the village, including that of Abu Hussein and
whom he described as "seniormedia people for al-Qa'ida."^°^^ Elaborating on al-
Hadi's location, Hassan Ghul described the importance of both a madrassa and a guesthouse in
Shkai known as the "bachelor house," where unaccompanied men stayed. Ghul stated that he
last saw al-Hadi in December 2003 when al-Hadi came to the "bachelor house" to visit with
other Arabs.Ghul also identified other permanent and transient residents of the "bachelor
house."^®^^ He stated that al-Hadi, who he believed was seeking another safehouse in Shkai at
which to hold meetings, had approximately 40 to 50 men under his command. Hassan Ghul also
identified a phone number used to contact al-Hadi.
1685 04)
04)
Gul statedtha^bu Faraj was with his associate, Mansur Khan, aka Hassan. {See \
1654 04).) Hassan Ghul's reporting on Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi and Abu Faraj al-Libi
included discussion of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti's links to UBL. According to Ghul, during his time in Shkai in 2003,
al-Hadi would periodically receive brief handwritten messages from UBL via Abu Faraj, which he would share with
their group. Ghul stated that this did not necessarily mean that Abu Faraj knew the location of UBL, but rather tliat
he had a window into UBL's courier network. It was at this point that Hassan Ghul described the role of Abu
Ahmed al-Kuwaiti and his connections to UBL. See 1647 04)
See 1679 AN
Hassan Ghul stated that al-Hadi, who did not travel with a securitydetail, visited the madrassa every few days,
but less frequently of late due to the deteriorating security condition in Waziristan for Arabs. Ghul stated that when
he last saw al-Hadi, he was accompanied by an Afghan assistant named Sidri, aka S'aid al-Rahman. He also
identified Osaid al-Yemeni as an individual who assisted al-Hadi. See ^^g|||||||||||||^g|||||||||||||| j
JAN 04).2099 Hassan Ghul identified Yusif al-Baluchi, Mu'awiyyaal-Baluchi, aKmdnamedQassam^^ Usamaal-
Filistini, and Khatal al-Uzbeki as living in the "bachelor house.'* See 1654 H^Hi
JAN 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "After being subjected to enhanced techniques, [Hassan GhulJ
provided more granular infonnation." According to the CIA Response, it was in this context that Hassan Ghul
identified the "bachelor house/^wherel^ had met al-Hadi, and where "several unmarried men associated with al-
Qa'ida" lived, including A review of CIA records found that Hassan Ghul provided this
information prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Hassan Ghul identified a phone number in his phone book that he said had been provided to him by Hamza al-
Jawfi to pass messages to al-Hadi in emergencies. The phone number was under the name Baba Jan, aka Ida Klian.
Ghu^ls^dentifie^^iu^ for Maior^ka Ridwan, aka Bilal, who, he said, brought equipme^ to Pakistan. See
1654 1646 ||||HJAN




According to Hassan Ghul, as of December 2003, approximately
60 Arab males and between 150 and 200 Turkic/Uzbek males were living in Shkai, along with a
"significant population" of Baluchis who assisted theArabs and Uzbeks. '^^ ' Ghul described al-
Qa'ida training, including an electronics course taught in the fall of 2003 by Abu Bakr al-Suri at
the house of Hamza Rabi'a where, he believed, individuals were being trained for an ongoing
operation.^^®^ Ghul discerned from the training andRabi'a's statements that al-Qa'ida operatives
in Shkai were involved in an assassination attempt against Pakistani President Pervez
MushaiTaf.^^^^ Ghul statedHamzaRabi'a was alsolikelyplanning operations into Afghanistan,
but had no specifics. '^®'^
Hassan Ghul elaborated on numerous other al-Qa'ida operatives he




Hassan Ghul stated that Abu Jandal and anotlier Saudi of in the electronics course.
(^See 1654•••JAN 04); 1655
As described in a separate cable, Ghul stated that he had seen 10-15 Pakistanis tiaining with Rabi'aandAbuBala
al-Suri, whom he described as an al-Qa'ida explosives expert, in early to mid-October 2003. (See
••!• 1656 •••(lAN 04).) The CIA's June 2013 Response states that Hassan Ghul reported tliat Hamza
Rabi'a "was using facilities in Shkai to train operatives for attacks outside Pakistan," without noting Ghul's
reporting, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques, on Rabi'a's training of operatives.
Ghul explained that he was in Shkai following a previous assassination attempt, in early December 2003, when
there was "frequent talk among tlie brothers" about who might have been responsible. Wlien Ghul asked around,
"tliere was a lot of talk" that Rabi'a was involved in planning a subsequent operation. Rabi'a's statement tliat there
would beanunspecified operation soon, combined with tlie training conducted byRabTaandal-Suru^^ to
believe that the second assassination attempt was conducted by al-Qa'ida. See 1656
Hassan Ghul stated that itwas unlikelythatAb^WIad^KIraqUiad an^lann^operations, although al-Hadi
would likely assist ifthere were any. 1654 ••H^FAN 04).
Hassan Ghul stated that Shaikh Sa'id al-Masri, aka Mustafa Ahmad (Abu al-Yazid), came to Shkai around
November 2003 and currently resided tliere. Ghul stated that Shaikh Sa'id's son, Abdullah, travelled between Slikai
and a location in the greater Dera Ismail Klian area, where the rest ofShaikh Sa'id's family lived. See HHHjl
•{••I 1679 JAN
Hassan Ghul stated that Sharif al-Masri, who came to Shkai aiound October/November 2003 for a brief visit,
was handling operations in Qandahar while living just outside Quetta. Ghul identified two of Sharif al-Masri's
TOP SECRE^BMBBmi|||PW//NOFGRN




Abu Maryam,-^^^ Janat Gul,-^"^ Khalil Deek,^^®^ Abu Talha al-Pakistani,-'^^ Firas, and
others.^^^^
Finally, Hassan Ghul described his interactions with Abu Mus'ab
al-Zarqawi, which also related to al-Qa'ida figures in Shkai, in particular Abd al-Hadi al-
Iraqi.^^^^ Ghul described al-Zarqawi's request to al-Hadi for money, explosive experts, and
electronicexperts, and provided details of his own trip to Iraq on behalfof al-Hadi.^ '^"^ Hassan
Hassan Ghul was asked about Tariq Mahmoud, whom he thought might be Abu Maryam, a British citizen of
Pakistani descent whom Ghul met in Pakistan. According to Ghul, MaiyamhadbeeninsideAMia^ and hadBlin training in Shkai, but was apprehended in Islamabad. {See
AN 04).) Ghul identified a phone number for Abu Maryam. 1646
AN 04).
Hassan Ghul stated that he last saw Janat Gul in December 2003 in Shkai, when Janat Gul was delivering three
Arabs who had come from Iran. Janat Gul came to the "bachelor house" accompanied by Khatal. Ghul also
described a discussion from September/October 2003 at Hamza al-Jawfi's house in Shkai with al-Hadi and Abu
'Abd al-Rahman BM in which Janat Gul claimed to know Russians who could provide anti-aircraft missiles. Gul
askedfor money, but al-Hadi was reluctiint to make the commitment and did not want to work with Gul. According
to Hassan Ghul, Janat Gul left and subsequent conversations revealed that Janat Gul likely made the story up.Hassan Ghul^^^^^^^ione number for Janat Gul. 1679 ^^^^BjAN 04);
simply an observer. See \
'' Hassan Ghul was shown photos of individuals apprehended by on| October 2003
and identified one as a Yemeni named Fuas, "a well-trained fighter and experienced killer, who was known to be an
excellent shot." Ghul reported that, when he first aixived in Shkai, Firas was living there. Prior to hearing about
Firas' arrest, Ghul's understanding was that Firas was in Angorada with Khalid Habib, which Ghul characterized as
the "front line." The otlie^hot^dentifiec^^Ghi^was that ofan Algerian named Abu Maryam, whom helped
"hide out" in Shkai.





Hassan Ghul stated that in the late summerof 2003, al-Zarqawi made the request through Luay MuhammadHajj
Bakr al-Saqa (aka Abu Hamza al-Suri, aka Abu Muhammad al-Turki, aka Ala' al-Din), but that al-Hadi had not
wanted to assist. According to Ghul, al-Hadi had previously sent Abdullah al-Kurdi to Iraq, but al-Kurdi did not
want to engage in any activities and was rumoredto be "soft." This led al-Hadi to send Ghul to Iraq to speak with
al-Zarqawi regarding the possibility of select al-Qa'ida members traveling to Iraq to fight. According to the cable,
"Ghul claimed that the Arabs inWaziristan were tired, and wantedchai^," and that Ghul "was tasked toboth
discuss this issue with Zarqawi, and to recon the route." (See
1646 JAN 04).
Hassan Ghul also discussed Abu Bilalal-Suri, aka, Shafiq, who was the father-in-law of Khalil Deek, aka Joseph
Jacob Adams, aka Abu 'Abd al-Rahman BM, aka Abu Ayad al-Filistini. Wliile Ghul did not know where Abu Bilal
was located, he had recently seen Abu Bilal's son preparing a residence in Shkai. See
1679 JAN 04).
Hassan Ghul stated that he knew Talha al-Pakistani, aka Suleiman, peripherally, through KSM and Ammar al-
Baluchi. Ghul last saw Talha in Slikai around October/November 2003 at the residence of Hamza Rabi'a with agroup that was undertakii^^^^^^^^u|j^^iul stated that he was not sure if Talha was aparticipant or
1679
1644HI^VAN
Ghul also describe the roles of Yusif al-Baluchi, Mu'awiyya al-Baluchi, and Wasim aka Ammar aka Little Ammar
aka Ammar Choto, in facilitating Ghul's trip out of Pakistan, as well as his exact route. Ghul identified Yusif's
phone number in his notebook and described how Yusif had come to Shkai to gain al-Hadi's approval for a plan to








Ghul identified fouremailaddresses for contacting al-Zarqawi directly,-^ and described a
phone code he would use to communicate with al-Zarqawi.-Ghul also described his
conversations with al-Zarqawi, interpreted the notes he had taken of the last of his conversations
with al-Zarqawi, identified operatives whom al-Zarqawi and al-Hadi agreed to send to Iraq, '^^ ^
anddiscussed strategic differences between al-Zarqawi and al-Hadi related to Iraq.^^^^
On January •, 2004, after two days atDETENTION SITE
COBALT, during which Hassan Ghul provided the aforementioned information about al-Qa'ida
activities in Shkai and other matters, Ghul was transferred to the CIA's DETENTION SITE
BLACK.^^^^ Ghul was immediately, and for the first time, subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques. He was "shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing
position."-^-® According to a CIA cable, Hassan Ghul provided no new information during this
period and was immediately placed in standing sleep deprivation with his hands above his head,
withplans to lowerhis hands after two hours.^^^^ In their request to use the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on Ghul, CIA detention site personnel wrote:
"The interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the
initial contact, that his al-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S.
military inten-ogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical
contact interrogators can have with him. The inteiTogation team believes the
approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift




The notes, which Ghul intended to use to brief Abd al-Hadi al-liaqi, had been seized during Ghul's capture. The
topics included al-Zarqawi's willingness to provide missiles to al-Hadi, al-Zarqawi's offer to provide al-Hadi with
an unspecified chemical weapon agent, al-Zarqawi's request to al-Hadi for walkie talkies, and al-Zarqawi's
willingness to work out any disagreements with al-Hadi. According to Ghul, al-Zarqawi responded positively to al-
Hadi's offer of al-Qa'ida personnel and discussed a number of specific, named individuals, including Kliatal al-
Uzbeki and a Palestinian named Usama al-Zargoi. Al-Zarqawi requested that al-Hadi facilitate the travel of an
operative who could assist in training inexperienced operatives in proper operational security. Al-Zaiqawi also
identified a Jordanian explosives expert named 'Abd al-Badi, an Algerian explosives expert named al-Sur, and
Munthir, a Moroccan religious scholar who was a close friend of al-Zarqawi. Ghul identified another operative,
Abu Aisha, who explained to him that al-Zarqawi's reference to chemical weapons was likely a reference to a




According to Hassan Ghul, al-Zarqawi told Ghul in January 2004 that he intended to assassinate senior Shi'ite
scholars, attack Sh'ite gatherings with explosives, and foment civil war in Iraq. Ghul stated that Abd al-Hadi al-
Iraqi was opposed to any operations in Iraq tliat would promote bloodshed among Muslims, and had counseled al-
Zarqawi against undertaking such operations. Using Ghul as an envoy, al-Hadi had inquired with al-Zarqawi about
whether he (al-Hadi) should travel to L-aq, but al-Zarqawi had responded that this wa^io^^oo^dea^^perations




Page 375 of 499
UNCLASSIFIED




[Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these
increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and
reliable information in a timely manner."-^-^
CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques againstHassan Ghul in order to "sufficiently shift [Ghul's] paradigm of
what he can expect from the interrogation process, and to increase base's capability to collect
critical and reliable threatinformation in a timely manner."^^-^ CIA recordsdo not indicate that
information provided by Ghul during this period, or after, resulted in the identification or capture
ofany al-Qa'ida leaders^Afterhisam^ at DETENTION SITE BLACK, Ghul was asked to
identify locations on and line drawings of Shkai provided to him, for the first
time, by interrogators.^^^"^
Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai prior to the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques was compiled by the CIA for passage to the Pakistani
government. On January 28, 2004, issued a cable stating that the information
on Shkai provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, combined with reporting unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program, "moved Shkai to th^orefront^^^^^^^B/^andthat^l^^ Station is
currently its Shkai On January
29, 2004, ALEC Station proposedthat^^^^^^^^|inid^ adiscussion with the Pakistanis
on "possible Arabs in Shkai," and concurred with a tear-line that requests that Pakistan
'''' 1285 AN^H£ADQUARTERS^^ |^(^ |^B JAN 04). On DDO Pavitt expressed his personal
congratulations to the interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT, who elicited infonnation from Hassan Ghul
prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Pavitt's message stated: "In the short time Ghul
was at your location, [interrogators] made excellentprogress and generated what appears to be a great amount of
highly interesting information and leads. This is exactly the type of effort with a detainee that will win the war
against al-Qai'da. With th^ntellieence Station has obtained from Ghul, we will be able to domuch damage to the
enemy." See DIRECTOR JAN 04).
Many of the questions for Hassan Ghul for more specific locational information were about sites Ghul had
mentioned or described during his interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT. {See HEADQUARTERS
IJAN 04); |||H1299(^^H JAN 04);
IJAN 04); 20401 (|||FE^4)^
[REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
^••1, [REDACTED],
Shkai. Please provide comments/requirements;
June 2013 Response states that while Hassan Ghul provided "some detail about the activities and general
whereabouts of al-Qa'ida members in Shkai" prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, only
afterwards did he "provide[] more granular information when, for example, hesat down with ||||^^| experts and
pointed to specific locationswherehe met some of the senior al-Qa'ida members we were trying to find." A review
ofCI^ecords found that Hassan Ghul was not provided theopportunity to identify specific locations on
andline drawings until after he was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation technique^
The cable noted that "[b]efore Ghul's capture, the Shkai valley had already been an area of focus
Tlie cable detailed Hassan Ghul's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced
inteiTogation techniques, as well as information unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,
including extensive information on Slikai from ||||BH1 sources, the locations in Shkai
I, and exact geolocational coordinates for numerous sites in Shkai. See 60245
^04).
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FEB 04)). See also email from:
I, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: HG on
at 1:11:01 PM; and attachments.) The CIA's
UNCLASSIFIED
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"undertake to verify" the presence of "a large number of Arabs" in Shkai "as soon as
possible."2>26
January 31, 2004, CIA's drafte^^a^ with
an extensive "tear-line" for Pakistan, much of it related to Shkai. The cable from
referenced nine cables describing Hassan Ghul's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques,and no cables describing Ghul's reporting after the use of
the techniques.^^^^ The cable from thenstated that "Stationsees the type of
information coming from [Hassan Ghul's] interrogations as perfect fodder for pressing
[Pakistan] into action against associates of Hassan Ghul in Pakistan,
I, and other terrorist in Pakistan
The
tear-line for Pakistan included extensive information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.On Febniary 3, 2004^I^Ieadquarters
requested that the tear-line be passed to thePakistanis^but^ to on the
portions dealing with Shkai.^^^® As CIA's informed CIA Headquarters on
February 9, 2004, it intended to hold the information on Shkai until theDCTsvisitt^aki^
the following day. As Station noted, "this tearline will prove critical
"2131 meantime and afterwards, additional tear-lines were prepared for the
Pakistanis that were based primarily on reporting from Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, combined with Ghul's subsequent reporting, and information
from sources unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^^^"







(311146Z JAN 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "CIA continues to assess
that the information derived from Hassan Gul after the commencement of enhanced techniques provided new and
unique insight into al-Qa'ida's presence and operations in Shkai, Pakistan." The CIA's June 2013 Response also
defends past CIA representations that "after tiiese techniques were used, Gi^rovided 'detailed tactical
intelligence,"' that "differed significantly in granularity and operational ^||| from what he provided before
enhanced techniques." The CIA's Response then states that "[a]s^_result^fjiisjnfo^^ able to make a
case
CIA records found tliat the CIA had previously determined that the information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to
the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTOgation techniques was the "perfect fodder for pressing [Pakistan] into action."
2'30 HEADOUAR •}• (032357Z FEB 04)
12742 (090403ZFEB 04)
160796 (051600Z FEB 04); ALEC •• FEB 04); DIRECTOR (|
FEB 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[sjenior US officials during the winter and spring of 2004
^resented tlie Agency's analysis of Gul's debriefmgs and other intelligence about Shkai
As support, the CIA Response cites two cables that relied heavily on information
provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use^theCIA^enhanced interrogation tech^ues^^^ll as inforaiation
from unrelated sources. {See ALEC |||||^ MH|||^ ^^E^04)^1RECTO^^^^M FEB 04)).











InJuly 2004, the CIA assessed
^ that "al-
Qa'idaoperativeswith
activities and waiting for the siUiation to normalize in the tribal areas." In particular, "[a]l-
Qa'ida's senior operatives who were in Shkai before the military's offensive remained in South
Waziristan as of mid-June 12004]."-^^^ Later, in December 2005, a CIA detainee profile of
Hassan Ghul assessed that the information provided by Ghul confirmed earlier reporting in
CIA's possession that the Shkai valley of Pakistan served as al-Qa'ida's command and control
center after the group's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.^^Hassan Ghul was




12. Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation
Shortly after the raid on the Usama bin Ladin (UBL) compound on
May 1, 2011, which resulted in UBL's death, CIA officials described the role of reporting from
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in the operation—and in some cases connected
the reporting to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques.The vast majority of
2'33 Directorate of Intelligence, Al-Qa'ida's Waziristan Sanctuary Disrupted butStill Viable, 21 July2004 (DTS
#2004-3240).
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date:




Congressional Notification (DTS #2012-3802).
In addition to classified representations to theCommittee, shortly after the operation targeting UBL on May 1,
2011, there were media reports indicatingthat theCIA's Detention and InteiTOgation Programhad produced "the
lead infonnation" that led to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, the UBLcompound, and/or the overalloperation that led to
UBL's death. In an interview with Time Magazine, published May 4, 2011, Jose Rodriguez, the former CIA chief of
CTC, stated that: "Information provided by KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libbi about bin Laden's courier was the lead
information tliat eventually led to the location of [bin Laden's] compound and the operation that led to his death."
See "Ex-CIA CounterterrorChief: 'EnhancedInterrogation' Led U.S. to bin Laden." Time Magazine, May 4, 2011
(italics added). Former CIA Director Michael Hayden stated that: "What we got, the original lead information—
and frankly it was incomplete identity infomiation on the couriers—began with informationfrom CIA detainees at
the black sites" In another interview, Hayden stated: "...the lead information I referredto a few minutes agodid
come from CIA detainees, against whom enhanced interrogation techniques have been used" (italics added). See
Transcript from Scott Hennen Show,dated May 3, 2011, with former CIA Director Michael Hayden; and interview
with Fareed Zakaria, Fareed Zakaria GPS, CNN, May 8, 2011. See also "The Waterboarding Trail to bin Laden,"
by Michael Mukasey, WallStreet Journal, May 6, 2011. Former Attorney General Mukasey wrote: "Consider how
the intelligence that led to bin Laden came to hand. It began with a disclosure from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
(KSM), who broke like a dam underthe pressure of harsh interrogation techniques that included waterboarding. He
loosed a torrent of information—including eventually the nickname of a trusted courier of bin Laden." The CIA's
June 2013 Response confu-ms information in the Committee Study, stating: "Even after undergoing enhanced
techniques, KSM lied about Abu Ahmad, and Abu Faraj denied knowing him." The CIA's September 2012
"Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," (DTS#2012-3826) compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of
Intelligence, indicates that the CIA sought to publicly attribute the UBL operation to detainee reporting months prior
to the execution of the operation. Under the heading, "The Public Roll-Out," the "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin
Ladin" document explains that the CIA's Office of Public Affairs was "formally brought into the [UBL] operation in
late March 2011." The document states thaUh |^materia^PAprepare^o^^^ was intended to "describe the
1(11 i( nil
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the documents, statements, and testimony highlighting information obtained from the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, or from CIA detainees more generally, was inaccurate
and incongnient with CIA records.
records indicate that: (1) the CIA had extensive reporting on
Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti (variant Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti),^^^^ the UBL facilitator whose
identification and tracking led to the identification of UBL's compound and the operation that
resulted in UBL's death, prior to and independent of information from CIA detainees; (2) the
most accurate information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti obtained from a CIA detainee was
provided by a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteiTOgation
techniques; and (3) CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques withheld and fabricated information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.
Within days of the raid on UBL's compound, CIA officials
represented that CIA detainees provided the "tipoffinformation on Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti.^^"^^ A review of CIA records found that the initial intelligence obtained, as well as the
hunt and the operation," among other matters. The document details how, prior to the operation, "agreed-upon
language" was developed for three "vital points," the first of which was "the critical nature of detainee reporting in
identifying Bin Ladin's courier."
CIA documents and cables use various spellings, most frequently "Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" and "Abu Ahmad
al-Kuwaiti." To the extent possible, the Study uses the spelling referenced in the CIA document being discussed.
2139 Testimony from the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services
Committee on May 4, 2011. In testimony, CIA Director Leon Panetta referenced CIA "interviews" with 12 CIA
detainees, and stated that "I want to be able to get back to you with specifics.. .But clearly the tipoff on the couriers
came from those interviews." The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "CIA has never represented that information
acquired tlirough its interrogations of detainees was either the first or tlie only information that we had on Abu
Ahmad." Former CIA Director Michael Hayden provided similar public statements. See transcript of Scott Hennen
talk-radio show, dated May 3, 2011. Hayden: "What we got, the original lead information—and frankly it was
incomplete identity information on the couriers—began with informationfrom CIA detainees at the black sites. And
let me just leave it at that" (italics added).
2'''° See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5,2011, which includes a document
entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart
entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004).
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information the CIA identified as the most critical—or the most valuable—on Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti,was not related to the use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation technique
The CIA did not receive any information from CIA detainees on
Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until 2003. Nonetheless, by the end of 2002, the CIA was actively
targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and had collected significant reporting on Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti—to include reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's close links to UBL. CIA records
indicate tiiat prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA had collected:
• Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Telephonic Activity: A phone number associated with
Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was under U.S. government intelligence collection as early as
January 1, 2002.-^"^^ In March 2002, this phone number would befound in Abu Zubaydah's
address book under the heading "Abu Ahmad In April 2002, the same phone number
was found to be in contact with UBL family members.-'"^^ In June 2002, a person using the
identified phone number and believed at the time to be "al-Kuwaiti" called a number
The CIA's June 2013 Responsestates that the December 13, 2012, Committee Study "inconectly characterizes
the intelligence we had on Abu Alimad beforeacquiring information on him from detainees in CIA custody as
'critical.'" Tliis is incorrect. The Committee uses the CIA's own definition of what infonnation was important and
critical, as conveyed to the Committeeby the CIA. In documents and testimony to the Committee, the CIA
highlightedspecific information on AbuAhmadal-Kuwaiti that the CIA viewed as especiallyvaluableor critical to
the identification and trackingof Abu Ahmadal-Kuwaiti. For example, in May 4, 2011, CIA testimony, a CIA
officer explained how "a couple of early detainees" "identi[fied]" Abu Alimed al-Kuwaiti as someone close to UBL.
The CIA officer stated: "I think the clearestwayto think about this is, in 2002 a coupleof early detainees, Abu
Zubaydah and an individual, Riyadh the Facilitator, talked about the activities of an Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. At this
point we don't have his true name. And they identifyhim as somebody involved with AQ and facilitation and some
potential ties to bin Ladin." As detailed in this summary, CIA recordsconfirm that Riyadh the Facilitatorprovided
information in 2002 closely linking al-Kuwaiti to UBL,but these records confirmthat this information was acquired
prior to Riyadh the Facilitatorbeing rendered to CIAcustody (the transferoccurred more tlian a year later, in
January 2004). Abu Zubaydahprovided no information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. According to CIA
records, Abu Zubaydah was not askedabout Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until July 7, 2003, when he denied knowing the
name. As an additional example, see CIA documents and charts provided to the Committee (DTS #2011-2004) and
described in this summary, in whichthe CIA ascribes value to specific intelligence acquiredon al-Kuwaiti.
In otlier words, the information the CIA citedwas acquired from a detaineenot in CIA custody,obtainedfrom a
CIA detainee who was not subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, obtainedfrom a CIA detainee
prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, or acquired from a source unrelated to detainee
reporting. As described, the information contained herein is basedon a review of CIA Detention and Interrogation
Program records. Although the CIA has produced more than six million pages of material associated with CIA
detainees and the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the Committee did not have direct access to other,
more traditional intelligencerecords, to includereporting from CIA HUMINTassets, foreign government assets,
electronic intercepts, military detainee debriefings, law enforcement derived information, and other methods of
collection. Based on the information found in theCIA detainee-related documents, it is likely thereis significant
intelligence on "Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" acquired from a variety of intelligence collection platforms that the
Committee did not have access to for this review.
^^^^Cl^ecord ("Call Details Incoming and Outgoing") relating to calling activity for phone number
ACIA document provided to the Committee or^c^er 25, 2013, (DTS #2013-3152), states that the
CIA was collecting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's phone (#H^H) early as November 2001, and that itwas
collectionfrom this time that was used to makevoicecomparisons to later collection targeting Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti. (^03203IZ APR 02)
(102I58Z APR02)
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associated with All of this information was acquired in 2002, prior to any
reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Email Communications: In July 2002, the CIA had
obtained an email address believed to be associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.As early
as August 24, 2002, the CIA was collecting and tracking al-Kuwaiti's email activity. A cable
from that day states that an email account associated with KSM "intermediary Abu Ahmed
al-Kuwaiti" remained active in Karachi.^^"^^ On September 17,2002, the CIA received
reporting on al-Kuwaiti's email address from a detainee in the custody of a foreign
government. The detainee reported that al-Kuwaiti shared an email address with Ammar al-
Baluchi, and that al-Kuwaiti was "coordinating martyrdom operations."^^"^^ When KSM was
captured on March 1, 2003, an email address associated with al-Kuwaiti was found on a
laptop believed to beused by KSM.^^^° AU of this information was acquired priorto any
reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
A Body of Intelligence Reporting on Abu Ahmadal-Kuwaiti's Involvement in Operational
Attack Planning with KSM—Including Targeting of the UnitedStates: On June 10, 2002, the
CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating
that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was engaged inoperational attack planning with KSM.^^^^ On
June 25, 2002, the CIA received reporting from another detainee in the custody of a foreign
government coiToborating information that al-Kuwaiti was close with KSM, as well as
reporting that al-Kuwaiti worked on "secret operations" with KSM prior to the September 11,
2001, teiTorist attacks. '^^ ^ By August 9, 2002, the CIAhad received reporting from a third
detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was
supporting KSM's operational attack planning targeting the United States.^^^^ By October
20, 2002, the CIA had received reporting from a fourth detainee in the custody of a foreign
government indicating that a known terrorist—Hassan Ghul—"received funding and
instructions primarily from Abu Ahmad, a close associate of KSM."^^^"^ Allof this
2'''® Include^i^e^^il cables an^^peated in ALEC 02),
31049 CIA's June 2013 Response downplays the importance of tlie
email address and phone numbers collected on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating that the accounts were later
discontinued by Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and were "never linked" to bin Ladin's known locations. However, on
October 25, 2013, the CIA (DTS #2013-3152) acknowledge that the "voice cuts" from Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti
were acquired during tliis period (2001-2002) from the (H) phone number cited in the Committee Study.
According to CIA records, in February 2009 and September 2009, the voice samples collected from the Abu Ahmad
al-Kuwaiti (jj^B) phone number (under collection in 2002) were compared to voice samples collected against
which led the Intelligence Community toassess that wh^wa^eo-
located to a specific area of Pakistan, was likely Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. In August 2010, Abu Ahmad
Iand tracked tothe UBL compound. See intelligence chronology in Volume IIfor
additional details.
ALEC•• (240057Z AUG 02)
[REDACTED] 64883 (171346Z SEP 02). This information was repeated in ALEC (302244Z SEP 02).
ALECJPIH (102238Z MAR 03)
2'5i ^^H19448 (101509Z JUN 02)
DIRECTOR•• (251833Z JUN 02)
[REDACTED] 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC•• (092204Z AUG 02)
DIRECTOR•• (202147Z OCT 02)
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information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from
CIA detainees.
Significant Corroborative Reporting on AbuAhmad al-Kuwaiti's Age, Physical Description,
and Family—Including Information the CIA Would Later CiteAs Pivotal: In September
2001, the CIA received reporting on al-Kuwaiti's family that the CIA would later cite as
pivotal in identifying al-Kuwaiti's true name.^^^^ From January 2002 through October 2002,
the CIA received significant corroborative reporting on al-Kuwaiti's age, physical
appearance, and family from detainees held in the custody of foreign governments and the
U.S. military.All of this information was acquiredprior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad
al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
Multiple Reports on AbuAhmadal-Kuwaiti's Close Association with UBL and His Frequent
Travel to See As early as April 2002, CIA had signals intelligence linking a phone
number associated with al-Kuwaiti with UBL's family, specifically al-Qa'ida member Sa'ad
Bin Ladin.^^^^ On June 5, 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of
a foreign government indicating that "Abu Ahmad" was one of tiiree al-Qa'ida associated
individuals—to include Sa'ad bin Ladin and KSM—who visited him. The detainee—Ridha
al-Najjar—was a former UBL caretaker.^On June 25, 2002, the CIA received reporting
from another detainee in the custody of a foreign government—Riyadh the Facilitator—
suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier for UBL. Riyadh the Facilitator
See intelligencechronology in Volume n, specifically dated 17 September2001,
[REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001). See also foreign governmen^porting from September 27, 2002, describing
information from a detaineewho was not inCIA custody (CIA (27I730Z SEP02)). That reporting is also
highlightedin a CIA document, entitled, "Background DetaineeInformation on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," dated May
4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2004). The document highlights that "Detainee Abdallah Falah al-Dusari provided what he
thought was a partial true namefor Abu Ahmad—Habib al-Rahman—whom [CIA] ultimately identifiedas one of
Abu Ahinad'sdeceased brothers. However, this partial true name for liisbrother eventually helped [CIA] mapout
Abu Ahmad'sentire family, including the truename of Abu Ahmad himself." The CIAdocument did not identify
that Abdallali Falah al-Dusari was not a CIA detainee. In June 2002, the CIA also obtained another alias for Abu
Ahmad al-Kuwaiti—"Hamad al-Kuwaiti"—that included a component of his tnie name. Tliis infonnation was
provided by aforeign government and wasunrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. See
DIRECTOR•• (251833Z JUN 02).
See intelligence chronolog^nVolui^^ including 63211 (30 JAN 2002); DIRECTOR
(251833Z JUN02);^002; Mil I I 11II BB|l I HI I CIA
(271730Z SEP02); IHI I I II II ' ' ' OCT02);|
In testimonyon May 4, 2011, the CIA informed the Coimnitteethat "From the beginning, CIA focusedon the
inner circle around bin Ladin, the people that were around him, as a way to try and go after bin Laden." See DTS
#2011-2049.
CIA mpi (102158Z APR 02). Sa'ad bin Ladin was aknown senior al-Qa'ida member and had been
assorted with individuals engaged in operational planning targeting the United States. See, for example, ALEC
IBH (062040Z MAR 02) for his association with KSM operative Masran bin Arshad, who was involved in
KSM's "SecondWave" plotting. Phonenumber(s) associated with Sa'ad bin Ladinwereunder intelligence
collection andresultedinthe^^ ofother al-Qa'ida targets. See 293363 (051121Z
JUN 02) and 285184, as well as 20306 (241945Z JAN 04).
[REDACTED] 11515,June 5, 2002. As detailedin this summaryand in VolumeIII, Ridha al-Najjarwas
later rendered to CIA custody and subjecte^^j^Wsenhance^nte^gation techniques.
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highlighted that al-Kuwaiti was "actively working in secret locations in Karachi, but traveled
frequently" to "meet with Usama bin Ladin," '^^ ^^ Months earlier the CIA disseminated
signals intelligence indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and Riyadh the Facilitator were in
phone contact with each other.^^^^ In August 2002, another detainee in thecustody of a
foreign government with known links to al-Kuwaiti^^^^—Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili—reported that
al-Kuwaiti "was one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin."^^^^ All of this
information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from
CIA detainees.^
Within a day of the UBL operation, the CIA began providing
classified briefings to Congress on the overall operation and the intelligence that led to the raid
and UBL's death.^^®^ On May 2, 2011, CIA officials, including CIA Deputy Director Michael
Morell, briefed the Committee. A second briefing occurred on May 4, 2011, when CIA Director
Leon Panetta and other CIA officials briefed both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both of these briefings indicated that CIA detainee
information—and the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques—played a substantial role in
developing intelligence that led to the UBL operation. The testimony contained significant
inaccurate information.
(¥Sy^|||||||||mi|||||//NF) For example, in the May 2, 2011, briefing, the CIA informed the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that:
"However, there remained one primary line of investigation that was proving
the most difficult to run to ground, and that was the case of a courier named
Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. Abu Ahmed had totally dropped off our radar in
about the 2002-2003 time frame after several detainees in our custody had
highlighted him as a key facilitator forbin Ladin."^^^
See intelligence chronology in Volume 11, including DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02). Riyadli the
Facilitator was eventually rendered into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in January 2004. CIA
records indicate he was not subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. The referenced information
was provided while Riyadh tlie Facilitator was in foreign government custody.
CIA•• (102158Z APR 02)
director (251833Z JUN 02)
DIRECTOR (221240Z AUG 02). Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili never entered the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program.
The CIA's June 2013 Response ignores or minimizesthe extensivereportingon Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti listed in
the text of this summary (as well as additional reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in tlie intelligence chronology in
Volume 11), describing this intelligence as "insufficient to distinguish Abu Ahmad from many other Bin Ladin
associates" before crediting CIA detainees with providing "additional information" that "put [the previously
collected reporting] into context." While the Committee couldfind no internal CIA records to support the assertion
in the CIA's June 2013 Response, as detailed, the most detailedand accurate intelligence collected from a CIA
detainee on Abu Alimad al-Kuwaiti and his unique links to UBL was from Hassan Ghul, and was acquired prior to
the use of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against Ghul.
^ series of public statements by membersof Congress linking the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program
and the UBL operation appearedin the mediaduring the time of the congressional briefmgs. The statementsreflect
the inaccurate briefings provided by the CIA.
Italics added. CIA testimony of the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligencebriefing on May 2, 2011 (DTS
#2011-1941).
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The information above is not fully congruent with CIA records. As
described, the CIA was targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to any reporting from CIA
detainees. Al-Kuwaiti was identified as early as 2002 as an al-Qa'ida member engaged in
operational planning who "traveled frequently" to see No CIA detainee provided
reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. While CIA detainees eventually did provide some
information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti beginning in the spring of 2003, the majority of the
accurate intelligence acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was collected outside of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program, either from detainees not in CIA custody, or from other
intelligence sources and methods unrelated to detainees, to include human sources and foreign
partners.^^^^ The most accurate CIA detainee-related intelligence was obtained inearly 2004,
from a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.^^^^ That detainee—Hassan Ghul—listed Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti as one of three
individuals likely to be with stated that "it was well known that [UBL] was always with
Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti],"^^ '^ and described al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant,"^^^^ who
"likely handled all of UBL's needs."-^^^ Thedetainee further relayed that he believed "UBL's
security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a house with a family
somewhere in Pakistan.
In the May 4, 2011, briefing, CIA Director Leon Panetta provided
the following statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed
Services Committee (which mirrored similar statements by a "senior administration official" in a
White House Press Briefing from May 2,2011)^^^^:
''The detainees in the post-9/11 period flagged for us that there were
individuals that provided direct support to bin Ladin... and one of those
identified was a courier who had the nickname Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. That
was back in 2002"^^^^
See intelligence chronology in Volume II.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ALEC HjjjjH AUG 02)^I^ecord ("Call
Details Incoming and Outgoing") relatingto calling activity for^^^Hlphone^mber [REDACTEDl
65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC (092204Z AUG 02);^^H^^H, dated 17 September 2001;[REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001); DIRECTOR ^HH(221240Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR g||g (251833Z
JUN 02).







Pakistan with minimal security.
See May 2, 2011, 12:03AM, White House "Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Killing of
Osama bin Laden." The transcript, posted on the White House website (www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/5/02/press-briefing-senior-administration-officials-killing-osama-bin-laden).
Italics added. Testimony of CIA Director Panetta, transcript of the May 4, 2011, briefing of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee (DTS #2011-2049).
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As previously detailed, no CIA detainees provided information on
Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. As such, for the statement to be accurate, it can only be a
reference to detainees in foreign government custody who provided information in 2002.^^^^ As
noted, prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, the CIA was targeting Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti—to include al-Kuwaiti's phone number andemail address.-'^ ^ Further, prior to 2003,
the CIA possessed a body of intelligence reporting linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KSM and
UBL and to operational targeting of the United States, as well as reporting that Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti was "one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin" '^^ ^ and "traveled frequently" to
"meet with Usama bin Ladin."^'^^
In the same May 4, 2011, briefing, a CIA officer elaborated on the
previously provided statements and provided additional detail on how "a couple of early
detainees" "identi[fied]" Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as someone close to UBL:
"I think the clearest way to think about this is, in 2002 a couple ofearly
detainees, Abu Zubaydah and an individual, Riyadh the Facilitator, talked
about the activities ofan Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. At this point we don't have
his true name. And they identify him as somebody involved with AQ and
facilitation and some potential ties to bin Ladin"^^^^
This testimony is inaccurate. There are no CIA records of Abu
Zubaydah discussing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002.^^^^ The first reference to Abu Zubaydah
As described in this summaiy, the CIA provided documents to the Committee indicating that individuals
detained in 2002 provided "Tier One" infomiation—hnking "Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin." The document did not
state when the information was provided, or when the detainee entered CIA custody. Internal CIA records indicate
that no CIA detainee provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. See CIA six-page chart entitled,
"Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists 12 detainees in "CIA Custody|WpTS #2011-2004).
CIA record ("Call Details Incoming and Outgoing") relating to calling activity for mBi number
#•^1; ALEC•• (240057Z AUG 02).
See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including [REDACTED] 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC
(092204Z AUG 02); DIRECTOR (221240Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02).
See intelligence chronology in Volume n, including DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02).
Italics added. CIA testimony from CIA officer [REDACTED] and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011. (See DTS #2011-2049.) As
discussed in tliis summary and in greater detail in Volume II, the CIA provided additional information to the
Committee on May 5, 2011, tliat listed Riyadh the Facilitator as a detainee in "CIA custody," who was "detained
February 2002," and provided the referenced information. Tlie CIA document omitted that Riyadh the Facilitator
was not in CIA custody when he provided the referenced information in June 2002. Riyadh the Facilitator was not
rendered to CIA custody until January 2004. See Volume HI and DTS #2011-2004.
The CIA's June 2013 Response does not address the Committee Study finding that Abu Zubaydah did not
provide reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. However, on October 25, 2013, the CIA responded in writing
that the December 13, 2012, Committee Study was correct, and confirmed that tlie "first report from Abu Zubaydah
discussing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was in 2003." (See DTS #2013-3152.) As described in the intelligence
chronology in Volume II, on June 13, 2002, the CIA's ALEC Station sent a cable requesting that Abu Zubaydah be
questioned regarding his knowledge of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, whom the CIA believed was then in Pakistan.
Despite this request, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydali was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti at this
time. (See ALEC ||||^| (130117Z JUN 02).) Days later, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in
isolation, without any questioning or contact. On August 4, 2002, the CIA resumed contact and immediately began
using the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, including the waterboaid. CIA records
indicate that Abu Zubaydah was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until July 7, 2003, when he denied




providing information related to al-Kuwaiti is on July 7, 2003, when Abu Zubaydah denied
knowing the name.^^^^ CIA records indicate that the information in 2002 that the CIA has
represented as the initial lead information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not obtained from the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, but was collected by the CIA from other
intelligence sources, including from detainees in foreign government custody. Riyadh the
Facilitator provided substantial information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, including
information suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier, as al-Kuwaiti reportedly
"traveled frequently" to see Consistent with the testimony, CIA records indicate that
the information provided by Riyadh the Facilitator was important information; however, Riyadh
the Facilitator was not in CIA custody in 2002, but was in the custody of a foreign
government.-^^^ Riyadh the Facilitator was not transfeiTcd to CIA custody until January |,
2004.^^^^ As noted, in 2002, the CIA received additional reporting from another detainee in the
custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili, that "Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" was "one of a
few close associates of Usama bin Ladin." '^®^^
At the May 4, 2011, briefing, a Senator asked, "I guess what we're
trying to get at here, or certainly I am, was any of this information obtained through [enhanced]
interrogation measures?" A CIA officer replied:
"Senator, these individuals were in our program and were subject to some
form ofenhanced interrogation. Because of the time involved and the
relationship to the information and the fact that I'm not a speciahst on that
program, I would ask that you allow us to come back to you with some
detail."2i««
(^f8/4|||||||||||||[|[||||^^|//NF) The information above is not fully congruent with CIA records. As
is detailed in the intelligence chronology in Volume II, the vast majority of the intelligence
knowing the name. {See ||HH|||| 12236 (072032Z JUL 03).) As isdetailed in the intelligence chronology in
Volume II, on April 3, 2002, the CIA sent a cable stating that on page 8 of a 27-page address book found witli Abu
Zubaydah, there was the name "AbuAhmad K." with a phone number that was found to be already under U.S.
intelligencewllection. See CIA (03203IZ APR 02).2183 jglum 12236 (072032Z JUL 03)
2'8^ DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02)
Riyadl^i^acilitator, aka Sharqawi Ah Abdu al-Hajj^j^aptured on Febmary 7,2002. {See
10480 FEB 02).) Al-Hajj was transfened to custody on February 2002.
18265 FEB 02).) On January |, 2004, al-Hajj was rendered to CIA custody. {See \
[jAN 04)0A1-Haiiwastransferred to U.S. military custody on May
>335 HjHjllPHi-
I591^^|^^BJAN04). Documents provided tothe Committee on "detainee
reporting" related to the UBL operation (incorrectly) indicate that Riyadh the Facilitator was in CIA custody. See
May 5,2011, six^ag^IA chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti"(DTS #2011-2004).
DIRECTOR (221240Z AUG 02). Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili never entered the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program.
Italics added. CIA testimony from CIA officer [REDACTED] and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Arnied Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2049). The CIA
subsequently provided the Committee with a letter dated May 5, 2011, which included a document entitled,
"Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart entitled,
"Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed CIA
document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden."
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acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was originally acquired from sources unrelated to the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program, and the most accurate information acquired from a CIA
detainee was provided prior to the CIA subjecting the detainee to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.^'As detailed in CIA records, and acknowledged by the CIA in
testimony, information from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques—to include CIA detainees who had clear links to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti based on a
large body of intelligence reporting—provided fabricated, inconsistent, and generally um-eliable
information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti tliroughout their detention.^^^^
On May 5, 2004, the CIA provided several documents to the Committee, including a chart entitled, "Detainee
Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," described in this summary. For additional details, see intelligence
chronology in Volume II.
Below are specific details on the reporting of Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Khallad bin Attash, Ammar al-Baluchi, and
Abu Faraj al-Libi related to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti: 1) Abu Zubaydali was captured on March 28, 2002, with a 27-
page address book that included a phone number for "Abu Ahmad K," which matched a mobile
phone number that was already under intelligence collection by the U.S. Intelligence Community. (As early as July
2002, the CIA associated tlie phone number with al-Kuwaiti.) As detailed in the Study, Abu Zubaydah provided
significant intelligence, primarily to FBI special agents, from the time of his capture on March 28, 2002, through
June 18, 2002, when he was placed in isolation for 47 days. On June 13, 2002, less than a week before he was
placed in isolation, CIA Headquarters requested that interrogators ask Abu Zubaydah about his knowledge of Abu
Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who was beheved to be in Pakistan, according to the request from CIA Headquarters. There are
no CIA records indicating tliat the intenogators asked Abu Zubaydah about al-Kuwaiti. Instead, as described, Abu
Zubaydah was placed in isolation beginning on June 18, 2002, with the FBI and CIA interrogators departing the
detention site. The FBI did not return. On August 4, 2002, CIA interrogators reestablished contact with Abu
Zubaydah and immediately began to subject Abu Zubaydah to the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques for 17 days, which included at least 83 applications of the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique.
According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until July 7, 2003, when he
denied knowing the name. On April 27, 2004, Abu Zubaydah again stated that he did not recognize the name "Abu
Ahmed al-Kuwaiti." In August 2005, Abu Zubaydah speculated on an individual the CIA stated might be
"identifiable witli Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, aka Abu Ahmad al-Pakistani," but Abu Zubaydah stated the person in
question was not close with UBL. 2) KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, during a raid in Pakistan. An email
address associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop that was assessed to be associated with KSM.
Once rendered to CIA custody on March 2003, KSM was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, which continued through March 25, 2003, and included at least 183 applications of the
CIA's waterboard inteiTogation technique. On Maich 5,2003, KSM provided information concerning a senior al-
Qa'ida member named "Abu Klialid," whom KSM later called "Abu Alimad al-Baluchi." The infomiation KSM
provided could not be corroborated by other intelligence collected by the CIA, and KSM provided no further
information on the individual. On May 5, 2003, KSM provided his first information on an individual named "Abu
Alimed al-Kuwaiti" when he was confronted with reporting from a detainee not in CIA custody, Masran bin Arshad.
KSM confirmed bin Arshad's reporting regarding Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, specifically that bin Arshad was
originally tasked by KSM to get money from Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in Pakistan. KSM further relayed that Abu
Ahmad al-Kuwaiti worked with Hassan Ghul helping to move families from Afghanistan to Pakistan. On May 22,
2003, KSM was specifically asked about a UBL courier named Abu Ahmed. KSM again described a courier for
UBL whose name was Abu Ahmed al-Baluchi, but noted that this Abu Ahmed was more interested in earning
money than in serving al-Qa'ida. According to KSM, Abu Ahmed was working with Hassan Ghul in April or May
2002, but speculated that Abu Ahmed was in Iran as of early March 2003. In July 2003, KSM stated that Abu
Ahmad al-Kuwaiti worked with Abu Zubaydah's group prior to September 2001 and later with Abu Sulayman al-
Jaza'iri. In September 2003, KSM was confronted with reporting from another detainee in foreign government
custody on Abu Alimad al-Kuwaiti. KSM confinned that he had told Hambali to work with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti
as he transited Pakistan, but KSM downplayed al-Kuwaiti's importance, claiming to have contacted Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti only thiee to four times when he was in Peshawar and stating that Abu Ahmad worked "primarily with
lower level members" and appeared to have a higher status than he actually had in al-Qa'ida because KSM relied on
al-Kuwaiti for travel facilitation. In Januai^004^ase^i^tatement^nad^y Hassan Ghul—provided prior tothe




use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques—that it was "well known" that UBL was always with al-
Kuwaiti, CIA HeadquartersaskedCIA interrogators to reengage KSM on the relationship betweenal-Kuwaiti and
UBL, noting the "serious disconnect" between Ghul's reporting linking UBL and Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and
KSM's "pithy" description of al-Kuwaiti. CIA Headquarters wrote that unlike Hassan Ghul, KSM had made "no
reference to a link between Abu Ahmed andal-Qa'ida's two top leaders" and that KSM "has someexplaining to do
about Abu Ahmed and his support to UBL and Zawaliii-i." On May 31, 2004, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was
"not verysenior, nor washe wanted," noting thatal-Kuwaiti couldmove about freely, and might be in Peshawar. In
August 2005, KSM stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not a courier and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad
transportingletters for UBL. Instead, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was focusedon family afterhe marriedin 2002.
3) Khallad bin Attash was arrested with Ammaral-Baluchi in a unilateraloperation by Pakistani authorities resulting
from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. On May 2003, he was renderedto CIA custody and immediately
subjected to the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques from May 16, 2003, to May 18, 2003, and then againfrom
July 18, 2003, to July 29, 2003. On June 30, 2003, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was admired among the men.
On July 27, 2003, bin Attash coiToborated intelligence reporting that al-Kuwaiti played a facilitation role in al-
Qa'ida and that al-Kuwaiti departed Karachi to get married. In January 2004, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was
not close to UBL and not involved in al-Qa'ida operations, and that al-Kuwaiti was settling down with his wife in
the summer of 2003. In August 2005, bin Attash stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, that he had
never heard of Abu Ahmad transportingletters for UBL, and that Abu Ahmad was instead focused on family after
he married in 2002. In August 2006, bin Attash reiterated that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, but rather focused on
family life. 4) Ammar al-Baluchi was arrestedwithKhallad bin Attash in a unilateraloperation by Pakistani
authoritiesresulting from criminal leadson April29, 2003. Upon his arrest, Ammaral-Baluchi wascooperative and
provided information on a numberof topics while in foreign governmentcustody, including information on Abu
Ahmadal-Kuwaiti that the CIA disseminated prior to al-Baluchi being transferred to CIA custodyon May 2003.
After Ammar al-Baluchi was transferred to CIA custody, the CIA subjected Ammar al-Baluchi to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques from May 17,2003, to May 20, 2003. On May 19, 2003, al-Baluchi stated he
fabricated information while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogationtechniques the previous day, but in
response to questioning, stated that he believed UBL was on tiie Pakistan/Afghanistan border and that a brother of
al-Kuwaiti was to take over courier duties for UBL. In June 2003, al-Baluchi stated that there were rumors that al-
Kuwaiti was a courier. In January 2004, al-Baluchi retracted previous reporting, stating that al-Kuwaiti was never a
courier and would not have direct contactwith UBLor Ayman al-Zawahiri because"unlike someone like Abu Faraj,
[al-Kuwaiti] was too young and didn't have much experienceor credentials to be in that position." In May 2004, al-
Baluchi stated that al-Kuwaiti mayhave worked for Abu Faraj al-Libi. 5) Abu Faraj al-Libi was captured in
Pakistan on May 2, 2005. On May 2005, Abu Faraj al-Libi was rendered to CIA custody. Abu Faraj al-Libi was
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from May 28, 2005, to June 2, 2005, and again fromJune
17, 2005, to June 28, 2005. It was not until July 12,2005, that CIA Headquarters sent a set of "Tier Three
Requirements Regarding Abu Ahmad Al-Kuwaiti" to the detention site holding Abu Faraj al-Libi. Prior to this,
intenogators had focused their questioning of Abu Faraj on operational plans, as well as information on senior al-
Qa'ida leadership, primarily HamzaRab'ia and AbuMusab al-Zarqawi. On July 13,2005, Abu Faraj al-Libidenied
knowledge of Abu Ahmadal-Kuwaiti, or anyof his aliases. On July 15,2005,CIA Headquarters noted theydid not
believe Abu Faraj was being truthful and requestedCIA debriefers confront Abu Faraj again regarding his
relationship with al-Kuwaiti. CIA records indicate that CIA debriefers did not respond to this request. On August
12, 2005, having received no response to its previous request, CIA Headquarters again asked Abu Faraj's debriefers
to readdress the issue of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. CIA analysts noted that they "[found Faraj's] denials of even
recognizing his name difficult to believe," and suggested that "one possible reason why [Faraj] lied about not
recognizing Abu Ahmad's name] is [an attempt] to protect him - leading us to request that base readdress this issue
with [Faraj] on a priority basis." Two days later, on August 14, 2005, after being questioned again about Abu
Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,Abu Faraj al-Libi "swore to God" that he did not know al-Kuwaiti, or anybodywho went by any
of his aliases, insisting he would never forget anybody who worked for him. Abu Faraj did suggest, however, that
an "Ahmad al-Pakistani" had worked with Marwan al-Jabbur to care for families in the Lahore, Pakistan, area, but
said he (Abu Faraj) had no relationshipwith this al-Pakistani. On August 17, 2005, CIA Headquarters requested
that debriefers reengage certain detainees on tlie role of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. In response, KSM and Khallad bin
Attash claimed that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier and that they had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters
for UBL. KSM and Khallad bin Attash claimed that al-Kuwaiti was focused on family after he married in 2002.
However, Ammar al-Baluchi indicated thataMCuwait^orke^o^buFam in 2002. ASeptember 1, 2005,
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(i^S^^IIIIIIIIIIBIII^H^^^) 4, 2011, briefing, aSenator asked, "ofthe people that
you talked about as detainees that were interrogated, which of those were waterboarded and did
they provide unique intelligence in order to make this whole mission possible?"^^^^ CIA Director
Panetta responded:
"I want to be able to get back to you with specifics, but right now we think
there were about 12 detainees that were inter\newed,^^^^ and about three of
them were probably subject to the waterboarding processNow what came
from those interviews, how important was it, I really do want to stress the fact
that we had a lot of streams of intelligence here that kind of tipped us off there,
but we had imagery, we had assets on the ground, we had information that
came from a number of directions in order to piece this together. But clearly
the tipojf^^^ on the couriers camefrom those interviews
As previously detailed, the "tipoff' on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in
2002 did not come from the interrogation of CIA detainees and was obtained prior to any CIA
detainee reporting. The CIA was akeady targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and collecting
intelligence on at least one phone number and an email address associated with al-Kuwaiti in
2002.-^^^ No CIA detainee providedinformation on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, and prior
to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA possessed a body of intelligence
reporting linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KSM and UBL and to operational targeting of the
United States, as well as reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was "one of a few close
CIA report states tliat Abu Faraj al-Libi identified an "Abu 'Abd al Khaliq Jan," as his "go-between witli Bin Ladin
since mid-2003," but there was no other CIA reporting to support this assertion. In May 2007, a CIA targeting study
concluded that the reporting from KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libi was "not credible," and "their attempts to downplay
Abu Ahmad's importance or deny knowledge of Abu Ahmad are likely part of an effort to withhold information on
UBL or his close associates." A September 28, 2007, CIA report concluded tliat "Abu Faraj was probably the last
detainee to maintain contact with UBL—possibly through Abu Ahmad," but noted that "Abu Faraj vehemently
denied any knowledge of Abu Ahmad." See intelligence chronology in Volume 11 for additional details.
Italics added.
Italics added. For a listing of the 12 detainees, see CIA's six-page chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu
Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists 12 detainees, all of whom are listed as being in "CIA Custody" (DTS #2011-2004).
Italics added. CIA records indicate that none of the three CIA detainees known to have been subjected by the
CIA to the waterboard intenogation technique provided unique intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. To the
contrary, there is significant evidence that two of the three detainees—Abu Zubaydah and KSM—failed to provide
accurate information likely known to them about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and/or fabricated information to protect al-
Kuwaiti. The diird CIA detainee known to have been subjected to the CIA's waterboard inten'ogation technique,
'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, provided no information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. See intelligence cluonology in
Volume II for additional information.
Italics added. Tlie CIA's June 2013 Response states: "CIA has never represented that information acquired
through its interrogationsof detainees was either the first or the only infomiation that we had on Abu Ahmad."
Italics added. CIA testimony from CIA Director Panetta, and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2049)^^^
CIA record ("Call Details Incoming and Outgoing") relating to calling activity for ||||||||m|| phone number
ALEC•• (240057Z AUG 02).
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associates of Usama binLadin"-^^^ and "traveled frequently" to"meet with Usama bin
Ladin/'2i98
The day after the classified briefing, on May 5, 2011, the CIA
provided the Committee with a six-page chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti," which accompanied a one-page document compiled by the CIA's CTC, entitled
"Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti."-^^^ In total, the CIA chart
identifies 25 "mid-value and high-value detainees" who "discussed Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's
long-time membership in al-Qa'ida and his historic role as courier for Usama Bin Ladin." The
25 detainees are divided into two categories. The chart prominently lists 12 detainees—all
identified as having been in CIA custody—"who linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," which the
CIA labeled as the most important, "Tier 1" information. The document states that nine of the
12 (9/12: 75 percent) CIA detainees providing "Tier 1" information were subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, and that of those nine detainees, two (2/9: 20 percent) were
subjected to the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. The chart then includes a list of 13
detainees "who provided general information on Abu Ahmad," labeled as "Tier 2" information.
The CIA document states that four of the 13 (4/13: 30 percent) "Tier 2" detainees were in CIA
custody and that all four (4/4: 100 percent) "CIA detainees" were subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.
On October 3, 2012, the CIA provided the Committee with a
document entitled, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin," completed in September 2012 by the
See intelligence chronology in Volume n, including CIA recor^Xall Details Incoming and Outgoing") relating
to calling activity for BHjUl^e number 4HH; ALECl^HgipOSTZ AUG 02); [REDACTED] 65902(080950Z AUG 02); ALECHHB(092204Z AUG0^^^^^^||idated 17 September 2001;
[REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001); DIRECTOR•• (221240Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR•• (251833Z
JUN 02).
See intelligence clironology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR jjjjl^m(251833Z JUN 02). As described
above, Riyadh the Facilitator was eventually rendered into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in
January 2004, but CIA records indicate he was not subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques. Tlie
referenced information was provided in June 2002, while Riyadh the Facilitator was not in U.S. custody, but in the
custody of a foreign government.
Senator McCain and other members requested information on the use of tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques in the UBL operation at the previous day's hearing and the CIA committed to provide additional
information to the members. Senator McCain: "I'm also interested in this whole issue of the 'enhanced
interrogation,' what role it played. Those who want to justify torture seem to have grabbed hold of this as some
justification for our gross violation of the GenevaConventions to which we are signatory. I'd be very interested in
having that issue clarified. I think it's really important." See transcript of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2049).
See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5,2011, which includes a document
entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart
entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed
CIA document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden."
The CIA's September 2012 "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of
Intelligence (See DTS #2012-3826), appears to utilize the same inaccurate information, stating: "In sum, 25
detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,his al-Qa'ida membership, and his historic role as a
courier for Bin Ladin. Nine of the 25 were held by foreign governments. Of the 16 held in CIA custody, all but
three had given information after b&'mg subjectedto enhanced interrogationtechniques (EITs), although of the 13
only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded" (italics added). As described, tlie information in this
CIA "lessons" report is inaccurate.
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CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. The CIA Lessons Learned document states, "fi]n
sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership,
and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin." The CIA document then states that 16 of the 25
detainees who reported on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were in CIA custody, and that "[o]f the 16
held in CIA custody, all but three [13] had given information after being subjected to enhanced
interrogation techniques (EITs)," before noting that "only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had
been waterboarded."
A review of CIA records found that these CIA documents
contained inaccurate information and omitted important and material facts.
• The May 5, 2011, CIA chart represents that all 12 detainees (12/12: 100 percent) providing
"Tier 1" intelligence—information that "linked Abu Ahmad to BinLadin"^^^^—were
detainees in CIA custody. A review of CIA records found that the CIA document omitted the
fact that five of the 12 listed detainees (5/12: 41 percent) provided intelligence on Abu
Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to entering CIA custody. In addition, other detainees—not in
CIA custody—provided information that "linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," but were not
included in the CIA list. For example, the first detainee-related information identified in CIA
records indicating a close relationship between UBL and Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was
acquired in July 2002, from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair
al-Ha'ili (Zubair). According to CIA records, Zubair provided a detailed physical description
of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, information on Abu Ahmad's family, his close connection to
KSM, and that "Ahmad al-Kuwaiti: was a one of a few close associates of Usama bin
Ladin.""^ '^^ This informationwouldbe used to question other detainees, but was omitted in
the CIA's "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" chart.
• The May 5, 2011, CIA chart also states that nine of the 12 (9/12: 75 percent) "CIA
detainees" providing "Tier 1" intelligence were subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques. A review of CIA records found that of the nine detainees the CIA
identified as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and
providing "Tier 1" information on links between Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and UBL, five of
the 9 (5/9: 55 percent) provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being
Italics added. "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA's Center for
the Study of Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826).
-202 Tjig document identified "Tier 1" intelligence as infonnation that "linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," but
inaccurately included CIA detainees under the "Tier 1" detainee reporting list who did not provide information
linking "Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin." For example, tlie CIA identified Abu Zubaydah and KSM as providing "Tier
1" intelligence that "linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," despite both detainees denying any significant connection
between al-Kuwaiti and UBL.2203 the Facilitator (information on June 25, 2002 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custo^ January |, 2004),
Ammar al-Baluclii (information on May 6,2003 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody Mayj||, 2003), Ahmed
Ghailani (infonnation on August 1, 2004 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody September 2004), Sharif al-Masri
(information on September 16, 2004 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody September 2004), and Muhammad
Rahim (infonnation on July 2, 2007 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody July 2007). Tliere are reports tliat a
sixth detainee, Hassan Ghul, also provided extensive information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being
transferred to CIA custody. See intelligence chronology in Volume n for additional information.
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subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.This information was omitted
from the CIA document. Of the remaining four detainees who did not provide information
on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, three were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the CIA's use of
enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^ All three provided information the CIA assessed to be
fabricated andintentionally misleading.-^^^ Thefourth, Abu Zubaydah, who was detained on
March 28, 2002, and subjected to tiie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August
2002, to include tiie waterboard technique, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that was described by CIA officers at the time as
"speculative."^-^^ These relevant details were omitted from the CIA documents.-^®^
The May 5, 2011, CIA chart also states that of the 13 detainees "who provided general
information on Abu Ahmad," labeled as "Tier!" information, four of the 13 (4/13: 30
percent) detainees were in CIA custody and that allfour (4/4:100 percent) were subjected to
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.A review of CIA records found the CIA
document omitted that two of the four (2/4; 50 percent) "CIA detainees" who were described
as subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques provided intelligence on Abu
Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to entering CIA custody, and therefore prior to being subjected to
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^-^^ Finally, there were additional detainees in
Ammar al-Baluchi, Hassan Ghul, Ahmad Ghallani, Sharif al-Masri, and Muhammad Rahim.
KhaUd Shaykh Mohammad, Khalid bin Attash, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.
Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and Klialid bin Attash. See intelligencechronology in Volume II
and CIA testimony from May 4, 2011. CIA officer: ..with the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi and Khalid Shaykh
Mohammed, these are key bin Ladin facilitators, gatekeepers if you will, and their description of Abu Ahmed, the
sharp contrast between that and the earlier detainees. Abu Faraj denies even knowing him, a completely uncredible
position for him to take but one that he has stuck with to this day. KSM initially downplays any role Abu Ahmed
might play, and by the time he leavesour program claims that he manied in 2002, retired and really was playing no
role." CIA records indicate Khalladbin Attash also downplayed the role of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating several
times that Abu Ahmad was focused on family and was not close to UBL, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad
al-Kuwaiti servin^^ courier for UBL.
2208 director (8/25/2005). OnJuly 7,2003, and April 27,2004, Abu Zubaydah was asked about "Abu
Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" and denied knowing the name.
See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document
entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanyingsix-page chart
entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed
CIA document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden." See
intelligence chronology in Volume IT for additional details.
See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document
entitled, "Background Detainee Information on AbuAhmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanyingsix-page chart
entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed
CIA document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden."
The CIA's September 2012 "Lessonsfrom the Hunt for Bin Ladin,"compiledby the CIA's Center for the Studyof
Intelligence(DTS #2012-3826), appears to utilizethe same inaccurate information, stating: "In sum, 25 detainees
provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin
Ladin. Nine of the 25 were held by foreign governments. Of the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three had given
infonnation after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs)..." (italics added). As described, the
information in this CIA "Lessons Learned" report is inaccurate.
Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, whowas detainedin May 2002, fu-st provided intelligenceon al-Kuwaition June 4/5
2002, and was subsequently transferred to CI^iistodyonJune|j2002^^ to the CIA's enhanced
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foreign government custody "who provided general information on Abu Ahmad" that were
not included in the list of 13 detainees. For example, in January 2002, the CIA received
reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government who provided a physical
description of a Kuwaiti named Abu Ahmad who attended a terrorist training camp.^^^^
The October 3, 2012, "Lessonsfor the Huntfor Bin Ladin" document states that "[i]n sum,
25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership,
and his historic role as a courierfor Bin Ladin." This is incorrect. As described, additional
detainees—not in CIA custody—provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, including
2002 reporting that al-Kuwaiti "was one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin."
The October 3, 2012, "Lessonsfor the Huntfor Bin Ladin" document also states that 16 of
the 25 (16/25: 65 percent) detainees who reported on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were in CIA
custody. This is incorrect. At least seven of the 16 detainees (7/16: 45 percent) that the CIA
listed as detainees in CIA custody provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to
being transferred to CIA custody.^^^"^
The October 3, 2012, "Lessonsfor the Huntfor Bin Ladin" document also states that "[o]f
the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three [13] had given information after being subjected to
enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs). This is incorrect. Seven of the 13 detainees
that the CIA listed as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^^ Of theremaining sixdetainees who did not provide
information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, five were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the
CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^^ (Of the five detainees, three provided
information the CIA assessed to be fabricated and intentionally misleading.The
interrogation techniques in October 2002. Hambali, who was detained on August 11, 2003, first provided
information on al-Kuwaiti on August 13, 2003. Later, Hambali was rendered to CIA custody on August H, 2003.
See intelligence clironology in Volume n, including 63211 (30 JAN 2002).
DIRECTOR•• (221240Z AUG 02)
See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including reporting from Riyadh the Facilitator, Ammar al-Baluchi,
Ahmad Ghailani, Sharif al-Masri, Muhammad Raliim, Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, and Hambali. As detailed, a
former CIA officer stated publicly that Hassan Ghul provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being
transfened to CIA custody.
"Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of
Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826).
See intelUgencechronology in Volume II, including reportingfrom Ammar al-Baluchi, Ahmad Ghailani, Sharif
al-Masri, Muhammad Rahim, Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, Hambali, and Hassan Ghul.
Khalid Shaykli Mohammad, Khalid bin Attash, Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri, Samlr al-Barq, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.
Klialid Shaykh Mohammad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and Khalid bin Attash. See intelligence clironology in Volume II
and CIA testimony from May 4, 2011. CIA officer: ".. .with the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi and Khalid Shaykh
Mohammed, these are key bin Ladin facilitators, gatekeepers if you will, and their description of Abu Ahmed, the
shaip contrastbetween that and the earlierdetainees. Abu Farajdenieseven knowinghim, a completelyuncredible
position for him to take but one thathe has stuck with to thisday. KSM initially downplays any role Abu Ahmed
might play, and by the time he leavesour programclaims that he marriedin 2002, retired and really was playing no
role." CIA records indicate Kliallad bin Attasl^ls^ownplaye^h^ral^^^ Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating several




remaining two provided limited, non-unique, corroborative reportingThe sixth, Abu
Zubaydah, who was detained on March 28, 2002, and subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques in August 2002, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that, as noted, was described by CIA officers at
the time as "speculative,"-^-®
The October 3, 2012, "Lessonsfor the Huntfor Bin Ladin" document also states that "only
two [detainees] (KSMand Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded. Even so, KSMgavefalse
information about AbuAhmad.... The CIA's May 5, 2011, Chart, "Reporting on Abu
Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," states that Abu Zubaydah and KSMprovided "Tier 1" intelligence that
"linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin." CIA records indicate that both detainees denied any
significant connection between al-Kuwaiti and UBL. CIA records further indicate that Abu
Zubaydah and KSM, who were both subjected to the CIA's waterboard inten-ogation
technique, withheld information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti:
o Abu Zubaydah: "Abu Ahmad K." and a phone number associated with Abu Ahmad
al-Kuwaiti was found on page 8 of a 27-page address book captured with Abu
Zubaydah on March 28, 2002. In July 2003, Abu Zubaydah stated that he was not
familiar with the name Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, or the description provided to him by
CIA officers. In April 2004, Abu Zubaydah again stated that he did not recognize the
name "Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.According to a CIA cable, in August 2005, Abu
Zubaydah provided information on "an individual whose name he did not know, but
who might be identifiable with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, aka Abu Ahmad al-
Pakistani." According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah speculated that this individual
knew UBL and al-Zawahiri, but did not think their relationship would be close. Days
later a CIA cable elaborated that Abu Zubaydah had speculated on a family of
brothers from Karachi that may have included Abu Ahmad.^--^
times that Abu Ahmad was focused on family and was not close to UBL, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad
ai-Kuwaiti serving as a courier for UBL.
Abu Yasir ai-Jaza'iri provided conoborative information in July 2003 that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was
associated with KSM, was best known in Karachi, and appeared to be Pakistani. {See DIRECTOR
(111632Z JUL 03).) Samir al-Barq provided information in September 2003 that al-Kuwaiti had provided al-Barq
with $1000 to obtain a house in Karachi that al-Qa'ida could use for a biological weapons lab. {See 47409
(191324Z NOV 03), as well as the detainee reviewof Samir al-Barq in Volume ni that details al-Barq's various
statements on al-Qa'ida's ambition to establish a biological weapons program.) Neither of these reports is cited in
CIA records as providing unique or new information. In October 2003, both detainees denied having any
information on the use of Abbottabad as a safe haven for al-Qa'ida. See 10172 (160821Z OCX 03);
48444 (240942Z OCX 03).
DIRECXOR (8/25/2005). On July 7, 2003, and April 27, 2004, Abu Zubaydah was asked about "Abu
Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" and denied knowing the name.
2221 "Lessons from theHunt forBin Ladin," dated September 2012, compiled bytheCIA's Center for theStudy of
Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DXS #2012-3826).
2222 Inaddition to "Abu Ahmad K." being included in Abu Zubaydah's addiess book, there was additional reporting
indicating that Abu Zubaydah had some knowledge of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. For example, on October 12, 2004,
another CIA detainee explained how he met al-Kuwaitiat a guesthouse that was operated by Ibn Shaykh al-Libi and
Abu Zubaydah in 1997. 5gg intelligence chronology in Volume H.
2223 See DIRECXOR(252024Z AU^05^n^i^ntelligencech^^ in VolumeII.
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o KSM: When KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, an email address associated with
Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop believed to be used by KSM. As
detailed in this review, KSM first acknowledged Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in May
2003, after being confronted with reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from a
detainee who was not in CIA custody. KSM provided various reports on Abu Ahmad
that the CIA described as "pithy." In August 2005, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was
not a courier, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for
UBL. In May 2007, the CIA reported that the denials of KSM and another detainee,
combined with conflicting reporting from other detainees, added to the CIA's belief
thatAbu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was a significant figure.^^^"^
The CIA detainee who provided the most accurate "Tier 1"
information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to UBL, Hassan Ghul, provided the information
prior to being subjected to the CIA'senhanced interrogation techniques.^^^^ Hassan Ghul was
captured on January 2004, by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.Ghul was
reportedly first inten'ogated by HHll, then transferred to U.S. military custody and
questioned, and then rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT on January
2004.^-^^ From January 2004, to January 2004, Hassan Ghul was questioned by the CIA
at DETENTION SITE COBALT. During this period the CIA disseminated 21 intelligence
reports based on Ghul's reporting.A CIA officer told the CIA Office of Inspector General
2224 intellige^e clironologyii^olume II, including ALEC ^^^^kl022^ZMAR 03); HEADQUARTERS
(•!!• JAN 04); •• 29986 (171741Z AUG 05);lHpiHi 5594 (201039Z MAY 07).
As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was
cooperative with CIA personnel prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. In an
interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul stated, "He sang like a tweetie
bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset." {See December 2, 2004, interview with
[REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, ) The CIA's September 2012
"Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence (DTS #2012-
3826), states that: "Ghul's tantalizing lead began a systematic but low profile effort to target and further identify
Abu Ahmad." On April 16, 2013, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a fomm in relation to the screening of
the film, "Manhunt." Tlie foium included former CIA officer Nada Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul
provided tlie critical informationon Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti to Kurdishofficialsprior to entering CIA custody.
When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds, Bakos stated: ".. .honestly, Hassan Ghul.. .when
he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house.
He wasn't locked up in a cell. He wasn't handcuffed to anything. He was—he was having a free flowing
conversation. And tliere's—you know, there's articles in Kurdish papers about sort of their interpretation of the
story and how forthcoming he was." See www.cfr.org/countertenorisra/film-screening-manhunt/p30560. When
asked by the Committee to comment on this narrative, tlieCIA wrote on October 25, 2013: "We liave not identified
any information in our holdings suggesting that Hassan Gul first provided information on Abu Ahmad wliile in
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that Hassan Ghiil "opened up rightaway and wascooperative from the outset."^-^^ During the
January 2004, to January 2004, sessions, Ghul was questioned on the location of UBL.
According to a cable, Ghul speculated that "UBL was likely living in Peshawar area," and that
"it was well known that [UBL] was always with Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti]."^- '^^ Ghul described
Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant"^-^^ and listed him as one of three
individuals likely to be with UBL.^-^^ Ghul further speculated that:
"UBL's security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in
a House with a family somewhere in Pakistan. Ghul commented that after
UBL's bodyguard entourage was apprehended entering Pakistan following the
fall of Afghanistan, UBL likely has maintained a small security signature of
circa one or two persons. Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmed likely handled all
of UBL's needs, including moving messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi]...
The next day, Januai^ |, 2004, Hassan Ghul was transferred to
the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLACK.Upon arrival, Ghul was "shaved and barbered,
stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head"
for forty minutes.^^^^ The CIA interrogators at the detention site immediately requested
permission to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ghul, writing that, during
the forty minutes, Ghul did not provide any new information, did not show the fear that was
typical of other recent captures, and "was somewhat arrogant and self important." The CIA
interrogators wrote that they "judged" that Ghul "has the expectation that in U.S. hands, his
treatment will not be severe."^^^^ Therequest to CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced





2229 See Decembe^^004^IAOffi^f Inspector General with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL
Department, i" wliich a CIA officer involved with the interrogations of Hassan Ghul,

























"The interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the
initial contact, that his al-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S.
military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical
contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the
approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift
[Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these
increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and
reliable information in a timely manner."^^^^
Headquarters approved the request the same day, stating that
the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would "increase base's capability to
collect critical and reliable threat information in a timely manner.During and after the use
ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques^Ghulpravidedn^therinfo^^




See intelligence clironology in Volume 11. Tlie CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[a]fter undergoing
enhanced inteiTogation techniques," Hassan Ghul provided infonnation that became "more concrete and less
speculative, it also corroborated information from Ammar that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was lying when
he claimed Abu Ahmad left al-Qa'ida in 2002." The assertion in the CIA's June 2013 Response that information
acquired from Hassan Ghul "[ajfter undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques" "corroborated information from
Ammar that Klialid Shaykli Muhammad (KSM) was lying when he claimed Abu Ahmad left al-Qa'ida in 2002" is
incorrect. First, the referenced information from Hassan Ghu^a^cquire^rior to the use ofthe CIA's enhanced
intenogation techniques. ACIA cable, HEADQUARTERS (|^|H| JAN 04), explains that based on
Hassan Ghul's comments that it was "well known" that UBL was always with al-Kuwaiti (acquired prior to the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques), CIA Headquarters asked interrogators to reengage KSM on the
relationship between al-Kuwaiti and UBL, noting the "serious disconnect" between Hassan Ghul's comments and
KSM's "pithy" description of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. The cable notes tliat KSM had made "no reference to a link
between Abu Ahmed and al-Qa'ida's two top leaders, nor has he liinted at all that Abu Ahmed was involved in the
facilitation of Zawahiri in/around Peshawar in February 2003," and that KSM "has some explaining to do about Abu
Ahmed and his support to UBL and Zawahiri." Second, as the intelligence chronology in Volume II details, there
was a significant body of intelligence well before Hassan Ghul's pre-enhanced intenogation techniques reporting in
January 2004 indicating that KSM was providing inaccurate information on Abu Alimad al-Kuwaiti. See detailed
information in Volume II intelligence clironology. Third, as detailed in CIA-provided documents (DTS #2011-
2004), the CIA described Hassan Ghul's reporting as "speculat[ive]" both during and after the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. Finally, as noted earlier, tlie CIA's June 2013 Response ignores or minimizes a
large body of intelligence reporting in CIA records—and documented in the Committee Study—that was acquired
from sources and methods unrelated to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Nonetheless, the
CIA's June 2013 Response asserts: "It is impossible to know in hindsight whedier we could have obtained from
Ammar, Gul, and others the same information that helped us fmd Bin Ladin without using enhanced techniques, or
whetlier we eventually would have acquired other intelligence tliat allowed us to successfully pursue the Abu
Ahmad lead or some other lead witliout the infomiation we acquired from detainees in CIA custody" (italics added).
As detailed in this summary, the most accurate intelligence from a detainee on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was acquired
prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced
inten'ogation techniques provided inaccurate and fabricated information on al-Kuwaiti. See detailed information in
the Volume II intelligence clironology.
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that Hassan Ghul provided the detailed information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to UBL prior
to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was omitted from CIA documents and
testimony.
While CIA documents and testimony highlighted reporting that the
CIA claimed was obtained from CIA detainees—and in some cases from CIA detainees
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—the CIA internally noted that
reporting from CIA detainees—specifically CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques—was insufficient, fabricated, and/or unreliable.
^ September 1, 2005, CIA report on the search for UBL states:
"Bin Ladin Couriers: Low-level couriers who wittingly or unwittingly facilitate
communications between Bin Ladin and his gatekeepers remain lai-gely
invisible to us until a detainee reveals them.-^"^^ Even then, detainees provide
few actionable leads, and we have to consider the possibility that they are
creatingfictitious characters to distract us or to absolve themselves ofdirect
knowledge about Bin Ladin. We nonetheless continue the hunt for Abu
Ahmed al-Kuwaiti—an alleged courier between Bin Ladin and KSM—and
Abu 'Abd al Khaliq Jan, who[m] Abu Faraj identified as his go-between with
Bin Ladin since mid-2003, in order to get one step closer to Bin Ladin.
^ 20, 2007, CIA "targeting study" for Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti
states:
"Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) described Abu Ahmad as a relatively
minorfigure and Abu Faraj al-Libi denied all knowledge ofAbu Ahmad.
Station assesses that KSM and Abu Faraj's reporting is not credible on this
topic, and their attempts to downplay Abu Ahmad's importance or deny
knowledge of Abu Ahmad are likely part of an effort to withhold information
on UBL or his close associates. These denials, combined with reporting from
otherdetainees^^"^^ indicating that Abu Ahmad worked closely with KSM and
Abu Faraj, add to our belief that Abu Ahmad is an HVT courier or
facilitator."-^"^^
See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document
entitled, "Background DetaineeInformation on AbuAhmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-pagechart
entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed
CIA document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden."
Significant information was acquired on AbuAhmadal-Kuwaiti independent of CIA detainees. See intelligence
chronology in Volume II.
Italics added. CIA analysis entided, "OvercomingChallenges To Capturing Usama Bin Ladin, 1 September
2005." CIA records indicate that Abu Faraj al-Libi fabricated information relating to "'Abd al Khaliq Jan."
Italics added. As detailed, the reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti "worked closely with KSM" and was "one
of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin," who "traveled frequently" to "meet with Usajna bin Ladin," was
acquired in 2002, from sources unrelatedto the CIA's Detention and InterrogationProgram.
Italics added. jjjj^mH 5594 (201039Z MAY 07). Reporting from CIA detainees Ammar al-Baluchi and
Khallad bin Attash—both subjected to the CIA^^nhance^nteiragati^^ —included similar inaccurate
nil 'iM nil ii^^^^^^BB[PIMii'i''i'i(iiiniiiii




Additional CIA documents contrasted the lack of intelligence
obtained from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques with the
value of intelligence obtained from other sources. A November 23, 2007, CIA intelligence
product, "Al-Qa'ida Watch," with the title, "Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin
Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," details how a:
"review of 2002 debriefings of a [foreign government] detainee who claimed
to have traveled in 2000 from Kuwait to Afghanistan with an 'Ahmad al-
Kuwaiti' provided the breakthrough leading to the likely identification of
Habib al-Rahman as Abu Ahmad. The [foreign government] subsequently
informed [the CIA] that Habib al-Rahman currently is living in Pakistan,
probably in the greater Peshawar area—according to our analysis of a body of
reporting."^^"^^
This CIA intelligence product highlighted how reporting from Abu
Faraj al-Libi, who was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and denied
knowing Abu Ahmad, differed from that of Hassan Ghul, who—prior to the application of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—stated that "Bin Ladin was always with Abu Ahmad,"
and that Abu Ahmad had delivered a message to senior al-Qa'ida leaders in late 2003, "probably
through Abu Faraj." The document further states that KSM "has consistently maintained that
Abu Ahmad 'retired' from al-Qa'ida work in 200^' The CIA document states that the CIA will
be working with government, as well as utilizing a database
information. FGialladbin Attash was aiTCSted with Ammar al-Bakichi in a unihiteral operation by Pakistani
authorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. On May 2003, bin Attash was rendered to CIA
custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from May 16, 2003, to May 18,
2003, and then again from July 18, 2003, to July 29, 2003. On June 30,2003, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was
admired among the men. On July 27, 2003, bin Attash corroborated intelligence reporting that al-Kuwaiti played a
facilitation role in al-Qa'ida and that al-Kuwaiti departed Karachi to get manied. In Januaiy 2004, bin Attash stated
tliat al-Kuwaiti was not close to UBL and not involved in al-Qa'ida operations, and tiiat al-Kuwaiti was settling
down with his wife in the summer of 2003. In August 2005, bin Attash stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not a
courier, that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL, and that Abu Ahmad was instead
focused on family after he married in 2002. In August 2006, bin Attash reiterated that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier,
but rather focused on family life. Ammar al-Baluchi was anested with Khallad bin Attash in a unilateral operation
by Pakistani autliorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. Upon his airest in Pakistan, Ammar al-
Baluclii was cooperative and provided information on a numberof topics to foreign government interrogators,
including informationon Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that the CIA disseminated prior to al-Baluchi being transfen*ed to
CIA custody on May |, 2003. After Ammar al-Baluchi was transferred toCIA custody, the CIA subjected Ammar
al-Baluclii to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniquesfrom May 17, 2003, to May 20, 2003. On May 19, 2003,
al-Baluclii admitted to fabricating information while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
tlie previous day, and in response to questioning, stated tliat he believed UBLwas on tlie Pakistan/Afghanistan
border and that a brother of al-Kuwaiti was to take over courier duties for UBL. In June 2003, al-Baluchi stated that
tiiere were rumors that al-Kuwaiti was a courier. In early 2004, al-Baluchi acknowledged that al-Kuwaiti may have
worked for Abu Faraj al-Libi, but stated that al-Kuwaiti was never a courier and would not have direct contact with
UBL. See intelligence chronology in Volume 11 and detainee reviews of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi
for additional information.
2247 See CIA CTC "Al-Qa'ida Watch," dated November 23, 2007.
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to follow-up on an individual traveling within Pakistan with a similar name
and date of birth.^^'^^
CIA cable records from early 200^iighlight how the discovery
and exploitation of phone numbers associated with al-Kuwaiti^|[||||| had been critical in
collecting intelligence and locating the target,and state:
. .debriefings of the senior most detainees who were involved in caringfor
bin Ladin have produced little locational information, and it is the final nugget
that detainees hold on to in debriefings (over threat info and even Zawahiri
LOCINT) given their loyalty to the al-Qa'ida leader. We assess that Abu
Ahmad would likely be in the same category as Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
and Abu Faraj al-Libi, so we advocate building as much of a targeting picture
of where and when Habib/Abu Ahmad travels to flesh out current leads to bin
Ladin."2250
May 1, 2008, a CIA Headquarters cable entitled, "targeting
efforts against suspected UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," documents that the CIA had a
number of collection platforms established to collect intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in
order to locate UBL. The cable closes by stating:
"although we want to refrain from addressing endgame strategies, HQS judges
that detaining Habib should be a last resort, since we have had no/no success in
eliciting actionable intelligence on bin Ladings location from any
detainees.
While the aforementioned CIA assessments highlight the
unreliability of reporting from senior al-Qa'ida leaders in CIA custody, specifically "that KSM
and Abu Faraj's reporting" was assessed to be "not credible"—and that their denials "add[ed] to
[the CIA's] belief that Abu Ahmad is an HVT courier or facilitator"^^^-—the CIA assessments
also highlight that "reporting from other detainees indicating that Abu Ahmad worked closely
with KSM and Abu Faraj" was useful.--^^ As documented, the initial detainee-related
information linking Abu Ahmad to UBL and KSM did not come from CIA detainees, but from
detainees who were not in CIA custody
See CIA CTC "Al-Qa'ida Watch," dated November 23, 2007.2249 3808 (211420Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS •
(240740Z JAN 08)J|^M^8 (081633Z FEB 08)
Italics added. 9044 (240740Z JAN 08).
22-'" HEADQUARTERS^^TcOI 1334ZMAY08)
2252 (201039Z MAY 07)
HI^HI (201039Z MAY 07)
See information in Volume II intelligence chronology for additional details.
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IV. Overview of CIA Representations to the Media While the Program Was
Classified
A. The CIA Provides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation
Program to Journalists Who then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File
Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories
seeking to shape press reporting on the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program, CIA officers and the CIA's Office of Public Affau's (OPA) provided
unattributed background information on the program to journalists for books, articles, and
broadcasts, including when the existence of the CIA's Detention and InteiTogation Program was
still classifiedWhen the journalists to whom the CIA had provided background information
published classified information, the CIA did not, as a matter of policy, submit crimes reports^
For example, as described in internal emails, the CIA's
never opened an investigation related to Ronald Kessler's book
The CIA at War, despite the inclusion of classified information, because "the book contained no
first time disclosures," andbecause "OPA provided assistance with the book."^^^^ SeniorDeputy
General Counsel John Rizzo wrote that the CIA made the determination because the CIA's
cooperation with Kessler had been"blessed" by the CIA director.-^^^ In another example, CIA
officers and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence raised concerns that an
article by Douglas Jehl in theNew York Times contained significant classified information.^-^^|CTC Legal wrote in an email that "part ofthis article was based on 'background'
provided by OPA. That, essentially, negates any use in making an unauthorized disclosure
[report]
Both the Kessler book and the Jehl article included inaccurate
claims about the effectiveness of CIA interrogations, much of it consistent with the inaccurate
information being provided by the CIA to policymakers at the time. For example, Kessler's
book stated that the FBI arrest of lyman Faris was "[bjased on information from the CIA's
On October 28, 2013, the CIA informed the Committee that "CIA pohcy is to conduct background briefings
using unclassified or declassified information" (DTS #2013-3152).
Email from:^^^^|H; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTEDUREDACIED]^:
1; subject: CIA at War; date: Januaiy 20, 2004, at 11:13 AM; email from: to:
I; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]J||^ ^HH. [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Cl^^ir;
date|Jani^ry 21^2004^at02^U PM; email from: |^^^mito Scott W. Muller, John A. Rizzo, |mH
IIIIIIH; cc: subject^£^IA at W^^ate^anua^21, 2004, at 02:27
Email John A. Rizzo; to: |||||||||^^^^^|; cc: duller,
[REDACTED]; subject: Re: CIA at War; date: January 22,2004, at 09:28 AM.2258 Change Lets C.I.A. Freely SendSuspectsAbroadU^ils," bvDo^ and Davi^ohnston, The New
email &om: |g||||||m||||||m. g^m|||||n||||||^|^^||||||||HH|subiectjQuest^ on 06MarchNewYor^imes revelations^ate^pril 22^ at 01:38
fl^^fl^^jr^^^mmrsu^ectTRer^estion on 06 March New York Times
revelations; date^pti^S^OO^ at 8:12j4^AM^^^^^^
^^^^maiHroi^^^j^^ to: cc:
1^1111111111; subject: Re: Question on 06 March New York Times revelations; date: April 28, 2005, at 8:25:23
AM.
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interrogation of [KSM]," and that the arrest of Khallad bin Attash was the "result" of CIA
interrogations of The Jehl article stated that a "secret program to transfer suspected
terrorists to foreign countries for interrogationhas been carried out by the Central Intelligence
Agency... according to current and former government officials." The article stated that a
"senior United States official" had "provid[ed] a detailed description of the program," and
quoted the official as claiming that "[t]he intelligence obtained by those rendered, detained and
interrogated ha[d] disrupted tenwist operations," The senior official added, "[ilt has saved lives
in the United States and abroad, and it has resulted in the capture of other terrorists.
B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and
Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed
In early April 2005, chief of ALEC Station,
asked CTC officers to compile information on the success of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Progran^ preparation for interviews ofCIA officers by Tom Brokaw of NBC
News.-^^- As rcrnarked in a Sametime communication with Deputy CTC Director
Philip Mudd, during World War II, the Pentagon had an Office of War Information (OWI),
whereas the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), did not. then
noted that "we need an OWI, at least every now and then.. According to Mudd, concerns
within the CIA about defending the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in the press were
misplaced:2264
"maybe people should know we're trying to sell their program, if they
complain, they should know that we're trying to protect our capability to
continue, we're not just out there to brag... they don't realize that we have
few options here, we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has
implications beyond the media, congress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes
The CIA at War, Ronald Kessler,St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003. As detailed elsewhere, lyman Paris was
already under investigation and Majid Khan, who was then in foreign government custody, had discussed Paris,
prior to any mention of Paris by KSM. Likewise, the capture of Khallad bin Attash in April 2003 was unrelated to
the reporting from KSM or anyother CIA detainee. Kessler's book also stated that Abu Zubaydah"soon began
singing to the PBI and CIA about other planned plots," and that "intercepts and infomiation developed months
earlier after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh... allowed the CIA to trace [KSM]." {See Ronald Kessler, The CIA at
War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003.) As detailed elsewhere, Abu Zubaydah did not provide intelligenceon al-
Qa'ida "planned plots," and KSM's capture wasunrelated to information provided by Ramzi bin Al-Shibh. Pinally,
Kessler's book stated that KSM "told the CIA about a range of planned attacks - on U.S. convoys in Afghanistan,
nightclubs in Dubai, targets in Turkey, and an Israeli embassy in the Middle East. Within a few months the
hanscripts of his interrogations were four feet high." These statements were incongruent with CIA records.
2261 "Rule ChangeLets C.I.A.Preely SendSuspects Abroad,"by Douglas Jehl and DavidJohnston, TheNew York
Times, March 6, 2005.
Email from: HB^B^fttoaRED^TED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTEDjT^^^^^B, [REDACTEdI^^M^WjREDACTED], —[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; ccTI^^^B, ^^^•••TsubjecTpOR IMMEDIATE
COORDINATION; Summary ofimpact ofdetainee program^ate^prin3,2005, at 5:21:37 PM.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to
19:56:05.
As detailed in this summary, this exchange occurred the day before an anticipated Committee vote on a
proposed Committee investigation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
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up our budget, we need to make sure the impression of what we do is
positive... we must be more aggressive out there, we eitlier put out our story
or we get eaten, there is no middle ground."^^^^
Mudd counseled not to "advertise" the discussions between CIA
personnel and the media with the CIA "workforce," because "they'd misread it."2266
promised to keep the media outreach "real close hold," Mudd wrote:
"most of them [CIA personnel] do not know that when the w post/ny times
quotes 'senior intel official,' it's us... authorized and directed by opa."^^^^
sent a draft compilation of plot disruptions to
|CTC Legal to determine whether the release ofthe information would pose any "legal
problems.According to CIA attorneys, information on Issa al-Britani posed no problems
because it was sourced to the 9/11 Commission. They also determined that information about
lyman Paris and Sajid Badat that was sourced to press stories posed no legal problems because
Paris had already pled guilty and Badat was not being prosecuted in the United States.^-^^ On
April 15, 2005, a CIA officer expressed concerns in an email to several CIA attorneys about the
CIA releasing classified information to the media. There are no CIA records indicating a
response to the CIA officer's email.-^^^
That day, April 15, 2005, the National Security Council Principals
Committee discussed a public campaign for the CIA's Detentior^nd Interrogation Program,
After the meeting, ALEC Station personnel informed ||B^^|CTC Legal that scheduled
interviews with NBC News of Director Porter Goss and Deputy CTC Director Philip Mudd
Saraetime communication, between John P. Mudd and
19:56:05.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and
19:56:05.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and
19:56:05.
2268 from: Cliief of Operations, ALEC Station; to:
IREDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
I [REDACTED], [REDACTED], •|;cc: p^^^^^^M^^^^BBi^^KsubjectjBrokaw interview: Take one; date:
April 13, 2005, at 6:46:59 PM; email^om^^^^^|^^^|rtor^^HH^H|; cc:[REDACTED], [REDACTED], ^HB^^HH^EDACTEDIJ[REDACTED]J^^^^HIJREDACTEDL [REDACTED], f"|, [REDACTED]^^^^^ |^; subject^^^^aw interview:
Take one; date: April 13,2005, at 6:50:28 PM; email from: [REDACTED],
I; cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED];
subject:Re: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13,2005,7:24:50 PM.
Email from:
A. Rizzo,
date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM.
Email from: jHUmi^Bi'
BIH' [REDACTED],
April 14, 2005, at 8:08:00 AM.
TOP SECRET/.
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should not proceed so that "we don't get a head [sic] of ourselves.On June 24, 2005,
however, Dateline NBC aired a program that included on-the-record quotes from Goss and
Mudd, as well as quotes from "top American intelligence officials.The program and
Dateline NBC's associated online articles included classified information about the capture and
interrogation of CIA detainees and quoted "senior U.S. intelligence analysts" stating that
intelligence obtained from CIA interrogations "approaches or surpasses any other intelligence on
the subject of al-Qaida and the construction of the network."^^^^ The Dateline NBC articles
stated that "Al-Qaida leaders suddenly found themselves bundled onto a CIA Gulfstream V or
Boeing 737 jet headed for long months of interrogation," and indicated that Abu Zubaydah,
KSM, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi were "picked up and bundled off to
interrogation centers." The ardcles also stated that the capture of bin al-Shibh led to the captures
of KSM and Khallad bin Attash.^^^"^ This information was inaccurate.^^^^ There are no CIA
records to indicate that there was any investigation or crimes report submitted in connection with
the Dateline NBC program and its associated reporting.
C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not
Be Attributed to the CIA
(^FS//||H||||H|||||^||||||/^^ After the April 15, 2005, National Security Council Principals
Committee meeting, the CIA drafted an extensive document describing the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program for an anticipated media campaign. CIA attorneys, discussing aspects of
the campaign involving off-the-record disclosures, cautioned against attributing the information
to the CIA itself. One senior attorney stated that the proposed press briefing was "minimally
acceptable, but only if not attributed to a CIA official." The CIA attorney continued: "This
should be attributed to an 'official knowledgeable' about the program (or some similar
obfuscation), but should not be attributed to a CIA or intelligence official." Referring to CIA
efforts to deny Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for previously acknowledged
Email from: subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 15, 2005, at
1:00:59 PM. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[w]ith regard to information related to covert action,
authorization [to disclose information to the media] rests with the White House." CIA records made available to the
Committee, however, do not indicate White House approval for the subsequent media disclosures. In the summer of
2013, the Committeerequested the CIA provide any suchrecords should theyexist. No records were identified by
the CIA.
See "The Long War; World View of War on Terror," Dateline NBC, June 24, 2005^i^pri^05, Mudd stated
that the program would likely be aired in June. Seeemail from: John P. Mudd; to: subject:Re:
Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 18, 2005, at 08:31 AM.
2273 frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has ledtodeadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June
24,2005.
2274 frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has ledtodeadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June
24, 2005; "Al-Qaida finds safehaven in Iran,"Dateline NBC, June 24, 2005. Notwithstanding this content, the
CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[a] review of the NBC broadcast, cited by the Study, shows that it contained
no publicdisclosures of classified CIAinformation; indeed, theRDIprogram was not discussed"(emphasis in the
original). In addition to the information described above included in the online articles associated with the
broadcast, the broadcast itselfdescribedthe role of a CIA asset in the captureof KSMand the capture of Abu Faraj
al-Libi in "joint US/Pakistani actions" ("The Long War; World View of War on Terror," Dateline NBC, June 24,
2005).
As describedelsewherein tliis summary and in moredetail in the full Committee Study, the captures of KSM
and Khallad bin Attash were unrelated to th^aptur^n^ntenjogatioi^f^ bin al-Shibh.
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information, the attorney noted that, "[o]ur Glomar figleaf is getting pretty thin."^^^^ Another
CIA attorney noted that the draft "makes the [legal] declaration 1Just wrote about the secrecy of
the interrogation program a work offiction.. IH^mCTC Legal urged that CIA
leadership needed to "confront the inconsistency" between CIA court declarations "about how
critical it is to keep this information secret" and the CIA "planning to reveal darn near the entire
"2278program
D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the
Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah
In late 2005, the CIA decided to cooperate again with Douglas Jehl
of the New York Times, despite his intention to publish information about the program. A CIA
officer wrote about Jehl's proposed article, which was largely about the CIA's detention and
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, "[t]his is not necessarily an unflattering story."^^^^ Jehl, who
provided the CIA with a detailed outline of his proposed story, informed the CIA that he would
emphasize that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques worked, that they were approved
through an inter-agency process, and that the CIA went to great lengths to ensure that the
interrogation program was authorized by theWhite House and the Department of Justice.^^^®
CIA records indicate that the CIA decided not todissua^Jehl from describingtheCIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques because, as ^m|||||||||||CTC Legal ^^^B^^^^^oted,
'[t]he EITs have already been out there."-^^^ The CIA's chief of ALECStation7|^ ^B
I, who wondered whether cooperation with Jehl would be "undercutting ourcomplaint
Email from:
subject: Re: Interrogation Program-
Going Public Draft Talking Points-Comments Due to {[^^JnebyCOBTODAY. Thanks.; date: April 20, 2005,
at 5:58:47 PM.
See from: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Re: Interrogation Program—Going Public Draft Talkin^Point^Comments Due tojjj^^lme by COB TODAY. Thanks.; date: April 21, 2005, at 07:24 AM. ||||||^|||||^| was referring to the assault
case against David Passaro. The Committee Study does not include an analysis of the accuracy of declarations to
U.S. courts by senior CIA officials.
I; cc:
L [REDACTED];subject: Re: Interrogation Program-Going Public
^Tie by COB TODAY. Thanks.; date: April 25, 2005, at 11:41:07
2278 from:
[REDACTED],
Draft Talking Points-Comments Due to
AM.
Email from: to: I, John A. Ri/zo, |
[REDACTED], Robert L. Grenier; subject: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydiili and
Conception of EITs; date: December 15, 2005, at 02:04 PM.
2280 |H,Yiail from: ^i^zo,
[REDACTED], Robert L. Grenier; subject: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and
Conception ofEITsjdatejDecember 15, 2005, at02:04 PM.
Email from:^^^^^; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]J
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: Doug Jehl -
Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Conception of EITs; date: December 15, 2005, at 02:10
PM. Another CIA officer added "I don't like so much talk about EIT's, but that particular horse has long left the
barn...." See email from: ^ |^^ ^^H^^c^REDACTED], [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^^^H, [REDACTEdIUHHIH, subject: Re:
Doug Jelil - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Conception of EITs; date: December 15,
2005, at 03:03 PM.




against those leakers," nonetheless suggested informing Jehl of other examples of CIA "detainee
exploitation success.
While the New York Times did not publish Jehl's story, on
September 7, 2006, the day after President Bush publicly acknowledged the program, David
Johnston of the New York Times called the CIA's OPA with a proposed news story about the
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. In an email with the subject line, "We Can't Let This Go
Unanswered," the CIA's director of public affairs in OPA, Mark Mansfield, described Johnston's
proposed narrative as "bullshit" and biased toward the FBI, adding that "we need to push
back."^^^^ While it is unclear if Mansfield responded toJohnston's proposed story, Mansfield
later wrote in an email that there was "[n]oneed to woiTy."-^"^ On September 10,2006, theNew
YorkTimes published an article by Johnston, entitled, "At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared
Over Tactics," that described "sharply contrasting accounts" of the interrogation of Abu
Zubaydah. The article cited officials "more closely allied with law enforcement," who stated
that Abu Zubaydah "cooperated with F.B.I, interviewers," as well as officials "closely tied to
intelligence agencies," who stated that Abu Zubaydah "was lying, and things were going
nowhere," and that "[i]t was clear that he had information about an imminent attack and time
was of the essence." The article included the frequent CIA representation that, after the use of
"tougher tactics," Abu Zubaydah "soon began to provide information on key A1 Qaeda operators
to help us find and capaire those responsible for the 9/11 attacks."-^^^ This characterization of
Abu Zubaydah's interrogation is incongruent with CIA interrogation records.~^^^ CTC stated
that the article resulted in questions to the CIA from the country
and assessed that "[djisclosures of this nature could adversely [have
an] impact on future joint CT operations with... HH partners."^^*^^ There are no indications
that the CIA filed a crimes report in connection with the article."^®^^
In early 2007, the CIA cooperated with Ronald Kessler again on
another book. According to CIA records, the purpose of the cooperation was to "push back" on
Kessler's proposed accounts of intelligence related to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the
2282 Email from; I; to: [REDACTED1; cc:|; subject: Re: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the
Capture ofAbu Zubaydah and Conceptioi^^ITs^ateJDecembeH5^00^at 8:50:36 PM.
2283 Email from: Mark Mansfield; to: cc: Paul
Gimigliano, subject: We Can't Let This Go Unanswered; date: September 7, 2006, at 01:12
PM.
228^ Email from: Mark Mansfield^oJ||^^^H||||H|^cJ||||||H [REDACTED],
n ^i,"I'I' i*
- Re: Fw: We Can't Let This Go Unanswered; date: September 7, 2006, at 3:14:53 PM.
2285 ^ Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over Tactics," TVevv York Times, David Johnston, September 10,2006.
228^ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III andsections on CIA claims related to the"Capture of Ramzi
bin al-Shibh" in this summaiy and Volume II.
2287 2005 & CY 2006CTCMedia Leaks; September 21, 2006. Thedocument described "the moreserious CTC
media leaks that occurred in CY 2005 and 2006."
2288 SeniorDeputyGeneralCounsel John Rizzo urgedthat his colleagues determine whether OPAcooperated with
the article "[bjefore we get DOJ o^reitoocrankec^^ on this." See email from: John A. Rizzo; to:
cc: [REDA^^^H^^H^^PII, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], |
[REDACTED], HHHiHHr|^||^mi^Bsubject: Re: Fw: Request for Crimes Reports on NYT and Time
Magazine Leaks on Interrogation Activitie^REDACTE|^ ^ate^eptembe^2, 2006, at 5:52:10 PM.
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inteiTOgation of Abu Zubaydah,-^^^ which a CIA officer noted "give undue credit to theFBIfor
CIA accomplishments.After another CIA officer drafted information for passage to
Kessler,-^^^ ^^^^^|CTC Legal, course being the lawyer, I
would recommend not telling Kesslerany±ing7^^^^H wrote that if, "for policy
reasons," the CIA decided to cooperate with the author, there was certain information that should
not be disclosed. then suggested that "if we are going to do this," the CIA could
provide information to Kessler that would "undercut the FBI agents," who stated had
"leaked that they would have gotten everything anyway" from Abu Zubaydah.
After Kessler provided a draft of his book to the CIA and met with
CIA officers, the CIA's director of public affairs, Mark Mansfield, described what he viewed as
the problems in Kessler's narrative. According to Mansfield, Kessler was "vastly overstating the
FBI's role in thwarting terrorism and, frankly, giving other USG agencies—including CIA—
short shrift." Moreover, "[t]he draft also didn't reflect the enormously valuable intelligence the
USG gleaned from CIA's inten'ogation program" and "had unnamed FBI officers questioning
our methods and claiming their own way of eliciting information is much more effective."
According to Mansfield, the CIA "made some headway" in its meeting with Kessler and that, as
a result of the CIA's intervention, his book would be "more balanced than it would have
been."2293
in an email to Mansfield, Kessler provided the "substantive
changes" he had made to his draft following his meeting with CIA officials. The changes
included the statement that Abu Zubaydah was subjected to "coercive interrogation techniques"
after he "stopped cooperating." Kessler's revised text further stated that "the CIA could point to
a string of successes and dozens of plots that were rolled up because of coercive interrogation
techniques." The statements in the revised text on the "successes" attributable to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques were similar to CIA representations to policymakers and were
incongruent with CIA records.^^ '^^
Sametime communication between
Email from: to: cc;
Ron Kessler draft; date: March 13, 2007, at 05:59 PM.
Email from: to:HHIHI; cc:
at 6:03:45 PM.
Email from:
I 28/Feb/0709:51:10 to 19:00:42.
subject: Fact Check on
; subject: Re: Fact Check on Ron Kessler draft; date: March 14, 2007,
cc:
|; subject: Re: FactCheckon Ron Kesslerdraft; date: March 15,
2007, at 7:07:52 AM .
EmaiHrom^ar^Mansfield; to: Michaer^layden^^^HB||^ ^^^H^^hen R. Kai:
Morell, Jose Rodriguez,
subject: Session with Author Ron Kessler; date: March 15,2007, at 6:54:33 PM.
Kessler's changes repeated the representation made in the president's September 6, 2006, speech, which was
based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, that Abu Zubaydali and Ramzi bin al-Shibh "provided information
that would help in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Klialid Sheikh Mohammed." With
regard to the Second Wave plotting, Kessler stated that "'[ilf it had not been for coercive interrogation techniques
used on Abu Zubaydali, CIA officials suggest, the second wave of attacks might have occurred and KSM could be
free and planning more attacks." As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volumes II and III, the
thwarting of the Second Wave plotting and the capture of KSM were unrelated to reporting from Abu Zubaydah.
Kessler's changes also included statements about the training and expertise of CIA interrogators, the Department of






Kessler's "substantive changes" made after his meeting with CIA
officials included the statement that many members of Congress and members of the media
"have made careers for themselves by belittling and undercutting the efforts of the heroic men
and women who are trying to protect us," Kessler's revised text contended that, "[wjithout
winning the war being waged by the media against our own government, we are going to lose the
war on terror because the tools that are needed will be taken away by a Congress swayed by a
misinformed public and by other countries unwilling to cooperate with the CIA orFBI because
they fear mindless exposure by the press." Finally, Kessler's changes, made after his meeting
with CIA officers, included the statement that "[t]oo many Americans are intent on demonizing
those who are trying to protect us.""^^^
Justice review of theCIA'sinterrogation techniques, and congressional oversight of the CIA'sDetention and
Interrogation Program. For example, Kessler wrote, "[bjefore confronting a teiTorist, each interrogator was given
250 hours ofspecialized training." This statement is incongruent with the history ofthe CIA program. Email from:
Ronald Kessler; to: MarkMansfield; subject: follow-up; date: March16,2007, at 10:52:05.
Email from: Ronald Kessler; to: Mark Mansfield; subject: follow-up; date: March 16, 2007, at 10:52:05.
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V. Review of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice
A. August 1,2002, OLC Memorandum Relies onInaccurate Information Regarding Abu
Zubaydah
The office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice
wrote several legal memoranda and letters on the legality ofthe CIA's Detention and
InteiTogation Program between 2002 and 2007. The OLC requested, and relied on, information
provided by the CIA to conduct the legal analysis included in these memoranda and letters.
Much of the information the CIA provided to the OLC was inaccurate in material respects.
On August 1,2002, the OLC issued a memorandum advising that
the use of theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah would not violate
prohibitions against torture found in Section 2340A of Title 18 of the United States Code.^^^^
The techniques were: (1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap),
(5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects
placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard. The memorandum relied on CIA
representations about Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida, his role inal-Qa'ida plots, his
expertise in interrogation resistance training, and his withholding ofinformation on pending
terrorist attacks.-^^"^ The OLC memorandum included the following statement about OLC's
reliance on information provided by the CIA:
"Our advice is based uponthe following facts, which you have provided to us.
We also understand that youdo nothave anyfacts in yourpossession contrary
to the facts outlined here, and this opinion is limited to these facts. If these
facts were to change, this advice would not necessarily apply
2296 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office ofLegal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation ofal Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 1). Also on August 1, 2002, OLC issued an unclassified, but non-public, opinion, from Deputy Assistant
Attorney General John Yoo to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales analyzing whether certain interrogation
methods violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.
2297 Memorandum forJohn Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office ofLegal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation ofal Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810.
Tab 1).
2298 Memorandum forJohn Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office ofLegal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation ofal Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 1). During a2008 hearing ofdie Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, tlien-Acting Assistant Attorney
General Steven Bradbury stressed that the OLC's opinions relied on factual representations made by the CIA. As
Bradbury testified, "all ofour advice addressing the CIA's specific intenogation methods has made clear that OLC's
legal conclusions were contingent on a number ofexpress conditions, limitations and safeguards adopted by the CIA
and designed to ensure that the program would be administered by trained professionals witli strict oversight and
controls, and that none ofthe interrogation practices would go beyond the bounds of the law." When asked whether
information could beelicited from detainees using techniques authorized bythe Army Field Manual, Bradbury
responded, "Iwill have to defer, because on those kinds of questions in terms of the effectiveness and the
information obtained I have torely on the professional judgment ofthe folks involved at the agency, and General
[Michael] Hayden I think has spoken to this issue before this Committee." (See transcript ofhearing ofthe Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, June 10, 2008 (DTS #2008-2698).) General Hayden's representations to the
Committee are described elsewhere in this summar^n^r^reate^etaiUi^^ume II.
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The facts provided by the CIA, and relied on by the OLC to
support its legal analysis, were cited in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, and many were
repeated in subsequent OLC memoranda on the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques. Much
of the information provided by the CIA to the OLC was unsupported by CIA records. Examples
include:
• Abu Zubaydah's Status in Al-Qa'ida: The OLC memorandum repeated the CIA's
representation that Abu Zubaydah was the "third or fourth man" in al-Qa'ida.^^^^ This
CIA assessment was based on single-source reporting that was recanted prior to the
August 1, 2002, OLC legaUnemorandum. This retraction was provided to several senior
CIA officers, including m^HCTC Legal, to whom the information was emailed on
July 10, 2002, three weeks prior to the issuance of the August 1, 2002, OLC
memorandum.^^°® The CIA laterconcluded that Abu Zubaydah was nota member of al-
Qa'ida.^^®^
• Abu Zubaydah's Role in Al-Qa 'ida Plots: The OLC memorandum repeated the CIA's
representation that Abu Zubaydah "has been involved in every major terrorist operation
carried outby al Qaeda,"--^^- and that Abu Zubaydah "was oneof the planners of the
September 11 attacks.CIA records do not support these claims.
• Abu Zubaydah's Expertise in Interrogation Resistance Training: The OLC memorandum
repeated the CIA's representation that Abu Zubaydah was "well-versed" in resistance to
interrogation techniques, and that "it is believed Zubaydah wrote al Qaeda's manual on
resistance techniques.""^^ A review of CIA records found no information to support
these claims. To the contrary, Abu Zubaydah later stated that it was his belief that all
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 1).
2300 from: to: with multiple cc's; subject; AZinformation; date: July
10, 2002, at 1:18:52 PM. This claim was included in subsequent OLC memoranda. See Memorandum for John A.
Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel,Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of LegalCounsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations
Under Article 16 of the Convention AgainstTorture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Intenogation of
High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11).
CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16,2006, "Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in
Afghanistan, 1990-2001."
2302 Memorandum forJohn Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from JayBybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 1). This claim was included in subsequent OLC memoranda. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior
Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under
Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogationof High
Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11).
2303 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, fromJay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Intenogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 1).
2304 Memorandum for JohnRizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of LegalCounsel, August 1,2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 1).
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individuals provide information in detention, and that captured individuals should
"expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when
someone with knowledge is captured.
• Abu Zubaydah's Withholding ofInformation on Pending Terrorist Attacks: The OLC
memorandum repeated CIA representations stating that "the interrogation team is certain"
Abu Zubaydah was withholding information related to planned attacks against the United
States, either within the U.S. homeland or abroad.^^^ CIA records do not support this
claim. Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team was not "certain" that Abu Zubaydah was
withholding "critical threat information." To the contrary, the interrogation team wrote
to CIA Headquarters: "[o]ur assumption is the objective of this operation [the
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah] is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu
Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United
States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided."-^^^
B. The CIA Interprets the August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Apply to Other Detainees,
Despite Language of the Memorandum; Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Other
Detainees Diverge from the CIA's Representations to the OLC
The CIA broadly interpreted the August 1, 2002, OLC
memorandum to allow for greater operational latitude. For example, the memorandum stated
that the legal advice was specific to the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the specific CIA
representations about Abu Zubaydah; however, the CIA applied its enhanced inteiTogation
techniques to numerous other CIA detainees without seeking additional formal legal advice from
the OLC. As detailed elsewhere, the other detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques varied significantly in terms of their assessed role in teiTorist activities
and the information they were believed to possess. CIA records indicate that it was not until July
29, 2003, almost a year later, that the attorney general stated that the legal principles of the
August 1, 2002, memorandum could be applied to other CIA detainees.^^^^
The August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum also included an analysis
of each of the CIA's proposed enhanced interrogation techniques with a description of how the
2305 10496 (162014Z FEB 03)
2306 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tabl).
[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN], [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02);
July 23, 2004, at 07:56:49 PM. See also email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: [SWIGERT
and DUNBAR]; date: August 8, 21,2002, at 10:21 PM.
2308 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Gold^ith III to Directo^enet^fun^S, 2004 (DTS #2004-
2710). In an August 2003 interview with the OIG, ||||^^|CTC Legal, stated that "every
detainee interrogatedisdifferent in that they are outside tlie opinion because the opinion was written for Zuba^ah."
Tlie context forBBBMH's statement was the legality ofthe waterboarding ofKSM. See interview of||B|
by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20,
2003.




CIA stated the techniques would be applied.-^^^ However, in the interrogations of Abu
Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees, the CIA applied the techniques in a manner that a
Department of Justice attorney concluded "was quite different from the [description] presented in
2002."- '^^ As reported by the CIA's inspector general, the CIA used the waterboarding
technique against Abu Zubaydah, and later against KSM, in a manner inconsistent with CIA
representations to the OLC, as well as the OLC's description of the technique in the August 1,
2002, memorandum. In addition, the CIA assured the OLC that it would be "unlikely" that CIA
detainees subjected to sleep deprivation would experience hallucinations, and that if they did,
medical personnel would intervene.^^^^ However, multiple CIA detainees subjected to prolonged
sleep deprivation experienced hallucinations, and CIA interrogation teams did not always
discontinue sleep deprivation after the detainees had experiencedhallucinations.-^^^ The CIA
further represented to the OLC that Abu Zubaydah's recovery from his wound would not be
impeded by the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.However, prior to the
OLC memorandum, DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel stated, and CIA Headquarters had
confirmed, that the inten-ogation process would take precedence over preventing Abu
Zubaydah's wound from becoming infectedOther CIA detainees were also subjected to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, notwithstanding concerns that the interrogation
techniques could exacerbate their injuries.^^^^ The CIA also repeatedly used intertogation
techniques beyond those provided to the OLC for review, including water dousing, nudity,
abdominal slaps, and dietary manipulation.^^
At the July 29, 2003, meeting of select National Security Council
principals. Attorney General John Ashcroft expressed the view that "while appropriate caution
should be exercised in the number of times the waterboard was administered, the repetitions
2309 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel,Central Intelligence Agency, fromJay Bybee,Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 1).
2-'"° Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; Report, Investigation into the Officeof Legal
Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009, pp. 140-41 (DTS #2010-1058).
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central IntelUgence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab I).
^^^^11299 (•••JA^4); 1308(^^•jANO40r|^^^B 1312^^HnA7^)7^^HB 1530(^^B^H04)
2313 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CentralIntelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee,Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 1).
10536 (151006Z JUL 02); A^Cj^H (182321Z JUL 02). After the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, ll^^l^reported that "[d]uring the most aggressive portions of[Abu
Zubaydah's] interrogation, the combination of a lack of hygiene, sub-optimal nutrition, inadvertent trauma to the
wound secondary to some of the stress positions utilized at that stage and the removal of formal, obvious medical
care to further isolate the subject had an overall additive effect on the deterioration of the wound." See
10679 (250932Z AUG 02).
See Volume III, including detainee reviews of Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim.
As described later, the CIA sought OLC approvalfor^se techniques onJuly 30, 2004, almost two years after
the August 1, 2002, memorandum. See letter from Legd Acting Assistant
Attorney General Levin, July 30, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809).




described do not contravene the principles underlying DOJ's August 2002opinion."^^^^ Records
do not indicate that the attorney general opined on the manner (as opposed to the frequency) with
which the waterboard was implemented, or on interrogation techniques not included in the
August 2002 opinion. The differences between the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, as
described by the CIA to the OLC in 2002, and the actual use of the techniques as described in the
CIA Inspector General May 2004 Special Review, prompted concerns at the Department of
Justice. On May 27, 2004, Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith sent a letter to the CIA
general counsel stating that the Special Review "raises the possibility that, at least in some
instances and particularly early in the program, the actual practice may not have been congruent
with all of these assumptions and limitations." In particular. Goldsmith's letter highlighted the
statement in the Special Review that the use of the waterboard in SERE training was "so
different from subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant."^^^^
C, Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, the
CIA Obtains Approval from the OLC for the Interrogation of Three Individual Detainees
Inspector General Special Review
recommended that the CIA's general counsel submit in writing a request for the Department of
Justice to provide the CIA with a "formal, written legal opinion, revalidating and modifying, as
appropriate, the guidance provided" in the August 1, 2002, memorandum. It also recommended
that, in the absence of such a written opinion, the DCI should direct that the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques "be implemented only within the pai'ameters that were mutually
understood by the Agency andDoJ on 1 August 2002."^^^^ After receiving the SpecialReview,
Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith informed the CIA that the OLC had never formally
opined on whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would meet constimtional
standards.On May 24, 2004, DCI Tenet, Deputy Director John McLaughlin, General
Counsel Scott Muller, and others met to discuss the Department of Justice's comments, after
which DCI Tenet directed that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as
the use of the CIA's "standard" techniques, be suspended.^^ '^ On June 4, 2004, DCI Tenet
Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith, 111 to Director George Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS
#2004-2710). As described above, the CIA's presentation to the NSC principals undercounted the frequency with
which KSM and Abu Zubaydah were subjected to the waterboard.
Letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmitli to CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, May 27, 2004.
CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Countertenorisra Detention and Inten'ogation Program,
(2003-7123-IG), May 2004.
May 25, 2004, Talking Points for DCI Telephone Conversation widi Attoniey General: DOJ's Legal Opinion
Re; CIA's Counterterrorist Program (CT) InteiTogation. This position was confirmed in a June 10, 2004, letter
(Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith lH, to Scott Muller, General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, June 10, 2004).
2321 24, 2004, Memorandum for tlie Record from Legal Group, DCI Countertenonsm
Center, Subject: Memorandum of Meeting with the DCI Regarding DOJ's Statement that DOJ has Rendered No
Legal Opinion on Whether the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques would meet ConstitutionalStanda^^email from: HHiHHIi' C/RDG^o^REDACT^]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED],
IIIIIBIIIIIII, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], jflHIHHHH' subject: Interim Guidance for Standard and
Enhanced Intenogations; date: May 25, 2004.




issued a formal memorandum suspending tlie use of the techniques, pending policy and legal
review. ^
As described in this summary, on July 2, 2004, Attorney General
Ashcroft and Deputy Attorney General James Comey attended a meeting of select National
Security Council principals, the topic of which was the proposed CIA interrogation of Janat
Gul.-^^^ According to CIA records, the attorney general stated that the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul would be consistent with U.S. law and treaty
obhgations, although Ashcroft made an exception for the waterboard, which he stated required
further review, "primarily because of the view that the technique had been employed in a
different fashion than that which DOJ initially approved.On July 20, 2004, Ashcroft, along
with Patiick Philbin and Daniel Levin from the Department of Justice, attended a National
Security Council Principals Committee meeting at which Ashcroft stated that the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques described in the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum,
with the exception of the waterboard, would not violate U.S. statutes, the U.S. Constitution, or
U.S. treaty obligations. The attorney general was then "directed" to prepare a written opinion
addressing the constitutional issues, and the CIA was directed to provide further information to
the Department of Justice with regard to the waterboard.^^-^ On July 22, 2004, Attorney General
Ashcroft sent a letter to Acting DCI John McLaughlin stating that nine interrogation techniques
(those addressed in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, with the exception of the waterboard) did
not violate the U.S. Constitution or any statute or U.S. treaty obligations, in the context of the
CIA interrogation of Janat Gul.^^-^
Oil July 30, 2004, anticipating the interrogation of Janat Gul, the
CIA provided the OLC for the first time a description of dietary manipulation, nudity, water
dousing, the abdominal slap, standing sleep deprivation, and the use of diapers, all of which the
CIA described as a "supplement" to the interrogation techniques outlined in the August 1, 2002,
memorandum.^^^^ The CIA's descriptions of the interrogation techniques were incongruent with
how the CIA had applied the techniques in practice. The CIA description of a minimum calorie
intake was incongruent with the history of the program, as no minimum calorie intake existed
prior to May 2004 and the March 2003 draft OMS guidelines allowed for food to be withheld for
June 4, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Directorfor Operations from Director of Central Intelligence Re:
Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques. On June 2, 2004, George Tenet informed the President that he
intended to resign from his position on July 11, 2004. Tlie White House announced the resignation on June 3, 2004.
Janat Gul's interrogation is detailed in Volume III and more briefly in this summary.
Letter from Assistant Attorney General Ashcroft to General Counsel Muller, July 7, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 3); July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting with National Security Advisor Rice in the White House
Situation Room, Friday 2 July Re: Interrogations and Detainee Janat Gul; July 6, 2004, Memorandum from
Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to George Tenet, Director of Central
Intelligence, Re: Janat Gul.
July 29, 2004, Memorandumfor the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller Re: Principals Meeting
relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004.
The one-paragraph letter did not provide legalanalysis or substantive discussion of the interrogation techniques.
(See letter from Attorney General John Ashcroft to Acting DCI John McLaughlin, July 22, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 4).)
Letter from m|H|CTC Legal Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin, July 30,
2004 (DTS #2009-1809).
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one to two The CIA represented to the OLC that nude detainees were "not wantonly
exposed to other detainees or detention facility staff," even though nude detainees at the CIA's
DETENTION SITE COBALT were "kept in a central area outside the interrogation room" and
were "walked around" by guards as a form of humiliation.The CIA's description of water
dousing made no mention of cold water immersion, which was used on CIA detainees and taught
in CIA interrogator training.^^^® The CIArepresentation describing a two-hour limit for the
shackling of detainees' hands above their heads is incongruent with records of CIA detainees
whose hands were shackled above their heads for extended periods, as well as the draft March
2003 OMS guidelines permitting such shackling for up to four hours.^^^^ The CIA further
represented to the OLC that the use of diapers was "for sanitation and hygiene purposes,"
whereas CIA records indicate that in some cases, a central "purpose" of diapers was "[t]o cause
humiliation" and "to induce a sense of helplessness.
August 13, 2004, CIA attorneys, medical officers, and other
personnel met with Department of Justice attorneys to discuss some of the techniques for which
the CIA was seeking approval, in particular sleep deprivation, water dousing, and the
waterboard. When asked about the possibility that detainees subjected to standing sleep
deprivation could suffer from edema, OMS doctors informed the Department of Justice attorneys
that it was not a problem as the CIA would "adjust shackles or [the] method of applying the
technique as necessary to prevent edema, as well as any chafing or over-tightness from the
shackles." With regard to water dousing, CIA officers represented that "water is at normal
temperature; CIA makes no effort to 'cool' the water before applying it." With respect to the
waterboard, CIA officers indicated that "each application could not last more than 40 seconds
2328 OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE RENDITION,
INTERROGATION, AND DETENTION, May 17, 2004, OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support
to Detainee Interrogations, First Draft, March 7, 2003. The evolution of OMS Guidelines is described in Volume III
of the Committee Study.
2329 Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, |
April 14,2003.
2330 Email from: [REDACTED] subject: Memo; date; March 15, 2004.
See detainee reviews of Abu Hudhaifa and Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah.
233' OMS Guidelines on Medical and PsychologkalSupport to Detainee Interrogations, "First Draft," March 7,
2003; 28246 Intei-view Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of
InteiTogations for Counterterrorism Puq5oses7^^^^^^H^pri^^003; Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG,
Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorisn^umoses^^H^^^^^^BjApril30, 2003; Memorandum for
[REDACTED] from [REDACTED] November |, 2002, Subject:
Legal Analysis of [REDACTED] Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in
"[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). For example, Ridha al-Najjar was repoiled to
have undergone "hanging," described as "handcuffing one or both of his wrists to an overhead horizontal bar" for 22
hours each day for two consecutive days. See Memorandum for [REDACTED], November |, 2002, Subject^eg^
Analysis of [REDACTED] Personnel Participating in InteiTogationa^e CIA Detention Facility in mmimgli
I(aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]". See also ••• 10171 (101527Z JAN 03), indicating tliat
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri "remained in th^tandin^o^tion, with hands tied overhead, overnight."
2332 interview of|^||HH|||||HI [^^^ OFFICER 1], December 19,2002; CIA Inteirogation
Program Draft Cours^Mat^als, March 11, 2003, pg. 28; CTC/RDG Interrogation Program, December 15, 2003,
pg. IO^DIRECTORHUI (251609Z JUL 02). See also "Standard InterrogatiorTTec^ attachment to email
from; ^m||||m||itolscott W. Muller, Jolin Rizzo, [REDACTED], jlHIHiiiHI' subject; revised
interrogation discussion; date: July 19, 2004.




(and usually only lasted about 20 seconds).As detailed in the full Committee Study, each of
these representations was incongment with the operational history of the CIA program.
//NF) On August 25, 2004, the CIA's Associate General Counsel
a letter to the OLC stating that Janat Gul, who had been rendered to CIA custody
on July 2004, had been subjected to the attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap, wall
standing, stress positions, and sleep deprivation. The letter further stated that CIA interrogators
"assess Gul not to be cooperating, and to be using a sophisticated counterinterrogation sti'ategy,"
and that the further use of the same enhanced interrogation techniques would be "unlikely to
move Gul to cooperate absent concurrent use" of dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing,
and the abdominal slap. The letter referenced the reporting from a CIA source,stating: "CIA
understan^that before his capmre, Gul had been working tofacilitate a direct meeting between
the CIA source reporting on the pre-election threat and Abu Faraj [al-Libi]
himself."-^^^
The following day, August 26, 2004, Acting Assistant Attorney
General Daniel Levin informed CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo that the use of the four
additional interrogation techniques did not violate any U.S. statutes, the U.S. Constitution, or
U.S. treaty obligations. Levin's advice relied on the CIA's representations about Gul, including
that "there are no medical and psychological contraindications to the use of these techniques as
you plan to employ them on Gul."^^^^ Atthe time, CIA records indicated: (1) that standing sleep
deprivation had already caused significant swelling in Gul's legs; (2) that standing sleep
deprivation continued despite Gul's visual and auditory hallucinations and that Gul was "not
oriented to time or place";-^^^ (3) that CIA interrogators on-site did notbelieve that "escalation to
enhanced pressures will increase [Gul's] ability to produce timely accurate locational and threat
August 11, 2004, Letter from [REDACTED], Assistant General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel; August 27, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED] Re:
Meeting with Department of Justice Attorneys on 13 August, 2004, Regarding Specific Interrogation Techniques,
Including the Waterboard.
As described in this summary, and in more detail in the Committee Study, the source later admitted to
fabricating information related to the "pre-election" threat.
Letter from |||||||||||^^|^|, Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, August 25,2004 (DTS #2009-1809). For Gul's rendition, see milll 1512 04).
According to an August 16, 2004, cable, a CIA interrogator did "not believe that escalation to enhanced measures
williricreaseJGu ability toproduce timely accurate locational and threat information." {See 1567|||||||||mm04).) On August 19, 2004, acable from DETENTION SITE BLACK noted that the inteiTogation
team "does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information." See 1574
04).
2336 Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
August 26, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 6). In May 2005, the OLC again accepted the CIA's representations that a
psychological assessment found that Gul was "alert and oriented and his concentration and attention were
appropriate," that Gul's "thought processes were clear and logical; there was no evidence of a thought disorder,
delusions, or hallucinations," and that there "were not significant signs of depression anxiety or other mental
disturbance." See memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency,
from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re:
Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May be Used in the Interrogation of a
High Value al Qaeda Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9).
2337 1330 (Ogi633Z AUG04); 1541 (101228Z AUG 04)




information"and (4) that CIA interrogators did not believe that Gul was "withholding
imminent threat information."^^^^
Levin's August 26, 2004, letter to Rizzo was based on the premise
that "[w]e understand that [Janat] Gul is a high-value al Qaeda operative who is believed to
possess information concerning animminent terrorist threat to the United States."- '^^ " Levin's
understanding was based on the CIA's representation that "Gul had been working to facilitate a
direct meeting between the CIA BUI source reporting on the pre-election threat
and Abu Faraj [al-Libi]."^ '^^ ^ This information laterproved to be inaccurate. As detailed
elsewhere in diis summary, the threat of a terrorist attack to precede the November 2004 U.S.
election was found to be based on a CIA source whose information was questioned by senior
CTC officials at the time."^"^^ The same CIA source admitted to fabricating the information after
a in October 2004.^^^^^ In November 2004, after the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on Janat Gul, CIA's chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK,
where Janat Gul was interrogated, wrote that "describing [Gul] as 'highest ranking' gives him a
stature which is undeserved, overblown and misleading." The chief of Base added that "[sjtating
that [Gul] had 'long standing access to senior leaders in al-Qa'ida' is simply wrong."^^"^ In
December 2004, CIA officers concluded that Janat Gul was "not the link to senior AQ leaders
tliat [CIA Headquarters] said he was/is,"-^"^^ and in April 2005 CIAofficers wrote that "[tjhere
simply is no 'smoking gun' that we can refer to that would justify our continued holding of
[Janat Gul]."^^^^
By April 2005, as the OLC neared completion of a new
memorandum analyzing the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC
sought information from the CIA on "what [the CIA] got from Janat Gul, was it valuable, [and]
did it help anything...." The CIA did not immediately respond to this request, and the CIA's
Associate General Counsel noted that DOJ personnel had "taken to calling
[him] daily" for additional information.^ '^^ ^ Subsequently, on April 15,2005, the CIA informed
2338 ^557 (161730Z AUG 04)
2339 2574 (191346Z AUG 04)
Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
August 26, 200^Km^#200^10, Tab 6).
Letter from Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, August 25,2004 (DTS #2009-1809).
from; to: [REDACTED],|;subject: coul^A^b^estin^^^SET Y^n^Sour^Nam^EDACTED]^date^arch
AM; email from^^H^^|H^^|; to BH|||||||^^ cc: HHiHIjlH. UHl[REDACTED], ^HmfHHTsu^ect: Re: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name
REDACTED]?; date: March 2004, at 7:52:32 AM. The fabricated source reporting is described elsev^here in
this summaiy.
^••11411 (•••• 04)
234^ Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
subject: reALEC HH; November 10, 2004.
CIA "Comments on Detainees," December 19, 2004, Notes from a CD from [DETENTION SITE BLACK],
Email from: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: cc:
subject^^HBB|BB|pH||||^ ate^pril 30^005^^^^
[REDACTED]; subject: questions from OL^o^rH^pinion^ate^prin^ 2005; email from:
nil I Mil I I nil mil I




the OLC that "during most of Gul's debricfings, he has sought to minimize his knowledge of
extremist activities and has provided largely non-incriminating information about his
involvement in their networks.On May 10, 2005, the OLC issued a memorandum that
stated, "[yjou informed us that the CIA believed Gul had infonnation about al Qaeda's plans to
launch an attack within the Lfnited States... [olur conclusions depend on these assessments."
The OLC referenced l^l^l's August 25, 2004, letter on Gul and the pre-election threat.'^ '^ ^ In
a May 30, 2005, memorandum, the OLC referred to Janat Gul as "representative of the high
value detainees on whom enhanced techniques have been, or might be used," and wrote that "the
CIA believed [that Janat Gul] had actionable intelligence concerning the pre-election threat to
the United States,"- '^'" In the same memorandum, the OLC conveyed a new CIA representation
describing the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Janat Gul, which
stated:
"Gul has provided information that has helped the CIA with validating one of
its key assets reporting on the pre-election threat."**^ '^
There arc no indications in the memorandum that the CIA
informed the OLC that it had concluded that Gul had no information about the pre-election
threat, which was the basis on which the OLC had approved the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against Gul in the first place, or that CIA officers had determined that
Gul was "not the man we thought he was." In September 2004, the OLC advised the CIA that
the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and
Sharif al-Masri was also legal, based on the CIA representations that the two detainees were al-
Qa'ida operatives involved in the "operational planning" of the pre-election plot against the
United States.^^''- This CIA assessment was based on the same fabrications from the same CIA
questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 14, 2005.
April 15, 2005, fax to DOJ Command Center, for
|, and [REDACTED); subject: Re:
|,Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Departmentof
Justice, from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re: Janat Gul.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of
18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques Tliat May Be Used in the Intenogation of a High Value al
Qaeda Detainee.
2350 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations UnderArticle 16of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11).
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation ofHigh Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DT^2009-1^0, Tab 11), citing Janat Gul Memo
pp. 1-2. See April 15, 2005, fajOc^O^omi^an^enter, for Office ofLegal Counsel, U.S.
Department ofJustice, from m Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re; Janat Gul.
Letter to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, September 6,2004 (DTS #2009-
1810, Tab 7); Letter to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, September 20, 2004 (DTS
#2009-1810, Tab 8).
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source." Like Janat Gul, Ghailani and al-Masri were subjected to extended sleep deprivation
and experienced hallucinations.
D. May 2005 OLC Memoranda Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA
Regarding the Interrogation Process, the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, and
the Effectiveness of the Techniques
4, 2005, Actin^Assistan^ttomey General Steven
Bradbury faxed to CIA Associate General Counsel ^ questions related to
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, in which Bradbury referenced medical journal
articles. The following day, sent a letter to Bradbury stating that the CIA's responses
had been composed by the CIA's Office of Medical Services (OMS). The CIA response stated
that any lowering of the threshold of pain caused by sleep deprivation was "not germane" to the
program, because studies had only identified differences in sensitivity to heat, cold, and pressure,
and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "do not involve application of heat, cold,
pressure, any sharp objects (or indeed any objects at all)." '^^ ''^ With regard to theeffectof sleep
deprivation on the experience of water dousing, the CIA response stated that "at the temperatures
of water we have recommended for the program the likelihood of induction of pain by water
dousing is very low under any circumstances, and not a phenomenon we have seen in detainees
subject to this technique."^^^^ In response to Bradbury's query as to when edemaor shackling
would become painful as a result of standing sleep deprivation, the CIA responded, "[w]e have
not observed this phenomenon in the interrogations performed to date, and have no reason to
believe on theoretical grounds that edema or shackling would be more painful," provided the
shackles are maintained with "appropriate slack" and "interrogators follow medical officers'
recommendation to end standing sleep deprivation and use an alternate technique when the
medical officer judges that edema is significant in any way." The CIA response added that the
medical officers' reconmiendations "are always followed," and that "[d]etainees have not
complained about pain from edema." Much of this information was inaccurate.-^^^
235" [REDACTED] 3221 ; [REDACTED] 3242 04)
2355 Lettej.f,-om Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 4, 2005. Multiple interrogationplansto CIA detaineescalledfor
"uncomfortably" cool temperatures along with sleep deprivation. 10361
••••III; 10654 (030904Z MAR
Letter^^rn^^^^^m, Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 4, 2005. The CIA had subjected detainees to cold water baths during periods
of sleep deprivation. As a CIA psychologist noted, "I heard [Abu Hudhaifa] gasp out loud several times as he was
placed in tlie tub." {Seeemail from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Memo; date: March 15, 2004.) The
inspector general later reported that, as a result of being batlied in ice water, Abu Hudhaifa was "shivering" and
interrogators were concerned about his body temperature dropping (2005-8085-IG, at 12). See also \
2-^-" Letter from ^^^mBj^A^ociate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Office ofLegal CounseljMay4^200 detainee^ubjecte^o standin^leep deprivation
suffered from edema. (5ge 34098 12502 (011309Z
AUG 03); ^^^•M^^^M40847 (251619Z JUN 03)n^^HB^^^P 1246 (I71946Z AUG03); ^^^Bi0492 (161529Z FEB 03); 10429 (101215ZFEB03FH^Hi0909 (20191 8Z MAR
03); 42206 (191513Z JUL 03).) Detainees sometimes complained of pain and swelling
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Bradbury further inquired whether it was "possible to tell reliably
(e.g. from outward physical signs like grimaces) whether a detainee is experiencing severe pain.'
The CIA responded that "all pain is subjective, not objective," adding:
"Medical officers can monitor for evidence of condition or injury that most
people would consider painful, and can observe the individual for outward
displays and expressions associated with the experience of pain. Medical
officer [sic] can and do ask the subject, after the interrogation session has
concluded, if he is in pain, and have and do provide analgesics, such as Tylenol
and Aleve, to detainees who report headache and other discomforts during
their interrogations. We reiterate, that an interrogation session would be
stopped if, in the judgment of the interrogators or medical personnel, medical
attention was required."
As described elsewhere, multiple CIA detainees were subjected to
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques despite their medical conditions.
Bradbury's fax also inquired whether monitoring and safeguards
"will effectively avoid severe physical pain or suffering for detainees," which was a formulation
of the statutory definition of torture under consideration. Despite concerns from OMS that its
assessments could be used to support a legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques,^^^^ the CIA's response stated:
in their lower extremities. {See, for example^^^^^l 2615 (201528Z AUG 2619 (211349Z AUG
a7)J||^PI 2620 (221303Z AUG 02jpBr^23 (231234Z AUG 07); •^•^29 (251637Z AUG 07);
1111^^12^2 (271341Z AUG 07);(271856Z AUG 07).) As noted, standing sleep deprivation was
not always discontinued with the onset of edema.
Letter from AssociateGeneral Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Office o^ega^oun^l, May 4, 2005.
Letter from IIHHHHi, Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Office of LegalCoui^, May 4, 2005.
See, for example, •||||||p 10536 (151006Z JULY 02)^ALEC^^B (182321Z JUL 02); 10647
(201331Z AUG02); 10618 (121448Z AUG 02); BMMl0679 (250932Z AUG 02); DIRECTOR
•• ^BBmAY03F^HI^^H^B|37754l
38161 (131326Z MAY 03); DIRECTOR^^M^^BBmAY 03); DIRECTOR ^^^gMAY 03);
134098 342941
134310 detainee reports and reviews inVolume HI.
^^^"OnApril 11, 2005, after reviewing adraft OLC opinion, OMS personnel wrote a memorandum for^^^|
that stated, "[sjimply put, OMS is not in the business of saying what is acceptable in causing discomfort to
other human beings, and will not take on that burden.... OMS did not review or vet these techniques prior to their
introduction, but rather came into this programwith the understanding of your office and DOJ that they were aheady
determined as legal, permitted and safe. We see this current iteration [of the OLC memorandum] as a reversal of
that sequence, and a relocation of thosedecisions to OMS. If this is the case, that OMS has now the responsibility
for determining a procedure's legality through itsdetermination of safety, then we will need to review all procedures
in that light giventhisnewresponsibility/^5££eiTiail^^mJH[REDACTED], HHHfl^l^ir^lllliH^llllinlllllllllllliH> subject:
8April Draft Opinion from DOJ - OMS Concenis^ate^pri^^^005^n0^2 AM.
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"[i]t is OMS's view that based on our limited experience and tiie extensive
experience of the military with these techniques, the program in place has
effectively avoided severe physical pain and suffering, and should continue to
do so. Application of the thirteen techniques^^^^ has not to date resulted in any
severe or permanent physical injury (or any injury other than transient
bruising), and we do notexpect this to change."^^^^
(^::S^|||||||B||||^^|//NF) in May 2005, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven
Bradbury signed three memoranda that relied on information provided by the CIA that was
inconsistent with CIA's operational records. On May 10, 2005, Bradbury signed two
memoranda analyzing the statutory prohibition on torture with regard to the CIA's enhanced
inteiTogation techniques and to the use of the interrogation techniques in combination.^^^"^ On
May 30, 2005, Bradbury signed another memorandum examining U.S. obligations under the
Convention Against Torture.^^^^ The memoranda approved 13 techniques: (1) dietary
manipulation, (2) nudity, (3) attention grasp, (4) walling, (5) facial hold, (6) facial slap or insult
slap, (7) abdominal slap, (8) cramped confinement, (9) wall standing, (10) stress positions, (11)
water dousing, (12) sleep deprivation (more than 48 hours), and (13) the waterboard. The three
memoranda relied on numerous CIA representations that, as detailed elsewhere, were
incongruent with CIA records, including: (1) the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques
would be used only when the interrogation team "considers them necessary because a detainee is
withholding important, actionable intelligence or there is insufficient time to try other
techniques," (2) the use of the techniques "is discontinued if the detainee is judged to be
consistently providing accurate intelligence or if he is no longer believed to have actionable
intelligence," (3) the "use of the techniques usually ends after just a few days when the detainee
begins participating," (4) the interrogation techniques "would not be used on a detainee not
reasonably thought to possess important, actionable intelligence that could not be obtained
otherwise," and (5) the interrogation process begins with "an open, non-threatening approach" to
discern if the CIA detainee would be cooperative.^^^^^
2362 QL(-; analyzing the legahty of 13 techniques, including the 10 techniques outlined in the
OLC's August 1, 2002, memorandum, and additional techniques for which die CIA sought OLC approval in 2004.
Letter from |||||m|||||||||||||||^ Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 4, 2005.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re; Application of
18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques Tliat May be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al
Qaeda Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain
Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 10).
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Tecliniques tliat May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11).2366 ^jj Qf these assertions were inaccurate. See Volume III for exaniple^fCI^detainee^e^ immediately
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including |||[H^m|^^^Hm^34491 (051400Z
MAR 03). See also Volume III for details on other interrogations in 2003, when at least six detainees that year were
stripped and shackled, nude, in the standing stress position for sleep deprivation or subjected to other enhanced
interrogation techniques prior to being questionedThe^nclude^AsaduU^ HH(|^H FEB
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The OLC memoranda also relied on CIA representations regarding
specific interrogation techniques that were incongruent with the operational history of the
program. For example, the CIA informed the OLC that it maintained a 75 degree minimum
room temperature for nude detainees as "a matter of policy," with a minimum of 68 degrees in
the case of technical problems. This information was inconsistent with CIA practice both before
and after the CIA's representations to the OLC.^^^^ The OLC relied on the CIA representation
that standing sleep deprivation would be discontinued in the case of significant swelling of the
lower extremities (edema), whereas in practice the technique was repeatedly not stopped when
edema occuired.-^^^ The OLC also repeated CIA representations that constant light was
necessary for security, even though the CIA had subjected detainees to constant darkness.^^^^
Additional CIA representations accepted by the OLC—and found to be inconsistent with CIA
practice —related to; (1) the exposure of nude detainees to other detainees and detention facility
staff,^^^° (2) theuse of water dousing—specifically the inaccurate representation that the
technique did not involve immersion, (3) the use of shacides in standing sleep deprivation, (4)
the likelihood of hallucinations during sleep deprivation, (5) the responsibility of medical
personnel to intervene when standing sleep deprivation results in hallucinations, and (6) the
purpose and the use of diapers on CIA detainees.
The OLC repeated the CIA's representations that "the effect of the
waterboard is to induce a sensation of drowning," that "the detainee experiences this sensation
even if he is aware that he is not actually drowning," and that "as far as can be determined, [Abu
03)); Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri
n35787
Abu Hudhaifa_^^^
|; and Majid Khan
39077 (271719ZMA^3)).
Letter from |||||||||^|||CTCLegal
2004 (DTS #2009-1809). See, for example,
31429 (161303Z DEC02);
03




MAR03))jHi|^^^^HH|H36023(l||HAP^3));38576 03)); Kambali^^H^^^^ll^H 1241
46471 (241242Z MAY 03)J
Ito Acting Assistant Attorney General Levin, December 30,
^31118r
10006 (070902Z DEC 02); [REDACTED] 33962 (211724ZFEB
34031 (231242Z FEE 03); ^^^^^^^^^^34575
34354•HHImAR 03); I II I I III! ' ' 03). Email to:
l^mn^REDACTED]; subject: Medical Evaulation/UpdateJJ^7)^ate: March |, 2004.
Email to; [REDACTED]; subject: Medical Evaluation/Update IB (047); date: March 8,
2004. Eniailto!^^^^^^B|^|; from: [REDACTEDJ^suWec^ Medical EvaluationAJpdate |
March 9, 2004. Hi^^B2377(300624Z MAY 05); ^••|l797 (021612Z DEC 05).
-368 See, for exampIenBl 10909 (201918Z MAR 03)I^^H 2622 (230851Z AUG 07).
23® According to a CL\ cable, cells at DETENTION SITE COBALT were "blacked out atjill times using curtains
)lus painted exterior windows. And double doors. The lights are never turned on." (See
128246 ) Upon finding Ramzi bin al-Shibh "cowering in the comer, shivering" when
tlie light in his cell burned out, interrogators decided to use darkness as an interrogation technique. He was then
placedinsleep deprivation "standing, shackled feet and hands, with hands over his head, naked, in total darkness."
See••• 10521 (191750Z FEB 03)J|^^H^25 (200840Z FEB 03).
Iinterview of ||||||||||||^^H|[| [CIA OFFICER 1], December 19, 2002. CIA Interrogation
Program Draf^ouree Materials, March 11, 2003, p. 28. CTC/RDG Interrogation Program, December 15, 2003.
DlRECTO^jHjH (251609Z JUL 02). See also "Standard Interrogati^i^echniqu attachment to email from:
Scott W. Muller, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], subject: revised interrogation
discussion; date: July 19, 2004.
Ito Acting Assistant Attorney General Levin, December 30,
(047); date:
//NOFORN




Zubaydah and KSM] did not experience physical pain or, in the professional judgment of
doctors, is there any medical reason to believe they would have done so." The OLC fLirther
accepted that physical sensations associated with waterboarding, such as choking, "end when the
application ends."^^^^ This information is incongruent withCIArecords. According to CIA
records, Abu Zubaydah's waterboarding sessions "resulted in immediate fluid intake and
involuntary leg, chest and arm spasms" and "hysterical pleas.A medical officer who
oversaw the interrogation of KSM stated that the waterboard technique had evolved beyond the
"sensation of drowning" to what hedescribed as a "series of near drownings."^^^"^ Physical
reactions to waterboarding did not necessarily end when the application of water was
discontinued, as both Abu Zubaydah and KSM vomited after being subjected to the
waterboard.^^^^ Further, as previouslydescribed, during at least one waterboard session, Abu
Zubaydah "became completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth."
He remained unresponsive after the waterboard was rotated upwards. Upon medical
intervention, he regained consciousness and expelled "copious amounts of liquid."^^^^ The CIA
also relayed information to the OLC on the frequency with which the waterboard could be used
thatwas incongment with pastoperational practice.^^^^
^005, memorandum analyzing the individual use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques accepted the CIA's representations that CIA
interrogators are trained for "approximately four weeks," and that "all personnel directly
engaged in the interrogation of persons detained... have been appropriately screened (from the
-3^2 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel,Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of
18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May be Used in tlie Interrogation of a High Value al
Qaeda Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain
Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 10); Memorandum for
John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States
Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the
Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees(D^#2009-1810, Tab 11).2373 ^j|j_ 10643||||^ iAW02)^^^^^h064^01235ZAUG02^^^^
See from: to: subject: More;
April 10, 2003, at 5:59: 27 PM.2375 10544 (201235Z AUG 02); email from: [REDACTED]^••••• and [REDACTED];
subject: Re: So it begins; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09 AM; ||||^^^| 1080^ni929Z MAR 03).
See Abu Zubaydal^n^KSM detainee review^i^olume ill, including H|pH 10803 (131929Z MAR 03).
See email from: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Departure; date: March 6,
2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: i^|^^^HoMS; to [REDACTED] and [REDACTEDJ^ufet: Re:
Acceptable lower ambient temperatures; date: March 7, 2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: HHm, OMS; to:
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at
10:22 AM; email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and
[REDACTED]; suWe^Re: Discussion with Dan Levin- AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM.
Letter from HjjlBCTC Legal IHUHH to Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin, August 19,
2004 (DTS# 2009-1809). The OLC, having been informed by the CIA that 40 seconds was the maximum length of
a single waterboard application, noted that "you have informed us tliat tMs maximum has rarely been reached." This
is inaccurate. KSM was subjected to40-secon^xposuresaUeasn^iii^^




medical, psychologicaland security standpoints).The CIA representations about training
and screening were incongnient with the operational history of the CIA program. CIA records
indicate that CIA officers and contractors who conducted CIA interrogations in 2002 did not
undergo any interrogation training. The first interrogator training course did not begin until
November 12, 2002, by which time at least 25 detainees had been taken into CIA custody
Numerous CIA interrogators and other CIA personnel associated with the program had either
suspected or documented personal and professional problems that raised questions about their
judgment and CIA employment. This group of officers included individuals who, among other
issues, had engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management
issues, and had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.^^^^
2378 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of
18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May be Used in the Intenogation of a High Value alQaecU^etmnee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9). As described in this summary, when |||^ |^ |^CTC Legal, ||||j||||
insisted that CTC Legal vet and review the background of CIA personnel involved in the CIA's
interrogations, he directly linked this review to the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
wrote: "we will be forced to Disapprove [sic] the participation of specific personnel in the use of
enhanced techniques unless we have ourselves vetted them and are satisfied with their qualifications and suitability
for what are clearly unusual measures that are lawful only when practiced correctly by personnel whose records






TC/LGL; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rod^uez, [REDACTED],
1; subject: EYES ONLY; date: November^ 2002, at03:13:01 PM; email
ICTC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
I; subject: EYES ONLY; date: November 2002, at 04:27 PM.
Tlie training to conduct the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques required only approximately65 hours of
classroom and operational instruction. December4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and
Exploitation (HVTIE) Trainin
2380 y\,^^ong other abuses.
Chief, Staff and Oi
[REDACTED], |
|. See email from:
[REDACTED]; to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject:
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Seminar 12-18 Nov 02, (pilot running).
had engaged in "Russian Roulette" with a detainee. (See Memorandum for
rations Branch from [REDACTED], April 3, 1980, Subject;
1984,Memorandum for Inspector General from [REDACTED], Inspector, via Deputy
Inspector General, re IG-B84.) [CIA OFFICER 2],who threatened 'Abd al-
Rahim al-Nashiri with a
59478
REDACTED], ACTED],












Finally, the OLC accepted a definition of "High Value Detainee"
conveyed by the that limited the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to
"senior member[s]" of al-Qa'ida or an associated terrorist group who have "knowledge of
imminent terrorist threats" or "direct involvement in planning and preparing" terrorist actions.
However, at the time of the OLC opinion, the CIA had used its enhanced interrogation
techniques on CIA detainees who were found neither to have knowledge of imminent threats nor
to have been directly involved in planning or preparing terrorist actions. Some were not senior
al-Qa'ida members,^^^^ or even members of al-Qa'ida.^^^^ Others were never suspected of
having information on, or a role in, ten'orist plotting and were suspected only of having
information on the location ofUBL orother al-Qa'ida figures,or weresimply^lieved to
have been present ata suspected al-Qa'ida guesthouse.^^^^ Ayear later, H^|^BCTC Legal
wrote to Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbui7 suggesting a new standard that
more closely reflected actual practice by allowing for the CIA detention and interrogation of
detainees to be based on the belief that the detainee had information that could assist in locating
senioral-Qa'ida leadership.-^^^ The OLCmodified the standard in a memorandum dated July
20, By then, the last CIA detainee, Muhammad Rahim, had already entered CIA
custody.238«
The May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum analyzing U.S. obligations
under the Convention Against Torture relied heavily on CIA representations about the
intelligence obtained from the program. Many of these representations were provided in a
March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum known as the "Effectiveness Memo," in which the CIA
advised that the CIA program "works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign
intelligence." The "Effectiveness Memo" stated that "lw]e assess we would not have succeeded
in overcoming the resistance of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), Abu Zubaydah, and other
equally resistant high-value teiTorist detainees without applying, in a careful, professional and
[REDACTEDl,
For more information, see Volume III.
Fax to Acting Assistant Attorney General Levin from January 4, 2005 (DTS #2009-1809).
-382 See detainee reviews for Suleiman Abdullah and Janat Gul in Volume III for additional infonnation.
See detainee review for Rafiq bin Bashir bin Halul Al-Hami in Volume III for additional information.
See detainee review for Ridha Ahmad al-Najjar in Volume 111 for additional information.
See detainee reviews for Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihani and Arsala KJian in Volume III for additional
information.
Letter from |H|||||CTC Legal Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury, May 23, 2006
(DTS #2009-1809).
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogationof High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
2388 7516 Muhammad16439
Raliim entered CIA custody on July 2007.
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safemanner, the full range of interrogation techniques."-^^^ The CIA "Effectiveness Memo"
further stated that "[pjrior to the use of enhanced techniques against skilled resistors [sic] like
KSM and Abu Zubaydah—the two most prolific intelligence producers in our control—CIA
acquired little threat information or significant actionable intelligence information." As
described in this summary, the key information provided by Abu Zubaydah that the CIA
attributed to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was provided prior to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. KSM was subjected to CIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques within minutes of his questioning, and thus had no opportunity to divulge information
prior to their use. As described elsewhere, CIA personnel concluded the waterboard was not an
effective interrogation technique against
Under a section entitled, "Results," the CIA "Effectiveness Memo"
represented that the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a
comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture
additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." It then
listed 11 examples of "critical intelligence" acquired ''after applying enhanced interrogation
techniques":^^^^ the "Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," the "Second Wave," the "Guraba
Cell," "Issa al-Hindi," "Abu Talha al-Pakistani," "Hambali's Capture," "Jafaar al-Tayyar," the
"Dirty Bomb Plot," the "Shoe Bomber," and intelligence obtained on "Shkai, Pakistan." These
representations of "effectiveness" were almost entirely inaccurate and mirrored other inaccurate
information provided to the White House, Congress, and the CIA inspectorgeneral.^^^^ In
addition, on April 15, 2005, the CIA provided the OLC with an eight-page document endtled,
"Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting." The CIA "Briefing Notes" document
repeats many of the same CIA representations in the "Effectiveness Memo," but added additional
inaccurate informationrelated to the capture of lyman Faris.^^^^
The OLC's May 30, 2005, memorandum relied on the CIA's
inaccurate representations in the "Effectiveness Memo" and the "Briefing Notes" document in
determining that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on executive conduct that "shocks the conscience," indicating that this
analysis was a "highly context-specific and fact-dependent question." The OLC also linked its
Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at tlie Department ofJustice, dated March 2,2005, from IH
^^mi, H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist
Interrogation Techniques/
-390 Interview of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of theInspector General, May
15, 2003; IntervieN^f^^^^^^^ll, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,
October 22, 2003; ^|||[fll715(201047Z MAY 03); Sametime Communication, and
15/Aug/06, 10:28:38 to 10:58:00; Interview of••^^••j^WREDAC]^] and [REDACTED],
Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003; Sametime CommunicationTHBI^^HHI ^nd [REDACTED],
02/May/05, 14:51:48 to 15:17:39; Interview of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003.
Emphasis in the original.
See list of 20 CIA representations included in this summary and additional details in Volume II. Representations
regarding Abu Talha al-Pakistani, which were less frequent, are also described this summary and in greater detail in
Volumes II and III.
April 15, 2005,10:47AM, fax to DOJ Command Center for Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Department ofJustice, from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center. Cover note: "|||[|,
Answers tosome ofyour questions," with attaclmiententitled^^^ the Value ofDetainee Reporting."
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analysis of whether the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "constitutionally
arbitrary" to the representation by the CIA that its interrogation program produced "substantial
quantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence.The CIA's representations to the
OLC that it obtained "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" from the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques were inaccurate."^^^
The OLC memorandum repeated specific inaccurate CIA
representations, including that the waterboard was used against Abu Zubaydah and KSM "only
after it became clear that standard interrogation techniques were not working"; that the
information related to the "Guraba Cell" in Karachi was "otherwise unavailable actionable
intelligence"; that Janat Gul was a "high value detainee"; and that information provided by
Hassan Ghul regarding the al-Qa'ida presence in Shkai, Pakistan, was attributable to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.Citing CIA information, the OLC memorandum also
stated that Abu Zubaydah was al-Qa'ida's "third or fourth highest ranking member" and had
been involved "in every major terrorist operation carried out by al Qaeda," and that "again, once
enhanced techniques were employed," Abu Zubaydah "provided significant information on two
operatives... who planned to build and detonate a 'dirty bomb' in the Washington DC area."
The OLC repeated additional inaccurate information from the CIA related to KSM's reporting,
including representations about the "Second Wave" plotting, the Heathrow Airport plotting, and
the captures of Hambali, lyman Paris, and Sajid Badat.^^^^ The OLC relied on CIA
representations that the use of the CIA's enhanced inten*ogation techniques against 'Abd al-
Rahim al-Nashiri produced "notable results as early as the first day," despite al-Nashiri providing
reporting on the same topics prior to entering CIA custody. The OLC also repeated inaccurate
CIA representations about statements reportedly made by Abu Zubaydah and
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, fiom Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the Intenogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.
See specific CIA examples of the "Results" of using the "CIA's use of DQJ-approved enhanced interrogation
tecliniques" in March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from H|||||||H||H|, Group, DCI
Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." The specific
representations in the "Briefing Notes" document were similar to those in the CIA's "Effectiveness Memo" and
included references to detainee reporting on Jose Padilla, Hambali, Dhiren Barot, Sajid Badat, lyman Paris, Jaffar al-
Tayyar, the Heatluow Airport plotting, and the Karachi plotting.
2396 Pqj. example, as detailed elsewhere in this review, Hassan Gul provideddetailed information on al-Qa'ida's
presence in Slikai, Pakistan, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of tlie Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.
The OLC memorandum stated that "[b]oth KSM and Zubaydah had 'expressed their belief that the general US
population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists
from succeeding in their goals.'" As described elsewhere in this summary, and in more detail in the full Committee
Study, CIA records indicate that KSM and Abu Zubaydah did not make these statements. Tlie memorandum also
repeated CIA representations about KSM's comment, "Soon, you will know," and Abu Zubaydali's reported
statements about being "permitted by Allali" to provide infomiation. As described in this summary, these
representations are not supported by CIA records.




Finally, the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum referenced the CIA
Inspector General May 2004 Special Review, stating; "we understand that interrogations have
led to specific, actionable intelligence as well as a general increase in the amount of intelligence
regarding al Qaeda and its affiliates.The OLC memorandum cited pages in the Special
Review that included inaccurate information provided by CIA personnel to the CIA's OIG,
including representations related to Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammad, Hambali and the "Al-
Qa'ida cell in Karachi," the Parachas, lyman Paris, Saleh al-Marri, Majid Khan, the Heathrow
Airport plotting, and other "plots.
E. After Passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, OLC Issues Opinion on CIA Conditions of
Confinement, Withdraws Draft Opinion on the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques After the U.S. Supreme Court Case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
On December 19, 2005, anticipating the passage of the Detainee
Treatment Act, Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo requested that the OLC review whether
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as the conditions of confinement at CIA
detention facilities, would violate the Detainee Treatment Act.-" '^ In April 2006, attorneys at
OLC completed initial drafts of two legal memoranda addressing these questions.In June
2006, however, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to
withdraw its draft memorandum on the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. As Legal explained, the OLC would
prepare "a written opinion 'if we want'... but strongly implied we shouldn't seek it."-'^ ^-^ As
described in a July 2009 report of the Department of Justice Office of Professional
Responsibility, the Administration determined that, after the Hamdan decision, it would need
new legislation to support the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.-'^ "'^
Even as it withdrew its draft opinion on the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, the OLC continued to analyze whether the CIA's conditions of
confinement violated the Detainee Treatment Act. To support this analysis, the CIA asserted to
the OLC that loud music and white noise, constant light, and 24-hour shackling were all for
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal DeputyAssistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
UnitedStates Obligations UnderArticle 16of theConvention Against Tortureto CertainTechniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.
2400 Memorandum forJohn A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury. Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30,2005, Re: Application of
UnitedStates Obligations Under Article 16of theConvention Against Tortureto CertainTechniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High ValueAl QaedaDetainees, pp. 10-11, citing IG Special Review, pp. 85-91.
The Detainee Treatment Act passed on December 30, 2005. Letter from Senior Deputy General Counsel John
Rizzo to Acting Assistant Attome^Genera^radb^, December 19, 2005 (DTS #2009-1809).
April 19, 2006, Fax from Legal Group, CIA Counterterrorism Center to DOJ Command
Center for Steve BradburWDTS #2009-1809).
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: |||[||^^H||^^^|, John Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary
of Hamdan Decision; date; June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM.
Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal
Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terronsts^ul^9^00^DT^2010^058).
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security purposes, that shaving was for security and hygiene purposes and was conducted only
upon intake and not as a "punitive step," that detainees were not exposed to an "extended period"
of white noise, and that CIA detainees had access to a wide array of amenities.^"^®^ This
information is incongruent with CIA records. Detainees were routinely shaved, sometimes as an
aid to interrogation; detainees who were "participating at an acceptable level" were permitted to
grow their hairand beards.^"^®^ The CIA had used music at decibels exceeding the
representations to the OLC. The CIA had also used specific music to signal to a detainee that
another interrogation was aboutto begin.-"^®^ Numerous CIA detainees were subjected to the
extended use of white noise.-"^®^ The CIA furdier inaccurately represented that "[mjedical
personnel will advise ending sleep deprivation in the event the detainee appears to be
experiencing hallucinations, transient or not."^"^®^ In a May 18, 2006, letter, j^^^HflCTC
Legal, wrote to the Department of Justice that "some of these conditions
provide the additional benefit of setting a detention atmosphere conducive to continued
intelligence collection from the detainee." While the letter referred generally to "constant light
in the cells, use of white noise, use of shackles, hooding, and shaving/barbering," it described an
intelligence collection purpose only for shaving, which "allows interrogators a clear view of the
terrorist-detainee's facial clues."
August 31, 2006, the OLC finalized two legal analyses on the
conditions of confinement at CIA detention sites. The first was a memorandum that evaluated
whether six detention conditions in the CIA's detention program were consistent with the
Detainee TreatmentAct.^"^ '^ The second, provided in the form of a letter, concluded that those
same six conditions did not violate the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
2405 Letter from Senior DeputyGeneral CounselJohn Rizzoto Acting Assistant AttorneyGeneral Bradbury,
December 19, 2005 (DTS #2009-1809). January 25, 2006, Lette^^tev^B^bu^^^ing Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, from f|^|CTC Legal, CIA (DTS
#1809-2009).
See, for example^^^^^HH^^l 31369 (151028Z 10361
HEADQUARTERS ^^•(1^55Z SEP05); HEADQUARTERS(212005Z JUN 05);
HEADQUARTERS (202036Z JUN 05).
2''°^ As one example, CIA records indicate that in the CIA interrogation of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the "the Blues
Brothers rendition of 'Rawhide' [was] played." CIA records state tliat bin al-Shibh's reaction to hearing the song
was evidence ofhis conditioning, as bin al-Shibh "knows whenhehea^ the music where he is going and what is
going to happen." {See 10602 (262020Z FEB 03); 10591 (252002Z FEB 03); [REDACTED]
1889 (091823Z MAR 03); [REDACTED] 1924 (151729Z MAR^4)I^^^| 10361 "Loud
noise" was also used to "prevent concentrating, planning, and derailing of the exploitation/interrogation process with
interrogation countermeasures (resistance)." See, for example, detainee reviews detaiUngthe detention and
inteiTogations of Lillie and Hambali in Volume HI.
2'*™ foi- example, IBHI2505 (272059Z JUN 05). The amenities described by the CIA to tlie OLC were
not available to detainees durin^atlieMter^on^fthe program.
April 23, 2006, Fax from ||g||^m|||||||||||^||||||||||Legal Group, CIA Counterterrorism Center to DOJ Command
Center for Steve Bradbury (DTS #2009-1809).
24'o May 2006, Letter to Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from
^Ull^TC Legal, CIA, re: Request for Infomiation on Security Measures (DTS #2009-1809).
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 31, 2006, Re: Application of the Detainee
Treatment Act to Conditions of Confinement at Central Intelligence Agency Detention Facilities (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 13).
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Conventions.-"^^- The OLC relied on the CIA's representations related to conditions of
confinement for its analysis.-'^ ^-^ The OLC wrote that "underlying ouranalysis of all these
methods [conditions of confinement] is our understanding that the CIA provides regular and
thorough medical and psychological care to the detainees in its custody.As detailed in this
summary, the lack of emergency medicalcare for CIA detainees was a significant challenge for
the CIA.-^^^
(^^S/^IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIH/^^) The August 31, 2006, OLC memorandum applying the terms of the
Detainee Treatment Act to the conditions of confinement at CIA detention facilities stated that
"over the history of the program, the CIA has detained a total of 96 individuals." This was based
on a representation made by H|B||CTC Legal on April 23, 2006.^"^^^ As ofthe date ofthe
OLC memorandum, the CIA had detained at least 118 individuals. The OLC memorandum also
stated that "we understand that, once the CIA assesses that a detainee no longer possesses
significant intelligence value, the CIA seeks to move the detainee into alternative detention
arrangements." CIA records indicate that detainees had remained in CIA custody long after the
CIA had determined that they no longer possessed significant intelligence. Finally, the OLC
memorandum repeated a number of earlier inaccurate CIA representations on the effectiveness of
the program, citing both the CIA's "Effectiveness Memo" and its own May 30, 2005,
memorandum. Notably, the August 31, 2006, OLC memorandum repeated the same inaccurate
representation, which first appeared in an August 2002 OLC memorandum, that Abu Zubaydah
was al-Qa'ida's "third or fourth highest ranking member" and had been involved "in every major
terrorist operation carried out by al Qaeda." As described, CIA records as early as 2002 did not
support these representations, and two weeks prior to the issuance of the August 2006
memorandum, the CIA had published an intelligence assessment stating that Abu Zubaydah had
been rejected by al-Qa'ida and explaining how the CIA had come to "miscast Abu Zubaydah as a
'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant.'"^"^^^
Letter for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 31, 2006 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 12).
The OLC did not apply the Detainee Treatment Act or Common Article 3 to the use of shaving or other
conditions of confinement in tenns of their use as an interrogation technique. The OLC stated that while "the
primary purpose of the conditions of confinementwe consider here is to maintain the security of the CIA's detention
facilities... [m]any of these conditions may also ease the obtaining of crucial intelligence information from the
detainees." Nonetheless, the OLC concluded that "the security rationale alone is sufficient to justify each of the
conditions of confinement in question." See memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury,Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August
31, 2006, Re: Application of the detainee Treatment Act to Conditions of Confinement at Central Intelligence
Agency Detention Facilities (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 13).
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 31, 2006, Re: Application of the Detainee
Treatment Act to Conditions of Confinement at Central Intelligence Agency Detention Facilities (DTS #2009-1810
Tab 13).
Foradditional detailed information, see Volume I andVolume 111.
23^006,Fax toDOJ Command Center for Steve Bradbury, Office ofLegal Counsel, from
[H^l, Legal Group, CIA Counterteirorism Center.
CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, "Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in
Afghanistan, 1990-2001." For additional details, see the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
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F. July 2007 OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate CIA Representations Regarding CIA
Interrogations and the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques;
CIA Misrepresents Congressional Views to the Department of Justice
(U) On July 20, 2007, the OLC issued a memorandum applying the War Crimes Act, the
Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. The memorandum noted that, while the Hamdan decision
"was contrary to the President's prior determination that Common Article 3 does not apply to an
armed conflict across national boundaries with an international terrorist organization such as al
Qaeda," this challenge to the CIA program was resolved by the Military Commissions Act,
which "left responsibility for interpreting the meaning and application of Common Article 3,
except for the grave breaches defined in the amended War Crimes Act, to the President.
The OLC memorandum determined that six proposed interrogation
techniques were legal: dietary manipulation, extended sleep deprivation, the facial hold, the
attention grasp, the abdominal slap, and the insult (or facial) slap. The memorandum accepted
the CIA's representation that, over the life of the program, the CIA had detained 98 individuals,
of whom 30 had been subjected to the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques.At the time
of the OLC memorandum the CIA had detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 38 had
been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniqueThe inaccurate statistics
provided by the CIA to the OLC were used to support OLC's conclusion that the program was
"proportionate to the government interest involved," as required by the "shocks the conscience"
test. The OLC also noted that "careful screening procedures are in place to ensure that enhanced
techniques will be used only in the interrogations of agents or members of al Qaeda or its
affiliates who tire reasonably believed to possess critical intelligence that can be used to prevent
future terrorist attacks against theUnited States and its interests."^"^^^ In practice, numerous
individuals had been detained by the CIA and subjected to the CIA's enhanced inten"ogation
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re; Application of
the Wai" Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques tliat May Be Used by the CIA in tlie InteiTOgation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Intenogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
Although all 119 known CIA detainees had entered CIA custody by July 20, 2007, Muhammad Raliim, the last
detainee, had not yet been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques by Uie time of the OLC
niemoranduiTLMuhamiTm to Cl^ustod^iU^y 2007. (See 6439
(||[|||||[|[||||||||||^ ^ HHHHIHHiiH ) Interrogators began using the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques on Raliim on July 21, 2007; tlie day after tlie OLC Memorandum was issued. See
••• 2467 (211341Z JUL 07).
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Tecliniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).




techniques, despite doubts and questions sun-ounding their knowledge of terrorist threats and the
location of senioral-Qa'ida leadership. Examples include, among others: Asadullah,^"^^^ Mustafa
al-Hawsawi,2423 Abu Hudhaifa,2424 Khan,-425 aBU TALHA AL-MAGREBI and ABU
BAHAR AL-TURKI, '^^ "^ Janat Gul,Ahmed Ghailani, '^^ ^^ Sharif al-Masri,^"^^^ and Sayyid
Ibrahim.^'^^^
Intenogators had asked CIA Headquarters for the assessments supporting the decision to subject Asadullah to
the CIA's enlianced interrogation techniques, noting tha^M^oul^^fenormou^help to the interrogator to know
what i^oncret^^c^n^wha^ good analYsi |^^ 5£&J|H||^ ^^^H^^^H|33963
also 34098
In response, ALEC Station acknowledged that "[tjobesure^ourc^^ should have agood sense ofbin
Ladin's location iscircumstantial." {See ALEC m||||||||^|^Hm|.) The following day, interrogators
commentedthat^^ hesimply does not know the [locational information onAQ leaders]." See
2423 Following al-Hawsawi's first interrogation session, Chiefof Interrogations askedCIA
Headquarters for information on what al-Hawsawi actually "knows," saying: "he does not appear to the [sic] be a
person that is a financial mastermind. However, we lack facts witl^hidU^onfiron^^Hawsawi]. What we need
at this point is substantive information vice supposition." See 34757 (101742Z MAR
03).
Although CIA records include no requests or approval cables, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to ice water baths
and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation. He was released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the
:rson he was believed to be. See WASHINGTON DC 51303
CIA Headquarters initially resisted approving Arsala Khan's capture because of a lack of information
confimiingt^ a "continuing tlireat." {See 169986 email from;
to; and
Approval to Capture ArsalaKhanTdaterBjjljj^^^^lyD doubts that Arsala Khan was tlie individual
sought by the CIA, interrogators subjected him to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "to make a better
assessmentj^egarding[his]^^ to start tallcing, or assess ifoursubject is, infact the man we are looking for.'
1373
The true names of tliese detainees have been replaced witli the capitalized pseudonyms AL-MAGREBI and AL-
TURKI. At the time the two detainees were rendered to CIA custody, the CIA was aware that they were then
working for a foreign partner government. {See ALEC [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 43773
[REDACTED].) They were subjected to sleep deprivation and dietary manipulation until the CIA confirmed that
the detainees had been trying t^ontacUh^I^o^e^s to inform the CIA ofVhanhe^elievedwer^endi^ al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks^5^^H||||^^H|Bilil^l [REDACTED]; 2233
[REDACTED]JH^HHH^^^^H2185[REDACTED]; III Ml III I II I B|B|I III I II li|
^ 12232 [REDACTED].) After the CIA had detemnne^ha^L-MAGREBI and AL-
TURKI should not be in CIA custody, the two detainees were held for additional months before
they were released. See [REDACTED] 2025 [REDACTED].
2427 jjjg Qf Janat Gul is described above in the context of OLC advice in 2004 and afterwards. As Gul's
interrogators noted, "Team does not believe [Gul] iswithholdin^ir^nent threat information, however team will
continue to press [Gul] for that during each session." See H^^jH 1574 (|m|||||^^^| 04).
The CIA's assessment of Ghailani's knowledge of terrorist threats was speculative. As one official noted,
"[ajlthough Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, his respected role in al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai
as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some knowledge about ongoing attack planning against the
United States homeland^n^he^eratives involved." See email from; HBHIH, CTC/UBLD |~^(formerly ALECH|^HH|); to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject:
derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani,Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Faraj; date: August 10, 2004.
As noted above, the credibility of the source implicating Sharif al-Masri, Janat Gul, and Ghailani's connections
to a pre-election plot was questioned by CIA officials prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques against them. The source was later determined to have fabricated the information.
2430 pjyg, intenogators began using enhanced interrogation techniques against Sayyid Ibrahim,
interrogators cabled CIA Headquarters requestinginformationttiatwou^^ link [Ibrahim] to nefarious
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The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum also stated that the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques "are not the first option for CIA interrogators confronted even
with a high value detainee."^"^^^ As described in this summary, numerous CIA detainees were
subjected to the CIA's enhanced or "standard" inten*ogation techniques on their first day of CIA
custodywhile other detainees provided significant information prior to the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. The OLC memorandum also accepted the CIA
representation that "[t]he CIA generally does not ask questions during the administration of the
techniques to which the CIA does not akeady know the answers," that the CIA "asks for already
known information" during the administration of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,
and that when CIA personnel believe a detainee will cooperate, "the CIA would discontinue use
of the techniques and debrief the detainee regarding matters on which the CIA is not definitely
informed." As the memorandum concluded, "[t]his approach highlights the intended
psychological effects of the techniques and reduces the ability of the detainee to provide false
information solely as a means to discontinue their application.This description of the
program was inaccurate. As described in this summary, and in more detail in the full Committee
Study, CIA inten'ogators always questioned detainees during the application of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques seeking new information to which the CIA did not have
answers, and numerous detainees fabricated information while being subjected to the
inten'ogation techniques.
The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum repeated CIA
representations that "many, if not all, of those 30 detainees" who had been subjected to CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques received counterinterrogation training, and that "al Qaeda
operatives believe that they are morally pennitted to reveal information once they have reached a
certain limit of discomfort."^"^-^"^ Neither of theserepresentations is supported by CIA records.
activity or knowledge by [Ibrahim] of known nefarious activities of al-Qa'ida members, if tliis is possible." {See
BIHHII 0^)-) Without receiving a response, they continued to subject Ibrahim to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA Headquarters, which rejected an assessment from two debriefers that
Ibrahim was, "at best... a low-level facilitator," would later indicate tliat it was "uncertain" he would meet the
requirements for U.S. military or detention. See HEADQUARTERS jfjBlil IHHIIHHHI'
HEADQUARTERS
The OLC further stated that "enhanced techniques would be used only as less harsh techniques fail or as
interrogators ran out of time in the face of an imminent threat, so that it would be unlikely that a detainee would be
subjected to more duress than is reasonably necessaj-y to elicit the infomiation sought." See Memorandum for John
A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the
Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be
Used by the CIA in the Intenogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).
See Volume IE for additional details.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in tlie Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of tlie Geneva Conventions to Certain
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The memorandum also repeated CIA representations that
inten-ogators were "highly trainedin carrying out the techniques," and "psychologically screened
to minimize the risk that an interrogator might misuse any technique." These presumptions were
central to the OLC's determination that the limitations on interrogationscontained in the Army
Field Manual were not "dispositive evidence" that the CIA's interrogation program fell outside
"traditional executive behavior and contemporary practice," an analysis required as part of the
substantive due process inquiry. Specifically, the OLC distinguished U.S. military interrogations
from the CIA program by stating that the CIA program "will be administered only by trained and
experienced interrogators who in turn will apply the techniques only to a subset of high value
detainees.As described in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study,
the CIA's representations to the OLC were incongruent with the history of the CIA's Detention
and Interrogation Program with regard to the training, screening, and experience of interrogators,
and the detainees against whom the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques.
The July 2007 OLC memorandum based its legal analysis related
to the six interrogation techniques under consideration on CIA representations that were
incongruent with the operational history of the program. In reviewing whether standing sleep
deprivation was consistent with the War Crimes Act, the OLC noted that its understanding that
the technique would be discontinued "should any hallucinations or significant declines in
cognitive functioning be observed" was "crucial to our analysis." The memorandum repeated
CIA representations that diapers employed during standing sleep deprivation "are used solely for
sanitary and health reasons and not to humiliate the detainee," and that, more generally, "[t]he
techniques are not intended to humiliate or to degrade.The OLC's understanding, which, as
described, was not consistent with the operational history of the CIA program, was part of its
analysis related to the prohibition on "outrages upon personal dignity" under Common Article 3.
As in the May 30, 2005 OLC memorandum, the July 20, 2007,
OLC memorandum conducted an analysis of the "shocks the conscience" test under the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the analysis. Citing
both the CIA's March 2005 "Effectiveness Memo" and the president's September 6, 2006,
speech describing the interrogation program, the July 2007 OLC memorandum repeated the CIA
assertion that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced "otherwise unavailable
intelligence." It also repeated CIA representations related to KSM's reporting on the "Second
Wave" plotting and Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Jose Padilla, both of which were
Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
2435 Memorandum for JohnA.Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
-'•3^ Memorandum forJohn A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, tlie Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
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inaccurate.The OLC memorandum also stated that the use of the CIA's enhanced
inten-ogation techniques had "revealed plots to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge and to release mass
biological agents in our Nation's largest cities." '^^ ^^
CIA representations-
f/N¥) Finally, the July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum asserted—based on
-that members of Congress supported the CIA interrogation program, and
that, by subsequently voting for the Military Commissions Act, those members effectively
endorsed an interpretation of the Act that would be consistent with the continued use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. This interpretation of congressional intent also
supported the OLC's constitutional analysis, which stated that there could be "little doubt" that
the Act "reflected an endorsement" from Congress that the CIA program "was consistent with
contemporary practice, and therefore did not shock the conscience." '^^ ^^ Specifically, the OLC
memorandum noted that according to CIA representations, prior to the passage of the Military
Commissions Act, "several Members of Congress, including the full memberships of the House
and Senate Intelligence Committees and Senator McCain, were briefed by General Michael
Hayden, director of the CIA, on the six techniques," and that "in those classified and private
conversations, none of the Members expressed the view that the CIA interrogation program
should be stopped, or that the techniques at issue were inappropriate."-'^ This representation
was inaccurate. For example, according to CIA records, during a briefing on September 11,
2006, Senator John McCain informed the CIA that he believed the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, including sleep deprivation and the waterboard, were "torture.On September
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, fiom Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of tlie Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
Tliis is a reference to the CIA's representation that KSM, "as a result of EITs," provided critical and unique
reporting on lyman Paris and Majid Klian. As described briefly in tliis summary, and in greater detail in tlie full
Committee Study, lyman Paris was already under investigation, and Majid Khan was already in custody, before
KSM mentioned them. Khan himself revealed a discussion about poisoning reservoirs prior to his rendition to CIA
custody. (See ALEC jjjjl^B (210015Z MAR 03).) When Paris, who was likewise not in CIA custody, discussed a
plot against the Brooklyn Bridge, the former chief of CTC's Bin Ladin Unit described it as "half-baked," and "more
of anuisnance [sic] than athreat." See WHD^^^^24^26^MA^03^nc^m^from: to:
[redacted];
attacks in conus; date: March 25,2003, at 6:19:18 AM).
2439 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the Wai' Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogationof High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
2440 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Intenogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
Email from: cc: ••••I, [REDACTED], [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTEDI^HH^^KT^^^^ '^^ EI '^I' [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Briefing for Senator John S. McCain (R-AZ); date:
September 11,2006, at 5:51 PM ("[Senator McCain] asked if I thought 'sleep deprivation' was torture. I responded
that I did not and he then added that he had talked with a Marine Colonel friend of his and the Colonel had indicated
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27, 2006, Senator Dianne Feinstein, a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
wrote a letter to CIA Director Hayden stating that she was "unable to understand why the CIA
needs to maintain this program." '^^ ^ On September 6, 2006, when the CIA provided its first and
only briefing to the full Committee on the CIA program prior to the vote on the Military
Commissions Act, Committee staff access was limited to the two Committee staff directors.
In May 2007, shortly after the CIA allowed additional Committee staff to be briefed on the
program, other members of the Committee prepared and provided letters to Director Hayden. On
May 1, 2007, Senator Russ Feingold wrote that "I cannot support the program on moral, legal or
national security grounds.On May 11, 2007, Senators Chuck Hagel, Dianne Feinstein, and
Ron Wyden wrote a letter expressing their long-standing concerns with the program and their
"deep discomfort with the use of EITs."-'^ ^
it was and he believed his friend"). In another exchange, the officer who briefed Senator McCain was asked about
the Senator's position^CIA officer "so, is the senator onboard?..." CIA officer
"not totally." "if he's moved in our direction at all, you are a miracle worker... was it painful?"
111111111111: "Very much so/^^^^^H^is the issue the ElTs still?" |||||[||H; "Yep." {See Sametime
communication between and ll/Sep/06,15:47:27 to 18:43:29.) The OLC
specifically cited statements from Senator McCain that tlie Military Commissions Act "will allow the CIA to
continue interrogating prisoners within the boundaries established in the bill." Memorandum for John A. Rizzo,
Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee
Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the
CIA in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14). The OLC did not mention
that McCain had specifically objected to the use of sleep deprivation.
Letter from Senator Dianne Feinstein to Director Hayden, September 27, 2006 (DTS #2006-3717).
Transcript of hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336).
Letter from Senator Russ Feingold to Director Hayden, May 1, 2007 (DTS #2007-1858).
Letter from Senators Chuck Hagel, Diann^einsteii^n^oi^^yden^l^ 2007 (DTS #2007-2102).




VI. Review of CIA Representations to the Congress
A. After Memorandum of Notification, the CIA Disavows Torture and Assures the
Committee Will Be Notified of Every Individual Detained by the CIA
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the signing
of the September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON), the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence ("the Committee") held a series of hearings and briefings on CIA covert actions,
including the new authority to detain terrorists. At a November 13, 2001, briefing for Committee
staff, Legal, described the CIA's new detention authorities
as "terrifying" and expressed the CIA's intent to "find a cadre of people who know how to run
prisons, because we don't."^"^^ Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) James Pavittassured the
Committee that it would be informed of each individual who entered CIA custody. Pavitt
disavowed the use of torture against detainees while stating that the boundaries on the use of
interrogation techniques were uncertain—specifically in the case of having to identify the
location of a hidden nuclear weapon.
meetings with the CIA in Februai^ 2002, the month before the
capture and detention of Abu Zubaydah, Committee staff exprcssed^ncern about the lack of
any legal review ofthe CIA's new detention authorities. mHHI noted that the discussion
with Committee staff was "tiie only peer review" the CIA lawyers had engaged in with regard to
the MON audiorities, and that the discussion helped refine the CIA's understanding of what
MON-authorized activity was in fact legally permissible and appropriate.^"^"^^
B. The CIA Notifies Committee of the Detention of Abu Zubaydah, but Makes No
Reference to Coercive InteiTogation Techniques; the CIA Briefs Chairman and Vice
Chairman After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; the CIA
Discusses Strategy to Avoid the Chairman's Request for More Information
On April 18, 2002, the CIA informed the Committee that it "has no
current plans to develop a detention facility."^"^^ At the time of this representation, the CIA had
already established a CIA detention site in Country | and detained Abu Zubaydah there. On
April 24, 2002, the CIA notified the Committee about the capture of Abu Zubaydah with the
understanding that the location of Abu Zubaydah's detention was among the "red lines" not to be
divulged to the Committee. '^^ ''^ The notification and subsequent information provided to the
2446 Transcriptof Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence staff briefing, November 13, 2001 (DTS #2002-0629).
2447 "\Ye're not goingto engagein torture. But, that said,howdo 1deal with somebody I know may know right now
that there is a nuclear weapon somewhere in the United States that is going to be detonated tomorrow, and I've got
the guy who I know built it and hid it? I don't know the answer to that." (^See transcript of Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence MON briefing, November 7, 2001 (DTS #2002-0611); see also transcript of Senate Select
Committee on Intelligenc^ta^briefing, December 11, 2001 (DTS #2002-0615).
Email fronr^^M^H|||^ |, SSCI Staff; to: m Cleared SSCI staff; subject: Meeting yesterday with CIA
lawyers on ^^J^B^BTdat^Febriiary 26, 2002 (DTS #2002-0925).2449 response^^Question^r the Recor^l^aring, March 6, 2002), April 18, 2002 (DTS #2002-1800).
Email fiom: to: subject: Issues for SSCI and HPSCI biweekly update on CT;
date: April 9, 2002; Transcript of "Update on War on Terrorism," April 24, 2002 (DTS #2002-1993). Committee
notifications of the capture of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri likewise omitted reference to his location and the use of the




Committee included representations that Abu Zubaydah was a "member of Bin Ladin's inner
circle" and a "keyal-Qa'ida lieutenant." '^^ ''^ These representations were inaccurate. Briefings to
the Committee in the spring of 2002 emphasized the expertise of FBI and CIA interrogators
engaged in the Abu Zubaydah interrogations and provided no indication that coercive techniques
were being used or considered, or that there was significant disagreement between the CIA and
the FBI on proposed interrogation approaches.In early August 2002, after the Department of
Justice determined that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah
would be legal, the CIA considered briefing the Committee on the CIA's interrogation
techniques, but did not. '^^ '^^
(¥8/^||^^mi|[||||||m//NF) In early September 2002, the CIA briefed the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)leadership about the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. Two days after, the CIA's ^^^|CTC Legal, excised from a
draft memorandum memorializing the briefing indications that the HPSCI leadership questioned
the legality of the program by deleting the sentence: "HPSCI attendees also questioned the
legality of these techniques if other countries would use them."^"^^"^ After blind-
copied Jose Rodriguez on the email in which he transmitted the changes to the memorandum,
Rodriguez responded to email with: "shortand sweet."^"^^^ The first briefing for
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Bob Graham and Vice Chairman Richard
Shelby—and their staff directors—occurred on September 27, 2002, nearly two months after the
CIA first began subjecting Abu Zubaydah to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The
only record of the briefing is a one-paragraph CIA memorandum stating that the briefing
occurred.The Committee does not have its own records of this briefing.
Shortly thereafter, in late 2002, Chairman Graham sought to
expand Committee oversight of the CIA's Detenfion and Interrogation Program, including by
having Committee staff visit CIA interrogationsites and interview CIA interrogators.^"^^^ The
CIA rejected this request. An internal CIA email from ^^^^jCTC Legal
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. {SeeCongressional Notification, November 20, 2002 (DTS #2002-
4910).) On Novem^r |, 2002, the CIA notified tlie Committee of the death of Gul Rahman at a"detention facility
in [Country operated by flie [Country | government] and funded by CIA." This description, as well as
subsequent representations to the Committee, understated the role of the CIA in managing DETENTION SITE
COBALT. See Congressional Notification, November 2002 (DTS #2002-5015); Responses to
Counterterrorism Questions for the Record, Question 3 (DTS #2002-5059).
Congressional Notification, April 15, 2002 (DTS #2002-1710); CIA responses to Questions for the Record
(hearing, March 6, 2002), April 18, 2002 (DTS #2002-1800).
Transcript of "Update on War on Terrorism," April 24, 2002 (DTS #2002-1993).
Email from: John Moseman; to: Stanley Moskowitz, et al.; subject: Abu Zubaydah Interrogation; date: August 3,
2002, at 11:34:13 AM.
bcc: Jose Rodriguez; subject: Re: immediate coord;
10I607Z SEP 02).
subject: Re: immediate coord; date: September 6, 2002, at
-^-'''Email from: to:
date: September 6, 2002. See also ALEC
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to:
2:52 PM.
DIRECTOR (252018Z OCT02)
Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John Moseman, Scott Muller, James Pavitt; subject: Graham request for
oversight into interrogation; date: December 4, 2002, at 05:58:06 PM; Stanley Moskowitz, Memorandum for tlie
Record, February 4, 2003, "Subject: Sensitive Notification." See also email from: Scott W. Muller; to: John A.
Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED]; date: December 19, 2002.




indicated that the full Committee would not be told about "the nature and scope of the
inten'ogation process," and that even the chairman and vice chairman would not be told in which
country or "region" the CIA had established its detention facilities?'^ '^^ Otheremails describe
efforts by the CIA to identify a "strategy" for limiting the CIA's responses to Chairman
Graham's requests for more information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,
specifically seeking a way to "getoff the hook on the cheap." '^^ ^^ TheCIA eventually chose to
delay its next update for the Committee leadership on the CIA's program until after Graham had
left the Committee.^"^^® At the same time, the CIArejected a request for the Committee staff to
be "read-in" and provided with a briefing on theCIA program.^"^^^
C. No Detailed Records Exist of CIA Briefings of Committee Leadership; the CIA Declines
to Answer Questions from Committee Members or Provide Requested Materials
February 4, 2003, the CIA briefed the new chairman, Senator
Pat Roberts, and the two staff directors. Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV was not present.
The only record of the briefing, a two-page CIA memorandum, states that CIA officers:
"described in great detail the importance of the information provided by [Abu]
Zubayda[h] and [*Abd al-Rahim al-] Nashiri, both of whom had information of
on-going terrorist operations, information that might well have saved
American lives, the difficulty of getting that information from them, and the
importance of theenhanced techniques in getting that information."^"^^^
As described in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah
and al-Nashiri did not provide actionable intelligence on ongoing plotting, and provided
significant reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced inten-ogation techniques. The CIA
declined to provide information pursuant to a request from Chairman Roberts on the location of
the CIA's detention site. Finally, the CIA memorandum states that Chairman Roberts "gave his
assent" to the destruction of interrogation videotapes; however, this account in the CIA
2458 from; to: Sensitive Matters
the SSCI Quarterly CA Briefing; date: November 19, 2002. This email included the text of the CIA cables
documenting the September 4,2002, briefing to HPSCI leadership^^e ALEC (101607Z SEP 02), and the
September 27, 2002, briefing to SSCI leadership, DIRECTOR (252018Z OCT02).
Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John Moseman, Scott Mueller, James Pavitt; subject: Graham request for
oversight into interrogation; date: December 4, 2002, at 05:58:06 PM; email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John H.
Moseman; cc: Scott Muller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached document] Re: Graham request on interrogations;
date: December 9, 2002, at 05:46:11 PM.
2460 Memorandumof December 26, 2002; FOR: Director of Central Intelligence;FROM: Scott W. Muller, General
Counsel; SUBJECT: Disposition of Videotapes.
Memorandum to: Stanley Moskowitz; from: Steven A. Cash; subject: Briefing; Interrogation and Debriefing of
individuals in custody related to counterterrorism operations, January 2,2003 (DTS #2003-0266); Lotus Notes dated
January 2- January^^betweenOCAjODDO, CTC personnel; email correspondences between [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], H||^^|||HilHi; subject: "SSCI's Request for Staff Briefing on Ten'orism
Interrogation/Debriefing Tecliniques."2462 Moskowitz Memorandum for the Recor4Febniary4j2003/|Su^^ Notification."




memorandum was laterdisputed by Chairman Roberts.^"^^^ The Committee has no independent
record of this briefing.
Throughout 2003, the CIA refused to answer questions from
Committee members and staff about the CIA interrogations of KSM and other CIA detainees.-'^ '^^
The CIA produced talking points for a September 4, 2003, briefing on the CIA interrogation
program exclusively for Conrnaittee leadership; however, there are no contemporaneous records
of the briefing taking place. The CIA talking points include information about the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, their effectiveness, and various abuses that occurred in
the program.Many of the CIA representations in the talking points were inaccurate.The
CIA continued to withhold from the Committee, including its leadership, any information on the
location of the CIA's detention facilities. On more than one occasion the CIA directed CIA
personnel at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, not to brief a visiting Committee member about the CIA
detention facility there, including duringa July 2005 visit by Chairman Roberts. '^^ ^
I" 2004, the Committee conducted two hearings on the CIA's role
in interrogating U.S. militai'y detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. CIA witnesses stressed that
the CIA was more limited in its intenrogation authorities than the Department of Defense, but
declined to respond to Committee questions about the interrogation of KSM or press reports on
CIA detention facilities.During the first briefing, on May 12, 2004, Committee members
requested Department of Justice memoranda addressing the legahty of CIA interrogations.
Moskowitz Memorandum for the Record, February 4, 2003, "Subject: Sensitive Notification." For information
on Senator Roberts's objections, see "Destroying C.I.A. Tapes Wasn't Opposed, Memos Say," by Scott Shane, The
New York Times, dated February 22, 2010.
Transcript of CIA briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 5, 2003 (DTS #2003-1156);
Transcript of "Intelligence Update," April 30, 2003 (DTS #2003-2174); Transcript of Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence briefing, September 3, 2003 (DTS #2004-0288); email from: to: [REDACTED];
subject: Re: EYES ONLY Re: Question Regarding Interrogations fi-om SSCI Member Briefing on KSM Capture;
date: March 17, 2003.
CIA Interrogation Program: DDO Talking Points, 04 September 2003.
2466 pqj. example, the talking points included inaccurate dataon tlie waterboaiding of Abu Zubaydah andKSM;
stated that two unauthorized techniques were used with a detainee, whereas 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was subjected
to numerous unauthorized techniques; and inaccurately stated that the offending officers were removed from the
site. The talking points also stated that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "has produced
significant results," and that the "[i]nformation acquired has saved countless lives...." See CIA Interrogation
Program: DDO Talking Points, 04 September 2003.
Because the Committee was not informed of the CIA detention site at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, no member of
the Committee was aware that the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush,
which related to the habeas corpus rights of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, resulted in the transfer of CIA detainees
from the CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay to other CIA detention facilities. See HEADQUARTERS
subject "RESTRICTED ACCESS TO [DETENTION SITE COBALT] AND[DETENTION SITE ORANGE]"; email from: HH|||||||||||toJPB||^^ cc: Jose Rodriguez,[REDACTEDJ^^^BH, [REDACTEDL^^^^MBjREDACTEDr[REDACTED]; subject;
guidance to |flgitmo; date: May 14,2004; forwarding final cable: HEADQUARTERS |m(14I502Z MAY
04), subject "Possible Brie^ US Senator"; email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED];
subject: Re: guidance to 2004; CIA responses to Questions for the Record, March 13,
2008 (DTS #2008-1310); "CODEL Roberts to Miami/Guantanamo, 7-8 July 2005," dated 5July, H|[| 902860.
2468 Transcript of hearing. May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332); Transcript of hearing, September 13,2004(DTS
#2005-0750).




Despite repeated subsequent requests, limited access to the memoranda was not granted until
four years later, in June 2008, by which time the CIA was nolonger detaining individuals.^"*^^
While the CIA continued to brief the Committee leadership on
aspects of the CIA's Detention and InteiTogation Program, there are no transcripts of these
briefings. Onebriefing, on July 15, 2004, discussed thedetention of Janat Gul.^"^^^ An email
from Legal stated that the "only reason" the chairman and vice chairman were
informed of the detention of Janat Gul was that the notification could serve as "the vehicle for
briefing the committees on our need for renewed legal and policy support" for the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program.^"^ '^ At the July2004 briefing, the minority staff director
requested full Committee briefings and expanded Committee oversight, including visits to CIA
detention sites and interviews with interrogators—efforts that had been sought by former
Chairman Graham years earlier. This request was denied.
D. Vice Chairman Rockefeller Seeks Committee Investigation
On February 3, 2005, Vice Chairman Rockefeller began a formal
effort to conduct a comprehensive Committee investigation of the CIA's detention, inten"ogation
and rendition activities, including a review of the legality and effectiveness of CIA
interrogations.On March 3, 2005, a CIA official wrote that Vice Chairman Rockefeller was
"convinced that we're hiding stuff from him" and that the CIA had planned a detailed briefing to
"shut Rockefeller up." '^^ '^^ The only Committee records of this briefing, which took place on
March 7, 2005, are handwritten notes written by Vice Chairman Rockefeller and the minority
staffdirector.^"^^^ Shortly after this briefing, dievice chairman reiterated his call for a broad
Committee investigation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, which he and the
ranking member of the HPSCI, Jane Harman, described in a letter to Vice President Cheney
There is no Committee record of a response to the letter.
2469 Transcript ofSenate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332^Mi±ammad
Rahim, the CIA's last detainee, was transfe^edtoU^Sjiiilit^ ciisto^ on Marchl3j2008^5c^^ 3445
19754 8405 ^•••^•[^^•8408
Handwritten notes of SSCI Minority Staff Director Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077); CIA notes (DTS
#2009-2024, pp. 92-95); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 110-121).
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Priority: congressional notification on Janat Gul;
date: July 29, 2004.
Handwritten notes of SSCI Minority Staff Director Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077); CIA notes (DTS
#2009-2024, pp. 92-95); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 110-121).
Febmary 3, 2005, letter from Senator Rockefeller to Senator Roberts on "the Committee's upcoming agenda,"
(letter incorrectly dated February 3, 2004).
Sametime message discussion between and [REDACTED], March 3, 2005.
The notes indicate that CIA briefers provided inaccurate information. For example, the notes indicate that "[w]e
screen carefully ^ people who might have contact with detainees" (emphasis in the Vice Chairman's notes) and that
"positive incentives" are used prior to "coercive measures." In a reference to the waterboard, the notes state, the
detainee "thinks he's drowning, even though they aie breatliing." See handwritten notes of then-Committee
Minority Staff Director Andiew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077, Image 1) and handwritten notes of Senator Rockefeller.
Letter to Senator Roberts from minority SSCI members, March 10, 2005 (DTS #2005-1126); Letter to Vice
President Cheney from Vice Chairman Rockefeller and Representative Harman, March 11, 2005; Letter from
Senator Rockefeller, March 11, 2005.
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Apnl 13, 2005, theday before an anticipated Committee vote
oiUh^jicechairman's proposed investigation of the CIA program, the chief of ALEC Station,
and the deputy chief ofCTC, Philip Mudd, discussed a press strategy to
shape public and congressional views ofthe program. As previously detailed, Mudd wrote:
"we either get out and sell, orwe get hanmiered, which has implications
beyond the media, congress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up our
budget, we need to make sure the impression ofwhat we do ispositive.
The next day, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson briefed
several members ofthe Committee on linuted aspects of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Piogram. According to Helgerson, Chairman Roberts' "motive was to have apresentation that
made clear that CIA IG is looking at all appropriate detention and interrogation issues, as (he
told me privately beforehand) the Committee will be voting today on whether to launch their
own inquiry." Helgerson added that "Roberts said 'I know how that vote is going to come out,
but I want the minority to go away knowing this is ingood hands.The proposed
investigation was not approved by the Committee. The Committee nonetheless subsequently
approved legislation requiring CIA reports on renditions and plans for the disposition of high-
value CIA detainees, as well as requesting expanded Committee staff access to the program
beyond the Committee staff directors.In addition. Vice Chairman Rockefeller requested full
Committee access to over 100 documents related to the May 2004 Inspector General Special
Review.^"^^^ On January 5, 2006, after multiple rounds of negotiations with the CIA for the
documents, the chief of staff to Director of National Intelligence Johi^feeroponte wrote aletter
reiectin^he request. The letter had been prepared by the former Legal,
who was by then serving as aCIA detailee in the Office of the Director'of National
Intelligence.-"^^^
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and
19:56:05.
See email from: CIA Inspector General John Helgerson; to: subject: this afternoon's briefing;
date: April 13, 2005. There is no Committee transcript of the briefing. CIA records state that the briefing covered
"updates on the half dozen key abuse cases," ghost detainees, and renditions. Tlie notes do not reference the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. In response to aquestion from Vice Chainnan Rockefeller, Helgerson explained
that the CIA was "preparing acomprehensive briefing" on detention and interrogation activities for the Committee.
Compartmented Classified Annex toReport No. S. 109-142, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, as Reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence (DTS #2005-4028).
2'*®° Letter from Johi^^izzo to John Rockefelle^ueu^^ 16, 2005 (DTS #2005-3522). The DNI, pursuant to
the advice of former HmCTC Legal, ^m^^^mi^upnorted the CIA's proposed limitations on
^^litte^ccess to the documents (emailfromTI^B^^HiH' to- Michael Leiter; cc: David Shedd,
and others; subject: Review ofDocuments Requested by Senator Rockefeller; date: December 16,
2005; Letter from David Shedd toAndy Johnson, January 5,2006 (DTS #2006-0373)).
2J»^tte^om David Shedd to Andy Johnson, Januar^^006^S #2006-0373); email from: IB
to: Michael Leiter; cc: David Shedd. •••^•1 and others; subject: Review ofDocuments
Requested by Senator Rockefeller; date: December 16, 2005.
Page 442 of 499
UNCLASSIFIED
I, April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET// //NOFORN
E. InResponse to Detainee Treatment Act, the CIA Briefs Senators Not on the Committee;
Proposal from Senator Levin for an Independent Commission Prompts Renewed Calls
Within the CIA to Destroy Interrogation Videotapes
In October and November 2005, after the Senate passed its version
of theDetainee Treatment Act, the CIA, directed by the Office of the Vice President, briefed
specific Republican senators, who were not on the Select Committee on Intelligence, on the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. (The full membership of the Committee had not yet
been briefed on the CIA inteiTOgation program.)^"^^^ The briefings, which were intended to
influence conference negotiations,were provided to Senator McCain;-'^ '^^ Senators Ted
Stevens and Thad Cochran, the chairmen of the Appropriations Committee and Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee;-"^^^ Majority Leader Bill Frist;-^^^ and Senator John Cornyn (CIA
records state that Cornyn was not briefed on the CIA's specific interrogation techniques).
Meanwhile, a proposal from Senator Carl Levin to establish an independent commission to
investigate U.S. detention policies and allegations ofdetainee abuse resulted in concern at the
CIA that such a commission would lead to thediscovery of videotapes documenting CIA
interrogations. That concern prompted renewed interest atthe CIA to destroy the videotapes.
2482 According to an email from John Rizzo, the subject of one such meeting was "how thecurrennjeraon^
McCain potentially undercuts our legal position." (See email from: John A. Rizzo; to: H
cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: IMMEDIATE HEADS UP; VP Meeting with Appropriations Committee
Leadersliip Tomonow reMcCain Amendment; date: October 17, 2005, at 10:49:39 AM; email from: John Rizzo; to:
^••••1; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDIATE: Re: Sen. Frist req for briefing on
impact of McCain Amendment; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:53:16 AM.
Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: IMMEDIATE
HEADS UP: VP Meeting with Appropriations Committee Leadership Tomonow reMcCain Amendment; date:
October 17, 2005, at 10:49:39 ANl
Email from: John Rizzo; to: •••H; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDI^^ Re:
Sen. Frist req for briefing on impact ofMcCain Amendment; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:53:16 AM;
Talking Points for OVP Sponsored Meeting with Sen McCain; Impact of McCain Amendment on Legal Basis for
CTC's HVD Detention and Interrogation Program, 20 October 2005.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: •••••; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], BHHHi' [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDIATE: Re:
Sen Frist req for briefing on impact ofMcCain Amendment; date: October 31,2005, at 10:53:16 AM.
Email from: John Rizzo; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDIATE: Re:
Sen Frist req for briefing on impact ofMcCain Amendment; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:53:16 AM; email from:
John A. Rizzo; to: David R. Shedd; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: BRIEF READOUT: 31 OCT FRIST
BRIEFING; date: November 1, 2005, at 2:53:40 PM.
Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Re: Senator Cornyn; date: November 30,2005, at 12:50:11 PM.
On October 31, 2005, John Rizzo wrote an email stating that "Sen. Levin's legislative proposal for a9/11-type
outside Commission to be established on detaineesseemstobe^^ wliich obviously would serve
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Senator Levin's amendment to establish the commission failed on November8, 2005.The
CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day.^"^^®
F. CIA Director Goss Seeks Committee Support for theProgram After the Detainee
Treatment Act; CIA Declines to Answer Questions for the Record
In March 2006, three months after passage of the Detainee
Treatment Act, the CIA provided a briefing for five Committee staffers that included limited
information on the interrogation process, as well as the effectiveness ofthe CIA interrogation
program.The briefings did not include information on the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques or the location of CIA detention sites.-^^^ ^ March 15, 2006, CIA
Director Porter Goss briefed the full Committee on CIA detention matters, but did not provide
the locations of the CIA's detention facilities, or a list or briefing on the CIA's enhanced
to surface the tapes' existence." Rizzo then added that "1 tliink 1need to be the skunk at the party again and see if
the Director is willing to let u^r^n^iiorctime to get the right people downtown on board with the notion of our[sic] destroying the tapes." asenior Cly^Uorne^^o had viewedUievideotapes, responded,
"You are conect. Tlie sooner we resolve this the better." Legal, ||^HHHIIi> agreed
that "[a]pproaching the DCIA isa good idea," adding, "[c]ommissions tend to make very broad document
pioduction demands, which might call for these videotapes that should have been destroyed in the normal course of
busines^years ago." See email from: John A. Rizzo; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], |B|
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: principals wan^Rplantopublicly roll the CTC program
in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:37 AM; email from: toJohn A. Rizzo; cc:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: Re: principals wantPRplantopublicly
roll the CTC programin somefashion; date: October 31, 2005. at 12:32PM;email from: to: John
A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re:
principals want PR plarn^ublicl^oll the CTC program in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 11:45 AM.
See also interview of t>y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, June
17, 2003.
SeeSenate Roll Call Vote #00309, November 8, 2005, 5:37pm, on Amendment #2430
[REDACTED] 27089 (090627Z NOV 05)
Areview of the Committee record of this briefing indicates much of the information provided by the CIA was
inaccurate. For example, according to the Committee's Memorandum for the Record, CIA briefers stated "the plan
divorces questioning from coercive measures." CIA records indicate, however, that questioning and the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were combined in practice. According toCommittee records, CIA
officials stated thatKhalid al-Masri hadandmaintained connections to al-Qa'ida, andthathe was released "when
the CIA reached apoint in debriefings that required [foreign government] assistance," which was not forthcoming.
The CIA Inspector General would later determine that when CIA officers questioned al-Masri, "they quickly
concluded that he was not a teiTorist," and that there was "insufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri." CIA
officers referenced the captures ofHambali, Sajid Badat, Jose Padilla, and lyman Paris, as well as the disruption of
the West Coast/Second Wave plotting, the Heathrow Airport plotting, and the Karachi plotting. As detailed inthis
summary, the CIA consistently provided inaccurate representations regarding tlie plotting and the capture ofthe
referenced individuals. CIA briefers also compared the program to U.S. military custody, stating that "the CIA can
bring far more resources - debriefers, analysts, psychologists, etc. - per detainee than is possible at large scale
facilities such as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." As described, the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK
complained of "problem, underperforming" and "totally inexperienced" debriefers almost a year prior to this
briefing. As further described, an inspector general audit completed three months after the briefing described the
lack ofdebriefers atCIA detention facilities as "an ongoing problem." (Senate Select Committee onIntelligence,
Memorandum for the Record, "CIA Briefing onDetention Program," March 8,2006 (DTS #2006-1182).)
Senate Select Committee on IntelUgence, Memorandum for the Record, "CIA Briefing on Detention Program "
March 8, 2006 (DTS #2006-1182).
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interrogation techniques.At this hearing Director Goss explained to the Committee that "we
cannot do it by ourselves," and that"[w]e need to have the support of our oversight
committee.Goss then described challenges to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program as a result of the Detainee Treatment Act, as well as strained relations with countries
hosting CIA detention sites after significant press revelations. '^^ ^^ Director Goss described the
program as follows:
"This program has brought us incredible information. It's a program thatcould
continue to bringus incredible information. It's a program that could continue
to operate in a very professional way. It's a program that I think if you saw
how it's operated you would agree thatyou would be proud that it's doneright
and well, with proper safeguards.
Contrasting the CIA program to the abuse of prisoners in U.S.
military detention at the Abu Ghraib prison in Laq, Director Goss stated that the CIA program:
"is a professionally-operated program that we operate uniquely.... We are not
talking military, andI'm not talking about anything thata contractor might
have done... in a prison somewhere or beat somebody or hit somebody with a
stick or something. That's not what this is about."-"^^^
Addressing CIA inten-ogations. Director Goss testified that "we
only bring in certain selected people that we think can give us intelligence information, and we
treat them in certain specific ways" such that "they basically become psychologically
disadvantaged to their interrogator." Explaining that the key to a successful interrogation was
"getting a better psychological profile and knowing what makes someone tick," Director Goss
stated, "just the simplest thing will work, a family photograph or something." Goss then
represented that the CIA's interrogation program is "not a brutality. It's more of anartor a
science that is refined."^'^^^
By the time of the briefing, press disclosures had resulted in widespread public discussion about some of the
CIA's reported enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard. Goss was thus asked by a member of
the Committee whetlier the CIA had undertaken a "technique by technique" analysis of the effectiveness of the
program. Goss responded that the problem witli such an analysis is that the techniques were used "in combination."
Asked bythe member fora comparison of "waterboarding versus sleep deprivation," Goss responded diat
"waterboarding is not used inconjunction with anything else." As detailed elsewhere, this testimony was
inaccurate. Gossthenreferred to sleepdeprivation, dietary manipulation, and"environment control"as "alleged
techniques." See transcript ofSenate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15,2006 (DTS #2006-
1308).
DirectorGoss stated: "I've had to seriously considerwhether passage of the McCain amendment was a
congressional disapproval of the CIA use ofEITs. I don't think it was, and Idon't think tliat was the message you
sentme. But I have to at leastget thatassurance, that that's not what you were saying to me." See transcript of
SenateSelectCommittee on Intelligence briefing, March 15,2006(DTS #2006-1308).
Transcript ofSenate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).
Transcript ofSenate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).
Transcript ofSenate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).
Transcript of Senate Select Committee oj^nteHigenc^riefin^MarclU^ (DTS #2006-1308).
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After the hearing, the Committee submitted official Questions for
the Record related to the history, legality, and the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program. The CIA did not respond. '^^ ^^
2006, the Committee approved legislation requiring the
CIA to provide reports on the CIA's detention facilities (including their locations), the CIA's
interrogation techniques, the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA program, CIA
renditions, and the CIA's plans for the disposition of its detainees. The legislation also called for
full Committee access to the CIA May 2004 Inspector General Special Review, as well as
expanded member and Committee staff access to information on the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program.-^^ In July 2006, the new CIA director. General Michael Hayden,
provided a briefing for the chairman and vice chairman in which he described the Detainee
Treatment Act as a "safehaven" that potentially permitted the CIA to use its enhanced
interrogation techniques.-^®'
G. Full Committee First Briefed on the CIA's Interrogation Program Hours Before It Is
Publicly Acknowledged on September 6, 2006
On September 6, 2006, President Bush publicly acknowledged the
CIA program and the transfer of 14 CIA detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. Hours prior to the announcement, CIA Director Hayden provided the first briefing on the
CIA's "enhanced interrogation" programfor all members of the Committee, although the CIA
limited staff attendance to the Committee's two staff directors.Due to the impending public
acknowledgment of the program, the briefing was abbreviated. At the briefing, the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques were listed, but not described. Director Hayden stated that the
techniques were developed at the Department of Defense SERE school and were "used against
American service personnel during their training." He testified that "once [a detainee] gets into
the situation of sustained cooperation," debriefings are "not significantly different than what you
and I are doing right now." Hayden sought "legislative assistance" in interpreting Common
Article 3, stated that he had not asked for an opinion from the Department of Justice, and
represented that he had been informed informally that seven interrogation techniques "are
viewed by the Department of Justice to be consistent with the requirements of the Detainee
Treatment Act."^^"^ Director Hayden declined to identify the locations of the CIA's detention
facilities to the members and stated that he personally had recommended not expanding
Letter from Vice Chairman Rockefeller to Director Goss, containing Questions for the Record, May 10,2006
(DTS #2006-1949); Letter from Chairman Roberts to Director Goss, May 4, 2006 (DTS #2006-1876).
Classified Annex to Report No. S. 109-259, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (DTS
#2006-2208). Compartmented annex (DTS #2006-2209).
Hayden stated that Hamdan v. had effectively prohibited the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. He then described an "action" that would define Common Article 3 according to the Detainee
Treatment Act, which was in turn "anchored" in the Convention Against Torture to "which the Senate express[ed]
reservation." As described, two months later, the President sought Congressional approval of the Militai7
Commissions Act. Based on handwritten notes by the Committee minority staff director.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefmg, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336).
As described above, tlie CIA had sought the Department of Justice's opinion on the application of the Detainee
Treatment Act to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The draft memorandum was withdrawn after the
U.S. Supreme Court case in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.
nil I Mil I I nil iiiii I




Committee staff access beyond the two staff directors alieady briefed on the CIA's Detention
and Interrogation Program.^^®"^
There were no other Committee briefings or hearings on the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program prior to the Senate's September 28, 2006, vote on the
Military Commissions Act. As described, the Department of Justice later concluded that the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were consistent with the Military Commissions Act in
part because, according to the CIA, "none of the Members [briefed on the CIA program]
expressed the view that the CIA interrogation program should be stopped, or that the techniques
at issue were inappropriate."-^®^ However, priorto the vote. Senator McCain—who had been
briefed on the CIA program—told CIA officials that he could not support the program and that
sleep deprivation, one of the interrogation techniques still included in the program, as well as
waterboarding, were torture.^^®^ Members of the Committee also expressed their views in
classified letters to the CIA. Senator Dianne Feinstein informed the CIA that Hayden's
testimony on the CIA program was "extraordinarily problematic" and that she was "unable to
understand why the CIA needs to maintain this program.In May 2007, shortly after
additional Committee staff gained access to the program. Senator Russ Feingold expressed his
opposition to the program, while Senators Feinstein, Ron Wyden, and Chuck Hagel described
their concerns about the CIA program and their "deep discomfort" with the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.
On November 16, 2006, CIA Director Hayden briefed the
Committee.^^®'-^ The briefing included inaccurate information, including on the CIA's use of
dietary manipulation and nudity, as well as the effects of sleep deprivation.Before speaking
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336). The
transcript includes the following exchange: Senator Feingold: "...you make it tougher on me and the members of
the Committee by the decision to not allow staff access to a briefing like this. Was it your recommendation to deny
staff access to this hearing?" CIA Director Hayden: "It was."
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain
Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogationof High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
Email from: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTEDLli^^^^Bn^EDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Briefing for Senator John S. McCain (R-AZ); date:
September 11, 2006, at 5:51 PM.
Letter from Senator Feinstein to Director Hayden, September 27, 2006 (DTS #2006-3717).
2508 Letter from Senator Feingold to Director Hayden, May 1, 2007 (DTS #2007-1858); Letter from Senators
Feinstein, Wyden and Hagel to Director Hayden, May 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-2102).
As in the September 6, 2006, briefing, only two staff members were permitted to attend.
Director Hayden testified tliat detainees were never provided fewer than 1,000 calories a day. This is inaccurate.
There were no calorie requirements until May 2004, and draft OMS guidelines from March 2003 indicated that
"[b]rief periods in which food is withheld(1-2 days), as an adjunct to interrogations are acceptable." (SeeOMS
GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE RENDITION,
INTERROGATION, AND DETENTION, May 17,2004; OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support
to Detainee Interrogations, First Draft, March 7, 2003.) Director Hayden testified that detainees were "not paiaded
[nude] in front ofanyone," whereas aCIA inteiTogator told the inspector general that nude detainees were "kep^ a
;uards." (See Interview Report,center area outside the inteiTogation room," and were "'walked around' bj





about the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, however, Director Hayden asked to brief the
Committee on the recent capture of the CIA's newest detainee, Abdul Hadi al-kaqi, who was not
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Vice Chairman Rockefeller and two
other members of the Committee expressed fmstration at the briefing that Director Hayden's
description of Hadi al-Iraqi's capture was preventing what was expected to be an in-depth
discussion of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
February 14, 2007, during a hearing on CIA renditions.
Director Hayden provided inaccurate information to the Committee, to include inaccurate
information on the number of detainees held by the CIA. the deputy chief of
the Department in CTC and the previous deputy chief of ALEC Station, provided
examples of information obtained from the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program.^^^^ After
providing the examples, closed her testimony with the statement that "[tjhere's no
question, in my mind, that having that detainee information has saved hundreds, conservatively
speaking, of American lives."^^ '^^
(T8/f|^||||||||||[||||||||||//NP^ On March 15, 2007, in a speech to a gathering ofambassadors to
the United States from the countries of the European Union, Director Hayden stated that
congressional support for the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program assured the continuity
of the program:
"I mentioned earlier that it would be unwise to assume that there will be a
dramatic change in the American approach to the war on terror in 2009. CIA
got the legislation it needed to continue this program in the Military
Commissions Act passed by our Congress last fall. And let me remind you
that every member of our intelligence committees, House and Senate,
Republican and Democrat, is now fully briefed on the detention and
interrogation program. This is not CIA's program. This is not the President's
program. This is America's program.
April 14, 2003.) testified that standing sleep deprivation is discontinued when swelling
or "any abnormality" appears. This was inaccurate. For example, KSM's standing sleep deprivation continued,
notwitfi^nding pedal edema and abrasions onhis ankles, shins and wrists, aswell as the back ofhis head. (See
••• 10916 (210845Z MAR 03); 10909 (201918Z MAR 03).) Director Hayden testified that
"mental conditions that would be of normal concern do not present themselves until a person has experienced more
than 100 hours of sleep deprivation," however at least three detainees experienced hallucinations after being




Transcript ofSenate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, Noven^r 16,2006 (DTS #2007-1422).
This testimony included inaccurate infonnation. For example, IBH testified that KSM "identified sleeper
cells inside the U.S., [and] the information allowed the FBI to identify that and take action." She further testified
that KSM "identified the second wave of attacks against the U.S. that were planned after 9/11," that Abu Zubaydah
"really pointed us towards [KSMJ and how to find him," and that Abu Zubaydah "led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh."
See transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337).
Additional information on the testimony is included in the full Committee Study.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337).
DIRECTOR•• (152227Z MAR 07)
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H. The CIA Provides Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It
Inaccurate; Intelligence Authorization Act Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to
Techniques Authorized by the Army Field Manual
On Apiil 12, 2007, CIA Director Hayden testified at a lengthy
hearing that was attended by all but one committee member, and for the first time, the CIA
allowed most of the Coimnittee's staff to attend. The members stated that the Committee was
still seeking access to CIA documents and information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program, including Department of Justice memoranda and the location of the CIA's detention
facilities.Director Hayden's Statement for the Record included extensive inaccurate
information with regard to Abu Zubaydah, CIA interrogators, abuses identified by the ICRC, and
the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.Director Hayden's
Statement for the Record also listed five examples of captures and four examples of plots
"thwarted" purportedly resulting from information acquired from CIA detainees, all of which
included significant inaccurate information.^^^^ Director Hayden's Statement for the Record
further included the following representation with regard to the effects of legislation that would
limit interrogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual:
"The CIA program has proven to be effective... should our techniques be
limited to the IArmy] field manual, we are left with very little offense and are
relegated to rely primarily on defense. Without the approval of EITs... we
have severely restricted our attempts to obtain timely information from HVDs
who possess information that will help us save lives and disrupt operations.
Limiting our inteiTogation tools to those detailed in the [Army] field manual
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
2516 pqj.example, the Statement for the Record claimed that Abu Zubaydahwas "an up-and-coming lieutenant of
Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) who had intimate knowledge of al-Qa'ida's current operations, personnel and plans." It
also stated that "[a]fter tiie use of tliese techniques, Abu Zubaydah became one of our most important sources of
intelligence on al-Qa'ida, and he himself has stated that he would not have been responsive or told us all he did had
he not gone through these techniques." The Statement claimed that CIA interrogators were "carefully chosen and
screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity," and that "they must complete inore than 250 hours
of specialized training before tliey aie allowed to come face-to-face with a terrorist." Claims made in the Statement
refuting the abuses identified by tlie ICRC were repeated by Director Hayden during the hearing, and are described
in an appendix to this summary. The Statement for the Record also included inaccurate information about past
congressional oversight, claiming that "[a]s CIA's efforts to implement [new interrogation] authorities got underway
in 2002, the majority and minority leaders of tlie Senate, the speaker and the minority leader of tlie House, and tlie
chairs and ranking members of the intelligence committees were fully briefed on tlie interrogation program." See
Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007,
hearing (DTS #2007-1563).
The Statement for die Record included claims of effectiveness similar to those made in otlier contexts by tlie
CIA, related to the captures of Hambali (on which Director Hayden elaborated during the hearing), Issa al-Hindi
("KSM also provided the first lead to an operative known as 'Issa al-Hindi'"), Sajid Badat ("[Ijeads provided by
KSM in November 2003 led directly to the anest of [Badat]"), Jose Padilla ("Abu Zubaydah provided information
leading to the identification of alleged al-Qa'ida operative Jose Padilla"), and lyman Paris ("[s]oon after his arrest,
KSM described an Ohio-based truck driver whom the FBI identified as lyman Paris, already under suspicion for his
contacts with al-Qa'ida operative Majid Khan"). Tlie statement also described the "thwarting" and "disrupting" of
the "West Coast Airiiner Plot" (aka, the Second Wave plotting), the "Heatlirow Airport plot," the "Karachi plots,"
and "Plots in the Saudi Peninsula." See Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on InteUigence from
CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearin^DT^200^563)




will increase the probability that a determined, resilient HVD will be able to
withhold critical, time-sensitive, actionable intelligence that could prevent an
imminent, catastrophic attack."^^^^
At the April 12, 2007, hearing, Director Hayden verbally provided
extensive inaccurate information on, among other topics: (1) the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah,
(2) the application of Department of Defense survival school practices to the program, (3)
detainees' counterinterrogation training, (4) the backgrounds of CIA interrogators, (5) the role of
other members of the interrogation teams, (6) the number of CIA detainees and their intelligence
production, (7) the role of CIA detainee reporting in the captures of terrorist suspects, (8) the
interrogation process, (9) the use of detainee reporting, (10) the purported relationship between
Islam and the need to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, (11) threats against
detainees' families, (12) the punching and kicking of detainees, (13) detainee hygiene, (14)
denial of medical care, (15) dietary manipulation, (16) the use of waterboarding and its
effectiveness, and (17) the injury and death of detainees. In addition, the chief of CTC's
Department provided inaccurate information on the CIA's use of stress positions, while
Acting General Counsel John Rizzo provided inaccurate information on the legal reasons for
establishing CIA detention facilities overseas.^^^^ A detailed comparison of Director Hayden's
testimony and information in CIA records related to the program is included in an appendix to
this summary.
I" responses to official Committee Questions for the Record, the
CIA provided inaccurate information related to detainees transferred from U.S. military to CIA
custody.The Committee also requested a timeline connecting intelligence reporting obtained
from CIA detainees to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA
declined to provide such a timeline, writing that "[t]he value of each intelligence report stands
alone, whether it is collected before, during, immediately after or significantly after the use of
[the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques].
2518 \Yitness Statement for theSenate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12,
2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
2520 Committeehad askedfor specifics related to the assertion in DirectorHayden's written statement that the
CIA program was effective in gaining intelligence after detainees successfully resisted interrogation under U.S.
military detention. The CIA's response referenced only one detainee, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi, stating that he was
"unwilhng to become fully cooperative given the limitations of the U.S. military's interrogation and detention
regulations." The CIA's response to Committee questions then asserted that "[i]t was not until Abu Jaf'ar was
subjected to EITS that he provided detailed information [about] his personal meetings with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi
and Zarqawi's advisors," and that "[i]n addition, Abu Jaf'ar provided information on al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI)
finances, travel, and associated facilitation activities." The provided information was inaccurate. CIA records
indicate that, while still in U.S. military custody, Abu Ja'far described multiple meetings with al-Zarqawi, other
members of al-Qa'ida in Iraq, and individuals who were to serve as al-Zarqawi's connection to senior al-Qa'ida
leadership. Abu Ja'far also provided insights into al-Zarqa '^s beliefsandpl^s. See |^^^^|32732
OCT^|^^^Hh2707(^^H OCT^^IHI 32726 (••• OCT 32810(•IH OCT05r||H|32^ (HHI OCT 05).
CIA Response to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for the Record, June 18, 2007 (DTS
#2007-2564).
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In May 2007, the Committee voted to approve the Fiscal Year
2008 Intelligence Authorization bill, which required reporting on CIA compliance with the
Detainee Treatment Act and Military Commissions Act. In September 2007, John Rizzo
withdrew his nomination to be CIA general counsel amid Committee concerns related to his role
in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. On August 2, 2007, the Committee
conducted a hearing that addressed the interrogation of Muhammad Rahim, who would be the
CIA's last detainee, as well as the president's new Executive Order, which interpreted the
Geneva Conventions in a manner to allow the CIA to use its enhanced interrogation techniques
against Muhammad Rahim. At that hearing, the CIA's director of CTC,
provided inaccurate information to the Committee on several issues, including how the CIA
conducts interrogations.^^-- Members againrequested access to the Department of Justice
memoranda related to the CIA program, but were denied this access.
On December 5, 2007, the conference committee considering the
Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to restrict the CIA's interrogation
techniques to those authorized by the Army Field Manual. Opponents of the provision
referenced Director Hayden's testimony on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques in acquiring critical information.^^^"^ On December 6, 2007, the New York Times
revealed that the CIA had destroyed videotapes of CIA interrogations in 2005.^^^^ The CIA
claimed that the Committee had been told about the destruction of the videotapes at a hearing in
November 2006.^ '^^ ^ A review of the Committee's transcript of its November 16, 2006, hearing
found that the CIA's claim of notification was inaccurate. In fact, CIA witnesses testified at the
hearing that the CIA did not videotape interrogations, while making no mention of past
videotaping or the destruction of videotapes.
2S22 example, the director ofCTC, ||||||||||||||m|||||[|^^|, testified that detainees "are given ample opportunity to
provide the information without the use of EITs" (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Tr^mscript of hearing,
August 2, 2007 (DTS #2007-3641). As detailed in this Study, numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques immediately upon being questioned.
2-''" Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, August 2, 2007 (DTS #2007-3641).
Transcript, Committee of Conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 5,
2007 (DTS #2009-1279).
"C.I. A. Destroyed Tapes of Interrogations," The New York Times, December 6, 2007 (published in the
December 7, 2007, edition of tlie newspaper).
2526 p|-e3s Release, entitled, "Chairman Rockefeller Says IntelCommittee Has Begun InvestigationInto CIA
Detainee Tapes; Senator Expresses Concern that CIA Continues to Withhold Key Information," Office of Senator
Rockefeller, December 7, 2007.
2527 Xranscript of Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence hearing,November 16,2006 (DTS #2007-1422). The
CIA's June 2013 Response states only that "[w]e acknowledge that DCIA did not volunteer past information on
CIA's process of videotaping the inteiTogation sessions or of the destruction of the tapes...." The Committee review
found that in testimony to the Committee in November 2006, CIA witnesses responded to questions about
videotaping in terms of cunent practice, while avoiding any reference to past practice. This was similar to what was
conveyed in June 2003, to David Addington of the Office of the Vice President, by CIA General Counsel Scott
Muller. In June 2003, the CIA's General Counsel Scott Muller traveled to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the Vice President's counsel David Addington, Department of Defense General
Counsel Jim Haynes, Patrick Philbin from the Department of Justice, and NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger.
According to CIA records, during the trip, White House officials asked CIA General Counsel Muller about the CIA
Inspector General's concerns regaiding the waterboaid technique and whether the CIA videotaped intenogations, as
David Addington had heard tapes existed of the CIA's interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. In an email to CIA
colleagues providing details on the trip, Mullerwrotej^XDavidAdd^ way, asked me if were [sic]




At the CIA briefing to the Committee on December 11, 2007,
Director Hayden testified about: (1) the information provided to the White House regarding the
videotapes, (2) what the tapes revealed, (3) what was not on the tapes, (4) the reasons for their
destruction, (5) the legal basis for the use of the waterboard, and (6) the effectiveness of the
CIA's waterboard inteiTogation technique. Much of this testimony was inaccurate or incomplete.
Director Hayden also testified that what was on the destroyed videotapes was documented in
CIA cables, and that the cables were "a more than adequate representation of the tapes."
Director Hayden committed the CIA to providing the Committee with access to the cables.^^-^
On February 5, 2008, after the House of Representatives passed the
conference report limiting CIA inteiTOgations to techniques authorized by the Army Field
Manual, Director Hayden testified in an open Committee hearing against the provision. Director
Hayden also stated, inaccurately, that over the life of the CIA program, the CIA had detained
fewer than 100people. '^'^ ^ OnFebruaiy 13, 2008, the Senatepassed the conference report.^""
I. President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by the CIA; CIA
Declines to Answer Committee Questions for the Record About the CIA Interrogation
Program
On March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed the Intelligence
Authorization bill. President Bush explained his decision to veto the bill in a radio broadcast that
repeated CIA representations that the CIA interrogation program produced "critical intelligence"
that prevented specific terrorist plots. As described in this summary, and in greater detail in
Volume n, the statement reflected inaccurate information provided by the CIA to the president
and other policymakers in CIA briefings."^^^ Threedays later, the House of Representatives
taping interrogations and said he had heard that there were tapes of the Zubaydah interrogations. I told him that
tapeswere not being made)." See email from: Scott Muller; to: John Rizzo, Hp||||||||||B|||||||||, and
subject: Report from Gitmo trip(Not proofread as usual); date: June |, 2003, at 5:47PM.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, December 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-4904). In the
spring of 2008, after the Committee agreed on a bipartisan basis to continue investigating the destruction of the
interrogation tapes. Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond pressed the CIA to provide the operational
cables promised by Director Hayden. See April 21, 2008, letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman
Bond, to Director Hayden (DTS #2008-1798). See also May 8, 2008, letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice
Chairman Bond, to Director Hayden (DTS #2008-2030).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, February 5, 2008 (DTS #2008-1140).
U.S. Senate vote to adopt tlie conference report on February 13, 2008, 4:31 PM. H.R. 2082 (Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008).
The President's veto message to the House of Representatives stated that "[tjhe CIA's ability to conduct a
separate and specialized interrogation program for terrorists who possess the most critical information in the war on
terror has helped the United States prevent a number of attacks, including plots to fly passenger airplanes into the
Library Tower in Los Angeles and into Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown London" (Message to the House
of Representatives, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). The president also explained his veto in his weekly
radio address, in which he referenced the "Library Tower," also known as the "Second Wave" plot, and the
Heathrow Airport plot, while representing that the CIA program "helped us stop a plot to strike a U.S. Marine camp
in Djibouti, a planned attack on tlie U.S. consulate in Karachi...(See President's Radio Address, President George
W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed, CIA representations regarding the role of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques with regard to the Second Wave, Heathrow Airport, Djibouti, and Karachi plots were inaccurate.
Page 452 of 499
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
failed to oveiride the veto.^^^^ On May 22, 2008, theCIA informed the Committee that the
vetoed legislation "has had no impact on CIA policies concerning the use of EITs."^^^*^ As noted,
CIA Director Goss had previously testified to the Committee that "we cannot do it by ourselves,"
and that "[w]e need to have the support of our oversight committee.As further noted, the
OLC's 2007 memorandum applying the Military Commissions Act to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques relied on the CIA's representation that "none of the Members expressed
the view that the CIA interrogation program should be stopped, or that the techniques at issue
were inappropriate.
(^^Sy^^^|[|||||||||||||H/^}F) InJune 2008, the CIA provided information to the Committee in
response to a reporting requirement in the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act. The
CIA response stated that all of the CIA's interrogation techniques "were evaluated under the
applicable U.S. law during the time of their use and were found by the Department of Justice to
comply with those legal requirements." This was inaccurate. Diapers, nudity, dietary
manipulation, and water dousing were used extensively by the CIA prior to any Department of
Justice review. As detailed in the full Committee Study, the response included additional
information that was incongruent with the history of the program.^^^^
On June 10, 2008, the Committee held a hearing on the
Department of Justice memoranda relating to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, to
which the Committee had recently been provided limited access.At the hearing,
CTC Legal provided inaccurate information on several topics, including the use of sleep
U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 117of the 110"^ Congress, Second Session, March 11,2008, 7:01
PM.
CIA Responses to Questions for the Record from the 6 March 2008 SSCI Covert Action Hearing, May 22, 2008
(DTS #2008-2234).
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of
the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of tlie Geneva Conventions to Certain
Tecliniques tliat May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 14).
The CIA response stated that during sleep deprivation, the detainee is "typically... handcuffed in front of his
body," and "will not be pennitted to hang from [the handcuffs]," despite the practice of detainees being subjected to
the technique with their hands above their heads, and reports of detainees hanging from their wrists at
DETENTION SITE COBALT. The response stated that "aduh diapers and shorts [are] for sanitary purposes," and
that "caloric intake will always be at least 1,000 kcal/day," although CIA records indicate tliat the puipose of die
diapers in several cases was humiliation and there were no caloric requirements until May 2004. The response
stated that "[n]o sexual abuse or threats of sexual abuse are permitted," despite an insinuation that a family member
of a detainee would be sexually abused. Tlie response stated tliat "[t]he detainee may not be intentionally exposed to
detention facility staff," even though detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT were walked around nude by
guards. The response stated tliat during water dousing, water "cannot enter the detainee's nose, moutii, or eyes," but
did not acknowledge detainees being immersed in water. Finally, the CIA response described limitations on the use
of the waterboard that were exceeded in the case of KSM. {See Response to Congi essionally Directed Actions cited
in the Compartmented Annex to Report 110-75, June 16,2008 (DTS #2008-2663).) This response was provided
notwithstanding the presidential veto of this legislation on March 8, 2008.
2537 The Committee had been provided four copies of the memoranda for a limited time. See Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Transcript ofhearing^un^0^00^DT^^00^698).
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deprivation and its effects.^^^*^ Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury also testified,
noting that the Department of Justice deferred to the CIA with regard to the effectiveness of the
CIA interrogation program.^^^^ The Committee then submitted official Questions for the Record
on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and on the effectiveness of the program,
including how the CIA assessed the effectiveness of its interrogation techniques for purposes of
representations to the Departm^of Justice.^ '^^ ^^i^IApi^ared responses that included an
acknowledgment that HB||^|CTC Legal, provided inaccurate
information with regard to the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.-^"^^ The prepared responses were never provided to the Committee. Instead, on
October 17, 2008, the CIA informed the Committee that it would not respond to the Committee's
Questions for the Record and that instead, the CIA was "available to provide additional briefings
on this issue to Members as necessary."-^"^^ In separate letters to Director Hayden, Chairman
Rockefeller and Senator Feinstein referred to this refusal to respond to official Committee
questions as "unprecedented and... simply unacceptable,and "appalling.
2538 immimcTC Legal repeated the representation tliat during sleep deprivation, detainees' hands were
shackled "about chin to chest level," and stated that "[i]f there is any indication, such as the legs begin to swell, or
thingsof that nature, that may tenninate the sleep deprivation." mmiUCTC Legalalso stated, inaccurately,
that "we cannot begin to implement any of tlie measures, absent first attempting to get information fiom the
individual in an up front and non-coercive way." He added, also inaccurately, that "if the individual cooperates and
begins to talk to you, you never go into the interrogation program."
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, June
10, 2008 (DTS #2008-2698).
Questions for the Record submitted to CIA Director Michael Hayden, September 8, 2008, with a request for a
response by October 10, 2008 (DTS #2008-3522).
See CIA document prepared in response to "Questions for tlie Record" submitted by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence on September 8, 2008. Tlie Committee had inquired why information provided by Abu
Zubaydah about Jose Padilla was included in the CIA's "Effectiveness Memo" for the Department of Justice, given
that Abu Zubaydah provided the information to FBI Special Agents prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques. The CIA response, prepare^uUiewr sent to the Committee, stated that the CTC attorney
who prepared the CIA "Effectiveness Memo," H|||||i|||imH, "simply inadvertently reported this wrong." The
unsent CIA response added that "Abu Zubaydahprovided information on Jose Padilla while being inteiTogated by
tlie FBI," and cited a specific CIA cable, 1099L In contrast to the CIA's unsent response to Committee
questions in 2008, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "[t]he Study also claims Abu Zubaydah had already
provided [Jose Padilla's] 'Dirty Bomb' plot information to FBI interrogators prior to undergoing CIA interrogation,
but this is based on an undocumented FBI internal communication and an FBI officer's recollection to the Senate
Judiciary Committee seven years later." The CIA's June 2013 Response also represents that "[w]hile we have
considerable information from FBI debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, we have no record that FBI debriefers acquired
information about such an al-Qa'ida tlireat." As detailed in this summary, this is inaccurate. The CIA's June 2013
Response fuilher states that "CIA correctly represented Abu Zubaydah's description of Jose Padilla as an example
of information provided after an individual had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques." The CIA's
unsent response to Committee questions in 2008 acknowledged that "[d]uring the initial timeframe Abu Zubaydah
(AZ) was waterboarded the inteiTogation team believed tliat AZ was compliant and was not withholding actionable
threat inforaiation," but ALEC Station "had additional infonnation they felt linked AZ with more planned attacks,"
and that "[a]s a result, the interrogation team was instnicted to continue with the waterboarding based on ALEC
Station's belief." Finally, the unsent responses acknowledged that notwithstanding CIA representations to the
Department of Justice regarding amenities available to CIA detainees, "[tjhe amenities of today evolved over the
first year and a half of the program," and that Abu Zubaydah was not initially provided those amenities.
CIA Letter to Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV, October 17, 2008 (DTS #2008-4131).
Letter from Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV to CIA Director Michael Hayden, October 29, 2008 (DTS #2008-
4217).
Letter from Senator Feinstein to CIA IDirecto^lichaeniayd^ 2008 (DTS #2008-4235).
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VII. CIA Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to Committee
Investigation; Committee Votes 14-1 for Expansive Terms of Reference
to Study the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
The Committee's scrutiny of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program continued through the remainder of 2008 and into the 111th Congress, in 2009. On
February 11, 2009, the Committee held a business meeting at which Committee staff presented a
memorandum on the content of the CIA operational cables detailing the interrogations of Abu
Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in 2002.^^"^^ CIADirector Hayden had allowed a small
number of Committee staff to review the cables at CIA Headquarters, and as noted, had testified
that the cables provided "a more than adequate representation" of what was on the destroyed
CIAinterrogation videotapes.-^"^^ The chairman stated that the Committee staff memorandum
represented "the most comprehensive statement on the treatment of these two detainees, from the
conditions of their detention and the nature of their interrogations to the intelligence produced
and the thoughts of CIA officers and contractors in the field and Headquarters.After the
staff presentation, the vice chairman expressed his support for an expanded Committee
investigation, stating, "we need to compare what was briefed to us by the Agency with what we
find out, and we need to determine whether it was within the guidelines of the OLC, the MON,
and the guidelines published by the Agency.Other members of the Committee added their
support for an expanded investigation, with one member stating, "these are extraordinarily
serious matters and we ought to get to the bottom of it... to look at how it came to be that these
techniques were used, what the legal underpinnings of these techniques were all about, and
finally what these techniques meant in terms ofeffectiveness."^^"^^
The Committee held two subsequent business meetings to consider
and debate the terms of the Committee's proposed expanded review of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program. The first, on February 24, 2009, began with bipartisan support for a draft
Terms of Reference.-^^® The Committee met again on March 5, 2009, to consider a revised
Terms of Reference, which was approved by a vote of 14-1.~^^^
On December 13, 2012, after a review of more than six million
pages of records, the Committee approved a 6,300-page Study of the CIA's Detention and
See Committee business meeting records and transcript from February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, December 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-4904). In the
spring of 2008, after the Committee agreed on a bipartisan basis to continue investigating the destruction of the
interrogation tapes. Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chainnan Bond pressed the CIA to provide the operational
cables promised by Director Hayden. See letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director
Hayden, April 21, 2008 (DTS #2008-1798); letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director
Hayden, May 8, 2008 (DTS #2008-2030).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, Febmary 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420)
Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR). Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February
11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420).
Transcript, business meeting, February 24, 2009 (DTS #2009-1913)
Transcript, business meeting, March 5, 2009 (DTS #2009-1916)
TOP




Interrogation Program.-^^- OnApril 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 11-3, the Committee agreed
to send the revised findings and conclusions, and an updated Executive Summary of the
Committee Study to the president for declassification and public release.
2552 After the receipt of the CIA's June 27, 2013,Response to the CommitteeStudy of the CIA's Detention and
Intenogation Program, and subsequent meetings between the CIA and the Committee in the summer of 2013, the
full Committee Study was updated. The final Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
exceeds 6,700 pages and includes approximately 38,000 footnotes.
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VIII. Appendix 1: Terms of Reference
Terms ofReference
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the
Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program
Adopted March 5, 2009
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's study of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) detention and
interrogation program consists of these tenns of reference:
• A review of how the CIA created, operated, and maintained its detention and interrogation program,
including a review of the locations of tlie facilities and any arrangements and agreements made by the CIA
or other Intelligence Community officials with foreign entities in connection witli the program.
• A review of Intelligence Community documents and records, including CIA operational cables, relating to
the detention and interrogation of CIA detainees.
• A review of tlie CIA's assessments that particular detainees possessed relevant information and how the
assessments were made.
• An evaluation of the information acquired from the detainees including tlie periods during wliich enhanced
intenogation techniques (EITs) were administered.
• An evaluation of whether information provided to the Committee by the Intelligence Community
adequately and accurately described tlie CIA's detention and intenogation program as it was carried out in
practice, including conditions of detention, such as personal hygiene and medical needs, and their effect on
the EITs as applied.
• An evaluation of the information provided by the CIA to tlie Deptutment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC), including whether it accurately and adequately described:
a. the implementation, effectiveness and expected effects of EITs;
b. the value of information obtained through the use of EITs; and
c. the threat environment at tlie time the EITs were being used or contemplated for use on CIA
detainees.
• An evaluation of whether the CIA's detention and intenogation program complied with:
a. tiie authorizations in any relevant Presidential Findings and Memoranda of Notification;
b. all relevant policy and legal guidance provided by the CIA; and
c. the opinions issued by the OLC in relation to the use of EITs.
• A review of the infomiation provided by the CIA or otlier Intelligence Community officials involved in the
program about the CIA detention and interrogation program, including the location of facilities and
approved interrogation techniques, to U.S. officials with national security responsibilities.
The Committee will use those tools of oversight necessary to complete a thorough review including, but not limited
to, document reviews and requests, interviews, testimony at closed and open heai ings, as appropriate, and
preparation of findings and recommendations.
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IX. Appendix 2: CIA Detainees from 2002 - 2008
# CIA Detainees Date ofCustody
Days in CIA
Custody
1 Abu Zubaydah ^^•2002 1.59|
2 Zakariya ••12002 36|
3 Jamal Elclin Boudraa ••II2OO2 62|
4 Abbar al-Hawari, aka Abu Sufiyan ^•2002 36|
5 Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr Qa'id ^•2002 51| KEY
6 Ridha Ahmad Najar, aka Najjar |H||2002 69|
Bold Text: Detainees in bold text were
7 Ayub Marshid Ali Salih ^^^^•2002 4 subjected to the CIA's enlianced
interrogation techniques.
8 Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalali ••§^•2002 4|
9 Ha'il Aziz Ahmad al-Milhali ^^^^•2002 4
Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not
been previously acknowledged by the CIA
10 Hassan bin Altash ••••12002 59| to the SSCI.
11 Musab Umar Ali al-Mudwani ^^^^•2002 4 #: Detainee number on main detainee
spreadsheet; based on date of CIA custody.
Number is based on a designation made by12 Said Saleh Said, aka Said Salih Said ••••2002 4
13 Shawqi Awad ^^^^•2002 4
die Committee, not the CIA.
14 Umar Faruq, aka Abu al-Faruq al-Kuwaili •^^^•2002 41| Note on Redaction: The last digit of days
in CIA custody is redacted.
15 Abd al-Salam al-Hilah ^•§••2002 59|
16 Karini, aka Asai Sar Jan ^^^^•2002 4
17 Akbar Zakaria, aka Zakai ia Zeineddin •••2002 4
18 Rafiq bin Bashir bin Ualul al-llami ^^^^•2002 4
19 Tawfiq Nasir Awad al Bihani ^^^•2002 4
20 Lutfi al-Arabi al-Gharisi ••••2002 38|
21 Dr. Hikmat Nafi Shaukat ^^^•2002 4
22 Yaqub al-Balticlii aka Abu Tallia ^^^•2002 4
23 Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani •••I2OO2 54 SOURCE LNFORMATION
24 Gul Rahman ^^^•12002 4 CIA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff,
25 Ghulam Rabbani aka Abu Badr ^^••2002 54 entitled, "15 June Request for ExcelSpreadsheet," June 17, 2009. DTS #2009-
2529.26 Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri ••^^•2002 1,37|
27 Haji Ghalgi •(^^•2002 lg| CIA detainee charts provided to die
28 NazarAli ^^^^•2002 4 Committee on April 27, 2007. Documentin Committee Rccords entitled, "Briefing
Charts provided to committee members
from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the
closed Hearing on April 12,2007,
concerning EITs used with CIA detainees,
and a list of techniques." DTS #2007-
29 Juma Gul iHHH2002 4
30 Wafti bill Ali aka Abdullah ^^^^•2002 4
31 Adel ^^•^•2002 4
32 Qari Moliib Ur Rehman ••§^•>002 4 1594.
33 Shah Wali Khan •^^^•2002 4 CIA operational cables and other rccords
produced for the Committee's Study of the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation34 Hayatullah Haqqani {^•^•12002 4
35 Bishcr al-Rawi ^^^•2002 1
Program.
36 Jamil el-Banna, aka Abu Anas •^^•2002 1
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# CIA Detainees Date ofCustody
Days in CIA
Custody
i7 Ghairat Bahir ^•^••2002 51|
38 Pacha WazLr ••••2002 33|
39 Muhammad Amein al-Bakri •••2003 49|
40 Abdullah Midhat Mursi §•••2003 111
41 Ram/i bin al-Shibli •••2003 128|
42 Ibn Shaykh al-Libi ^^^•2003 114| KEY
43
Muliammad Uraar 'Abd al-Rahman, aka
Asadallali
^•^•2003 15| Bold Text: Dctiiinecs in bold text weresubjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.
Italics Text-. Detainees in italics have not
been previously acknowledged by the CIA
44 Abu Khalid •••2003 2|
45 Khalid Sliaykh Mohammad ^^•2003 126|
46 Mustafa Ahmad al-IIawsa\vi •••I2OO3 126| to the SSCI.
47 Abu Yasir al-Jaxa'iri §^••2003 124| #: Detainee number on main detainee
spreadsheet; based on date of CIA custody.
Number is based on a designation made by
the SSCI, not the CIA.
48 Suleiman Abdullah ••••2003 43|
49 Hamid Aich •••2003 4
50 Sayed Habib ^^•2003 49|
51 Abu Hazim, aka Abu Ha/Jm al-Libi ••2003 72|
52 Al-Shara'iya, aka Abd al-Karim ^^•2003 48|
53 Muhammad Khan (son of Suhbat) •IIH2Q03 38|
54 Ibrahim tlaqqani IIIK003 1
55 Ammar al-Baluchi •^•2003 J18|
56 Khallad bin Attash ^^•2003 118|
57 Laid Ben Dohnian Saidi, aka Abu Hudhaifa ••2003 46|
58 Majid Khan ^^•2003 llg|
59 Mohammad Dinshali •II2OO3 26|
SOURCE INFORMATION
CIA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff,
entitled, "15 June Request for Excel
60 Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Qahtani ^•2003 34|
61 Abu Nasim a!-Tunisi ••2003 32|
62 Mohd Farik bin Amin, aka Abu Zubair ^^•2003 115| Spreadsheet," June 17,2009. DTS #2009-2529.
63 Ziirmein ^^•2003 19|
CIA detainee charts provided to the
Committee on April 27, 2007. Document
in Committee Records entitled, "Briefing
Qiarts provided to committee membei-s
64 Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul ••2003 111
65 Adel Abu Redwan Ben Hamlili ••12003 30|
66 Shaistah Habibullah Khan {^•2003 21| from CIA Director Michael Hayden at theclosed Hearing on April 12,2007,
67 Samr liilmi Abdul Latif al-Barq |^H2003 4 concerning EITs used with CIA detainees,
and a list of techniques." DTS #2007-
1594.68 Aii Jan 2003 34|
69 Muhammad Klian (son of Amir) •[••2003 1| CIA operational cables and other records
70 Modin Nik Muhammad ^^^•2003 20| produced for the Committee's Study of theCIA's Detention and Interrogation
71 AbdullaJi Ashami •••12003 27| Program.
72 Bashir bin Lap, aka Lillic ••^•2003 iiol
73 Riduan bin Isomuddin, aka Ilambali •••2003 12g|
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# CIA Detainees Date ofCustody
Days ill CIA
Custody
74 Sanad 'AH Yislam al-Kazimi ^••2003 26|
75 Salah Nasir Salim Ali, aka Muhsin ^^•I|Boo3 59|
76 Abd Qudra Allah Mala Azrat al-Hadi ^^•^•2003 8|
77 Bismullah ••••2003 1
78 Sa'id Allam •§^•12003 B|
79 Sa'ida Gul •{^••|2003 4 KEY
80 Shall Khan Wali •^•••2003 B| Bold Text: Detainees in bold text were
81 Yahya, aka Rugollah ^^^^•2003 4 subjected to the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques.
Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not
been previously acknowledged by the CIA
82 2^kariya 'abd al-Rauf •{{^••|2003 B|
83 Zamarai Nur Muhammad Juma Klian ^^^^•2003 s|
84 Abdullah Salim al-Qoluani ^^^••2003 3| to the SSCI.
85 Awwad Sablian al-Shannnari ••IH2003 3| #: Detainee number on main detainee
spreadsheet; based on date of CIA custody.
Number is based on a designation made by
the SSCJ, not the CIA.
86 Noor Jalal •^lHi2003 23|
87
Majid Bin Muhammad Bin Sulayman
Khayil, aka Arsaia Khan •^•12003 '1
88 Aso Hawleri ••^•2003 2|
89 Mohd al-Shomaila 54|
90 Ali Saeed Awadh ^•^••2003 17|
91 Adnan ai-Libi ^^^^•2003 23|
92 Muhammad Abdullah Saleh iHH2004 48|
93 Riyadh the Facilitator |^^^B2004 14
94 Abu Abdallah al-Zulaytini ^^••2004 21|
95 Binyam Ahmed Mohamed ^^•^004 Hi
96 Firas al-Yemeni ^^^•2004 95|
98 Khalid 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Masri •••I2OO4 12| SOURCE INFORMATION
97 Hassan Ghul •^^02004 94| CIA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff,
entitled, "15 June Request for Excel
Spreadsheet," June 17, 2009. DTS #2009-
2529.
99 Muhammad Qurban Sayyid Ibrahim •••2004 24
100 Saud Memon •^^•2004 74i
101 Gill Rahman (2) ^••2004 3| CIA detainee charts provided to tlieCommittee on April 27, 2007. Document
in Committee Records entitled, "Briefing
Charts provided to committee members
from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the
closed Hearing on April 12, 2007,
concerning ElTs used with CIA detainees,
and a list of techniques." DTS #2007-
102 Hassan Ahmed Guleed •••2004 90|
103 Abu 'Abdallah •^^•2004 87|











CIA operational cables and other records
produced for the Committee's Study of the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program.
106 Abd al-Bari al-Filistini •{•2004 77|
107 Ayyub al-Libi ••2004 3(1
108 Marwan al-Jabbur |^^|2004 77l
109 Qattal al-Uzbeki ^^•2004 80|
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IJO Janat Gul ^^•2004 92|
111 Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani ^^•••2004 73|
KEY
112 SItarii' al-Masri ^•^^•2004 8l|
Bold Text: JDetainees in bold text were-
113 Abdi Rashid Samatar •^^•12004 65| subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.
Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not
been previously acknowledged by the CIA
114 Abu Far^j al-Libi ••2005 46|
115 Abu Mundnr al-Magrebi ^^•2005 46|
116 Ibrahim Jan 31| to the SSCI.
117 Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi •^^•2005 28| #: Detainee number on main detainee
spreadsheet; based on date of CIA custody.
Number is based on a designation made by
the SSCI, not the CIA.
118 Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi ^•••2006 17|
119 Muhanimad Rahini ••2007 24|
Sources; CIA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff, entitled, "15 June Request for Excel Spreadsheet," June 17, 2009
(DTS #2009-2529); CIA detainee charts provided to the Committee on April 27, 2007; document in Committee
records entitled, "Briefing Charts provided to committee Members from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the closed
Hearing on April 12, 2007, concerning EITs used with CIA detainees, and a list of techniques" (DTS #2007-1594,
hearing transcript at DTS# 2007-3158); and CIA operationalcables and other records produced for the Committee's
Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
Gul Rahman, listed as detainee 24, was the subject of a notification to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence following his death at DETENTION SITE COBALT; however, he has not appeared on lists of CIA
detainees provided to Committee.
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X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee-
April 12,2007
Testimonyof Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2007^^^^
CIA Testimony Sampling of Information
in CIA Records
The Interrofjation ofAbu Zubaydah
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Now
in June, after about four months
of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah
reached a point where he refused
to cooperate and he shut down.
He would not talk at all to the
FBI inten-ogators and although he
was still talking to CIA
interrogators no significant
progress was being made in
learning anything of intelligence
value. He was, to our eye,
employing classic resistance to
interrogation techniques and
employing them quite effectively.
And it was clear to us that we




Abu Zubaydah was rendered to CIA custody on March H,
2002. The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped
cooperating with debriefers who were using traditional
interrogation techniques is not supported by CIA records.
In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators
recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in
isolation from intenjogation while the interrogation team
members traveled "as a means of keeping [Abu
Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time
offfor a break and to attend to personal matters m
as well as to discuss "the endgame" for Abu
Zubaydah with officers from CIA Headquarters.
As a result, Abu Zubaydah spent much of June 2002 and
all of July 2002, 47 days in total, in isolation. When CIA
officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, they
immediately used the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, including the waterboard.
Prior to the 47 day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah
provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans,
capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information
Transcript at DTS #2007-3158. The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "We disagree with the Study's
conclusion that the Agency actively Impeded Congressional oversightof the CIA Detention and Interrogation
Program. ...As discussed in our response to Conclusion 9, we also disagree with the assessment that the information
CIA provided on the effectiveness of the programwas largely inaccurate. Finally, we have reviewed DCIA
Hayden's testimonybefore SSCIon 12 April, 2007and do not find, as the Studyclaims, that he misrepresented
virtually all aspects of the program, although a few aspects were in error....The testimony contained some
inaccuracies,and the Agencyshouldhave done better in preparing the Director,particularly concerningevents that
occurred prior to his tenure. However, there is noevidence that there was any intent on the part of the Agencyor
Director Hayden to misrepresent material facts." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA has "identified
a number of broad lessons learned" and includeseight recommendations. The CIA's only recommendation related
to Congress was: "Recommendation 8: Improve recordkeeping for interactions with Congress. Direct the Director of
the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA)and the Chief Information Officer to develop a concreteplan to improve
recordkeeping on CIA's interactions with Congress. OCA's records going forward should reflect each interaction
with Congress and the content of that interaction. OCA should work with the oversight committees to develop
better access to transcriptsof CIA testimony and briefings. This plan should be completedwithin90 days of the
arrival of a newDirector of OCA."
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really began in the spring of 2002
with the capture of Abu
Zubaydah. At that time we
deployed a psychologist who had
been under contiact to CIA [Dr.
SWIGERT], to provide real-time
recommendations to help us
overcome what seemed to be Abu
Zubaydah's very strong
resistance to interrogation... We
also made arrangements for [Dr.
DUNBARl^r. DUNBAR]
was the |||[|[||psychologist for
the Department of Defense's
SERE program, DOD's Survival,
Escape, Recovery and Evasion
program, the program of training
we put our troops, particularly
our airmen, through so that they




on its leadership structure, including personalities,
decision-making processes, training, and tactics. Abu
Zubaydah provided this type of information prior to,
during, and after the utilization of the CIA's enhanced
inteiTogation techniques.
Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the
next attack in the United States and operatives in the
United States was the basis for CIA representations that
Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," and for the CIA's
determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to become
"compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed
he was withholding. At no point during or after the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu
Zubaydah provide the information sought.^ '^'^
The CIA testimony that SWIGERT was deployed to
"overcome what seemed to be Abu Zubaydah's very
strong resistance to interrogation" is not supported by
internal CIA records. Rather, CIA records indicate that
CIA CTC officers anticipated Abu Zubaydah would resist
providing information and contracted with SWIGERT
prior to any meaningful assessment of Abu Zubaydah and
his level of cooperation.
• On April 1, 2002, at a meeting on tJie interrogation of
Abi^uba^ah, |||||^ |^CTC Legal
recommended that SWIGERT—who was
working under contract in the CIA's OTS—be brought
in to "provide real-time recommendations to overcome
Abu Zubaydah's resistance to interrogation." (Abu
Zubaydah had been in CIA custody for HH.) That
evening, SWIGERT, and the CIA OT^ffi^ who
had recommended SWIGERT to
prepared a cable with suggestions for the inten'ogation
of Abu Zubaydah. SWIGERT had monitored the U.S.
Air Force's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape
(SERE) training. SWIGERT, who had never
conducted an actual interrogation, encouraged the CIA
See intelligence reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review in VolumeIII, as well as a CIA paper
entitled, "Abu Zubaydah,"dated March 2005. Sirailai- information was included in, "Abu ZubaydiUi Bio," a CIA
document "Prepared on 9 August 2006."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume 111.





to focus on developing "learned helplessness" in CIA
detainees.
• Following the suggestion of i^li^HCTC Legal,
CTC contracted with SWIGERT to assist in the
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah.
• As described in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in
Volume m, almost immediately after Abu Zubaydah's
transfer to CIA custody on March 2002, Abu
Zubaydah's medical condition deteriorated and Abu
Zubaydal^as^nsferred to the intensive care unit of
a hospital in Country During this
time, FBI personnel continued to collect significant
intelligence from Abu Zubaydah. According to an FBI
report, during the period when Abu Zubaydah was still
"connected to the intubator" at the hospital and unable
to speak, he "indicated that he was willing to answer
questions of the interviewers via writing in Arabic."
While in the intensive care unit of the hospital, Abu
Zubaydah first discussed "Mukhtar" (KSM) and
identified a photograph of KSM.
• When Abu Zubaydah was discharged from the
hospital and returned to the CIA's
DETENTION SITE GREEN on April 15, 2002, he
was kept naked, sleep deprived, and in a cell with
bright lights with white noise or loud music playing.
The FBI personnel objected to the coercive aspects of
Abu Zubaydah's interrogation at this time, as they
believed they were making substantial progress
building rapport with Abu Zubaydah and developing
intelligence without these measures. (During their
questioning of Abu Zubaydah, the FBI officers
provided a towel for Abu Zubaydah to cover himself
and continued to use rapport building techniques with
the detainee.^^^^)
See Volume I, including 178955 (012236Z APR 02); April 1, 2002 email from [REDACTED] to
[REDACTED], re: Please coord on cable attached; and email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc:
|, April 1, 2002, re: POC for [SWIGERT]- consultant whodrafted Al-Qa'ida resistance to interrogation
backgrounder (noting that CTC/LGL would contact SWIGERT).
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
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DUNBAR's] ideas about what
approaches might be useful to get
information from people like Abu
Zubaydah and other
uncooperative al-Qa 'ida
detainees that we judged were
withholding time-sensitive,
perishable intelligence. Keep in
mind, as a backdrop for all of
this, this wasn't interrogating a
snuffy that's picked up on the
battlefield. The requirement to
be in the CIA detention program
is knowledge of[an] attack
against the United States or its
interests or knowledge about the
location of Usama bin Ladin or
Ayman al-Zawahiri."
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "We
began in 2002, in the spring of
2002. We had one very high
value detainee, Abu Zubaydah.
We knew he knew a lot. He
would not talk. We were going
nowhere with him. The decision
was made, we've got to do
something. We've got to have an
intervention here. What is it we
can do?"




The representation that the "requirement to be in the CIA
detention program is knowledge of [an] attack against the
United States or its interests or knowledge about the
location of Usama bin Ladin or Ayman al-Zawahiri" is
inconsistent with how the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program operated from its inception."^^^ As
detailed elsewhere, numerous individuals had been
detained and subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, despite doubts and questions
surrounding their knowledge of terrorist threats and the
location of senior al-Qa'ida leadership.
The representation that Abu Zubaydah "would not talk" is
incongruent with CIA intenogation records. The CIA
representation that the CIA "knew [Abu Zubaydah] knew
a lot" reflected an inaccurate assessment of Abu Zubaydah
from 2002, prior to his capture, and did not represent the
CIA's assessment of Abu Zubaydah as of the April 2007
testimony.
• Prior to Abu Zubaydah's capture, the CIA had
intelligence stating that Abu Zubaydah was the "third
or fourth" highest ranking al-Qa'ida leader. This
information was based on single-source reporting that
was retracted in July 2002—prior to Abu Zubaydah
being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. Other intelligence in CIA databases
indicated that Abu Zubaydah was not a senior member
of al-Qa'ida, but assisted al-Qa'ida members in
acquiring false passports and other travel documents.
Still other reporting indicated that, while Abu
Zubaydah served as an administrator at terrorist
training camps, he was not the central figure at these
camps.






• After Abu Zubaydah was subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002, the
chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN wrote:
"I do not believe that AZ was as wired with al-Qa'ida
as we believed him to be prior to his capture.
• In August 2006, the CIA published an assessment that
concluded that "misconceptions" about Afghanistan
training camps with which Abu Zubaydah was
associated had resulted in reporting that "miscast Abu
Zubaydah as a 'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant.'" The
assessment concluded that "al-Qa'ida rejected Abu
Zubaydah's requestin 1993 to join the group."-^^®
CIA representations that interrogators "were going
nowhere with [Abu Zubaydah]" prior to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques are also
incongruent with CIA records.
• Prior the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-
Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, relationships,
leadership structure, personalities, decision-making
processes, training, and tactics. Abu Zubaydah
provided this type of information prior to, during, and
after the utilization of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.
• A quantitative review of Abu Zubaydah's
disseminated intelligence reporting indicates that more
intelligence reports were disseminated from Abu
Zubaydah's first two months of interrogation—prior to
the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques—than were derived during the two-month
period during and after the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.^^^^
Email from: [REDACTED] (outgoing Chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN): to: [REDACTED]
subject: "Assessment to Date" of AZ; date: 10/06/2002, at 05:36:46 AM.
CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, "Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in
Afghanistan, 1990-2001."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, including monthly intelligence reporting charts.




CIA *s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques and the SERE School
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "After
lengthy discussion, [Dr.
SWIGERT] suggested that we
might use the interrogation
approaches that had been, for
years, safely used at the DOD
survival school —in other words,
the interrogation techniques that
we were training our airmen to
resist. Those techniques have
been used for about 50 years,
with no significant injuries,"
VICE CHAIRMAN BOND:
"And the techniques you are
using are boiled down, is it true,
from the SERE school?"
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "All of
them are techniques that have
been used in the SERE school,
that's right. Senator."
The CIA consistently represented that the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques were the same as the techniques
used in the U.S. Department of Defense SERE school.
However, CIA interrogation records indicate there were
significant differences in how the techniques were used
against CIA detainees. For example, a letter from the
assistant attorney general to the CIA general counsel
highlighted the statement in the Inspector General Special
Review that the use of the waterboard in SERE training
was "so different from subsequent Agency usage as to
make it almost irrelevant."^^^^ Prior to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu
Zubaydah, the chief of Base at the detention site identified
differences between how the SERE techniques were
applied in training, and how they would be applied to Abu
Zubaydah:
"while the techniques described in Headquarters
meetings and below are administered to student
volunteers in the U.S. in a harmless way, with no
measurable impact on the psyche of the volunteer,
we do not believe we can assure the same here for a
man forced through these processes and who will be
made to believe this is the future course of the
remainder of his life... personnel will make every
effort possible to insure [sic] that subject is not
permanently physically or mental harmed but we




list of recommended techniques
then went to the Department of
Justice for their opinion
regarding whether or not the
As described in this summary, the August 1, 2002,
Department of Justice OLC memorandum relied on
inaccurate information provided by the CIA concerning
Abu Zubaydah's position in al-Qa'ida and tlie
interrogation team's assessment of whether Abu Zubaydah
Letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmitli to CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, May 27, 2004. For
more information on the SERE program, see tlie Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of
Detainees in U.S. Custody, December 2008. See also statement of Senator Carl Levin relating to the inquiry,
December 11, 2008: "In SERE school, our troops who are at risk of capture are exposed in a controlled
environment with great protections and caution - to techniques adapted from abusive tactics used against American
soldiers by enemies such as the Communist Chinese during the Korean War. SERE training techniques include
stress positions, forced nudity, use of fear, sleep deprivation and, until recently, the Navy SERE school used the
waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste of what they might be subjected to if
captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be better prepared to resist. The techniques were never
intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody."
2-'^ " [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02)
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techniques were lawful. DOJ
returned a legal opinion that the
13 techniques were lawful, didn't
constitute torture, and hence
could be employed for CIA
interrogations.
VICE CHAIRMAN BOND:
"How far down the line [does al-
Qa'ida] train [its] operatives for
interrogation resistance?"
DIRECTOR HAYDEN; "I'm
getting a nod from the
experts,^-''^ ^ Senator, that it's
rather broadly-based."
VICE CHAIRMAN BOND: "So
even if you captured the al-
Qa'ida facilitator, probably the
army field manual stuff are
things that he's already been
trained on and he knows that he
doesn't have to talk."
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "We
would expect that, yes, Senator."
UNCLASSIFIED
//NOFORN
was withholding information about planned terrorist
attacks.
The OLC memorandum, which stated that it was based on
CIA-provided facts and would not apply if facts were to
change, was also specific to Abu Zubaydah. The CIA
nonetheless used the OLC memorandum as the legal basis
for applying its enhanced interrogation techniques against
other CIA detainees.
Resistance Traininf!
A review of CIA records on this topic identified no
records to indicate that al-Qa'ida had conducted "broadly-
based" interrogation resistance training. The CIA
repeatedly represented that Abu Zubaydah "wrote al
Qaeda's manual on resistance techniques.This
representation is also not supported by CIA records.
When asked about interrogation resistance training, Abu
Zubaydah stated:
"... both Khaldan camp and Faruq [terrorist
training] camp at least periodically included
instruction in how to manage captivity. He
explained that in one instance, Khaldan had an
Egyptian who had collected and studied
information from a variety of sources
(including manuals and people who had been
in 'different armies'). This Egyptian 'talked
to the brothers about being strong' and 'not
talking.' Abu Zubaydah's response to this
2564 August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum addressed 10interrogation techniques. Tlie May 10, 2005, OLC
memorandum addressed 13 techniques.2565 "Qyj. advice is based upon the following facts, which you have provided to us. We also understand that you do
not have any facts in your possession contrary to the facts outlined here, and this opinion is limited to these facts. If
thesefacts were to change, thisadvice would notnecessarily apply." (See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting
GeneralCounsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General,Office of Legal
Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 1).) CIA records indicate that
it was not until July 29, 2003, that the AttorneyGeneral stated that the legal principles of the August 1, 2002,
memorandum could be applied to other CIA detainees. (See June 18, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General
Jacl^^oldsmith Iin^Dkecto^Ten^DTS #2004-2710).) In a subsequent interview with the OIG, however,
I^IICTC Legal, stated that "every detainee interrogated is different in that they are outside
the opinion because the opinion was written for Zubaydah." The context for statement was the
legality of the waterboarding of KSM. See Interview of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003.
^^^^OAierQA attendees at the hearing included John Rizzo, and
former HHjCTC Legal, attended for the ODNl.
Memorandum for John Rizzo, ActingGeneralCounsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Officeof LegalCounsel, August 1, 2002,Interrogation of al QaedaOperative (DTS#2009-1810,
Tab 1).
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was to take him aside—out of the view of the
brothers—and explain to him that it was more
important to have a 'super plan-not expect a
superman.
Abu Zubaydah explained that he informed trainees at the
training camp that '"no brother' should be expected to
hold out for an extended time," and that captured
individuals will provide information in detention. For that
reason, the captured individuals, he explained, should
"expect that the organization will make adjustments to
protect people and plans when someone with knowledge is
captured."^^^^
CIA Interrogators^ U.S. Military Interrogators, and the Army Field Manual
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "All
those involved in the questioning
of detainees have been carefully
chosen and carefully
screenedP^^ The average age of
our officers interrogating
detainees is 43. Once they are
selected, they must complete
more than 250 hours of
specialized training for this
program before they are allowed
to come face-to-face with a
This CIA testimony is incongruent with internal CIA
records and the operational history of the program.
• OnNovember 2002, after the completioi^^he
first formal interrogation training class,
CTC Legal, asked CTC attorney
'[m]ake it known that from now
on, CTC/LGL must vet all personnel who are enrolled
in, observing or teaching - or otherwise associated
with - the class.The chief of CTC, Jose
Rodriguez, objected to this approach, stating: "I do
not think that CTC/LGL should or would want to get
2568 10496 (162014Z FEB 03). On July 25, 2002, aCIA Headquarters cable stated that Abu Zubaydal^^
was the "author of a seminal al-Qa'ida manual on resistance to intenogation techniques." {See DIRECTOR
(251609Z JUL 02)). As a result of an ACLU lawsuit, in April 2010, the CIA released a document stating that Abu
Zubaydah was tlie "author of a seminal al-Qa'ida manual on resistance to interrogation techniques." {See ACLU
release entitled, "CIA Interrogation of AZ Released 04-15-10.") No CIA records could be identified to support this
CIA assessment.2569 IHigil 10496 (162014Z FEB 03)
The CIA's June 2013 Response states tliat "[w]e concede tliat prior to promulgation of DCI guidance on
inteiTogation in January 2003 and the establishment of inten-ogator trainingcourses in November of the same year,
not every CIA employee who debriefed detainees had been tlioroughly screenedor had received formal training.
After that time, however - the period with which DCIA Hayden, who came to the Agency in 2005, was most
familiar - the statement is accurate." CIA records indicate tliat tlie first interrogator training course was established
in November 2002. General Hayden became the CIA Director on May 30, 2006. After this time two CIA detainees
entered CIA custody, one of whom was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Email from: ••••||||m|/CTC/LGL; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], subject: EYES ONLY; date: November 2002, at 03:13:01 PM. As
described above, Gul RahmaiUikel^r^ to death at DETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of
November 2002. email, however, appears to have been drafted before the guards had
found Gul Rahman's body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211|, describing the guards observing Gul Rahman alive in the morning of November 2002. Gul
Rahman's death appeared in cable traffic at least
to provide the impetus for email.
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terrorist. And we require
additional field work under the
direct supervision of an
experienced officer before a new
interrogator can direct an
interrogation."
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The
Army field manual was also
written to guide the conduct of a
much larger, much younger force
that trains primarily to detain
large numbers of enemy
prisoners of war. That's not what
the CIA program is."
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "[The
Army Field Manual has] got to
be done by hundreds and
hundreds of teenagers in
battlefield tactical situations."
SENATOR JOHN WARNER:
"Without the benefit of a tenth of






into the business of vetting participants, observers,
instaictors or others that are involved in this program.
It is simply not your job. Your job is to tell all what
are the acceptable legal standards for conducting
interrogations per the authorities obtained from Justice
and agreed upon by the White House."-^^^ Contrary to
CIA Director Hayden's comments and Statement for
the Record that "[alll those involved in the questioning
of detainees are ciirefully chosen and screened for
demonstrated professional judgment and mamrity,"
CIAreco^suggest that the vetting sought by
mijjjffH did not take place. The Committee
reviewed CIA records related to several CIA officers
and contractors involved in the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted
interrogations. The Committee identified a number of
personnel whose backgrounds includc notable
derogatory information calling into question their
eligibility for employment, their access to classified
information, and their participation in CIA
interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, the
derogatory information was known to the CIA prior to
the assignment of the CIA officers to the Detention
and Interrogation Program. This group of officers
included individuals who, among other issues, had
engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had
workplace anger management issues, and had
reportedly admitted to sexual assault. '^^ '^^
Director Hayden's testimony on the required hours of
training for CIA interrogators is inconsistent with the
early operational history of the program. Records
indicate that CIA officers and contractors who
conducted CIA interrogations in 2002 did not undergo
any interrogation training. The first interrogator
training course, held in November 2002, required
approximately 65 hours of classroom and operational
In addition, Foriner Chief, CTC, testified: "First off, we have
thirteen interrogators and, of that thirteen, eleven are contract employees of ours, and they've all been through the
screening process, they've all been through our vetting process, and they are certainly more than qualified. They are
probably some of the most mature and professional people you will have in this business."
2"' Email from: Jose Rodriguez ^TC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED],
PM.
2574 Pqj. additional detailed information, see Volume III.
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instruction.^^^^ The initial training was designed and
conducted by who had been sanctioned
for using abusive interrogation techniques in the
1980s, and who had never been
trained in, or conducted interrogations. In April 2003,
OFFICER 1] was certified as
an interrogator after only a week of classroom
training.^^^^ In 2003, interrogator certification
required only two weeks of classroom training (a
maximum of 80 hours) and 20 additional hours of
operational training and/or actual interrogations.^^^^
Other Members ofthe Interrogation Team
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "All
interrogation sessions in which
one of these lawful procedures is
authorized for use has to be
observed by nonparticipants to
ensure the procedures are applied
appropriately and safely. Any
observer can call 'knock it ojf' at
any time. They are authorized to
terminate an interrogation
immediately should they believe
anything unauthorized is
occurring,"
SENATOR SNOWE: "So you
also mentioned that there are
non-participants who are
observing the interrogation
process. Who are these non-
participants?"
This testimony is incongruent with CIA records, for
example:
• During the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, CIA
personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN objected to
the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques against Abu Zubaydah, stating that it was
"highly unlikely" Abu Zubaydah possessed the threat
information CIA Headquarters was seeking.^^^^ When
the interrogation team made this assessment, they
stated that the pressures being applied to Abu
Zubaydah approached "the legal limit.CIA
Headquarters directed the interrogation team to
continue to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques and instructed the team to refrain fi'om
using "speculative language as to the legality of given
activities" in CIA cables.-^^^
December 4, 2002 Training Report, High Value Target Intenogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training
Seminar 12-18 Nov 02, (pilotn^ing).
DIRECTOR APR 03)
InteiTogator Selection, Training, Qualification, and Certification Process; approximately January 29-Febmary 4,
2003. ____
2"^ See 10604 (091624Z AUG 02) and 10607 (100335Z AUG 02). In an email, the former
SERE psychologists on contract with the CIA, who largely devised the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques,
wrote that Abu Zubaydah stated he was "ready to talk" the first day after they used the CIA's techniques. Speaking
specifically of the waterboard technique, they wrote, "As for our buddy; he capitulated the first time. We chose to
expose him over and over until we had a high degree of confidencehe wouldn't hold back. He said he was ready to
talk during tiie first exposure." See email from: [REDACTED]; subject: "Re: [SWIGERT and DUNBAR]"; date:
August 21, 2002, at 10:21 PM.2579^|||^gg10607 (100335Z AUG 02)
2580 Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: "[DETENTION SITE GREEN]," with attachment of
an earlier email fiom: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; date: August 12,2002. See also the section on Abu
Zubaydah's intenogation in tliis summary and the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
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could be other interrogators,
medical personnel, chief of base,
debriefers, analysts."
SENATOR SNOWE: "Do they




"Everybody watching has - every
individual has an absolute right
to stop the procedure just by
saying 'stop.'"
SENATOR SNOWE: "Did it
happen? It's never happened?"
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No,
we're not aware. I'm sorry.
John [Rizzo] and [H[|||
imH] point out it's just not
the ability to stop it; it is an
obligation to stop it if they
believe something is happening
that is unauthorized."
Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
3/10; date: March 11, 2003, at 8:10:39 AM.
2S82 ffom: [REDACTED]; to: cc: Jose
Rodriguez; subject^^ye^nly - Legal and Political Quand[]ry; date: March 13, 2003, at 11:28:06 AM.
Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodnguez,|; subject: EYES ONLY - Use ofWater Board; date: March 13,
2003, at 08:28 AM.2584 from: [REDACTED]; to: cc: ^m||||^m|||||||m; subject: Re: State cable; date:
March 13, 2003, at 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had written that'T am going the extra mile to
trytohandledi^in a non confrontational manner." See email from: [REDACTED]; to:
subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 5:17:07 AM.
See, for example, the report of investigation of the Inspector General: "By mid-2002, Headquarters and
[DETENTION SITE BLUE] were at odds regarding [DETENTION SITE BLUE]'s assessment on Al-Nashiri and
how to proceed with his interrogation or debriefing. On several occasions throughout December 2002,
[DETEIsfTION SITE BLUE] reported via cables and secure telephone calls that Al-Nashiri was not actively resisting
and was responding to questions directly. Headquarters disagreed with [DETENTION SITE BLUE]'s assessment
because Headquarters analysts tliought Al-Nashiri was withholding imminent threat information." See Report of
Investigation, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE
BLUE] (2003-7123-IG), 29 October 2003, p. 18 (DTS #2003-4897)
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During the KSM interrogation sessions, the CIA chief
of Base directed that the medical officer at the
detention site not directly contact CIA Headquarters
via the CIA's classified internal email system, to avoid
establishing "grounds for further legal action."
Instead, the chief of Base stated that any information
on KSM's interrogations would be first reviewed by
the chief of Base before being released to CIA
Headquarters."^^^ Prior to KSM's third waterboard
session of March 13, 2003, the on-site medical officer
raised concerns that the session would exceed the
limits of draft OMS guidelines for the waterboard.^^^^
The waterboard session was conducted after an
approval email from a CTC attorney at CIA
Headquarters.The medical officer would later
write that "[t]hings are slowly evolving form [sic]
[medical officers] being viewed as the institutional
conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are
dedicated to maximizing the benefit in a safe manner
and keeping everyone's butt out of trouble.
As was the case with several other CIA detainees,
'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was repeatedly subjected to
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at the
direction of CIA Headquarters, despite opposition
from CIA interrogators.
The CIA Inspector General Special Review states that
CIA "psychologists objected to the use of on-site
I; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET//
SENATOR SNOWE: "Did any
CIA personnel express
reservations about being engaged
in the interrogation or these
techniques that were used?"
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "I'm




psychologists as interrogators and raised conflict of
interest and ethical concerns." According to the
Special Review, this was "based on a concern that the
on-site psychologists who were administering the
[CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques] paiticipated
in the evaluations, assessing the effectiveness and
impact of the [CIA's enhanced inten-ogation
techniques] on the detainees.In January 2003,
CIA Headquarters requked that at least one other
psychologist be present who was not physically
participating in the administration of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. According to |
^miOMS, however, the problem still existed
because "psychologist/interrogators continue to
perform both functions.""^^^
This statement is incongruent with CIA records. For
example, from August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002,
the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced
inten-ogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis.
The non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was disturbing to CIA personnel at
DETENTION SITE GREEN. These CIA personnel
objected to the continued use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, but were
instructed by CIA Headquarters to continue using the
techniques. The intenrogation using the CIA's enhanced
techniques continued more than two weeks after CIA
personnel on site questioned the legality "of escalating or
even maintaining the pressure" on Abu Zubaydah. CIA
records include the following reactions of CIA personnel
expressing "reservations about being engaged in the
interrogations" and the use of the techniques:
• August 5, 2002: "want to caution [medical
officer] that this is almost certainly not a place
he's ever been before in his medical career... It is
visually and psychologically very
uncomfortable.
2586 Special Review, Office of the InspectorGeneral, Counterterrorism Detention and Inteixogation Activities
(September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, p. 35 (DTS #2004-2710).
Special Review, Office of the Inspector General, Countertenorism Detention and Inteixogation Activities
(September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, p. 40 (DTS #2004-2710).
2588 Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
at 05:35 AM.
TOP SECRET//
|, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August5, 2002,
//NOFORN





• August 8, 2002: "Today's first session... had a
profound effect on all staff members present... it
seems the collective opinion that we should not go
much further... everyone seems strong for now
but if the group has to continue... we cannot
guarantee how much longer.
• August 8, 2002: "Several on the team profoundly
affected... some to the point of tears and choking
• August 9, 2002: "two, perhaps three [personnel]
likely to elect transfer" away from the detention
site if the decision is made to continue with the
enhanced interrogation techniques.
• August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu
Zubaydah on video "has produced strong feelings
of futility (and legality) of escalating or even
maintaining the pressure." With respect to
viewing the interrogation tapes, "prepare for
something not seen previously.
The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez—via email—instructed
the CIA interrogation team to not use "speculative
language as to the legality of given activities" in CIA
cable traffic.^^^^ Shortly thereafter, circa December 2002,
the CIA general counsel had a "real concern" about the
lack of details in cables of what was taking place at CIA
detention sites, noting that "cable traffic reporting was
becoming thinner," and that "the agency cannot monitor
the situation if it is not documented in cable traffic.
The CIA's chief of interrogations—who provided training
to CIA interrogators—expressed his view that there was
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], |
August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.
2''^ ° Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], |
August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date: August 9,
2002, at 10:44 PM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002, at
09:45AM.
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, Scott W. Muller,
September 5, 2003.
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procedures and practices that are
seen are to he immediately
reported and immediate
corrective action taken, including
referring to the CIA Office of
Inspector General and to tiie
Department of Justice, as
appropriate."
This testimony is not supported by CIA records, for
example:
• Multiple individuals involved in the interrogation of
CIA detainee 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri failed to report
inappropriate activity. With regard to the unauthorized
use of a handgun and power drill to threaten al-
Nashiri, one CIA interrogator stated he did not report
the incidents because he believed they fell below the
reporting threshold for the CIA's enhanced
inteiTogation techniques, while noting he did not
receive guidance on reporting requirements. The chief
of Base stated he did not report the incidents because
he assumed the interrogator had CIA Headquarters'
approval and because two senior CIA officials had
instructed him to scale back on reporting from the
detention site to CIA Headquarters. The inappropriate
activity was discovered during a chance exchange
between recently arrived CIA Headquarters officials
and security officers.^^^^
• There were significant quantitative and qualitative
differences between the waterboarding of KSM, as
applied, and the description of the technique provided
to the Department of Justice. Neither CIA
inten'ogators nor CIA attorneys reported these
deviations to the inspector general or the Department
of Justice at the time.
• Additionally, CIA records indicate that at least 17
detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced
interrogation techniques for which they were not
approved.^^^^
Detainee Statistics
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of InteiTogations for Countertenorism Puiposes,
7, 2003.
2596 Report of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized Intenogation Techniques at
[DETENTION SITE BLUE] (2003-7123-IG), 29 October 2003, p. 24 (DTS #2003-4897).
See Volume III for details.





you have there is a matrix. On
the lefthand side of the matrix are
the names of the 30 individuals in
the CIA program who have had
any ElTs used against them. Mr.
Chairman and Vice Chairman
and Members, you've heard me
say this before. In the history of
the program, we've had 97
detainees. Thirty of the detainees




Army field manual is designed
for the folks at Guantanamo to
interrogate a rifleman that was in
the employ of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar. That guy never gets
into our program. The ticket into
UNCLASSIFIED
//NOFORN
This testimony is inaccurate. At the time of this
testimony, there had been least 118 CIA detainees. CIA
records indicate at least 38 of the detainees had been
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.^^^*^
for CIA Detention and Interrogation
This testimony is incongruent with CIA detention and
interrogation records. For example, numerous individuals
had been detained and subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, despite doubts and questions
surrounding their knowledge of terrorist threats and the
location of senior al-Qa'ida leadership. They inchide
Asadullah,^^^^ Mustafa al-Hawsawi,^^^^ Abu Hudhaifa,-^®'
See Volume III for details. As discussed in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee
Study, on January 5, 2009, a CIA officer informed Director Hayden that additional CIA detainees beyond the
98 CIA detainees previously briefed to Congress had been identified. A CIA chart indicated there were "13
New Finds," additional individuals who had been detained by the CIA, and that tlie new true number of CIA
detainees was now at least 112. After the briefing with Director Hayden, the CIA officer sent a record of this
interaction via email only to himself, which stated: "I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be
included in RDI numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98 -- pick whatever date i
needed to make that happen but the number is 98." {See email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED];
subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: January 5,2009, at 10:50 PM.) Shortly thereafter, the final draft of
prepared remarks by Director Hayden to President-elect Obama's national security team state: "Tliere have
been 98 detainees in the history of the CIA program."
Interrogators had asked CIA Headquarters for the assessments supporting the decision to subject Asadullah to
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, noting that "it would be of enormous help to the interrogator to know
what concrete fact and what isgoo^inalysi^J^(^ 33963
34098 348In
response, ALEC Station acknowledged that "[t]o be sure, our case that Asadullah should have a good sense of bin
Ladin's location is circumstantial." {See ALEC The following day, intenogators
commentedthat^^ he simply does not know the [locational information on AQ leaders]." See
^••••••343101
2600 Following al-Hawsawi's first interrogation session. Chiefof Interrogations asked CIA
Headquarters for information on what al-Hawsawi actually "knows," saying "he does not appear to the [sic] be a
person that is a financial mastermind. However, we lack facts with which to confront [al-Hawsawi]. What we need
at this point is substantive information vice supposition." See 34757 (101742Z MAR
03).
Although CIA records include no requests or approval cables for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation. He was
released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be. See WASHINGTON DC
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this program is knowledge of
threat to the homeland or the
interests of the United States or
knowledge of location of1 or 2.'
UNCLASSIFIED
//NOFORN
Arsala Khan,2^02 aBU TALHA AL-MAGREBI^^®^ and
ABU BAHAR AL-TURKI,^^^^ Janat Ahmed
Ghailani,^^^^ Sharif al-Masri,^^^^ and Sayyid Ibrahim.-^®^
The CIA represented to the OLC that the CIA would only
use its enhanced interrogation techniques against detainees
who had knowledge of imminent threats or direct
involvement in planning and preparing of terrorist actions.
Not until July 20, 2007, more than three months after this
testimony, did the OLC approve the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques against detainees based
CIA Headquarters initially resisted approving Arsal^harT^ap^ becaus^^Uacl^nn^mation
conHmiin a ''continuinMlu^^ 169986 email from:
to: and
Approval to Capture Ai il l I Inn il il( I hi |iil( diiiilil that Arsala Khan was the individual
sought by the CIA, interrogators subjected him to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques "to make a better
assessment regai ding [his] willingness to start talking, or assess if our subject is, in fact the man we aie looking for."
2603 Authorization touse the CIA's enhanced inten-ogation techniques against ABU TALHAAL-MAGREBIwas^
sought in order to "identify inconsistencies in [ABU BAHAR AL-TURKI's] story." See
2186^HH||^H.
2604 names of these detainees have been replaced with the capitalized pseudonyms AL-MAGREBI and AL-
TURKI. At the time the two detainees were rendered to CIA custody, the CIA was aware that tliey were tiien
working for a foreign partner government. They were subjected to sleep deprivation and dietary manipulation until
the CIA confirmed that the detainees had been trying to contact the CIA for weeks to infonn tlie CIA of what tiiey
believed were pending al-Qa'ida tenorist attacks. After the CIA had detemiined that AL-MAGREBI and AL-
TURKI should not be in CIA custody, the two detainees were held for additional months before
they were released.
Janat Gul's CIA interrogators wrote: "Team does not believe [Gul] is witliholdingimminent threatinforma^
however team will continue to press [Gul] for that during each session." {See 1574 (Hmim|
04).) The interrogation of Janat Gul is described in this summary and detailed in Volume 111.
2606 CIA's assessment of Ghailani's knowledge of terrorist tlireats was speculative. As one CIA official noted,
"[a]lthough Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, liis respected role in al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai
as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some knowledge abou^neoin^ttack planning againsUh^^^
United States homeland, and the operatives involved." See email from: CTC/UBLD
(formerly ALECHHH||^|); to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject:
derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani, Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Faraj; date: August 10, 2004.
As noted above, the credibility of the source implicating Sharif al-Masri, Janat Gul, and Ghailani's connection to
a pre-election plot was questioned by CIA officials prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques against the detainees. The source was later determined to have fabricated tlie information.
2608 pjyg jgyg intenogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Sayyid Ibrahim,
interrogators cabled CIA Headquarters requesting information that would "definitively link [Ibraliim] to nefarious
activity or knowledge by [Ibrahim] of known nefarious activities of al-Qa'ida members, if this is possible." (See
(HUHB 1324 HIBBfEB 04).) Without receiving aresponse, they continued using the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against Ibraliim. CIA Headquarters, which rejected an assessment from two CIA debriefers
that Ibrahim was, "at best... a low-level facilitator," would later indicate that it was "uncertain" he would meet the
auirements for U.S. military^ foreigngoverm^^ detention. (See HEADQUARTERS
;HEADQUARTERS IIII^HIBllllm.) Other detainees, Abd al-Karim and Abu Hazim, were
subjected to tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "in an attempttomorerapidlyass^^ knowledge of
ending attacks, operational planning, and whereabouts of UBL." See 36843
136908




on their suspected knowledge of the locations of UBL or
Ayman al-Zawahiri.Prior to July 20, 2007, in the case
of at least six CIA detainees, the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques was nonetheless
predicated on the assessment that the detainees possessed
"locational information" on senior HVTs, to include UBL
or Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Intelligence Reporting from Overall Detainee Population
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Since
we began this in the summer of
2002, the 97 detainees have
helped us by their testimony
create 8,000 intelligence reports."
SENATOR SNOWE: "Of the
8,000 intelligence reports that
were provided, as you said, by 30
of the detainees
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "By all
97, raa'am."^^^'
CIA representations suggesting that every CIA detainee
provided intelligence reporting are not supported by CIA
records. A detailed reporting chart is provided in Volume
11. CIA reporting records indicate that 34 percent of all
CIA detainees produced no intelligence reports, and nearly
70 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports.
Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA records,
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,
nearly 20 percent produced no intelligence reports, while
40 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports.
2609 Yhe OLC defined a High-Value Detainee as "a detainee who, until time of capture, wehave reason to believe:
(1) is a senior member of al-Qai'da or an al-Qai'da associated terrorist group (Jemaah Islamiyyah, Eqyptian[sic]
IslamicJihad, al-ZarqawiGroup, etc.); (2) has knowledge of imminent tenorist tlueats against the USA, its military
forces, its citizens and organizations, or its allies;or that has/had direct involvement in planningand preparing
terrorist actions against the USAor its allies, or assisting the al-Qai'da leadership in planning and preparing such
terrorist actions; and (3) if released, constitutes a clear and continuing threat to the USA or its allies" (Memorandum
for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy GeneralCounsel,Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C.
Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques Tliat May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda
Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of UnitedStates ObligationsUnder Article 16 of the Convention Against
Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS
#2009-1810, Tab 11)). Memorandumfor John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re:
Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and ConuTion Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS
#2009-1810, Tab 14) ("Tlie CIA informs us that it currently views possession of information regarding the location
of Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri as warranting application of enhanced techniques, if other conditions are
met.")
Ridh^hma^^Iaii^ 11542^^^^^^^^|; ALEC Ghairat
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Similar representations had been made by Director Hayden on September 6, 2006. Senator Bayh: "I was
impressed by your statement about how effective the [CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in
eliciting important information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information about al-Qa'ida. I
think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?|^Directo^layden^|Over^ sir." Senator Bayh: "And yet
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CIA Detainee Reporting and Captures of Terrorists
DIRECTOR HAYDEN;
"Detainee reporting has played a
role in nearly every capture of
key al-Qa'ida members and
associates since 2002."
The CIA consistently represented that the interrogation of
CIA detainees using the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques resulted in critical and otherwise unavailable
intelligence that led to the capture of specific terrorists, to
include, among others: KSM, Majid Khan, Ramzi bin al-
Shibh, lyman Paris, Saleh al-Marri, Ammar al-Baluchi,
Khallad bin Attash, Sajid Badat, and Dhiren Barot.^^*^
These representations were inaccurate.
The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Led to the Capture ofHambali and the
Karachi "Cell"
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "March
2003, KSM gives us information
about an al-Qa'ida operative,
Majid Khan... KSM was aware
that Majid had been recently
captured. KSM, possibly
believing that Khan was talking,
admitted to having tasked Majid
with delivering $50,000 to some
of Hambali's operatives in
December 2002... So now we go
to [Majid] Khan and we tell him,
hey, your uncle just told us about
the money. He acknowledged
that he delivered the money to an
operative named Zubair. He
provided Zubair's physical
description and phone number.
Based on that1 captured
Zubair in June''
The chronology provided in this testimony, which is
consistent with other CIA representations, is inaccurate.
Prior to KSM's capture, in early January 2003, coverage
of a known al-Qa'ida email account uncovered
communications between the account and a former
Baltimore, Maryland, resident, Majid Khan. The
communications indicated that Majid Khan traveled to
Bangkok for terrorist support activities and was in contact
there with a "Zubair."^^^^ By this time, the CIAhad
significant intelligence indicating that a "Zubair" played a
central supporting role in Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), was
affiliated with al-Qa'ida figures like KSM, had expertise
in Southeast Asia, and was
suspected of playing a role in Hambali's October 12,
2002, Balibombings.- '^'^ On March 6, 2003, the day after
Majid Khan was captured (the capture was unrelated to
CIA detainee reporting), and while being questioned by
foreign government interrogators using rapport-building
techniques, Majid Khan described how he traveled to
Bangkok and provided $50,000 USD to Zubair at the
behest of al-Qa'ida.^^^^ Majid Khan's physical description
this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals." Director Hayden: "No, sir, 96, all 96" (Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Briefing by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on the Central Intelligence
Agency Detention, Intenjogatior^nd Rendition Program, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336)).
See, for example, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief,
Counterten'orist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003; Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities; CIA briefing slides entitled, "C/A
Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Hearing of tlie Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337). For additional details, see Volume II.
alec ••• (1701 nZ JAN 03)
See intelligence cluonology in Volume E.
A cable describing the foreign government interrogation of Majid Klian stated, "[a foreign government officer]
talked quietly to [Majid Khan] alone for about ten minutes before tlie interview began and was able to establish an




enters the program. During
debriefing, Zubair reveals he
worked directly for Hambali. He
)rovides information on |
Hambali and a
company
excellent level of rapport." {See 13678 (070724Z MAR 03).) Records indicate that this information was
also disseminated in FBI channels. See ALEC j
See intelligence chronology in Volume 11.
1367^07072^M^03Xdiss^^ as 10865 (171648Z MAR
03), disseminated as 10866 (171832Z MAR 03). Prior to Majid Khan's reporting
in foreign government custody, the CIA was aware from sources outside of the CIA detainee program that KSM had
used couriers to transfer money to Hambali. Even while being questioned about such transfers, however, KSM
made no mention ofMajid Khan. See DIRECTOR >[^(2519387^ 02); ALEC ^m (072345Z MAR 03);
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of Zubair matched previous intelligence reporting already
collected on Zubair.^^'^
When confronted with this information, KSM confirmed
the reporting, but denied knowing Zubair.^^^^
By May 2003, the CIA learned that a source the CIA had
been developing,
mm, received acall from a phone number associated
with Zubair. When the source was contacted by the CIA,
he described a Malaysian man ^2618 I
later, the source alerted the CIA that Zubair would
Acting on this information.
Thai authoritiesT^^^^^^miHB' captured Zubair
on June 8, 2003.
This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. Prior to
entering the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,
while still in foreign government custody, Zubair was
questioned about his efforts to obtain fraudulent
documents, as well as his phone contact with
[Business Q]
Zubair admitted to seeking illegal^^Hdocuments on
behalf of Hambali, as well as usinj
[Business Q] cia
detention records do not state what immediate
investigative steps the CIA or Thai authorities took with
regard to [Business Q], although signals
intelligence had indicated that Zubair had been in frequent
contact with the company.
After being rendered to CIA custody, Zubair was




"Working with [an entity of a
foreign government], we used
that information to capture
another Hambali lieutenant, a
fellow named Lillie — who is also
on your list [of CIA detainees] ~
who provided the location of
Hambali. And that location








interrogation techniques.After days of being
questioned about other matters, Zubair was asked about
his efforts to obtain I^Jjdocuments for Hambali, at
which point he again acknowledged usiry
[Business Q]
"l^^^^Whei^hai authorities
approached "a contact" [Business Q], they
were provided [2624
In anoperation that included surveillance of|
[Business Q], Hambali associate Amer was arrested on
August 11, 2003.^^^^ Amer was immediately cooperative
and assisted in the arrest of Lillie hours later at
approximately 6:00 During his aiTest, Lillie was
found to have a key fob in his possession imprinted with
an address of an apartment building in Ayutthaya,
Thailand. In response to questioning, "within minutes of
capture," Lillie admitted that the address on the key fob
was the address where Hambali was located. Less than
four hours later, Hambali was captured at the address
found on thekey fob.^^^^
According to the chief of the CTC's Southeast Asia
Branch:
"[The CIA] stumbled onto Hambali. We stumbled
onto the [source]... picking up the phone and calling
his case officer to say there's
really stumbled over it. It wasn't police work, it
41017
In response to this
information, "Wow..this is just great... you guys are soooo closing in on Hmabali [sic]
See email fromTI^^^^^^^B^; tojJHH||^^[||^ and others; subject: "wohoo—hilite for EA team
pis....aliases for Hambali"; date: June if2003, at 9:51:30 AM.2624 ^H^Hg(3449
87409 87617
2626 37414 37617
Lillie provide this information immediately and prior to entering CIA custody. See
87617 ••^••1; !••• 87414
|, "Hambali Capture."





"Bringing this story full circle,
'Abdul al-Hadi then identifies a
cell of JI operatives whom
Hambali had sent to Karachi for
another al-Qa'ida operation. We
take this information from Abdul
Hadi to his brother, Hambali.
Hambali then admits that he was
grooming members of the cell for
a U.S. operation, at the guidance
of KSM —remember, this is
where this started — and we're
almost certain these were the
guys trying to implement KSM's
plot to fly hijacked planes into
the tallest buildings on the west
coast of the United States."
UNCLASSIFIED
//NQFQRN
wasn't good targeting, it was we stumbled over it
and it yielded up Hambali/'-^-^
the Karachi ''Cell" (the al-Ghuraba Group)
CIA Director Hayden's reference to "the guys trying to
implement KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the
tallest buildings on the west coast of the United States," is
a reference to the al-Ghuraba student group and KSM's
"Second Wave" plotting detailed in this summary and in
greater detail in Volume 11,-^ '^^
A review of CIA records found that contrary to CIA
representations, Hambali's brother, 'Abdul al-Hadi, aka
Gunawan, who was in foreign government custody, did
not identify a "cell of Jl operatives whom Hambali had
sent to Karachi for another al-Qa'ida operation." He
identified "a group of Malaysian and Indonesian students
in Karachi" who were witting of his affiliation with
Jemaah Islamiyah.-^ '^^ CIA officers on site recalled other
intelligence reporting indicating that KSM planned to use
Malaysians in the "next wave of attacks," connected it to
Gunawan's statements about Malaysian students, and
reported that Gunawan had just identified "a group of 16
individuals, most all of whom are Malaysians.
Records indicate that it was this initial analysis that led the
CIA to consider the group a KSM "cell" for the "next
wave of attacks."
While Hambali was being subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, he was confronted
about KSM's efforts to find pilots, as well as information
on the al-Ghuraba group—which the CIA assessed was a
KSM "cell." Hambali told his CIA interrogators "that
some of the members of [the al-Ghuraba group] were
destined to work for al-Qa'ida if everything had gone
CIA Oral History Program Documenting Hambalicapture, interviewof [REDACTED], interviewedby
[REDACTED], on November 28, 2005.
2629 [REDACTED] 45915 (l4143iZ SEP 03). See also February 27,2004, Memorandum forCIA Inspector General
from James L. Pavitt, CIA Deputy Directorfor Operations, entitled "Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
"CounterteiTorism Detention and Interrogation Program," which contains a Febniary 24, 2004, attachment entitled,
"Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities"; CIA Intelligence Product entitled,
"Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," dated April 18, 2008; KSM
and Hambali reporting from October 2003 in Volumes II and III.
2630 15359
2631 15359
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according to plan," and that "KSM told him to provide as
many pilots as he could.
Months later, on November 30, 2003, after three weeks of
being questioned by a debriefer "almost entirely in Bahasa
Indonesia," Hambali admitted to fabricating information
during the period he was being subjected to the CIA's
enhanced intenogation techniques. According to
Hambali, he fabricated these claims "in an attempt to
reduce the pressure on himself' and "to give an account
that was consistent with what [Hambali] assessed the
questioners wanted to hear."^^^^ A November 30, 2003,
cable noted that CIA personnel "assesse[d] [Hambali]'s
admission of previous fabrication to be credible."
Hambali then consistently described "the al-Ghuraba
organization" as a "development camp for potential future
JI operatives and leadership, vice a JI cell or an
orchestrated attempt by JI to initiate JI operations outside
of Southeast Asia." This description was consistent and
corroborative of other intelligence reporting.
A wide body of inteUigence reporting indicates that,
contrary to CIA representations, the al-Ghuraba group was
not "tasked" with, or witting, of any aspect of the "Second
Wave" plotting.2635
While KSM's reporting varied, KSM stated "he did not
yet view the group as an operational pool from which to
draft operatives."^^^^ An October 27, 2006,CIA cable
stated that "all of the members of the JI al-Ghuraba cell
have beenreleased,"^^^^ while an April 18, 2008, CIA
intelligence report referencing the al-Ghuraba group
See the intelligence chronology in Volume 11, including [REDACTED] 45953 (151241Z SEP 03)
[REDACTED] 1323 (16i749Z SEP 03).
1142 (301055Z NOV 03)
See intelligence chronology in Volume II. Although NSA signals intelligence was not provided for this Study,
an April 2008 CIA intelligence report on the Jemaah Islamiya noted that the al-Ghuraba group "consisted of the sons
of JI leaders, many of whom completed basic militant training in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at Islamic
universities in Karachi," and that this assessment was based on "signals intelligence and other reporting." See CIA
Intelligence Productentitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Countertenorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan,"
dated April 18, 2008.
See intelligence chronology in Volume II.2636 Umilj^ 10223 (221317Z OCT 03); f
WASHINGTON DC ••} (272113Z OCT 06)
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before, with these seven
[enhanced interrogation
techniques] we use the least
coercive measures to create
cooperation at a predictable,
reliable, sustainable level. They
are used to create a state of
cooperation. Once the state of
cooperation is created, we simply
productively debrief the detainee.
On average, we get to that state
of cooperation in a period
measured by about one to two
weeks."
"When we're asking him
questions during that period of
increased stress, when we're
being more rather than less
coercive, we are generally asking
him questionsfor which we know
the answers. Otherwise, how do
we know we have moved him
from a spirit of defiance into a
spirit of cooperation? And only
after we have moved him into
this second stage do we then
begin to ask him things we really
think he knows but we don't."
UNCLASSIFIED
//NOFORN
makes no reference to the group serving as potential
operatives for KSM*s "Second Wave" plotting.-^^^
Interrogation Process
This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. As is
detailed throughout the Committee Study, CIA detainees
were frequently subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques immediately after being rendered
to CIA custodyCIA interrogators asked open-ended
questions of CIA detainees, to which the CIA did not
know the answers, while subjecting detainees to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques. This approach began
with Abu Zubaydah, whose interrogation focused on him
being told to provide "the one thing you don't want me to
know,"-^"^^ andremained a central feature of the program.
Numerous CIA detainees were determined never to have
reached a "state of cooperation." Several detainees, when
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,
transitioned to normal debriefing, and were then subjected
to one or more additional periods of being subjected to the
techniques.-^"^^
2638 Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in
Pakistan," dated April 18,2008.
2639 Numerous detainees were stripped andshackled, nude, in thestanding stress position for sleep deprivation or
subjected to other enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an interrogator. See for example






; and Majid Khan
(271719Z MAY 03).264ogg|gg 10016 (120509Z APR 02); ••• 10594 (061558Z AUG 02)
See detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information.










"Nothing that we get from the
program, however, is used in
isolation. It's a data point that
then has to be rubbed up against
all the other data points we have
available to us."
The CIA regularly disseminated intelligence reports based
on uncorroborated statements from CIA detainees. The
reports, some of which included fabricated or otherwise
inaccurate information, required extensive FBI
investigations.^ '^^ ^ Forexample, the CIA disseminated
inforaiation that KSM had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to
Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts.^^^
In June 2003, KSM stated he fabricated the information
because he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he
made these claims and simply told his inteiTogators what
he thought they wanted to hear."^^"^ OtherKSM
fabrications led the CIA to capture and detain suspected
terrorists who were later found to be innocent.
The Relift,nous Foundation for Cooperation
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "This
proposed program you have in
front of you has been informed
by our experience and it has been
informed by the comments of our
The CIA made a similar representation to the Department
of Justice in the context of Abu Zubaydah.CIA
records do not indicate that CIA detainees described a
religious basis for cooperating in association with the
CIA's enhanced interrogation technique
2642 pqj.example, on May 15 and May 16, 2003, tlie FBI hosted a conferenceon KSM and investigations resulting
from KSM's reporting. The agenda included al-Qa'ida recruitment efforts in the U.S., a topic on which KSM had
provided significant fabricated infoniiatioivfSecMeiT^andumtomjr^DACTED]; for:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
1, [REDACTED], [REDACTEdT^^^^MBJREDACTED], [REDACTED],
REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Bi
, [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], |l I li I II ll| M ' " ' " "I [REDACTED];
date: 8 May 2003.) See also Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
HmmHj^ubject: Thanks from FBI; datejM^ 17, 2003, at
7:25:15 I I I IIIIIIM I ^^^58 (041938Z AUG 03); •• 31148 (171919Z
DEC 05); 11^31147 (171919ZDEC 05), disseminated a^
10942 (221610ZMA^3),disseminatedas10948(222101Z MAR
03), disseminated as
2644 , 2095 (222049Z JUN 03)
The CIA captured and detained two individuals whom KSM had identified as the protectors of his children.
KSM later desciibed his reporting as "all lies." See 34569 (061722Z MAR 03); Hf
1281 (130801ZJUN 04).
The CIA has referred only to Abu Zubaydah in the context of this representation. See Memorandum for John A.
Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations
Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques tiiat May be Used in the Interrogation of
High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees. The OLC document states: "As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to
enhanced techniques, 'brothers who are captured and interrogated are pemiitted by Allah to provide information
when tiiey believe they have 'reached the limit of tlieir ability to withhold it' in the fact of psychological and
physical hardships."
2648 there are no records of CIA detainees making these statements, the Deputy Chief of ALEC Station,
told the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, thaUh |^besUnformati^ on
how to handle the [CIA] detainees came from a walk-in [a source
to volunteer information to the CIAJaftCTthearrestofAbu He told uswewere
TOP^;E€REiV/^||||H|||H||B//NOFORN
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detainees. It's built on the
particular psychological profile
of the people we have and expect
to get ~ al-Qa'ida operatives.
Perceiving themselves true
believers in a religious war,
detainees believe they are
morally bound to resist until
Allah has sent them a burden too
great for them to withstand. At
that point —and that point varies
by detainee —their cooperation
in their own heart and soul
becomes blameless and they
enter into this cooperative
relationship with our debriefers."
DIRECTOR HAYDEN:
"Number one, we use the
enhanced interrogation
techniques at the beginning of
this process, and it varies how
long it takes, but I gave you a
week or two as the normal
window in which we actually
helped this religious zealot to get
over his own personality and put
himself in a spirit of
cooperation."
VICE CHAIRMAN BOND:
"Once you get past that time
period, once you have convinced
them that Allah gives them the
green light, that's when you get
the 8,000 intelligence reports."
UNCLASSIFIED
l/NQFORN
The CIA has referred only to Abu Zubaydah in the context
of this representation. As detailed, Abu Zubaydah
referenced religion in the context of his cooperation prior
to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques. On May 14, 2002, more than two months
before Abu Zubaydah began his August 2002 enhanced
interrogation period, Abu Zubaydah told interrogators that
"if he possessed any more information on future threats,
then he would provide this information to us to help
himself, claiming that 'the sharia' gives him permission to
do so in his current situation.Abu Zubaydah also
made a similar statement to his interrogators
approximately a week later—again, prior to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—stating that he
had "prayed his 'Istikharah' (seeking God's guidance) and
was now willing to tell what he really knew," and "that he
had received guidance from God" to cooperate to "prevent
his captured brothers from having a difficult time."^^^®
Further, Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always
intended to provide information and never believed he
could withhold information from interrogators.In
February 2003, he told a CIA psychologist that he
believed every captured "brother" would talk in detention,
and that these "brothers should be able to expect that the
organization will make adjustments to protect people and
plans when someone with knowledge is captured.
Abu Zubaydah stated he conveyed this perspective to
trainees at a terrorist training camp.^^^^
underestimating Al-Qa'ida. Tlie detainees were happy to be arrested by the U.S. because they got a big show trial.
When they were turned over to [foreign governments], they were treated badly so tliey talked. Allah apparently
allows you to talk if you feel threatened. The [CIA] detainees never counted on being detained by us outside the
U.S. and being subjected to methods they never dreamed of." See Memorandum for the Record;
subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
2649 ||||||||H 10262 (151138Z MAR 02)
2650^^^^ 10262 (151138Z MAR 02)
10496 (162014Z FEB 03)
10496 (162014Z FEB 03)
10496 (162014Z FEB 03)
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con*ect, Senator, when we get the
subject into this zone of
cooperation. I think, as you
know, in two-thirds of the
instances we don't need to use
any of the techniques to get the
individual into the zone of
cooperation."
SENATOR NELSON: "How do
you suspect that al-Qa'ida
operatives are training in order to
counter your techniques?"
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "You
recall the policy on which this is
based, that we're going to give
him a burden that Allah says is
too great for you to bear, so they
can put the burden down."^^"^^
UNCLASSIFIED
//NOFORN
Threats Related to Sodomy, Arrest ofFamilyuitu IV ouuu /\rrKSi uj rurnu
This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation
records.
• As documented in the May 2004 Inspector General
Special Review and other CIA records, interrogators
threatened 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, KSM, and Abu
Zubaydah with harm to their families.^^^"^
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Many
assertions [in the ICRC report]
regarding physical or threatened
abuse are egregious and are
simply not true. On their face,
they aren't even credible.
Thi'eats of acts of sodomy, the
In addition, CIA officerHjjHHI testified at the April 12, 2007, Committee hearing: "I spoke witli
Zubaydah. I was at one of these facilities for several months and I spent around 18 hours a day with Abu Zubaydah.
At the conclusion of my time, as I was leaving the facility, he spoke with me, and he said there is something I need
you to understand - to go back to the question that came earlier about walling and a collar. He looked at the
plywood wall in the cell and said I want to thank you for that. I've had a lot of time to sit and reflect, and I
understand why that's there. That's there so I don't get hurt. In terms of the totality of the experience, his advice
was I may have been the first person, but you need to continue to do this because I need to be able to live with who I
am and I will continue to be the religious believing person I am, but you had to get me to tlie point where I could
have absolution from my god to cooperate and deal with your questions. So he tlianked us for bringing him to that
point, beyond wliich he knew his religious beliefs absolved him from cooperating with us." There are no CIA
records to support this testimony.
According to the Inspector General Special Review, a debriefer threatened al-Nashiri by saying "[w]e could get
your mother in here," and, "[w]e can bring your family in here." In addition, one of KSM's intenogators told the
inspector general that the psychologist/intenogators told KSM tliat, if anything happens in the United States,
"[w]e're going to kill your children." {See Special Review, pp. 42-43; interview of]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 30 April 2003; interview
by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 22 October 2003; 10757
(111505Z MAR 03).) According to a CIA cable, a case officer "used [Abu Zubaydah's] 'family card' to apply more
psychological pressure on [Abu Zubaydah]." The cable stated that the case officer "advised [Abu Zubaydali] that
even if [Abu Zubaydah] didnot care about himself^^[AbuZub^dal^^ care about his family and keep
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aiTest and rape of family
members, the intentional
infection of HIV or any other
diseases have never been and
would never be authorized.
There are no instances in which
such threats or abuses took
place."
Rectal exams were standard operating procedure for
security purposes. A June 2002 cable noted that Abu
Zubaydah was mildly "tense," "likely an anticipatory
reaction given his recent unexpected rectal exam" the
previous day.^^^^
At least five detainees were subjected to rectal
rehydration or rectal feeding. There is at least one
record of Abu Zubaydah receiving "rectal fluid
resuscitation" for "partially refusing liquids.
According to CIA records, Majid Khan was "very
hostile" to rectal feeding and removed the rectal tube
as soon as he was allowed to.^^^^ KSM was subjected
to rectal rehydration without a determination of
medical need, a procedure that KSM interrogator and
chief of interrogations, would later
characterize as illustrative of the interrogator's "total
control over the detainee.""^^^ Marwan al-Jabbur was
subjected to what was originally referred to in a cable
as an "enema," but was later acknowledged to be rectal
rehydration.^^^^ Both al-Nashiri^^^® and Majid Khan
were subjected to rectal feeding.-^ '^
in mind their welfare; the insinuation being [that] something might happen to them." See
(220713Z APR 02)
2655 10507 leadership, including CIA GeneralCounsel Scott Mullerand DDO
James Pavitt, were also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with "excessive force" on two
detainee^DETENTO COBALT. See email from [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; cc: ••
^^H^^^|JREDACTED]; subject; ACTIONS fromdieGCUpdate this Morning, date; mH
12:15 PM; I I I to: [REDACTED]; cc; [REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED]^i^ect: ACTIONS from the GCUpdatethisMorning; date: |||||H|||||| 1:23:31
PM; Email from to: [REDACTED]; cc: ••^^•1, [REDACTED]; subject: Re;
ACTIONS from tlie GC Update this Morning REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: •••, at 10:47:32
AM_^^H^23^|H^^^K_HEADQUARTERS2656 lHIIII^ 100701
26" [REDACTED] 3868 (291534Z DEC 04); [REDACTED] 3868 (291534Z DEC 04). See also
HEADQUARTERS^^B£021 14Z NOV 04).
34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of by [REDACTED] and
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 27 March 2003. Office of
Medical Services (OMS), described the rectal rehydration of KSM as helping to "clear a person's head" and
effective in getting KSM to talk.
See 2563 email from: ||m|||||BHH> to:
I, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: TASKING - Fw:
|; date; March 30, 2007;DTS #2007-1502.
2660 described in the context of the rectal feeding of al-Nashiri, Ensure was infused into al-Nashiri "in a forward-
facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso." See HHH 1203 (231709Z MAY 04).
According toCIA records, Majid Khan^sJUunchtea^ ofhummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins
was "pureed" and rectally infused. See |^H|||||||^^^H|3240(23^9Z SEP 04).





"Punches and kicks are not




Three detainees, Rarazi bin al-Shibh, Khallad bin
Attash and Adnan al-Libi, were threatened with rectal
rehydration.^^^^
Punches and Kicks
This testimony is incongruent with CIA records.
Interviews conducted for two CIA internal reviews related
to Gul Raliman's death provided details on CIA
interrogations at the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT.
In an interview report, CIA contractor DUNBAR
described the "hard" or "rough" takedown used at
DETENTION SITE COBALT. According to the
interview report of DUNBAR, "there were approximately
five CIA officers from the renditions team... they opened
the door of Rahman's cell and rushed in screaming and
yelling for him to *getdown.' They dragged him outside,
cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They
covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a
long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and
punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that
although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as
hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were
forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couplc of
times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the
floor outside of the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a
number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but
nothing that required medical attention. (This may
account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after
his death. Rahman had a number of surface abrasions on
his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and face.)"^^^"^
The use of the "hard" or "rough" takedown, as used on
Gul Rahman, was described by the CIA officer in charge
of the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT as "employed
often in inteiTogations at [DETENTION SITE COBALT]
as 'part of the atmospherics.
See Volume HI tor additional information.
2663 CIA's June 2013 Response states, "DCIA Hayden stated that 'punches' and 'kicks' were not autliorized
techniques and had never been employed and that CIA officers never threatened a detainee or his family." Tlie
CIA's June 2013 Response adds: "Part of that assertion was an error. Tlie DCIA would have been better served if
the Agency had framed a response for him tliat discussed CIA's policy prohibiting such conduct, and how tlie
Agency moved to address unsanctioned behavior which had occuned (including punches and kicks) and implement
clear guidelines."
2664 Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subject: Death
Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.
CIA Inspector General report, "Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG),
April 27, 2005, at 38.




"Detainees have never been
denied tlie means — at a
minimum, they've always had a





This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. CIA
detainees, particularly those subjected to standing sleep
deprivation, were routinely placed in diapers. Waste
buckets were not always available. In the interrogation of
Abu Hazim, a waste bucket was removed from his cell for
punishment. According to a CIA cable, Abu Hazim
"requested a bucket in which he could relieve himself, but
was told all rewards must be earned."^^^^
Medical Personnel and Medical Care
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The
medical section of the ICRC
report concludes that the
association of CIA medical
officers with the interrogation
program is 'contrary to
international standards of
medical ethics.' That is just
wrong. The role of CIA medical
officers in the detainee program
is and always has been and
always will be to ensure the
safety and the well-being of the
detainee. The placement of
medical officers during the
interrogation techniques
represents an extra measure of
caution. Our medical officers do
not recommend the employment
or continuation of any procedures
or techniques."
2666 ^ 137493
ALEC ^Hf082321Z JUL 02). According to the CIA attorney who reviewed the videotapes ofthe
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, "the person he assumed was a medical officer was dressed completely in black from
head to toe, and was indistinguishable from other [interrogation] team members." See June 18, 2003, Interview
Report of [REDACTED], Office of General Counsel Assistant General Counsel.
2668 Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to nudity, dietary manipulation, insult slaps, abdominal slaps, attention grasps,
facial holds, walling, stress positions, and water dousing with 44 degree Fahrenheit water for 18 minutes. He was
shackled in the standing position for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation, and experienced swelling in his lower
legs requiring blood thinner and spiral ace bandages. He was moved to a sitting position, and his sleep deprivation
was extended to 78 hours. After tlie swelUng subsided, he was provided with more blood thinner and was returned
to the standing position. The sleep deprivation was extended to 102 hours. After four hours of sleep, Abu Ja'far al-
Iraqi was subjected to an additional 52 hours of sleep deprivation, after which CIA Headquarters informed
interrogators that eight hours of sleep was the minimum. In addition to the swelling, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi also
experienced^ edemaonhishead due to walling, abrasions on his neck, andblisters onhis ankles from shackles.
1810(^HH DEC 05)^^HPH 18n(^IHdec 05); 1819(HHUdEC 05); •••1848 (^••^C 05); HEADQUARTERS |
DEC 05). See additional information on AbuJa^fo^Mraqiii^olumen^^
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CIA records detail how throughout the program, CIA
medical personnel cleared detainees for the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and played a
central role in deciding whether to continue, adjust, or
alter the use of the techniques against detainees. For
example:
• Prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, CIA
Headquarters, with medical personnel participation,
stated that the "interrogation process takes precedence
over preventative medical procedures.
• Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was provided medication for





allegation in the report that a CIA
medical officer threatened a
detainee, stating that medical
care was conditional on
cooperation is blatantly false.
Health care has always been
administered based upon detainee
needs. It's neither policy nor
practice to link medical care to
any other aspect of the detainee
program."
SENATOR HATCH: "Has there
been any use of any kind of drug






This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. For
example, as CIA interrogators prepared for the August
2002 "enhanced interrogation" phase of Abu Zubaydah's
interrogation, the CIA's DETENTION SITE GREEN
noted, and CIA Headquarters confirmed, that the
interrogation process would take precedence over
preventing Abu Zubaydah's wounds from becoming
infected.2669 DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel also
stated that delaying a medical session for 72 hours after
the start of the new phase of inteiTogation would convey
to Abu Zubaydah that his level of medical care was
contingent upon his cooperation.On August 10, 2002,
the medical officer at DETENTION SITE GREEN stated
that, under the model of medical intervention that the
detention site was following during the most aggressive
inten'ogation phase, Abu Zubaydah's medical status was
likely to deteriorate to an "unacceptable level" over the
next two weeks.^^^^ On August 25, 2002, the Base stated
that the "combination of a lack of hygiene, sub-optimal
nutrition, inadvertent trauma to the wound secondary to
some of the stress techniques utilized at that stage, and the
removal of formal obvious medical care to further isolate
the subject had an overall additive effect on the
deterioration of the wound.
Abu Zubaydah lost his left eye while in CIA custody. In
October 2002, DETENTION SITE GREEN recommended
that the vision in his right eye be tested, noting that "[w]e
have a lot riding upon his ability to see, read and write."
DETENTION SITE GREEN stressed that "this request is
driven by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian
concern for AZ.""^^^^
CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each broke a
foot while trying to escape capture and were placed in
casts; Abd al-Karim's medical evaluation upon entry into
CIA custody included a recommendation that he not be
subjected to "extended standing for a couple of weeks,"
10536 (15I006Z JULY 02); ALEC
10536 (I51006Z JULY 02)
10607 (100335Z AUG 02)
10647 (201331Z AUG 02); I
H(182321ZJUL 02)
10618 (121448Z AUG 02); 10679 (250932Z
//NOFORN
AUG 02)
2673 11026 (070729Z OCX 02)
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which was then extended to three months.A cable
describing the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques to
be used on the two detainees stated that the interrogator
would "forego cramped confinement, stress positions,
walling, and vertical shackling (due to [the detainees']
injury).Abd al-Karim was nonetheless subjected to
two 45-minute sessions of cramped confinement,
repeated walling, and a stress position that involved
placing his "head on [the] wall, bent at waist, shuffled
backwards to a safe, yet uncomfortable position."-^^^ As
part of sleep deprivation, he was also "walked for 15
minutes every half-hour through the night and into the
morning."^^^^ A few days later, a cable stated that, even
given the best prognosis, Abd al-Karim would have
arthritis and limitation of motion for the rest of his life.^^^^
Meanwhile, Abu Hazim was subjected to repeated
walling.2680
Subsequently, and despite the aforementioned
recommendation related to Abd al-Karim and a
recommendation from a regional medical officer that Abu
Hazim avoid any weight-bearing activities for five
weeks,inteiTogators sought and received approval to
use standing sleep deprivation on al-Karim and Abu
Hazim.2682
Abu Hazim underwent 52 hours of standing sleep
deprivation,and Abd al-Karim underwent an
unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation.^^^"^
44147
37121 (221703ZAPR 03);
37508 (021305Z MAY 03);
37152 (231424Z APR 03)
37410 (291828Z APR 03);
03); 37754








36908 36862 (181352Z APR 03).
The interrogatorrequestedapproval to use sleepdeprivation, the facial slap, attention grasp, abdominal slap and
waterdousing. To accommodate Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries, the cable stated that, rather thanbeing
shackled standing during sleep deprivation, the detainees would be "seated, secured to a cell wall, witli intermittent
disruptions ofnormal sleeping patterns." For water dousmg^edetain^^ legs would be "wrapped in
elastic." The request was approved. See DIRECTOR jBHHHHHHl' DIRECTOR HiUfl
37152 (231424Z APR 03)
"37202 (250948Z APR 03)
37509 (021309Z MAY 03)
AY 03); DIRECTOR




in the section [of the ICRC
report] on medical care, the
report omits key contextual facts.
For example, Abu Zubaydah's
statement that he was given only
Ensure and water for two to three
weeks fails to mention the fact
that he was on a liquid diet [was]
quite appropriate because he was
recovering from abdominal
surgery at the time.'"
UNCLASSIFIED
//NOFORN
Interrogators left Asadullah, a detainee with a sprained
ankle, in the standing sleep deprivation position. When
Asadullah was subsequently placed in a stress position on
his knees, he complained of discomfort and asked to sit.
He was told he could not sit unless he answered questions
truthfully
Due to a lack of adequate medical care at CIA detention
sites and the unwillingness of host governments to make
hospital facilities available, CIA detainees had care
delayed for serious medical issues. See, for example, the
detainee reviews for Janat Gul, Hassan Guleed, Mustafa
al-Hawsawi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Firas al-Yemeni in
Volume III.
Dietary Manipulation
This testimony is inaccurate. CIA records detail how Abu
Zubaydah was fed solid food shortly after being
discharged from the hospital in April 2002.^^^^ In August
2002, as part of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, Abu Zubaydah was placed on a liquid diet of
Ensure and water as both an interrogation technique, and
as a means of limiting vomiting during waterboarding.^^^^
In planning for the interrogation of subsequent detainees,
the CIA deteraiined that it would use a "liquid diet."^^^^
At least 30 CIA detainees were fed only a liquid diet of
Ensure and water for interrogation purposes.
Waterboardinf: and Its Effectiveness
SENATOR HATCH: "So this is
not tipping the board and putting
his head underneath the water."
DIRECTOR HAYDEN; "No.
It's slightly inclined, cloth.
This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation
records. As described in the Study, the waterboarding of
KSM involved interrogators using their hands to maintain
a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and
mouth in an effort to make it impossible for KSM to ingest
all the water being pouredon him.^^^^ According to the
2685 Asadullah was also placed in a "small isolationbox" for 30 minutes, without autliorization and without
discussion ofhow the technique would affect his ankle. 340981
2686 May20027mH stated that variety was introduced into Abu Zubaydah's diet; in addition to his daily
intake of two cups of kidney beans, one cup of rice, Ensure, and juice, Abu Zubaydah was given a piece of fried
chicken. Coke, and several cups of hot tea. See
Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
2688 10961 (260650Z SEP 02)
See detainee reviews in Volume III.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
3/15; date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 AM; Interview
TOP SECRET/i
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and [REDACTED]; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09AM.





pouring of water under the rules I
just laid out, Senator."
DIRECTOR HAYDEN:
"[W]aterboarding cannot take
place any more than f ive days out
ofa total of30 days. There
cannot be more than two sessions
per day. A session is described
as being strapped to the board.
No session can last longer than
two hours. In any session, there
can be no more than six pourings
of the water greater than ten
seconds in duration. Under no
circumstances can any detainee
be under the pouring of the water
a total ofmore than twelve
minutes in any 24-hour period,
and one pouring cannot exceed,
one application cannot exceed 40
seconds."
SENATOR NELSON: "On
KSM, was it waterboarding that





"Although it took you a long
time to break him?"
UNCLASSIFIED
//NOFORN
attending medical officer, the technique became a "series
ofnear drownlngs."^^^^
This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation
records. For example, KSM was waterboarded on nine
separate days over a two-week period. On March 13,
2003, KSM was subjected to three waterboard sessions in
one day. Over March 12-13, 2003, he was subjected to
five waterboard sessions in 25 hours. During that same
period, he was subjected to the pouring of water for more
than twelve minutes during a 24-hour period.^^^-
In regard to the description of "pouring," a CIA record
related to Abu Zubaydah states that;
"Each iteration of the watering cycle consisted
of four broad steps: 1) demands for
information interspersed with the application
of the water just short of blocking his airway
2) escalation of the amount of water applied
until it blocked his airway and he started to
have involuntary spasms 3) raising the water-
board to clear subject's airway 4) lowering of
the water-board and return to demands for
information."26»
This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation
records. CIA personnel—including members of KSM's
interrogation team—believed that the waterboard
interrogation technique was ineffective on KSM.-^^"^ The
on-site medical officer told the inspector general that, after
three or four days, it became apparent that the waterboard
was ineffective, and that KSM "hated it but knew he could
manage."^^^^ KSM inten'ogator told the
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. See also interview of|
[REDACTED] an^REDACTTO], Offic^^ielnspecto^eneral, May 15^2003.
from:
10, 2003, at 5:59: 27 PM.
2692 HHH 10300 (131909Z MAR 03);|HH 10801 (131918Z MAR 03); |
03);^HB 10803 (131929Z MAR 03)
CIA record entitled, "Aggressive Interrogation Phase Synopsis," Abu Zubaydah, August 2002.
Similarly, participants in the interrogationof Abu Zubaydah wrote that Abu Zubaydah "probably reached the
point of cooperation even prior to the August institution of 'enhanced' measures -a development missed because of
the narrow focus of the questioning. In any event there was no evidence that the waterboard produced time-
perish^e information wliich otherwise would have been unobtainable." See CIA Summary and Reflections of
IBB^^dicalSemcesonOMSj^icipation in tlie RDI program, at 41.2695 Interview of||||||[||||||||||||[|^ by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May
15,2003.
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DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "He had
nine separate days in which
waterboarding took place. He
also was subject[ed] to sleep
deprivation and I believe his
deprivation was the longest of
any detainee's, at one stretch, and
I think that may be what Senator
Hatch was referring to by that
180 number. That's the number
of hours at one stretch."
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The
most serious injury that I'm
aware of - and I'll ask the
experts to add any color they




inspector general that KSM had "beat the system,"^^^^ and
assessed two months after the discontinuation of the
waterboard that KSM responded to "creature comforts and
sense of importance" and not to "confrontational"
approaches KSM debriefer and Deputy Chief of
ALEC Station told the inspector
general that KSM "figured out a way to deal with [the
If^^^micTC Legal, HI
inspector general that the
waterboard "was of limited use on KSM."^^^^ CIA
records indicate that KSM was subjected to the waterboard
interrogation technique at least 183 times.
Injuries and Deaths
This testimony is incongruent with CIA inten'ogation
records. CIA records indicate that CIA detainees suffered
physical injuries beyond bruising from shackling, as well
as psychological problems:
• During a waterboard session, Abu Zubaydah "became
completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through
his open, full mouth." He remained unresponsive after
the waterboard was rotated upwards and only regained
consciousness iifter receiving a "xyphoid thrust."^^®^
• Multiple CIA detainees subjected to prolonged sleep
deprivation experienced hallucinations, and CIA
interrogation teams did not always discontinue sleep
deprivation after the detainees had experienced
hallucinations.
2696 Interview of |
22,2003.
2697 11715 (201047Z MAY 03). In August 2006, wrote in a Saraetime communication that
KSM and Abu Zubaydah "held back" despite the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but added
"I'm ostracized whenever I suggest those two did not tell us everything." See Sametime Communication,
•••and|^^^^lj5/^/06, 10:28:38 to 10:58:00.2698 Interview ofjj^Hj^^Hlf, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of tlie Inspector General, April 3,
2003. also wrote in a 2005 Sametime communication that "we broke KSM... using the Majid Klian
stuff... and the emails." See Sametime Communication, and [REDACTED], 02/May/05,
14:51:48 to 15:17^39^
Interview of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector
General, August 20, 2003.2700 Ejjiaii from: |H||||^HH> OMS; to: [REDACTED^n^RED^TED], subject: Re: Acceptable lower
ambient temperatures; date: March 7, 2003; email from: OMS; to: [REDACTED] and
[REDACTED]; subject: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004; email from
IBH; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Re:
Discussion with Dan Levin - AZ; date: October 26, 2004.
^•••1299 (•HjA^4); 1308
13121^^VjAN04)[^^^Bi530^HHHI 04)
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SENATOR LEVIN: "Not one
person?"
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No
one. The Committee is aware
that there was an individual who
died in CIA custody prior to the
initiation of this program."
SENATOR LEVIN: "Prior to
the initiation of what?"
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "This
program. In fact, the discipline
of this program is a product of or
UNCLASSIFIED
//NOFORN
Some detainees exhibited significant bruising and
swelling unrelated to shackling. For example, a
medical officer noted that, in addition to the swelling
of his ankles and wrists, Ramzi bin al-Shibh had a
bruise on his brow.^^^^
During the application of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, KSM was described as
"[t]ired and sore," with abrasions on his ankles, shins,
and wrists, as well as on the back of his head.^^®^ He
also suffered from pedaledema-^ '^^ resulting from
extended standing.^^®^
At the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT, CIA
inteiTogators used "rough takedowns," described as
taking a naked detainee outside of his ceU, placing a
hood over his head, and dragging him up and down a
long corridor while slapping and punching him. Gul
Rahman, after his death, was found to have surface
abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and
face.^^®^
This testimony is incongruent with CIA records.
• Gul Rahman died in CIA custody at the CIA's
DETENTION SITE COBALT after being rendered
there on November |, 2002. At the time,
DETENTION SITE COBALT was described as a
place where the CIA could detain suspected terrorists
for the purposes of "intense interrogations" by CIA
officers.DDO James Pavitt told the inspector
general that "there were some who say that
[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is not a CIA facility,
but that is 'buUshit.'"^'^®^
• CIA records reveal that Gul Rahman was subjected to




10916 (210845Z MAR 03)
of the feet.
10909 (201918Z MAR 03)
2706 Memorandum for Deputy Directorof Operations, from January28, 2003, Subject; Death
Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22. See Volume m for additional injuries resulting from CIA interrogations.
ALEC••2708 y\ugust 21, 2003, Interview Report of Jame^avitt^pur^uanM^OO^l^IG), Deputy Director of Operations.
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result of the undisciplined
activity that took place earlier."
DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "[Gul
Rahman] was not part of this
program, but I understand it was
in CIA custody."
SENATOR LEVIN: [Reading a
SSCI staff document, "Summaiy
Notes of the Februaiy 14, 2007
ICRC Report"] "Prolonged
sti'ess standing position, naked,
armed chained above the head [?]
129520
|, to CTC/LGLOfficer
using coercive techniques without authorization.
2710 29909
Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee
UNCLASSIFIED
^/NOFORN
"coercive techniques without authorization."^^^^ At
ALEC Station's request, CIA contractor Hammond
DUNBAR conducted an assessment of Gul Rahman to
determine which CIA enhanced interrogation
techniques should be used on him.^ '^^ While the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were never
authorized, DUNBAR interrogated Rahman, once
employing the "insult slap" enhanced interrogation
technique without CIA Headquarters approval.^^^ ' On
November 2002, Gul Rahman was shackled to the
wall of his cell in a short chain position,^ '^^ which
required himto sit on thebare concrete."^^^ Rahman
was wearing a sweatshirt, but was nude from the waist
down. On November 2002, the guards at
DETENTION SITE COBALT found Gul Rahman's
dead body.^ '^"^ Although a CIA employee tried to
perform CPR, Gul Rahman remained unresponsive
and was declared dead.^^^^ An autopsy report by the
CIA found that the cause of Gul Rahman's death was
"undetermined," but that the clinical impression of the
medical officer who conducted the autopsy was that
the cause of death was hypothermia.'^ ^^^
Stress Positions
This testimony is inaccurate.
There are multiple descriptions of CIA detainees being
forced to stand with their arms shackled above their heads
for extended periods of time at the CIA's DETENTION
SITE COBALT."^In one example, a U.S. militaiy legal
;email dated November |, 2002, from CIA interrogator
with tlie subject line, "Another example of field interrogation
ALEC
(2003-7402-IG), 27 April 2005, p. 23 (DTS #2005-
1957).
In the short chain position, a detainee's hands and feet are shackled together by a short chain.
[REDACTED] 29520
January 27, 2003, Memorandum from [REDACTED], Chief, Counterintelligence Evaluation Branch,
Counterespionage Group Counterintelligence Center, to Deputy Director for Operations, Subject: Death
Investigation - Gul Raliman.
January 27, 2003, Memorandum from [REDACTED], Chief, Counterintelligence Evaluation Branch,
Counterespionage Group Counterintelligence Center, to Deputy Director for Operations, Subject: Death
Investigation - Gul Rahman. The circumstances suiTOunding Gul Rahman's death are described in detail in both
reports prepared by the Counterintelligence Center and a2005 report prepared bythelnspe^r General. See April
27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of aDetainee |^|^^|||| (DTS #2005-1957).
27"^ FINAL AUTOPSY FINDINGS, by [REDACTED], MD, CASE #: OMS A-01-02.
28246 Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of
Interrogations forCounterterrorism PurposeSj^^^^^^B|^ pn^^003^Ii^rview Report, 2003-7123-IG,




above the head. Stress positions
are part of the EITs, and




advisor observed the technique known as "hanging,"
involving handcuffing one or both wrists to an overhead
horizontal bar. The legal advisor noted that one detainee
was apparently left hanging for 22 hours each day for two
consecutive days to "break" his resistance.^^^^
CIA records indicate that multiple detainees were shackled
with their hands above their heads at other CIA detention
sites. For example, see detainee reviews in Volume IK, to
include 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,^^^^ Hassan Ghul,^^^®
and According to CIA cables, Abu Zubaydah
was handcuffed "high on the bars."^^^-
Draft OMS guidelines on interrogations, noted that
detainees could be shackled with their arms above their
heads for "roughly two hours without great concern," and
that the arms could be elevated for between two and four
hours if the detainee was monitored for "excessive
distress.
Legal Reasonsfor Overseas Detention
SENATOR WHITEHOUSE:
"Has there been any
consideration at any point within
the Agency that the purpose in
locating facilities overseas is
either to avoid liability under
American statutes or to avoid the
ability of any court to claim
jurisdiction because they would
not know where these took
place? Is there an element of
Mr. Rizzo's testimony is incongruent with CIA records.
Afte^h^aptu^rf Abu Zubaydah, HHICTCLegal,
prepared a PowerPoint presentation
laying out the "pros" and "cons" of six detention options.
The pros for detention in Country |, where Abu
Zubaydah would be rendered, included "[n]o issues of
possible U.S. [court] jurisdiction." The cons for a CIA
facility in the United States included "[c]an't foreclose
ability of U.S. [courts] considering Habeas Corpus
petition.
Review of Interrogations for CounterteiTorismPurposesJ^^^H|||^ H^pril30^ Memorandum for[REDACTED] fiom [REDACTED] •••••^••^^•^mNovembeiii2002, Subject:
Legal^Anal^sis^f|RED^ Personnel Participating inInterrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in
I(aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").
Memorandum for [REDACTED] from [REDACTED]
Novembeifl(2002, Subiect^ega^nalysi^nREDACTED] Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA
Detention Facility in (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").
Email from: [DETENTION SITEBLUE] COB to: subject: EYES
ONLY - [^^BMH] ONLY - MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003.
2720
2721 34491 (051400ZMAR 03); 10654 (030904Z MAR03);I
(102320Z MAR 03)
2722 10487 (181656Z JUN 02); 10393 (020543Z JUN 02)
2^23 OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE
INTERROGATIONS, "First Draft," March 7, 2003.2724 PowerPoint presentation, Options of Incarceratin^AbuZubaydahjM^h^ 2002.
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providing legal defense to the
participants in these
applications?"




In late 2003 and early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision to accept certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush
prompted a decision by the CIA, in coordination with the
Department of Justice, to transfer five CIA detainees held
at Guantanamo to other CIA detention facilities.-^^^
Email from: Scott W. Muller; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Detainees in
Gitmo; date: January H2004; email from Scott W. Muller; to: [REDACTED]^ubject: DCI Meeting with Rice;
date: JanuaryH|2004; email from: Scott Mulle^o^fame^avittJjjjj^^^HBj; cc: Geo^^en^John
McLaughlin, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], •^•••^•ffREDACTED], subject: CIA
Detainees atGITMO; date: February ^2004.
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